Army World War 2. Military history, weapons, old and military maps

(historiographic notes)

From the annals it is well known that the famous victory on the Kulikovo field was won by the Russians on September 8, 1380, on Saturday, on the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin, after Don, at the "mouth of the Nepryadva". This river, being the right tributary of the Don, then flowed from Lake Volova, located in the central part of the Kulikovo field. The length of the Nepryadva is more than fifty kilometers. The battle was at the head of this river, and not near its confluence with the Don, as it had been mistakenly considered for a long time. I substantiated this circumstance in detail in the reports that were read in Moscow and St. Petersburg at three international and two all-Russian conferences in January, September, October and December 2013 and March 2014. An article was written on the subject of these reports, which published in the scientific journal " Ancient Russia. Questions of Medieval Studies. "

This allows, without retelling once again the entire argumentation of the mentioned work, to consider the relevant issues of historiography related to it. It is important to find out how the wrong determination of the place of the battle was established - contrary to the Russian chronicles. The fact is that N. M. Karamzin primarily relied on the annals in his “History of the Russian State,” from which his most educated contemporaries drew information about the details of the Battle of Kulikovo. Nepryadva was mentioned repeatedly when quoting sources in the notes of N. M. Karamzin and once even in his main text. There, this river was named after the report of the crossing of the Russian army across the Don. But it is not said that the upper or lower course of the Nepryadva is meant [Karamzin, p. 69]. Among the readers of N. M. Karamzin were landowners in the southeast of the Tula province, whose possessions were located at the lower reaches of Nepryadva, near its confluence with the Don. Local peasants more than once brought to their masters the artifacts found during plowing in these places. In addition to pectoral crosses, icons, and other antiques, arrowheads and spears came across. The landowners quite reasonably regarded this as an indicator of the hostilities that took place here.

However, among the military relics nevertheless, berdysh and flintlock pistols prevailed, equally replenishing the home museums of local lovers of antiquity. Their owners did not yet have professional knowledge that would highlight in the finds what really could be attributed to relics of the battle of 1380. On the same Kulikovo field, Russian governors defeated the Crimean Tatars in 1542 [Soloviev, p. 455]. During the Livonian War, Epiphanes County was subjected to Tatar raids more than twenty times. Large fights with the Crimean Tatars took place here in 1571 and 1659 [Fomin, p. 138-133]. In addition, during the Time of Troubles there were clashes with detachments of Poles and Cossacks. But the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 was the most outstanding event local history, which is described in detail in the annals. Therefore, the local landowners considered the area of \u200b\u200bfinds of ancient weapons on their lands to be the scene of the great battle of 1380, interpreting in a suitable sense chronicles, from which it followed that the battle took place near the "mouth of the Nepryadva". Although the concept of "river mouth" had several meanings in the Russian language, only the place where Nepryadva flowed into the Don seemed appropriate. The owners of these lands wanted to consider themselves the heirs of the Field of Russian Glory. Since they were the main interpreters of the annals of the "mouth of the Nepryadva", their opinion was fixed. This was facilitated by the evolution of the Russian language, where the corresponding meaning of the word "mouth" itself over time became dominant. Academician Izmail Ivanovich Sreznevsky during his life did not manage to publish the dictionary of the Old Russian language compiled by him. Only at the beginning of the last century in its last volume could the necessary explanation be read: "Ust - the mouth of the river ... the source of the river: to the mouth - at the source". Specifically, the source of the Neva from Lake Ladoga was meant and a reference was made to the monument of the XIV century - the Synodal List of the Novgorod First Annals.

But the word "mouth" when designating the source of a river from a lake in medieval texts was recorded not only for the Neva, but also for much longer rivers. Such, for example, the mouth of the Sheksna or the mouth of the Sukhona. The tale of the Ust-Shekhonsky Monastery reported the transfer of the “Belaozer city” to a new place “up the Bel Yeser from the Shekhonskast Ustia ten fields” 3. The legend of Paisiy Yaroslavov about the Stone Monastery narrated about the “great Sukhon River, it flows from the Kuben Yezer to the Freezing Sea-Okian with its mouth from the beginning of the world” 4 (Sukhona is a tributary of the Northern Dvina).

Subsequently, the compilers of the dictionaries recorded the traditional outdated meaning of the “mouth” - ‘source of the river’. It is enough to recall the famous dictionary of Vladimir Ivanovich Dahl: "the mouth of the river, the source." Or indicate a recent dictionary of popular geographical terms: "The mouth ... In the old sources used in the meanings" source of the river from the lake "..." narrow exit from the reservoir "." But for more than a hundred years, in almost any textbook of Russian history, one can see a hypothetical map of the battle on the Kulikovo field near the confluence of Nepryadva in the Don. Variations of such a scheme were published both in the writings of military historians and in the works of popularizers of the 19th and 20th centuries. [Afremov] 7. This began with the Tula landowner, in his youth - the Decembrist and writer, and in his old age - Privy Councilor and Senator, Stepan Dmitrievich Nechaev (1792-1860). From 1817 to 1823 he served as the director of schools in the Tula province and acquired from the local peasants curious antiquities found in the land during plowing. As a landowner, S. D. Nechaev was the hereditary owner of land near the lower reaches of the Nepryadva River, in particular, the village of Kulikovka (Shakhovsky identity), which was one of many settlements of the same name located on the Kulikovo field.

For more than five years he has appeared in the most widely read literary and historical journals in Moscow with a number of articles in which the thought was consistently carried out, which received the final wording in the article of 1825, placed in the Moscow Telegraph by Nikolai Polevoy. It has already been explicitly stated there that “in the very focus of the battlefield” was “a village ... belonging to the author of this article” [Nechaev, 1825, p. 379]. The Nechaevskoe village of Kulikovka was located near Nepryadva, south of the alleged battle site depicted in his diagram. A similar name, as I have already mentioned, had other settlements of the Kulikovo field (there are ten in total). One of them was located at an even less significant distance from a marked increase in local relief four kilometers south of Nepryadva. Nechaev considered it the "Red Hill" on which, according to legend, Mamaia’s headquarters was located on the very day of the Battle of Kulikovo. However, neither annalistic nor other written indications of this exist. But until now there is the village of Red Hill, located on a more significant hill, with which, indeed, a wide overview of the central part of the Kulikov field opened.

This Red Hill is quite far from the territories belonging to the mentioned Tula landowners. He is at the headwaters of Nepryadva, just two kilometers from the left bank of the famous river. As the prominent Tula local historian and archaeologist Nikolai Ivanovich Troitsky (1851-1920) reported at one time, Red Hill was not in the possession of the landowners. It is located "near the headwaters of Nepryadva on the land of state-owned peasants of the village of Nikitsky." According to the information of N. I. Troitsky, “with this hill,“ the traditions of local residents about Kudeyar, Mamai, etc. ”are connected [Trinity, p. 82]. As you know, not here, but forty kilometers east — on the land of the Nechayev’s neighbors on the estate, the Olsufievs — a memorial column was erected in honor of the Kulikov victory. They erected it precisely there out of respect for the urgent request of the large Tula landowner Dmitry Stepanovich Nechaev, who had passed away by that time (1742-1820). This is quite clearly indicated by the text addressed to the Governor-General of Ryazan, Tula, Oryol, Voronezh and Tambov provinces A.D. Balashov and the appeal dated 9 July 1820 from the then Tula civil governor Count V.F. Vasiliev.

He wrote that he had received “from Mr. landowner Nechaev, a venerable old man, who, according to all historical beliefs, should be reputed by the real owner of the very place where there was a battle and the center thereof, a notice in the original presented that he would regard as a most lucky event in his life if this precious monument for every Russian, according to historical traditions, will be erected in the dachas of his estate, preserving preferably before others the likely name of the battle itself, namely in the village of Kulikovo, in Epifansky district, between the rivers Don and Nepryadva ”[Karpova, p. 254]. Shortly before the already mentioned son of this venerable old man, a member of the Union of Welfare and one of the Masonic lodges of Moscow, Stepan Dmitrievich Nechaev in his journal Vestnik Evropy, founded by N. M. Karamzin, published his letter saying: “The current governor Count Vladimir Fedorovich Vasiliev was the first to propose the idea of \u200b\u200bconstructing a decent monument to Dimitry Donskoy at the very site of the famous victory over Mamai on the glorious Kulikovo field, which lies beyond the Don and Nepryadva rivers ... This patriotic desire was brought to the attention of the governor-general A. D. Balashev sovereign emperor and received the highest approval ...

The famous artist I.P. Martos is now working on a project of this precious monument for all Russians ”[Nechaev, 1820, p. 149]. In the next 1821, the same son of the venerable old man published in his own journal “Vestnik Evropy” his concrete assumptions as to the exact place of the Battle of Kulikovo9. Later that year, he reproduced on the pages of the same magazine drawings of eight antique objects found, according to him, on the Kulikovo field. In fact, only one of them is the arrowhead of the fourteenth century. - indeed, it could be connected with the Battle of Kulikovo [Nechaev, 1821b, p. 348-351]. But S. D. Nechaev already then organizes the collection of donations for the erection of the monument. And in 1823 he published in this journal descriptions and images of "ancient weapons" found "in the Kulikovo Field" and located in the collection of antiquities of collector V. A. Levshin - although these were just a gun and a berdysh, which, of course, had no relationship to the events of 1380 [Nechaev, 1823, p. 307-312]. After the Decembrists were exposed, S. D. Nechaev, who was not directly involved in the investigation, was briefly outside the Tula province, and since 1828, under the patronage of Prince P.S. Meshchersky, he has served in the Synod10. The baton of the main guardians and sponsors of the “Kulikov Field” memorialization “with time passes from the Nechaevs to their close neighbors on the estates in the lower reaches of the Nepryadva - Olsufiev.

The fact is that Alexander and Vasily Dmitrievich Olsufyevs received estates on the Kulikovo field in 1843, after the death of their aunt, childless princess E. A. Dolgoruka. In 1850, on the so-called “Red Hill”, three kilometers from the village of Kulikovka (Shakhovskoy identity), located on the Nechaevs estate, and one kilometer from another village Kulikovka (Veal identity), located on the Olsufievs estate, a memorial column was inaugurated in commemoration of the victory of Grand Duke Dmitry Donskoy over Mamai. This monument, the construction of which, due to the cause of the Decembrists and other reasons was repeatedly postponed, was finally erected, but not according to the project of I.P. Martos, but according to the then approved project of the architect A.P. Bryullov, approved by Emperor Nicholas I.

A few years later, in connection with the coronation of Emperor Alexander II, the eldest of the owners of the land provided by them for the construction of this monument, Vasily Dmitrievich Olsufiev (1796-1858), was awarded the title of count11. In 1880, official celebrations organized by the Tula provincial authorities on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the great battle were held at the memorial column. Finally, in 1913, the care of the Counts Olsufyevs on the site of their land, which was once specially designed for this purpose by the deceased shortly before Count Alexander Vasilievich (1843-1907), in the immediate vicinity of the memorial column, a temple was built, which was built with the approval of Emperor Nicholas II designed by the famous architect A.V. Shchusev. The son of the just mentioned Earl Yuri Alexandrovich Olsufiev (1878-1938) participated in the laying ceremony. The temple was dedicated to the inspirer of the Kulikov victory, St. Sergius of Radonezh.

The construction of the temple was slowed down due to the outbreak of war with Germany, and its consecration took place only in 1918 (but as a result of the outbreak of revolution, the decoration of the temple remained incomplete then) [Ashurkov; Gritsenko, Naumov; Naumov, Naumov]. Thus, the positive result of the persistent cares of lovers of Russian history (but amateurs!), Landowners of the southeast of the Tula province, the Nechaevs and the Olsufievs were memorials erected in their possessions for the famous victory of Russian weapons in 1380.The victory was won off the coast of Nepryadva. But this happened to the west of the territory, which later belonged to the Nechaev and Olsufiev. In the 80s of the XX century. archaeological reconnaissance unfolded on it, the place of which was determined by the erroneous localization of the battle, which had by then already become familiar, precisely at the confluence of Nepryadva in the Don. Localization, based on a long established first in society, and then among scientists, coming from the landowners Nechaev and Olsufiev, a tendentious interpretation of the information of N. M. Karamzin. As I already mentioned, N. M. Karamzin wrote that the famous battle of 1380, according to the chronicles used by him, took place near Nepryadva - but without indicating its lower reaches. Despite the long-term efforts of the Tula archaeologists, they still could not find the burial places of the participants of the Kulikovo battle (or even any mass graves at the lower reaches of the Nepryadva River). It was not possible to detect any significant remains of weapons of that time. Historians should be more qualified to turn to the annalistic news of the famous battle near the "mouth of the Nepryadva", taking into account the necessary Russian language.

Accordingly, archaeologists who for all recent decades have unsuccessfully searched for traces of the tombs mentioned by the annals of the tens of thousands of Russian soldiers who died in 1380 on the Kulikovo Field, it is advisable to move the main field intelligence area 40 or 50 kilometers westward. The flight of the remnants of the defeated Mamaia army hardly occurred only in a southerly direction. Part of the Horde probably rushed west and joined the forces of Jagiel. The other part fled in the direction from which the army of Mamaia arrived at Kulikovo Field, that is, back to the east, along the shortest route to the crossing over the Don. Having overcome Nepryadva, the fugitives fired from bows on its right bank, but were probably overtaken by the Russians off the banks of the Smolka - not far from the confluence of this river in the Don. The traces of the pursuit of fleeing enemies and the military clashes that took place here are those finds of fragments of weapons of the XIV century. - mainly arrowheads and spears, which in the 19th century nourished the “museological” enthusiasm of the local landowners. The data of the Russian chronicles are important not only for the correct determination of the place of the battle that took place on the Kulikovo field in 1380, but also for its correct dating.

The two-volume work of A. V. Zhuravel, published four years ago by the Moscow publishing house Russian Panorama, is formally devoted to the Battle of Kulikovo and related events [Zhuravel] 12. At times, this connection is vanishingly small, but the author’s abundant reasoning has covered a wide range of topics and includes many valuable observations and details worthy of attention. However, written in a somewhat cheeky, sometimes arrogantly self-confident, subjective work of A. V. Zhuravel contain a number of controversial, dubious or unprovable conclusions. Basically, this author nevertheless follows the "traditional" interpretation of the battle of 1380 (including, of course, the erroneous interpretation of the words "the mouth of the Nepryadva"). But the striking dissonance is the assertion often repeated by A. V. Zhuravel that the Battle of Kulikovo was not in 1380, but in 1379. He categorically advised his readers to “say goodbye” to the usual dating of the Battle of Kulikovo “and get used to the new - by September 8 1379 " (p.168). This sensational thesis, the propaganda of which is dedicated to a special chapter, is undoubtedly the most remarkable “achievement” of his two-volume book in comparison with the works of all who seriously wrote about this battle before A. V. Zhuravel.

His work itself was professionally prepared: it included about 1250 bibliographic notes, is equipped with a qualified list of sources and literature, two indexes. Among the special works on the battle on the Kulikovo field, he is noticeably distinguished by its volume and circulation (contains about 750 pages, published in two thousand copies). This publication is actively advertised on the Internet. Therefore, it is inexpedient to silence in the scientific press the insistent demand of A. V. Zhuravel to revise one of the most important dates in the history of Russia. I must say that just in this case, the assertive subjectivity of this author is especially impressive, because it is based, first of all, on neglect of the direct evidence of our annals. As you know, all the surviving annalistic monuments unequivocally date the battle on Kulikovo Field on Saturday September 8, 1380. A.V. Zhuravel does not have indications of real sources that the battle took place in 1379. He enthusiastically uses only his own conclusions deduced from his erroneous interpretation of some collateral circumstances.

Moreover, this is not about the battle at Kulikovo Field itself, but only about what could happen earlier or later than this epoch-making historical event. Chronicles reported on what happened after the Battle of Kulikovo: “Then Mamai won’t save herself ... and took away her remaining strength, even in the hope of driving the packs into Russia.” But he learned that Tokhtamysh was coming at him. They met "on Kalka". Mamai was defeated, fled to Kafu, where he was killed. Tokhtamysh "having taken the horde of Mamaev ... And so let your ambassadors go to Prince Dmitry ... povdaa ... somehow reign ... Princes of Russia ... for this winter and spring ... letting go of the Horde ... Kilichiev with many gifts" 13. According to A.V. Zhuravel, “in the traditional version” (that is, assuming that the battle on the Kulikovo field took place in 1380) “it turns out a lot of inconsistencies. 1) Tokhtamysh went on a campaign against Mamaia in the spring of 1380, and for some reason then he hesitated until the fall, and the Russians didn’t know anything about it ... 2) Momai gathered the Genoese militia in 1379, but for some reason didn’t use them and kept him in his “yurt” for a year ... 3) Momai could not have known about the appearance Tokhtamysh on the left bank of the Volga, however, as if nothing had happened, roamed the whole summer near Russian lands, that is, left the Tatar uluses proper under attack. 4) Tokhtamysh, who had been lounging for some reason all summer, begins active actions only in the middle of autumn, giving his enemy the opportunity to gather new troops ... 5) After this, events develop extremely rapidly - to meet the deadlines of November 28, when the Genoese recognized Tokhtamysh as their “emperor” ”” [Crane, c. 151]. In fact, just “in the traditional version” there are no inconsistencies. But they inevitably arise if you try to date the battle of 1379. Tokhtamysh, who prepared in the spring of 1380 to fight against Mamaia, naturally decided to wait for the outcome of the war between him and the army of Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow. For Russians, Mamai, and not Tokhtamysh, was the actual opponent then.

The detachment (and not the militia) of the Genoese employed by Mamai was intended for use by them against the Russians. Mamai’s own uluses in Crimea could not be “under the blow” of Tokhtamysh, who was then on the left bank of the Volga. Summer of 1380 Tokhtamysh did not “idle”, but expected the result of the war of Mamai with the Grand Duke of Moscow. Momai, after his defeat at Kulikovo Field, could not quickly prepare a new army for a new war, but only gathered his "residual" strength - for a raid by "exile". It is not surprising that the Genoese of Crimea, learning about the defeat of Mamai in the Kulikovo field, no longer began to help him and recognized his opponent Tokhtamysh as their "emperor". A. V. Zhuravel in vain believes that Mamai, defeated by the Russians as if in the autumn of 1379, that same autumn and winter of the next year “was preparing new troops for a second campaign” [Zhuravel, p. 152].

There is no indication of this in the sources. In fact, Tokhtamysh, taking advantage of the defeat of Mamaia in early September 1380 at Kulikovo Field, did not defeat Mamaia’s “new troops”, but his “residual” force, hastily assembled to attack Russia by “exile” in late autumn or winter of the same 1380 A. V. Zhuravel operates not only with theses derived from his own conjectures and his own chronological errors, but also with conclusions based on the results of his careless use of sources. For example, he refers to the work of M. G. Safargaliev, from which it seems to be concluded that Tokhtamysh defeated Mamaia "in the spring of 1380." [Crane, p. 150].

In fact, M. G. Safargaliev wrote, “what can explain the flight of Mamai after the Battle of Kulikovo precisely to the Crimea, and not to the Volga. While in Crimea after the Battle of Kulikovo, Mamai gathered the remains of his army "to go" expel "to Russian land, but when he learned that Tokhtamysh was coming against him, Mamai went to Tokhtamysh and was defeated on Kalka [Safargaliev, p. 402-403]. It is clear that we are talking here about the autumn or winter of 1380. However, according to A. V. Zhuravel, “the data of numismatics” indicate that Tokhtamysh defeated Mamai “in the spring of 1380”, because “coins of Tokhtamysh minted in 781 were found hijra in Azak (Azov) and in the Crimea ”[Zhuravel, p.150].

In fact, the only coin that can be implied here has a date not of 781, but of 881 [Fedorov-Davydov, p. 196]. As A.V. Zhuravel emphasizes, “chronicles report that Tokhtamysh began his campaign in Moscow for the 3rd summer of his reign. This means that almost three years passed between the battle on the Don (September) and the ruin of Moscow (August), and not two, as is now customary in historiography ”[Zhuravel, p. 152]. But the reign of Tokhtamysh did not begin with the Battle of Kulikovo. A. Zhuravel himself, in two pages, previously stated that Tokhtamysh "first sat on the throne in 1378, and established himself only in the spring of 1379." [Crane, p. 150].

Having forgotten this own statement, A.V. Zhuravel in vain wants to reproach the historians who quite correctly dated the Kulikov victory in September 1380, and the ruin of Moscow by the Tokhtamysh army - two years later - in August 1382. Having turned his back on the impossible, as it turned out, universal for him Coverage of many diverse facts and an abundance of diverse sources in a wide geographical and chronological range, A. V. Zhuravel is failing in the central link of the design he invented. Attentive readers do not need to "get used" to the false date of the battle at Kulikovo Field - a date contrasted with annalistic information. But it would be worth getting used to the correct understanding of the annalistic localization of the great battle of 1380.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article discusses aspects of the participation of the state of Poland in World War II, from the attack by the German armed forces on the country on September 1, 1939 and ending with the participation in the joint assault of Berlin in May 1945 with the Soviet troops.

Poland's participation in World War II

Poland's participation in World War II includes:

• participation in the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the division of its territories between Poland and Germany on September 21, 1938 (date of the actual start of World War II)
• battles of regular units of the Polish army against Germany September 1 - October 6, 1939;
• underground and partisan struggle in the occupied territory of Poland (1939-1945).
• military operations of Polish military units in Western Europe, North Africa and Southern Europe - together with the Anglo-American forces (1939-1945);
• military operations of Polish military units in Eastern Europe - together with the Soviet army (1943-1945);
• participation of Polish citizens in the Soviet partisan movement (1941-1944).

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September - October 1939

Plans and forces of the parties

Geographically and militarily, Germany had all the prerequisites for a quick victory over Poland [ ]. German lands - East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia surrounded most of Poland from the north and west. The German occupation of Czechoslovakia expanded the areas of strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Third Reich, allowing the use of the territory of Slovakia.

1. The numbered list item (von Rundstedt) consisted of the 8th, 10th and 14th armies. It was supposed to advance from Silesia in a general direction to Warsaw (10th Army - 2 Panzer, 8 Infantry, 3 Light Divisions, Colonel General von Reichenau). The 14th Army (2 Panzer, 6 Infantry, 1 Light, 1 Mountain Division, Colonel General List) - in the direction of Krakow, it was supposed to support the armed forces of Slovakia. The 8th Army (4 infantry divisions, 1 regiment of SS troops, Colonel-General Blaskowitz) was aimed at Lodz.

On September 6, the Polish high command ordered the armies Pomorie, Poznan, Lodz and Prussia to retreat to positions on the Vistula. On the same day, President Ignatius Moscitsky and the Polish government left the capital of the country, and the General Staff moved to Brest.

September 8, German tanks approached Warsaw. On the same day, Marshal Rydz-Smigly ordered all Polish troops to retreat to the east, if possible, to establish a defense near the border with Romania. Marshal hoped that in this forest region, in the conditions of the coming autumn, the rapid advance of the motorized units of the Germans would slow down. In addition, the marshal hoped that arms supplies from the Western allies would go through Romania.

On September 10, the headquarters of the Polish command was moved to Vladimir-Volynsky. On the same day, the Polish armies Poznan and Pomerania, under the command of General Kutrzeba, launched a counterattack from the border of the Bzura River. At first it was successful, but already on September 12 the Germans again went on the offensive and inflicted heavy losses on the Poles. The troops of Kutrzeba tried to retreat to Warsaw, but were surrounded by Germans.

On September 12, German troops reached Lviv. September 14 began fighting in the Brest Fortress (the Germans took the fortress on September 17).

On the night of September 17, the remnants of the Poznan army tried to break through the positions of the Germans, but only a few managed to reach Warsaw and Modlin.

At dawn on September 17, Soviet troops crossed the eastern border of Poland. Marshal Rydz-Smigly ordered the Polish troops located on the border with the USSR (17 infantry battalions and 6 cavalry squadrons) to withdraw to the border with Romania, without entering into battles with the Red Army, except in cases of attack on its part. Contrary to this order, the defense of Grodno lasted until September 22, Lviv until September 23.

On September 18, the president, government, and commander in chief of the armed forces left Poland. However, the fighting continued.

On September 29, fighting in Modlin stopped. On October 2, the resistance of the Poles on the Hel Peninsula ceased.

According to current estimates, during the fighting in September 1939 polish army lost 66 thousand troops killed, 133,700 wounded and about 400 thousand prisoners. The losses of the German army amounted to about 14 thousand killed and missing, 319 tanks and armored vehicles, 195 guns and mortars, 11 584 cars and motorcycles.

However, Poland did not capitulate, its government and part of the armed forces continued their service in exile.

Polish armed forces in emigration

Polish units in France and Norway (1939-1940)

Polish military units in France began to form after the signing of the Franco-Polish Protocol on September 21, 1939.

Commander of the Polish forces in France was General Wladyslaw Sikorski. At the end of 1939, the Polish 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions were formed.

In February 1940, a separate mountain rifle brigade was formed (commander - General Zygmunt Bohush-Shyshko), which was included in the Anglo-French expeditionary forces, scheduled to be sent to Finland for the war against the USSR. However, peace was concluded between Finland and the USSR on March 12, 1940, and in early May 1940 the brigade was sent as part of an expeditionary Anglo-French corps to Norway for the war against the Germans.

In Norway, the Polish brigade successfully stormed the German-occupied villages of Ankenes and Nyborg, the Germans were pushed to the Swedish border. After the start of the German offensive in France, by June 1940, Allied forces left Norway.

The Polish 1st Infantry Division based in France (renamed the 1st Grenadier Division on May 3, 1940), under the command of General Bronislaw Duh, was sent to the front in Lorraine. On June 16, the Polish division was almost surrounded by Germans and received the order of the French command to retreat. On June 19, General Sikorsky ordered the division to retreat to the south of France or, if possible, to Switzerland. However, this order was difficult to execute, and therefore only 2 thousand Poles managed to reach the south of France, about a thousand left for Switzerland. The exact losses of the division are unknown, but at least a thousand Poles were killed and at least 3 thousand were wounded.

In Lorraine, the Polish 2nd Infantry Division (renamed the 2nd Infantry Division) under the command of General Prugar-Ketling also fought. On June 15 and 16, this division covered the withdrawal of the French 45th corps to the Swiss border. The Poles moved to Switzerland on June 20 and were interned there until the end of World War II.

In addition to the infantry, the Polish Armed Forces in France had the 10th Armored Cavalry Brigade under the command of General Stanislav Maciek. She was in Champagne and from June 13 covered the withdrawal of two French divisions. Then, on orders, the brigade retreated, but was surrounded on June 17. Having managed to break through the German lines, the brigade was evacuated to Britain.

In addition, several Polish anti-tank companies attached to the French infantry divisions participated in the fighting in France.

The Polish 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions in June 1940 were in the process of formation and did not take part in the battles. In total, at the end of June 1940, the Polish armed forces in France totaled about 85 thousand.

When the defeat of France became apparent, the commander of the Polish forces decided to evacuate them to Britain. June 18, 1940, General Sikorsky flew to England. At a meeting in London, he assured British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that the Polish troops were not going to surrender to the Germans and wanted to fight until they were completely victorious. Churchill ordered the organization of the evacuation of Polish troops to Scotland.

As a result, 17 thousand Polish soldiers and officers managed to evacuate to Britain.

Polish units in Syria, Egypt and Libya

In April 1940, a Polish Carpathian rifle brigade was formed in Syria under the command of Colonel Stanislav Kopansky (from Polish soldiers and officers who fled through Romania, which was subsequently replenished at the expense of former Wehrmacht soldiers of Polish nationality - deserters and prisoners of war).

After the French troops were surrendered in Syria to the Germans, the French command ordered the Poles to surrender to Germany, but Colonel Kopansky did not obey this order and took the Polish brigade to British Palestine.

In October 1940, the brigade was relocated to Egypt.

In October 1941, the Polish Carpathian brigade was landed in the German-besieged Libyan town of Tobruk to help the 9th Australian Infantry Division defending there. In December 1941, the Allied forces attacked the German and Italian forces, on December 10 the siege of Tobruk was stopped. On December 14-17, 1941, the Polish brigade participated in the battle in the Ghazali region (in Libya). Of the 5 thousand soldiers, the Poles lost more than 600 killed and wounded.

Polish parts in Britain

In August 1940, British Prime Minister Churchill signed a Polish-British military agreement allowing Polish troops to be deployed in Britain. The Polish armed forces in Britain received the same status as the troops of the countries of the British Commonwealth, and received the right to form new Polish units.

By the end of August 1940, the Polish ground forces in Britain consisted of 5 rifle brigades (3 of them were staffed almost exclusively by command personnel, due to a lack of privates).

On September 28, 1940, the Polish commander-in-chief, General Sikorski, ordered the formation of the 1st Polish corps.

In October 1941, the 4th Infantry Brigade was reorganized into the 1st Separate Parachute Brigade (under the command of Colonel Sosnowski). In February 1942, the formation of the Polish 1st Panzer Division (under the command of General Maciek) began.

After the death of General Sikorsky in 1943, General Sosnowski became the commander of the Polish forces.

Polish units in Yugoslavia

Some Polish military participated in battles against Germany and its allies on the territory of Yugoslavia: with the support of the Polish community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 5th Polish battalion of the 14th Central Bosnian brigade was formed in the partisan People’s Liberation Army of Yugoslavia.

Polish units in the USSR (1941-1942)

On June 22, 1941, at the initiative of Lieutenant Colonel Sigmund Berling, thirteen officers of the Polish army (including Colonel and 4 lieutenant colonels) sent a collective letter to the USSR government asking them to give them the opportunity to take part in the war with Germany.

On August 6, 1941, General Vladislav Anders (released on August 4, 1941) was appointed commander of the Polish army in the USSR.

On December 4, 1941, the Declaration of the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Republic of Poland on friendship and mutual assistance was signed, according to which the government of V. Sikorsky reaffirmed the obligation "to wage war against the German brigands hand in hand with the Soviet troops." In addition, an agreement was reached on increasing the total number of the Polish army in the USSR from 30 thousand to 96 thousand people. .

Since the beginning of 1942, the question of the timing of sending Polish divisions to the front has come to the fore. In February 1942, the government of the USSR turned to the Polish side with a request to send the 5th Infantry Division to the front, the training of which had been completed by that time. V. Anders rejected the possibility of entering into battle one separate division, the decision he made was supported by V. Sikorsky.

In March 1942, the government of the USSR reported that due to the complication of the food situation in the USSR, the number of food rations for Polish military units in the USSR that did not take part in the hostilities would be reduced to 44 thousand.

At the end of March 1942, the first stage of the evacuation of Anders' army to Iran was carried out - 31,488 soldiers of the Polish army and 12,400 civilians left the USSR.

On September 1, 1942, the evacuation of Anders' army was completed. In total, 75,491 military personnel and 37,756 civilians left the USSR during two evacuations.

Polish parts in the Middle East and Italy

The Polish units of the Anders army withdrawn from the USSR were stationed in northern Iraq, and in July 1943 they were transferred to Palestine.

On July 22, 1943, the Polish units were converted into the 2nd Polish Corps as part of the British Army.

On December 7, 1943, the British command decided to send the 2nd Polish Corps to Italy.

On March 24, 1944, the 2nd Polish Corps received an order from the British command to break through German positions in the Monte Cassino area, storm the monastery and occupy the town of Piedimonte and thereby clear the way to Rome.

In April 1944, the 2nd Polish Corps numbered 46 thousand troops and consisted of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division (commander - General Duh), the 5th Armored Infantry Division (General Sulik), and the 2nd Tank Brigade (General Rakovsky) and 2nd artillery group.

In August 1942, the destroyer Shlenzak supported artillery fire on a British landing in Dieppe.

Submarines "Falcon" and "Dzik" acted in the Mediterranean Sea and received the nickname "Scary Twins."

Polish warships took part in ensuring the allied landing operations in 1940 in Narvik, in 1942 in North Africa, in 1943 on Sicily and in Italy. They were also part of the protection of the Arctic convoys of the Allies, who delivered weapons, food and other military materials to the USSR under the Lend-Lease program.

In total, Polish military sailors sank several enemy warships (German and Italian), including 2 German submarines, about 40 transport ships and shot down about 20 aircraft.

Of the approximately 4,000 Polish sailors, about 400 died. Most of the survivors after the end of World War II remained in the West.

Polish aviation in the West

After the September campaign of 1939, many Polish military pilots tried to move to France. During the defense of France, Polish pilots shot down about 50 German planes, 13 Poles died.

Then the Polish pilots crossed to Britain, 2 Polish squadrons were formed here as part of the British Air Force (302nd and 303rd, but the Poles also served in other British squadrons). The battle for Britain (July-October 1940) involved 145 Polish fighter pilots who shot down 201 enemy aircraft.

After August 1, rebel forces were isolated in several separate centers of resistance (Old City, center, Mokotov, Zholibozh). By September 30, the Germans suppressed resistance in all major outbreaks. On October 2, 1944, General T. Bur-Komorowski, commander of the AK forces in Warsaw, signed the surrender. The rebels lost 15.2 thousand killed and 5-6 thousand wounded, another 15 thousand were taken prisoner. Warsaw residents were deported from the city: part was sent to concentration camps, part - to labor camps. German archival evidence suggests that military units 1 T-V tank and 2 Hetzer self-propelled guns were irretrievably lost, police units and collaborative military units lost several tanks irretrievably. Almost all damaged tanks and self-propelled guns were evacuated and repaired (some tanks and self-propelled guns were repaired several times). According to the Polish side, 290 tanks, self-propelled guns and armored cars were destroyed. German archival data indicate that all formations of the Third Reich lost about 3,000 dead and died from wounds and about 12,000 wounded. The losses of the von Dem Bach group, including only Third Reich citizens and Cossacks, amounted to 9044 people, including 1570 killed. The calculation of the total losses of the Third Reich in the fighting in Warsaw since 1947 is based on the outright falsification of German losses to the level of 17,000 killed and 9,000 wounded . This and similar “information” is widely found in the media, in history textbooks, in contemporary works, by a number of historians and publicists, in the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising.

The Germans brutally crushed the uprising, destroying the city and its inhabitants by 70%.

In total, AK partisan units operating since 1943 took part in more than 170 military clashes with the Germans, destroying more than 1,000 Germans. AK was also actively engaged in intelligence activities (including in the interests of Western allies). AK activists engaged in sabotage and sabotage, they organized the crash of 732 trains, destroyed about 4.3 thousand cars, blew up 40 railway bridges, carried out about 25 thousand sabotage actions at military factories and released prisoners from 16 prisons. Among the achievements should be called:

• collection of data on the location of gasoline production factories (Operation Synthesis);
• collecting data on the development of the V-1 and V-2 missile shells and their testing at the Peenemuende training ground;
• the murder of a number of senior functionaries of the German occupation administration (in particular, they killed the SS brigadeführer Franz Kucher).

In addition, in the period from June 28, 1944 to May 30, 1945, AK members killed 594 and wounded 218 Soviet troops. In total, about 1,000 Soviet troops were killed by AK members.

Units of the Guard of Ludova in 1942-1943 conducted more than 1,400 operations (including 237 battles), they destroyed 71 German officers, 1,355 gendarmes and police officers, 328 German agents; as a result of sabotage on the railways, they derailed 116 freight and 11 passenger trains, destroyed 9 long sections of railways and stopped traffic for 3137 hours; destroyed and incapacitated 132 cars and 23 locomobiles; 13 bridges, 36 railway stations, 19 post offices, 292 volost departments, 11 factories and industrial enterprises, 4 fuel depots with fuel and oil products, 9 livestock branding points, as well as a number of other facilities were destroyed and burned.

During 1944, units of the Ludova Army conducted 904 combat operations (including 120 major battles); destroyed 79 highway and railway bridges and 55 railway stations, organized the crash of 322 trains; destroyed over 19 thousand Nazis, 24 tanks, 191 cars, 3 aircraft, 465 steam locomotives and 4,000 wagons.

Polish army in the USSR (1943-1945)

In May 1943, on the initiative of the Union of Polish Patriots, and with the support of the Soviet government on the territory, the formation of new Polish military units began: first the 1st Polish Infantry Division named after T. Kosciuszko, and later - and other Polish military units and units. Colonel Zygmunt Burling (former chief of the Anders Army military camp in Krasnovodsk) was appointed commander of the first Polish division, and Alexander Zavadsky, political instructor. In June 1943, the formation of the division was completed, on July 15, 1943, the soldiers of the division took the oath of office

On July 20, 1944, artillery of the 1st Army of the Polish Army supported with fire parts of the 69th Army during the crossing of the Western Bug. On the same day, the first Polish soldiers set foot on Polish soil. Over the next three days, the main forces of the 1st Polish Army crossed to the western shore of the Bug. In late July - early August 1944, the 1st Polish Army was at the junction of the 8th Guards Army and 69th Army, it participated in battles with units of the 4th German Panzer Army, the attack on Helm and Lublin, the liberation of Demblin and Pulaw ( Pulawski bridgehead).

“With respect and gratitude, I recall our Polish friends who bravely fought shoulder to shoulder with Soviet soldiers. Even before crossing the Vistula, they had given us great help ... I already mentioned Polish anti-aircraft gunners who arrived on the Vistula at the most difficult time for us. The Polish anti-aircraft division was commanded by Colonel Prokopovich, and Major Sokolovsky was the chief of staff. This division selflessly covered up the passage of our units across the Vistula. Under the fire of machine guns, under the explosions of bombs, Polish anti-aircraft gunners engaged in heavy battles with enemy artillery.
During the crossing of the Vistula and during the battles to expand the Magnushevsky bridgehead, the first Polish field engineer brigade, commanded by Colonel Lubansky, and Lieutenant Colonel Zelginsky served as his deputy for political affairs, worked perfectly. This brigade under the fire of artillery and enemy aircraft in two days built a bridge over the Vistula with a length of 900 meters. And although it lasted only two hours, a lot of valuable cargo was passed through it.
The Polish tank brigade under the command of General Mezhitsan approached the river when there was a fierce battle on the bridgehead. For several days and nights under continuous bombing, the brigade’s tanks ferried to the west bank of the river. Polish tankmen showed exceptional courage. No matter how frantic the bombing, they remained on the ferry. But the steam broke. The tankers went in search of crossing facilities. Soon they reported that there was a serviceable barge near Demblin, on which 8-10 tanks could be immediately put. At night, the barge was delivered to the Pshevuz - Tarnovsky district, and the crossing of tanks continued.
The crossing tanks were concentrated near Magnushev. The brigade commander immediately organized a strong defense here. The very first attempt by the fascist troops to break through to the Vistula in this direction failed. All attacks were repelled with heavy losses for the enemy.
Exceptional heroism was shown by Polish tankers on the Lenkavitsa, Trzeben section. In the midst of the battle, General Mezhitsan took a place in the ranks on the tank ...
The battle did not stop all day. The entire battlefield was littered with burning German tanks. At an expensive price, the enemy managed to break into our defense, but he could not achieve more. The tankers of the heavy tank regiment, Lt. Col. Ogloblin, and the artillerymen of Colonel Kobrin came to the aid of Polish tankers. Together, fighting friends knocked out the enemy at night. On the battlefield there were many corpses of enemy soldiers and up to 40 tanks and armored vehicles.
For this battle, more than a hundred tank crewmen immediately received Soviet orders and medals on the battlefield. Among the recipients I remembered the crew of tank No. 212: coroner commander Pavlitsky, driver Yakovlenko, Corporal Levik, privates Zabnitsky and Svyantek. The brave five went on reconnaissance several times in their combat vehicle, crushed the firing positions of two batteries with caterpillars, knocked out three German tanks ...
No less bravely fought for the Magnushevsky bridgehead on its right flank of the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division of the Polish Army. The division was commanded by Colonel Stanislav Galitsky. I had a chance to meet him several times at the bridgehead. A brave and thoughtful commander. They had a difficult task. They defended the Zalessky, Zagshev section, which for some reason was especially chosen by fascist aviation. The Junkers dived endlessly into the battle formations of the regiments. In just one morning, more than 400 sorties were recorded here. After a massive air strike, German tanks and infantry went on the offensive. In this battle, many Polish comrades died. But the division did not flinch and repelled all attacks. "

The 1st Polish tank brigade participated in the defense of the Studzian bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula south of Warsaw. In a three-day defensive battle on the Magnushev-Rychevul-Studzyanka line, Polish soldiers destroyed about 1,500 enemy troops, 2 Tiger tanks, 1 Panther tank, 12 T-IV tanks, one T-III tank, 8 self-propelled guns, 9 armored personnel carriers, 11 75 mm guns and 16 anti-tank rifles.

On July 28, 1944, units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army took up combat positions on the eastern bank of the Vistula and received orders from Marshal Rokossovsky to force the river. On the night of August 1, the 2nd Polish division tried to do this. As a result, one company crossed the Vistula, another company was able to reach one of the islands in the middle of the river. All units trying to force the Vistula suffered heavy losses.

In the afternoon of August 1, the 1st and 2nd Polish infantry divisions tried to cross the Vistula. As a result, the 2nd Regiment of the 1st Division was almost completely destroyed. On August 2, the army did not try to advance, since all 9 attempts to force the Vistula were unsuccessful. On August 3, attempts by the 2nd Division to cross were stopped by German artillery.

On September 10, 1944, Soviet and Polish troops went on the offensive in the Warsaw area and September 14 captured Prague - a suburb of Warsaw on the eastern bank of the Vistula. Immediately after the end of the fighting in the Prague area (a suburb of Warsaw), units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army attempted to cross to the western bank of the Vistula in order to help the rebels.

On the night of September 15-16, 1944, in the Saska Kempa area, the crossing of units of the 3rd Infantry Division of the Polish Army began. Despite the fierce opposition of the enemy, the landing operation continued until September 19, 1944 and was discontinued due to heavy losses. On September 23, 1944, the previously transferred units of the Polish Army, as well as a group of rebels who joined them, were evacuated to the eastern bank of the Vistula. During the operation, the total losses of the Polish Army amounted to 3,764 soldiers and officers, including 1987 people. killed on the western bank of the Vistula (1921 troops of the 3rd Infantry Division of the Polish Army and 366 troops of the 2nd Division of the Polish Army), the casualties were 289 soldiers.

On January 12, 1945, a new Soviet offensive began, in which the 1st Polish Army participated. Warsaw was liberated on January 16-17, 1945, which the Germans turned into ruins.

At the end of January 1945, the 1st Polish Army (93 thousand people) was stationed in Pomerania. In February, she went on the offensive.

In February-March 1945, the First Polish Army fought fierce battles for the city of Kohlberg for ten days, to which Hitler's command assigned the status of a fortress. On March 18, 1945, units of the 1st Army of the Polish Army established control over the city. In the battles for Kohlberg, German troops lost 5,000 troops killed and 6,992 prisoners.

In January 1945, the formation of the 2nd Army of the Polish Army was completed. She was transferred to the Neisse River, which she crossed on April 17. The next day, German troops under the command of Field Marshal Schörner, marching to defend Berlin, were partially abandoned, partially surrounded by units of the 2nd Polish Army.

On April 20, German troops left their positions on the west bank of the Oder and began to retreat west.

The contribution of Polish soldiers to the victory was highly appreciated: more than 5 thousand military personnel and 23 formations and units of the Polish Army were awarded Soviet orders, 13 times the Polish Army was noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR (moreover, during the Great Patriotic War it was published 373 grateful orders, and another 5 orders were issued for the war with Japan). The best soldiers of the Polish Army took part in the Victory Parade on Red Square on June 24, 1945.

In May-June 1945, the Polish Army numbered about 400,000 people. It was the largest regular military force that fought along with Soviet troops. The Polish Army (1st, 2nd Army and Reserve of the High Command) had 2 army directorates, 1 tank corps; 14 infantry, 1 artillery and 3 anti-aircraft artillery divisions; 10 artillery, 1 mortar, 1 motorized rifle, 5 engineer-sapper, 1 cavalry and 2 separate tank brigades, 4 aviation divisions, as well as a number of special, auxiliary and rear units and several military schools. In service there were 4 thousand guns and mortars, 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, 600 aircraft and 8 thousand machine guns.

In total, during the war, the USSR transferred 302,994 rifles and carbines, 106,531 machine guns, 18,799 light and machine guns, 6,768 anti-tank guns, 4,806 mortars, 3,898 guns, about 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, 1,200 aircraft, 1,800 vehicles to the Polish Army. and a significant amount of other equipment and military property, and also provided the Polish Army with uniforms, food, ammunition, fuel and medicine.

Polish citizens took an active part in the Soviet partisan movement in the occupied territory of the USSR.

The BSSR was attended by 2,500 Poles, of which 703 were awarded Soviet government awards.

2000 Soviet Poles took part in the Soviet partisan movement on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Of the 9187 established by name Soviet partisans and underground members operating in the territory of the Lithuanian SSR (the identity of some of the victims in the initial period of the war remained undetermined), 3.5% were ethnic Poles.

In addition, the Poles took part in the Soviet partisan movement on the territory of other republics of the USSR:

In total, 5 thousand Poles took part in the Soviet partisan movement in the occupied territory of the USSR. For participation in the anti-fascist struggle in the underground and partisan detachments on the territory of the USSR, 993 Polish citizens were awarded Soviet government awards.

Sabotage in Germany

In December 1942, Polish sabotage group Zagra-Lin of 18 people, which was subordinate to the London government, began to operate on German territory. In February 1943, they staged an explosion at the Friedrichstrasse station, later an explosion at the Berlin city railway line, and in April 1943, an explosion at the central railway station in Berlin. The bombings had a significant public outcry, in addition, as a result of the bombings, rail infrastructure was damaged and several Germans were killed and wounded. At the beginning of June 1943, the group was identified by the Gestapo and subsequently liquidated. german special services and the police.

Notes

1. Meltiukhov M.I. Soviet-Polish war. Military-political confrontation 1918-1939 - M .: Veche, 2001 .-- S. 232.
2. Gzheljak Ch., Stanchik H. The Polish campaign of 1939. The beginning of the 2nd World War. - Warsaw, publishing house "Rhythm", 2005. - S. 5, 385.
3. Bronislaw Bednage. The participation of Polish regular military units in World War II // World War II. Materials of a scientific conference dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany (April 14-16, 1965). Book 2. - M.: “Science”, 1966. - S. 221-236.
4. « Już podczas kampanii wrześniowej w 1939 r. oraz francuskiej w 1940 r. zdarzały się dezercje Polaków z armii niemieckiej (obywateli III Rzeszy) i przechodzenie ich do polskich oddziałów, jednakże były to przypadki pojedyncze. Pierwsze meldunki o masowym zgłaszaniu się polskich ochotników z Wehrmachtu napłynęły do \u200b\u200bpolskiego dowództwa pod koniec 1941 r. z Afryki Północnej.»
   W Polskich Siłach Zbrojnych
5. Documents and materials on the history of Soviet-Polish relations. volume 7 (1939-1943) / redkoll., otv. ed. I.A. Khrenov. - M., "Science", 1973. - S. 197-198.
6. History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes) / redkoll., Ch. ed. A.A. Grechko. Volume 4. - M., Military Publishing, 1975 .-- P. 172.
7. The Polish labor movement during the war and Hitler's occupation (September 1939 - January 1945) / M. Malinovsky, E. Pavlovich, V. Poteransky, A. Pshegonsky, M. Vilyush. M., Politizdat, 1968. p. 111
8. History of the Second World War 1939-1945 (in 12 volumes) / redkoll., Ch. ed. A.A. Grechko. Volume 4. M., Military Publishing, 1975. p. 177
9. The Polish labor movement during the war and Nazi occupation (September 1939 - January 1945) / M. Malinowski, E. Pavlovich, V. Poteransky, A. Pshegonsky, M. Vilyush. - M., Politizdat, 1968 .-- S. 154.
10. The Polish labor movement during the war and Nazi occupation (September 1939 - January 1945) / M. Malinowski, E. Pavlovich, V. Poteransky, A. Pshegonsky, M. Vilyush. M., Politizdat, 1968. pp. 155-156
11. V.I. Klokov. The struggle of the peoples of the Slavic countries against the fascist enslavers. - Kiev: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 1961. - P. 24.
12. Jan Ciechanowski. Powstanie Warszawskie. Warszawa, 2009.
    Tomasz Łubieński. Ani tryumf ani zgon. Warszawa, 2004.
    Antoni Przygoński. Powstanie Warszawskie w sierpniu 1944. Warszawa, 1988.
    Jerzy Kirchmayer. Powstanie Warszawskie. Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Książka i Wiedza, 1959.p. 474
13. E. Druchinsky. Warsaw Uprising // Another War. 1939-1945. under the general. ed. Y. Afanasyev. - M .: RGGU, 1996 .-- S. 345.
14. Boris Sokolov Stop order. Why the ashes of Warsaw are beating in our hearts. Archived October 24, 2014. Political Journal
15. Irina Pakhomova Warsaw tragedy - trial of the winners (inaccessible link) The First Crimean weekly
16. Winston Churchill World War II Suffering of Warsaw M. Military Publishing, 1991 Prince 1

More than once in speeches at the highest level, the number of losses of both military personnel and the civilian population of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War was reported. Having recently celebrated the 62nd Victory Day, we again turn to our losses in this war.
In addition to Germany and Italy (both on June 22), Romania declared war on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Romania (June 22), Finland (June 26) and Hungary (June 27). They were joined by Slovakia and Croatia. Japan and Spain, formally maintaining neutrality, worked closely with Germany. The allies of Germany were also the governments of Bulgaria and Vichy France.

Who fought against us?
In addition to these countries, units equipped with citizens of Spain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, the Czech Republic, Yugoslavia, Albania, Luxembourg, Sweden and Poland participated in the war against the USSR.
After the attack on the USSR, under the influence of German propaganda, the "European Volunteer Movement" arose, which set its goal crusade Europe against Bolshevism. Militarily, his role was small, but the "volunteers" played an important role to replenish the reserves of the combat troops of the SS. Of these, 26 SS volunteer divisions were formed. But only a small number of people actually signed up voluntarily. Until the end of the war, there were almost 500 thousand foreigners in the Wehrmacht, mainly Volksdeutsche (Germans living outside Germany).
The White Guard Cossack corps of Steifon, the 15th Cossack corps of von Panwitz and the Kalmyk units (according to some reports, two corps) participated in the war against the USSR. In total, the Germans attracted 1.8 million citizens of the countries they occupied in the Wehrmacht. Of these, 59 divisions and 23 brigades were formed.

Description of the losses of the USSR
The most serious consequences of the Second World War for the Soviet Union were the general loss of life - the military and the civilian population. According to the results of studies conducted by the State Statistics Committee of the USSR and the Center for the Study of Population Problems at Moscow State University, the total direct human losses of the country during the years of World War II are estimated at 26.6 million people. The figure is huge. Our country has never faced such victims. In the First World War, we lost 2.3 million people, in the civil war with its deadly epidemics, 8 million people were killed, died from wounds and diseases. That is, for 8 years of the war (1914-1922) 10.3 million people were lost, which is 2.5 times less than in World War II.

Military casualties
During World War II, only Germany and the USSR attracted about 56 million people into their armed forces. And all the warring countries together - about 120 million people. The USSR attracted 34,476,700 people. Germany - 21 107 000 people.
Of these 34,476,700 people, 29,574,900 people were called up for war in the Red Army, and as of June 22, 1941 the staff was 4,826,900 people. This figure is equal to the total population of Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Finland combined. 490 thousand women were called up, of which 80 thousand were officers. Of this number, according to the statistical materials of the General Staff, reports and reports of military medical institutions, during the war years the total irretrievable losses of the Soviet Armed Forces together with the border and internal troops amounted to 11,444,100 people.
This number did not include 500 thousand liable for military service, called up for mobilization in the early days of the war and missing - before arriving at military units. Together with them, the irretrievable losses of the Red Army, Navy, border and internal troops amounted to 11 944 100 people. In World War I, these losses amounted to 4,467,800 people.
Each regiment presented reports of personnel losses 6 times a month: on the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, 30th or 31st day of each month. On the same dates, he also presented a personal list of irreparable losses of the regiment’s regiment to the headquarters of the division. The division submitted reports of losses to the military division of the division also 6 times a month — to the army, and personal lists of irretrievable losses of the military division — 3 times a month.

What is an irreparable loss?
According to the order of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense No. 023 of February 4, 1944, these are those who died in battle, disappeared at the front, died from wounds on the battlefield and in medical institutions, died from diseases received at the front, or died at the front from others reasons and captured by the enemy.
These irreparable losses were reported. These were losses for the regiment and the division irretrievable, these people were lost for them - rarely did any of the survivors fall into their unit again. But this does not mean that all these people died. Some of them were captured, remained in the occupied territory, some to the partisans, and some returned to the regiment, but no clarification was made. Of this figure of irretrievable losses, a large percentage of people were subsequently alive.
So, irretrievable losses are losses on payroll personnel. 11 444 100 people - this is an operational account in hot pursuit, after the battle. Only by reports of losses of military personnel and by reports of combat personnel (if there was no report of military losses of military personnel) it is possible to determine the irretrievable losses of units in the army as a whole.
As for those captured, the commanders reported on them only when it was clear that the person was captured. In the remaining cases, everyone was considered missing. During the war, according to reports, only 36,194 people were captured.
Have there always been reports from compounds and individual parts? What if there were none? No matter how difficult the situation was, reports were presented, with the exception of cases when a part fell into the environment or was defeated, i.e. when there was nobody to report. Such moments were especially in 1941 and in the summer of 1942. In September-November 1941, 63 divisions were surrounded and could not provide reports. And their number according to the latest report was 433,999 people.
In total, during the war, 115 divisions - infantry, cavalry, tank, and 13 brigades - were surrounded, and their number according to the latest reports was 900 thousand people. These numbers refer to the unaccounted for losses of the war.
These unaccounted for losses of the war amounted to 1,162,600 people over its entire period. Thus, 11,444,100 people include these people.

Demographic losses
In determining the demographic losses of the personnel of the army and navy, the number 11 444 100 people was reduced by the number of people who were alive after the war. These are 1 836 000 servicemen who returned from captivity and 939 700 people, recruited a second time in the liberated territory - those who were previously missing. Of these, 318,770 people who were captured and released by the Germans from the camps, and 620,930 people who were missing. So excluded from the number of irretrievable losses 2,775,700 people.
The total demographic irretrievable losses of the USSR Armed Forces amounted to 8,668,400 military personnel and 500,000 draftees who went missing at the beginning of the war.

Dead in captivity
The indictment of the Nuremberg trials indicated that from the USSR, the German occupation authorities had enslaved 4,978,000 civilians. This figure is set by the Office of the Commissioner of the SNK of the USSR for Repatriation. In a report signed on October 20, 1945 by the head of this department, Golikov, addressed to the deputy people's commissar of internal affairs Chernyshev, it was stated: “According to incomplete data, only 6 979 470 were captured and taken away by the enemy, of which 4 978 735 civilians and 2 000 735 prisoners of war (only identified and recorded in May 1945). "
These data were further refined, but insignificantly and everywhere there were reservations "for incomplete data."
Christian Streit, a German military historian, in his work They Are Not Comrades, cites the figure of 5,700 thousand Soviet prisoners of war who were in military camps. Of these, about 3,300 thousand were killed. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen in the article "Order on the mass destruction of Soviet commissars and prisoners of war" in the collection "The Anatomy of the Nazi State" speaks of 2 600 thousand dead Soviet prisoners of war. The data available to our General Staff indicate a few other figures. According to documents, out of 11,944,100 people. 5,059 thousand people were irretrievably lost and captured, which is 42%.
The research results confirm that 4,559 thousand Soviet troops were captured. And about 450-500 thousand of the missing servicemen died, remained in the occupied territory, and fell to the partisans. These data are confirmed by the information of the German High Command, published in the military journal. According to them, by December 20, 1942, 3,350,639 Soviet troops were captured. Of these, about 2 million were killed or were shot by the end of 1942.
These data are close to ours. According to Soviet documents, in 1941, 2,335,482 people were missing and captured (the Red Army irretrievable losses amounted to 3,137,673 people). In 1942, 1 515 221 people went missing and captured (irretrievable losses amounted to 3 258 216 people). By December 30, 1942, according to the General Staff, 3,850,703 people were missing. Given that some of them died during the fighting, some remained in the occupied territory, some went to the partisans, then Streit’s figure is close to reality.
Subsequently, the number of missing persons sharply decreased. In 1943, 367,806 people were missing (2,312,429 - irretrievable losses), in 1944 - 167,563 people (irretrievable losses - 1,763,891 people), and in 1945 68,637 people went missing (irretrievable losses - 800 817 people).
Not only military personnel, but also civilians from 16 to 55 years old, captured by the Germans in the occupied territory, were considered prisoners of war in German captivity. When studying documents and in conversations with former prisoners of German camps, it is confirmed that from 15 to 20%, and in some cases up to 46% of civilians, were in prison camps. These persons were considered prisoners of war by the camp administration. Consequently, the total number of prisoners of war, taking into account the administration of the camps (civilians and military personnel), was not 4,559 thousand people, but much more.
Cruelty and inhuman treatment of prisoners of war entailed great mortality, which is recognized by German scientists. Streit writes: "Of the 3.4 million Soviet troops captured by the Wehrmacht in 1941 during the invasion of the USSR, by the end of January 1942 only 1.4 million remained alive. The remaining 2 million were victims of executions, epidemics, starvation or cold: Tens, hundreds of thousands were destroyed by SD teams or military units for political or racial reasons.
In accordance with the principles of National Socialist ideology, the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war was very different from the treatment of prisoners of war of other armies; in many ways it is impossible to compare this even with the extermination of European Jews.
Geyngard Rurupa in his work “The war of Germany against the Soviet Union 1941-1945” says: “It was considered sufficient that the prisoners lived in dugouts and eat mainly“ Russian bread ”made half of the refining of sugar beets mixed with cellulose flour, leaf flour or straw "It is not surprising that in the winter of 1941/42 these conditions led to mass mortality in the Reich territory, which was aggravated by the epidemic of typhus."
German captivity is one of the darkest phenomena of World War II. At the same time, German prisoners of war in our camps were fed according to the soldier's norm. So, a former prisoner of war, later - the Minister of Defense of the GDR, General Hoffmann, who was held captive at logging operations in the Urals, said:
“I can't understand you, Russians.” In captivity, we Germans, in a difficult time for you, were fed according to the soldier's norm of your soldier. And your children ran half-starved around us and begged for a piece of bread from us.
Count von Einsiedel said:
- The Soviet government ordered the prisoners to be given almost the same nutritional standards as their own population. As a percentage, far fewer prisoners died in the USSR than during the First World War in tsarist Russia.

Germany losses
There is such a document - "The balance of the payroll of the personnel of the German Armed Forces during the Second World War." According to it, on September 1, 1939, the Armed Forces of Germany totaled 3,214 thousand people. From June 1, 1939 to April 30, 1945, 17,893 thousand people were drafted into the German army. 21,107 thousand Germans passed through the army during the war.
At the time of surrender, 4,100 thousand people remained in service. In hospitals in Germany there were 700 thousand people. During the war 16 307 thousand people died. Of them
irretrievable losses - 11,844 thousand people (died and died of wounds and diseases, 4,457 thousand people went missing. 7,387 thousand people were captured). Another decrease amounted to 4,463 thousand people. Of which: dismissed due to injury and illness for a long time as unfit for military servicedeserted - 2 463 thousand people; demobilized and sent to work in industry - 2 million
And in our captivity prisoners of war died. So, out of 4,126,964 prisoners of war recorded in our camps, 580,548 people died during all the years of captivity, i.e. every seventh. Among German prisoners of war, out of 2,389,560, 356.7 thousand and 93.9 thousand died at transit points and on the road, especially during Battle of stalingrad (total - 450.6 thousand people). This is a lot, but can not be compared with the number of our soldiers who died in German captivity - three out of every five.

How many troops
The basis of the armies of the warring states in World War II was the Ground Forces, and in them the divisions and brigades, different in purpose and technical equipment.
The divisions evaluated the mobilization capabilities of states, the level of strategic deployment of the armed forces, and their readiness for war. The number and quality of divisions is the most important indicator of the combat power of the state armed forces. The number of divisions was taken as the basis for the plans of operations and war plans and was a decisive factor influencing their progress and completion.
An analysis of the state and correlation of the compounds of Germany and the USSR at various stages of the war, made at the General Staff, speaks volumes. By the beginning of the war, Germany had completely mobilized its armed forces. In June 1941, they included 214 divisions: 179 infantry and cavalry divisions, 35 motorized and tank divisions, and 7 brigades. Of these, 152 divisions and 2 brigades concentrated against the USSR. Another 62 divisions and 5 brigades were in other theaters of operations. The total strength of the German Armed Forces was 8.5 million.
At the borders of the USSR, 29 divisions and 16 brigades of German allies also developed. All formations were brought to the wartime states, operational groups of 190 divisions were created. The number of personnel at the borders of the USSR was 5.5 million.
The Italian, Slovak and Croat formations, the Spanish infantry division were preparing to be sent to the East and to participate in the war against the USSR.
By June 1941, the Soviet Union had 303 divisions and 22 brigades, of which 166 divisions and 9 brigades were in the western military districts (54%), the rest in the internal, Transcaucasian and Central Asian military districts and the All-Russian Supreme Command Reserve - 105 divisions and 8 brigades (35 %), in the Far East and Transbaikalia - 32 divisions and 5 brigades (over 10%).
Of the 303 divisions, there were: rifle - 198, cavalry - 13, motorized - 31, tank - 61. Tank and motorized divisions were part of 29 mechanized corps. The headcount was 4.8 million. The staff number is more than 5.2 million people.
The staffing of the units was 14,483 people with a full-time rifle division: 14,000 in 21 rifle divisions, 12,000 in 72 rifle divisions, and 11,000 in 6 rifle divisions.
The number of personnel in the western military districts was 2,900 thousand people.
During the war, Germany from June 1941 to May 1945 re-formed 402 divisions and 98 brigades. During the same period, 151 divisions and 26 brigades were restored. Of the total number of 767 divisions and 131 brigades that were formed and restored during the war by June 22, 1941, 560 divisions and 85 brigades operated on the Soviet-German front, 72% of the total number of German formations that were part of the armed forces.
During the war years, 141 divisions and 60 brigades of German allies also acted on the Soviet-German front.
In the Soviet Union during the years of the Great Patriotic War another 661 divisions were formed (of which: 490 rifle, 37 - people's militias (40 began to be formed, but 3 divisions received a personnel number), 13 - the NKVD, 18 airborne, 91 cavalry, 1 motorized and 11 tank). The largest number of divisions was formed in 1941 - 419 and in 1942 - 126. A large number of brigades were formed at the same time as divisions in the ground forces of the Red Army. In total, 666 brigades were created (313 rifle brigades, 251 tank brigades, 22 airborne assault brigades, 48 \u200b\u200bmotorized rifle brigades, and 32 mechanized rifle brigades.

About Contribution to Victory
Germany on the Soviet-German front suffered the largest losses in divisions, brigades, personnel and equipment - 508 settlement divisions (of which: 474 divisions and 68 brigades, excluding surrendered German formations in May 1945). At the same time, in other theaters of war, German losses amounted to 179 divisions.
87 divisions and 8 brigades capitulated to the Soviet troops. Before the allied forces - 49 divisions and 9 brigades.
In fact, almost 3/4 (72%) of the German armed forces and more than 60% of the allied armies were defeated, destroyed, captured, forced to surrender on the Soviet-German front.
The Soviet Union lost 339.5 accounting divisions (297 divisions and 85 brigades).

Prepared by Ivan Serov.
Photo from the editorial archive.
Vladimir

Public poll "Call"

Why, in your opinion, were the losses of the Soviet troops so great
during WWII?

Sofya Romanovna, working pensioner:
- They did not value our people, however, as now. There is a direct link between the huge losses of our people and the ruthless level of the Stalinist leadership.

Svetlana, a soldier:
- Our people were not spared - used as cannon fodder. In addition, Soviet troops helped the fraternal peoples, died for others.

Sergey, investigator:
- At the beginning of the war there was no organization. There was a rearmament in the country - the Soviet Union itself was planning to attack Europe, but we got ahead: On the other hand, the high price of victory cannot overshadow the contribution of the Soviet peoples to the defeat of fascism.

Nikolay, electrician:
“We didn’t have a good command - all military commanders were transplanted and shot. But for a long time the responsibility for the enormous civilian casualties and other damage was decided to be blamed entirely on the occupiers.

Interviewed Margarita QUEEN.
Photo by Rudolph NOVIKOV.
Vladimir

The names of some are still honored, the names of others are forgotten. But all of them are united by leadership talent.

the USSR

Zhukov, Georgy Konstantinovich (1896–1974)

Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Zhukov had a chance to take part in serious hostilities shortly before the outbreak of World War II. In the summer of 1939, the Soviet-Mongolian troops under his command defeated the Japanese group on the Khalkhin Gol River.

By the beginning of World War II, Zhukov headed the General Staff, but was soon sent to the army. In 1941, he was appointed to the most critical sectors of the front. Tidying up the retreating army with the toughest measures, he managed to prevent the Germans from taking Leningrad and stop the Nazis on the Mozhaisk line on the outskirts of Moscow. And already in late 1941 - early 1942, Zhukov led a counterattack near Moscow, pushing the Germans away from the capital.

In 1942-43, Zhukov did not command separate fronts, but coordinated their actions as a representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters both near Stalingrad and Kursk, and when breaking the blockade of Leningrad.

In early 1944, Zhukov took command of the 1st Ukrainian Front instead of the seriously wounded General Vatutin and led the planned Proskurovsky-Chernivtsi offensive operation. As a result, Soviet troops liberated most of Right-Bank Ukraine and reached the state border.

At the end of 1944, Zhukov led the 1st Belorussian Front and launched an attack on Berlin. In May 1945, Zhukov accepted unconditional surrender Nazi Germany, and then two Victory Parades, in Moscow and Berlin.

After the war, Zhukov was on the sidelines, commanding various military districts. After Khrushchev came to power, he became deputy minister, and then headed the Ministry of Defense. But in 1957 he finally fell into disgrace and was removed from all posts.

Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich (1896–1968)

Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Shortly before the start of the war, in 1937 Rokossovsky was repressed, but in 1940, at the request of Marshal Tymoshenko, he was released and reinstated in his former post as corps commander. In the early days of World War II, units under the command of Rokossovsky turned out to be one of the few who managed to provide worthy resistance to the advancing German troops. In the battle of Moscow, the Rokossovsky army defended one of the most difficult areas, Volokolamsk.

Returning to service after a severe wound received in 1942, Rokossovsky took command of the Don Front, which completed the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad.

On the eve of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, Rokossovsky, contrary to the position of most military commanders, managed to convince Stalin that it was better not to launch an offensive on his own, but to provoke the enemy into action. Having precisely determined the direction of the main strike of the Germans, Rokossovsky, before their very offensive, undertook a massive artillery bombardment, bleeding the enemy’s striking forces.

The most famous of his military achievements, included in the annals of military art, was the operation to liberate Belarus, codenamed Bagration, which actually destroyed the German Army Group Center.

Shortly before the decisive attack on Berlin, the command of the 1st Belorussian Front, to the disappointment of Rokossovsky, was transferred to Zhukov. He was also instructed to command the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in East Prussia.

Rokossovsky possessed outstanding personal qualities and, of all Soviet military commanders, was the most popular in the army. After the war, Rokossovsky, a Pole by birth, for a long time headed the Ministry of Defense of Poland, and then served as Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief Military Inspector. The day before his death, he finished writing his memoirs called Soldier's Duty.

Konev Ivan Stepanovich (1897–1973)

Marshal of the Soviet Union.

In the fall of 1941, Konev was appointed commander. Western front. In this position, he suffered one of the biggest failures of the outbreak of war. Konev was not able to get permission to withdraw the troops on time, and, as a result, about 600,000 Soviet soldiers and officers were surrounded near Bryansk and Yelnya. Zhukov rescued the commander from the tribunal.

In 1943, the troops of the Steppe (subsequently 2nd Ukrainian) Front under the command of Konev liberated Belgorod, Kharkov, Poltava, Kremenchug and crossed the Dnieper. But most of all Konev was praised by the Korsun-Shevchen operation, as a result of which a large group of German troops was surrounded.

In 1944, already as the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Konev led the Lviv-Sandomierz operation in western Ukraine and southeastern Poland, paving the way for a further attack on Germany. The troops distinguished themselves under the command of Konev and the Vistula-Oder operation, and in the battle for Berlin. During the last rivalry between Konev and Zhukov appeared - everyone wanted to take german capital first. Tensions between marshals persisted until the end of life. In May 1945, Konev led the liquidation of the last major hotbed of Nazi resistance in Prague.

After the war, Konev was the commander in chief of the ground forces and the first commander of the combined forces of the Warsaw Pact countries; he commanded troops in Hungary during the events of 1956.

Vasilevsky Alexander Mikhailovich (1895-1977)

Marshal of the Soviet Union, chief of the General Staff.

In the post of chief of the general staff, which he held since 1942, Vasilevsky coordinated the actions of the fronts of the Red Army and participated in the development of all major operations of the Great Patriotic War. In particular, he plays a key role in planning the operation to encircle German troops near Stalingrad.

At the end of the war, after the death of General Chernyakhovsky, Vasilevsky asked for his release from the post of chief of the General Staff, took the place of the deceased and led the assault on Koenigsberg. In the summer of 1945, Vasilevsky was transferred to the Far East and commanded the rout of the Quatun Army of Japan.

After the war, Vasilevsky headed the General Staff, and then was the Minister of Defense of the USSR, but after the death of Stalin went into the shadows and held less senior posts.

Tolbukhin Fedor Ivanovich (1894–1949)

Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Before the start of World War II, Tolbukhin served as the chief of staff of the Transcaucasian District, and with its beginning, the Transcaucasian Front. Under his leadership, a sudden operation was developed to send Soviet troops into northern Iran. Tolbukhin also developed an operation to land the Kerch assault, which should result in the liberation of the Crimea. However, after its successful start, our troops could not develop success, suffered heavy losses, and Tolbukhin was removed from office.

Distinguishing himself as commander of the 57th Army in the battle of Stalingrad, Tolbukhin was appointed commander of the Southern (later 4th Ukrainian) Front. A significant part of Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula were liberated under his command. In 1944-45, when Tolbukhin already commanded the 3rd Ukrainian Front, he led the troops during the liberation of Moldova, Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and ended the war in Austria. The Iasi-Chisinau operation, planned by Tolbukhin and leading to the encirclement of a two-hundred-thousand-strong group of German-Romanian troops, was included in the annals of military art (sometimes called the “Iasi-Chisinau Cannes).

After the war, Tolbukhin commanded the Southern Group of Forces in Romania and Bulgaria, and then the Transcaucasian Military District.

Vatutin Nikolay Fedorovich (1901-1944)

Soviet army general.

In the pre-war era, Vatutin served as deputy chief of the General Staff, and with the outbreak of World War II he was sent to the North-Western Front. In the Novgorod region, under his leadership, several counterattacks were carried out, which slowed down the advance of Manstein’s tank corps.

In 1942, Vatutin, who then headed the Southwestern Front, commanded the operation "Small Saturn", the purpose of which was to prevent the German-Italian-Romanian troops to help the army of Paulus surrounded near Stalingrad.

In 1943, Vatutin led the Voronezh (later 1st Ukrainian) front. He played a very important role in the battle of Kursk and the liberation of Kharkov and Belgorod. But the most famous military operation of Vatutin was the forcing of the Dnieper and the liberation of Kiev and Zhytomyr, and then Rivne. Together with the 2nd Ukrainian Front of Konev, the 1st Ukrainian Front of Vatutin also carried out the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation.

At the end of February 1944, Vatutin's car came under fire from Ukrainian nationalists, and a month and a half later the commander died of his wounds.

United Kingdom

Montgomery Bernard Lowe (1887–1976)

British Field Marshal.

Before the start of World War II, Montgomery was considered one of the bravest and most talented British military commanders, but his promotion was hindered by a harsh, heavy character. Montgomery, himself distinguished by physical endurance, paid much attention to the daily hard training of the troops entrusted to him.

At the beginning of World War II, when the Germans defeated France, parts of Montgomery covered the evacuation of the Allied forces. In 1942, Montgomery became the commander of the British forces in North Africa, and achieved a turning point in this sector of the war, defeating the German-Italian grouping of troops in Egypt at the Battle of El Alamein. Winston Churchill summed up its significance: “Before the battle of Alamein, we did not know victories. After her, we did not know defeat. " For this battle, Montgomery received the title of Viscount Alamein. True, the opponent of Montgomery, German Field Marshal Rommel said that, having resources such as the British military leader, he would conquer the entire Middle East in a month.

After that, Montgomery was transferred to Europe, where he was supposed to act in close contact with the Americans. Here, his non-caring nature affected: he came into conflict with the American commander Eisenhower, which badly affected the interaction of the troops and led to a number of relative military failures. Toward the end of the war, Montgomery successfully resisted the German counterattack in the Ardennes, and then conducted several military operations in Northern Europe.

After the war, Montgomery served as chief of the British General Staff, and later as first deputy commander in chief of the NATO Allied Forces in Europe.

Alexander Harold Rupert Leofrick George (1891–1969)

British Field Marshal.

At the beginning of World War II, Alexander led the evacuation of British troops after the German capture of France. It was possible to take out most of the personnel, but almost all the military equipment went to the enemy.

At the end of 1940, Alexander was appointed to Southeast asia. He did not manage to defend Burma, but he managed to block the Japanese from entering India.

In 1943, Alexander was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Ground Forces in North Africa. Under his leadership, a large German-Italian group in Tunisia was defeated, and this, by and large, completed the campaign in North Africa and opened the way to Italy. Alexander commanded the landing of allied forces in Sicily, and then on the mainland. At the end of the war, he served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in the Mediterranean.

After the war, Alexander received the title of Earl of Tunisia, for some time was Governor-General of Canada, and then Minister of Defense of Great Britain.

USA

Eisenhower Dwight David (1890–1969)

US Army General.

His childhood passed in a family whose members for religious reasons were pacifists, but Eisenhower chose a military career.

Eisenhower met the beginning of World War II with a rather modest rank of colonel. But his abilities were noticed by the chief of the American General Staff George Marshall, and soon Eisenhower became the head of the operational planning department.

In 1942, Eisenhower led Operation Torch to land the Allies in North Africa. At the beginning of 1943, he was defeated by Rommel in the battle for the Kasserinsky passage, but subsequently superior Anglo-American forces introduced a turning point in the North African campaign.

In 1944, Eisenhower oversaw the general landing of the Allied forces in Normandy and the subsequent attack on Germany. At the end of the war, Eisenhower became the creator of the notorious camps for the “disarmed enemy forces” that did not fall under the Geneva Convention on the Rights of Prisoners of War, which actually became death camps for German soldiers who got there.

After the war, Eisenhower was the commander of NATO forces, and then twice elected president of the United States.

MacArthur Douglas (1880–1964)

US Army General.

In their youth, MacArthur did not want to take in military academy West Point for health reasons, however, he achieved his goal and, after graduating from the academy, was recognized as its best graduate in history. He received the general rank in the First World war.

In 1941-42, MacArthur led the defense of the Philippines from Japanese troops. The enemy managed to take the American units by surprise and gain a big advantage at the very beginning of the campaign. After the loss of the Philippines, he uttered the famous phrase: "I did what I could, but I will come back."

After being appointed commander of forces in the southwestern Pacific, MacArthur resisted Japanese plans to invade Australia, and then conducted successful offensive operations in New Guinea and the Philippines.

On September 2, 1945, MacArthur, already being all US forces in the Pacific, aboard the battleship Missouri accepted the surrender of Japan, which put an end to World War II.

After World War II, MacArthur commanded the occupation forces in Japan, and then led American troops in the Korean War. He developed the landing of the American landing in Incheon became a classic of military art. He called for a nuclear bombardment of China and the invasion of this country, after which he was dismissed.

Nimitz Chester William (1885–1966)

US Navy Admiral.

Before World War II, Nimitz was engaged in the design and combat training of the American submarine fleet and headed the Navigation Bureau. At the beginning of the war, after the disaster at Pearl Harbor, Nimitz was appointed commander of the US Pacific Fleet. His task was to confront the Japanese in close contact with General MacArthur.

In 1942, the American fleet under the command of Nimitz managed to inflict the first serious defeat on the Midway Atoll. And then, in 1943, to win the fight for the strategically most important island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands archipelago. In 1944-45, the fleet led by Nimitz played a decisive role in the liberation of other Pacific archipelagos, and at the end of the war he landed an assault in Japan. During the fighting, Nimitz used tactics of sudden rapid movement from island to island, called the "frog jump".

The return of Nimitz to its homeland was celebrated as a national holiday and was called the “Nimitz Day”. After the war, he led the demobilization of troops, and then oversaw the creation of an atomic submarine fleet. At the Nuremberg trials, he defended his German colleague, Admiral Dennitz, saying that he himself had used the same methods of conducting submarine warfare, so Dennitz had avoided the death sentence.

Germany

Von Bock Theodore (1880–1945)

German Field Marshal.

Even before the outbreak of World War II, von Bock led the troops that carried out the Anschluss of Austria and invaded the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. With the outbreak of war, he commanded the Army Group North during the war with Poland. In 1940, von Bock led the seizure of Belgium and the Netherlands and the defeat of the French troops near Dunkirk. It was he who hosted the parade of German troops in occupied Paris.

Von Bock objected to the attack on the USSR, but when a decision was made, he led the Army Group Center, which carried out a strike in the main direction. After the failure of the attack on Moscow, he was considered one of the main responsible for this failure of the German army. In 1942, he led the Army Group South and successfully restrained the Soviet offensive against Kharkov for a long time.

Von Bock was extremely independent in character, repeatedly clashed with Hitler and defiantly kept aloof from politics. After the summer of 1942, von Bock opposed the Führer’s decision to divide the Army Group South into 2 directions, the Caucasus and Stalingrad, during the planned offensive, he was removed from command and sent to the reserve. A few days before the end of the war, von Bock died during an air raid.

Von Rundstedt Karl Rudolph Gerd (1875–1953)

German Field Marshal.

By the beginning of the Second World War, von Rundstedt, who had occupied important command posts back in World War I, had already resigned. But in 1939, Hitler returned him to the army. Von Rundstedt became the main developer of the plan of attack on Poland, code-named Weiss, and during its implementation he commanded the Army Group South. He then led Army Group A, which played a key role in the capture of France, and also developed an unrealized Sea Lion attack plan for England.

Von Rundstedt objected to the Barbarossa plan, but after deciding to attack the USSR, he led the Army Group South, which captured Kiev and other large cities in the south of the country. After von Rundstedt, in order to avoid encirclement, violated the order of the Fuhrer and withdrew his troops from Rostov-on-Don, he was dismissed.

However, the very next year he was again drafted into the army to become the commander in chief of the German armed forces in the West. His main task was to counteract the possible landing of the allies. Having familiarized himself with the situation, von Rundstedt warned Hitler that prolonged defense by the available forces would be impossible. At the crucial moment of the landing in Normandy, on June 6, 1944, Hitler canceled von Rundstedt’s order to transfer troops, thereby losing time and allowing the enemy to develop an offensive. Already at the end of the war, von Rundstedt successfully resisted the Allied landing in Holland.

After the war, von Rundstedt, thanks to the intercession of the British, managed to escape the Nuremberg Tribunal, and participated in it only as a witness.

Von Manstein Erich (1887–1973)

German Field Marshal.

Manstein was considered one of the strongest strategists of the Wehrmacht. In 1939, he, as chief of staff of Army Group A, played a key role in developing a successful plan for the invasion of France.

In 1941, Manstein was part of the Army Group North, which captured the Baltic states, and was preparing for an attack on Leningrad, but was soon deployed to the south. In 1941-42, the 11th Army under his command captured the Crimean Peninsula, and for the capture of Sevastopol Manstein received the rank of Field Marshal.

Then Manstein commanded Army Group Don and unsuccessfully tried to rescue Paulus' army from the Stalingrad boiler. Since 1943, he led the Army Group South and inflicted a sensitive defeat on the Soviet troops near Kharkov, and then tried to prevent the crossing of the Dnieper. During the retreat, Manstein’s troops used the scorched earth tactics.

Having suffered a defeat in the Battle of Korsun-Shevchenko, Manstein retreated, violating Hitler's order. Thus, he saved part of the army from encirclement, but after that he was forced to resign.

After the war, he was sentenced by the British tribunal for war crimes for 18 years, but already in 1953 he was released, worked as a military adviser to the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and wrote his memoir, Lost Victories.

Guderian Heinz Wilhelm (1888–1954)

German Colonel General, commander of the armored forces.

Guderian is one of the main theorists and practitioners of the "blitzkrieg" - lightning war. He assigned the key role in it to tank units, which were supposed to break through to the rear of the enemy and disable command posts and communications. Such tactics were considered effective, but risky, creating the danger of being cut off from the main forces.

In the years 1939-40, in the military campaigns against Poland and France, the blitzkrieg tactics fully paid off. Guderian was at the pinnacle of fame: he received the rank of colonel general and high awards. However, in 1941, in the war against the Soviet Union, this tactic failed. This was due to both the huge Russian spaces and the cold climate, in which equipment often refused to work, and the willingness of the Red Army units to withstand this method of warfare. Guderian’s tank forces suffered heavy losses near Moscow and were forced to retreat. After that, he was sent to the reserve, and subsequently served as inspector general of tank forces.

After the war, Guderian, who was not charged with war crimes, quickly went free and lived his life writing memoirs.

Rommel Erwin Johann Eugen (1891–1944)

German Field Marshal, nicknamed the Desert Fox. He was distinguished by great independence and a penchant for risky attacking actions, even without command sanction.

At the beginning of World War II, Rommel participated in the Polish and French campaigns, but his main successes were related to military operations in North Africa. Rommel led the African Corps, which was originally given to help Italian troops defeated by the British. Instead of strengthening the defense, as the order prescribed, Rommel went on the offensive with small forces and gained important victories. In a similar way he acted in the future. Like Manstein, Rommel assigned the main role to rapid breakthroughs and maneuvering of armored forces. And only by the end of 1942, when the British and Americans in North Africa had a great advantage in manpower and equipment, Rommel's troops began to lose. Subsequently, he fought in Italy and tried together with von Runstedt, with whom he had serious disagreements affecting the combat readiness of the troops, to stop the Allied landing in Normandy.

In the pre-war period, Yamamoto paid great attention to the construction of aircraft carriers and the creation of naval aviation, making the Japanese fleet one of the strongest in the world. For a long time, Yamamoto lived in the USA and had the opportunity to study the army of the future enemy well. On the eve of the war, he warned the country's leadership: “In the first six to twelve months of the war, I will demonstrate an unbroken chain of victories. But if the confrontation lasts two or three years, I have no confidence in the final victory. "

Yamamoto planned and personally led the Pearl Harbor operation. On December 7, 1941, Japanese planes taking off from aircraft carriers defeated the American naval base Pearl Harbor in Hawaii and inflicted huge damage on the US Navy and aircraft. After that, Yamamoto won a number of victories in the central and southern parts of the Pacific Ocean. But on June 4, 1942, he suffered a serious defeat from the Allies at Midway Atoll. This happened largely due to the fact that the Americans managed to decrypt the codes of the Japanese Navy and get all the information about the upcoming operation. After that, the war, as Yamamoto feared, took a protracted character.

Unlike many other Japanese generals, Yamashita did not commit suicide after surrendering to Japan, but surrendered. In 1946, he was executed on war crimes charges. His case became a legal precedent, called the Yamashita rule: according to him, the commander is responsible for not suppressing war crimes of his subordinates.

Other countries

Von Mannerheim Karl Gustav Emil (1867–1951)

Finnish Marshal.

Before the revolution of 1917, when Finland was part of the Russian Empire, Mannerheim was an officer in the Russian army and rose to the rank of lieutenant general. On the eve of World War II, he, as chairman of the Finnish Defense Council, was engaged in strengthening the Finnish army. According to his plan, in particular, powerful defensive fortifications were erected on the Karelian Isthmus, which went down in history as the “Mannerheim Line”.

When the Soviet-Finnish war began at the end of 1939, 72-year-old Mannerheim led the country's army. Under his command, the Finnish troops for a long time restrained the offensive significantly exceeding the number of Soviet units. As a result, Finland maintained its independence, although peace conditions were very difficult for it.

During World War II, when Finland was an ally of Hitler Germany, Mannerheim showed the art of political maneuver, avoiding active fighting with all his might. And in 1944, Finland broke the pact with Germany, and at the end of the war already fought against the Germans, coordinating operations with the Red Army.

At the end of the war, Mannerheim was elected President of Finland, but already in 1946 he left this post due to health reasons.

Tito Josip Broz (1892–1980)

Marshal of Yugoslavia.

Before the start of World War II, Tito was a leader in the Yugoslav communist movement. After the German attack on Yugoslavia, he took up the organization of partisan detachments. At first, the Titovites acted together with the remnants of the tsarist army and the monarchists, who were called the Chetniks. However, the differences with the latter over time became so strong that it came to military clashes.

Tito managed to organize scattered partisan detachments into a powerful partisan army of a quarter million soldiers under the leadership of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Partisan Units of Yugoslavia. She used not only the traditional methods of warfare for partisans, but also entered into open battles with fascist divisions. At the end of 1943, Tito was officially recognized by the Allies as the leader of Yugoslavia. When the country was liberated, Tito's army acted in conjunction with Soviet troops.

Shortly after the war, Tito led Yugoslavia and remained in power until his death. Despite the socialist orientation, he pursued a fairly independent policy.

The German Army in World War II - Luftwaffe Field Divisions (1941 - 1945)

German Army in World War II - Luftwaffe Field Divisions (1941 - 1945)

Artwork by Ron Volstad After the previous propaganda material devoted to the topic of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it would probably be logical to create a post with illustrative images of typical German soldiers of the 1941 model.
But since the German soldiers of the illustrator Stephen Andrew, who is actively developing (among others) this topic too, seemed to me too boring and rude, I once again decided to turn to much more attractive illustrations of the artist Ron Wolstad for me on the field Luftwaffe divisions.
And indeed, the German Luftwaffe field divisions are a rather interesting phenomenon. Their occurrence was due to the fact of the emergence of a sharp confrontation between the Reichminister (and part-time Marshal of Aviation) Goering and the Wehrmacht personnel corps.
In his desire to ensure maximum maximum influential opportunities, Goering managed to ensure that in addition to aviation units, the structure of his military aviation department included airborne, anti-aircraft and field units (the latter to protect airfields and surrounding areas).
When in 1942, in connection with the discovery of a serious shortage of manpower for replenishing army units, the Wehrmacht command began to press for Hitler's transfer of Goering’s “pocket” ground units to his subordination, the latter insisted on converting a number of them into full-fledged field divisions that would preserve it would be their submission to the Luftwaffe and began to be used to carry out critical tasks in front-line conditions.
In order to turn such field units into truly combat-ready units that could surpass Wehrmacht divisions in their qualities (and thereby justify the fact of their creation in the eyes of the Führer), Goering undertook whole line steps. First of all, he achieved the opportunity to select the best from among ordinary recruits (those whom Nazi Germany considered the best of the best were intended for the SS from the time they were in the Hitler Youth).
Secondly, unlike parts of the Wehrmacht, in which there was an institute of chaplains and traditions of educating all soldiers in a religious spirit, Goering for the Luftwaffe field divisions introduced the practice of educating their personnel exclusively in the National Socialist spirit (in many ways similar to the one that existed in SS troops), and in the third, he achieved the right to pre-emptively supply such units with the latest models of small arms and military ammunition.

The result of such experiments, in principle, turned out to be quite successful - the Luftwaffe field divisions were turned into highly combat-ready military units, which in essence were an example of something in between the Wehrmacht and the SS troops.
It goes without saying that innovations of this kind were unable to somehow rectify the situation of Nazi Germany due to the initial presence of significant miscalculations that were made at the strategic planning stage of the entire war, but at the same time seemed very interesting from a purely applied point of view.

Soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Luftwaffe field divisions (spring 1942)

Soldiers and officers of the jäger (light infantry) regiments of the Luftwaffe (1943)