What is the battle of Kursk. Kursk Bulge

The battle of Kursk in its scope, military, as well as political significance, is rightfully considered one of the key battles of not only the Great Patriotic War, but also of the Second World War. The battle on the Kursk Bulge finally established the power of the Red Army and completely broke the fighting spirit of the forces of the Wehrmacht. After it, the German army completely lost its offensive potential.

The Battle of Kursk, or as it is also called in Russian historiography, the Battle of the Kursk Bulge, is one of the decisive battles during the Great Patriotic War, which took place in the summer of 1943 (July 5-August 23).

Historians call the Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk the two most significant victories of the Red Army against the forces of the Wehrmacht, which completely turned the tide of hostilities.

In this article we will find out the date of the Battle of Kursk and its role, and its significance during the war, as well as its causes, course and results.

The historical significance of the Battle of Kursk is hard to overestimate. If it were not for the exploits of the Soviet soldiers during the battle, the Germans could seize the initiative on the Eastern Front and resume the offensive, will again move to Moscow and Leningrad. During the battle, the Red Army defeated most of the combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front, and it lost the opportunity to use fresh reserves, since they were already depleted.

In honor of the victory, August 23 was forever the Day of the military glory of Russia. In addition, during the battles there was the largest and bloodiest tank battle in history, and a huge number of aircraft and other types of equipment were involved.

The Battle of Kursk is also called the Battle of the Arc of Fire - all because of the critical importance of this operation and the bloody battles that took hundreds of thousands of lives.

The battle of Stalingrad, which took place before the battle on the Kursk Bulge, completely destroyed the Germans' plans for the quick capture of the USSR. According to the Barbarossa plan and Blitzkrieg tactics, the Germans tried to take the USSR in one fell swoop even before winter. Now the Soviet Union gathered forces and was able to challenge the Wehrmacht.

During the Battle of Kursk from July 5 to August 23, 1943, according to the estimates of historians, at least 200 thousand soldiers were killed and more than half a million were wounded. It is important to note that many historians consider these figures to be underestimated and the losses of the parties in the Battle of Kursk, perhaps much more significant. Basically, the bias of these data is said by foreign historians.

Intelligence service

A huge role in the victory over Germany was played by Soviet intelligence, which was able to learn about the so-called operation "Citadel". Soviet intelligence began to receive messages about this operation in early 1943. On April 12, 1943, a document was laid on the table of the Soviet leader, which contained complete information about the operation - the date of its operation, tactics and strategy of the German army. It was hard to imagine what would have happened if intelligence had not done its job. Probably, the Germans would still be able to break through the Russian defense, since the preparations for Operation Citadel were serious - they prepared for it no worse than for Operation Barbarossa.

At the moment, historians are unsure exactly who delivered this crucial knowledge to Stalin. It is believed that this information was obtained by one of the British intelligence agents, John Cancross, as well as a member of the so-called "Cambridge Five" (a group of British intelligence agents, which was recruited by the USSR in the early 1930s and worked for two governments at once).

There is also an opinion that information on the plans of the German command was transmitted by scouts of the Dora group, namely the Hungarian scout Sandor Rado.

Some historians believe that all the information about the operation "Citadel" in Moscow was transmitted by one of the most famous intelligence officers of the Second World War period - Rudolf Ressler, who at that time was in Switzerland.

Substantial support for the USSR was provided by British agents who were not recruited by the Union. During the Ultra program, British intelligence managed to break into the German Lorenz encryption machine, which transmitted messages between members of senior management of the Third Reich. The first step was to intercept the plans for the summer offensive in the Kursk and Belgorod region, after which this information was immediately sent to Moscow.

Before the start of the Battle of Kursk, Zhukov claimed that as soon as he saw the future battlefield, he already knew how the German army’s strategic offensive would proceed. However, there is no confirmation to his words - it is believed that in his memoirs he simply exaggerates his strategic talent.

Thus, the Soviet Union knew about all the details of the Citadel offensive and got the opportunity to adequately prepare for it so as not to leave the Germans a chance to win.

Battle preparation

In early 1943, the German and Soviet armies carried out offensive operations, which led to the formation of a ledge in the center of the Soviet-German front, reaching a depth of 150 kilometers. This ledge was called the Kursk Bulge. In April, it became clear to both sides that soon one of the key battles would begin over this ledge, which could decide the outcome of the war on the Eastern Front.

In the German headquarters there was no consensus. Hitler for a long time could not develop an accurate strategy of action for the summer of 1943. Many generals, including Manstein, were against the attack at the moment. He believed that the offensive would make sense if it started right now, and not in the summer, when the Red Army could prepare for it. The rest either thought it was time to go on the defensive, or else to launch an offensive in the summer.

Despite the fact that the most experienced Reich commander (Manshetain) was against it, Hitler agreed to launch an offensive in early July 1943.

The battle of Kursk in 1943 is the Union’s chance to consolidate the initiative after the victory at Stalingrad, and therefore they reacted with unprecedented seriousness to the preparation of the operation.

The situation at the headquarters of the USSR was much better. Stalin knew about the plans of the Germans, he had a numerical advantage in the infantry, tanks, guns and aircraft. Knowing how and when the Germans would advance, Soviet soldiers prepared defensive fortifications for their meeting and set up minefields to repel the attack, and then go on a counterattack. A huge role in the successful defense was played by the experience of the Soviet military leaders, who, over the two years of military operations, were nevertheless able to develop tactics and strategies for waging the war of the best military leaders of the Reich. The fate of Operation Citadel was a foregone conclusion even before it began.

Plans and forces of the parties

The German command planned to carry out a large offensive operation under the name (code name) on the Kursk "Citadel". To destroy the Soviet defense, the Germans decided to deliver outgoing strikes from the north (the region of the city of Oryol) and from the south (the region of the city of Belgorod). Having broken down the enemy defenses, the Germans were to unite in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Kursk, thus taking the troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts into complete encirclement. In addition, the German tank units had to turn eastward - to the village of Prokhorovka, and destroy the Red Army armored reserves so that they could not come to the rescue of the main forces and help to get out of the encirclement. This tactic was completely new to German generals. Their tank flank attacks worked for four. Using this tactic, they were able to conquer almost the whole of Europe and inflict many crushing defeats on the Red Army in 1941-1942.

For the operation "Citadel" the Germans concentrated in eastern Ukraine, on the territory of Belarus and Russia 50 divisions with a total number of 900 thousand people. Of these, 18 divisions were tank and motorized. Such a large number of tank divisions was commonplace for the Germans. The forces of the Wehrmacht have always used lightning attacks of tank units to prevent the enemy from even a chance to group and repulse. In 1939, it was the tank divisions that played a key role in the capture of France, which surrendered before they could fight.

The commanders of the Wehrmacht were Field Marshal von Kluge (Army Group Center) and Field Marshal Manstein (Army Group South). The shock forces were commanded by Field Marshal Model, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Task Force were commanded by General German Goth.

The German army before the start of the battle received the long-awaited tank reserves. Hitler sent to the Eastern Front more than 100 Tiger heavy tanks, almost 200 Panther tanks (first deployed at the Battle of Kursk) and less than a hundred tank destroyers Ferdinand or Elephant (Elephant).

"Tigers", "Panthers" and "Ferdinands" - were one of the most powerful tanks during the Second World War. Neither the allies, nor the USSR at that time had tanks that could boast of such firepower and armor. If the “Tigers” Soviet soldiers have already seen and learned to fight against them, the “Panthers” and “Ferdinandas” brought a lot of problems on the battlefield.

The Panthers are medium tanks that are slightly inferior in terms of armoring the Tigers and were armed with a 7.5 cm KwK 42 cannon. These guns had an excellent rate of fire and fired at great distances with great accuracy.

"Ferdinand" - a heavy self-propelled anti-tank installation (PT-SAU), which was one of the most famous during the Second World War. Despite the fact that its number was small, it offered serious resistance to the tanks of the USSR, since at that time it possessed almost the best armor and firepower. During the Battle of Kursk, the Ferdinandas showed their strength, perfectly withstanding hits from anti-tank guns, and even coped with artillery hits. However, his main problem was the small number of anti-personnel machine guns, and therefore the tank destroyer was very vulnerable to infantry, which could get close to him and detonate them. Destroy these tanks of frontal shots was simply impossible. Weaknesses were on the sides, where they later learned to shoot with sub-caliber shells. The most vulnerable spot in the protection of the tank is the weak chassis, which was disabled, and then captured a stationary tank.

In total, Manstein and Kluge received at their disposal less than 350 new tanks, which was disastrously insufficient, given the number of Soviet armored forces. It is also worth noting that approximately 500 tanks used during the Battle of Kursk were obsolete models. These are the tanks Pz.II and Pz.III, which at that time were already irrelevant.

The 2nd Panzer Army during the Battle of Kursk included elite panzerwaffe tank units, including the 1st SS Panzer Division Adolf Hitler, the 2nd Panzer Division SS DasRaich and the famous 3rd Panzer Division Totenkopf (it same "Dead Head").

The number of aircraft to support the infantry and tanks of the Germans was modest - about 2500 thousand units. Among the guns and mortars, the German army was more than twice as inferior to the Soviet army, and some sources indicate the USSR’s three-fold advantage in guns and mortars.

The Soviet command realized its mistakes in conducting defensive operations in 1941-1942. This time they built a powerful defensive line capable of holding back the massive offensive of the German armored forces. According to the plans of the command, the Red Army was to exhaust the enemy in defensive battles, and then begin a counterattack at the most disadvantageous moment for the enemy.

During the Battle of Kursk, the commander of the Central Front was one of the most talented and productive army generals - Konstantin Rokossovsky. His troops took on the task of defending the northern face of the Kursk ledge. The commander of the Voronezh Front on the Kursk Bulge was a native of the Voronezh Region Army General Nikolai Vatutin, on whose shoulders lay the task of defending the southern face of the ledge. The Red Army was coordinated by the marshals of the USSR Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

The ratio of the number of troops was far from the side of Germany. According to estimates, the Central and Voronezh fronts had 1.9 million soldiers, including units of the troops of the Steppe Front (Steppe Military District). The number of fighters of the Wehrmacht did not exceed 900 thousand people. In terms of the number of tanks, Germany was less than two times less than 2.5 thousand versus less than 5 thousand. As a result, the balance of forces before the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 2: 1 in favor of the USSR. World War II historian Alexei Isaev says that the Red Army is overestimated during the battle. His point of view is greatly criticized, since he does not take into account the troops of the Steppe Front (the number of fighters of the Steppe Front who participated in operations totaled more than 500 thousand people).

Kursk defensive operation

Before giving a full description of the events on the Kursk Bulge, it is important to show a map of actions to make it easier to navigate the information. Battle of Kursk on the map:

In this picture you can see the scheme of the Battle of Kursk. The map of the Battle of Kursk can clearly show how the combat formations acted during the battle. On the map of the Battle of Kursk, you will also see symbols that will help to absorb information.

Soviet generals received all the necessary orders - the defense was strong and the Germans soon awaited resistance that the Wehrmacht had not received in the entire history of its existence. On the day the Battle of Kursk began, the Soviet army pulled up a huge amount of artillery to the front to give reciprocal artillery preparation, which the Germans would not expect.

The beginning of the Battle of Kursk (defensive stage) was scheduled for the morning of July 5 - the offensive was to take place immediately from the northern and southern faces. Before the tank attack, the Germans conducted large-scale bombing, to which the Soviet army responded in the same way. At this point, the German command (namely Field Marshal Manstein) began to realize that the Russians had learned about Operation Citadel and were able to prepare the defense. Manstein has repeatedly told Hitler that this offensive at the moment no longer makes sense. He believed that it was necessary to carefully prepare the defense and first try to repulse the Red Army and only then think about counterattacks.

Start - Arc of Fire

On the northern front, the offensive began at six in the morning. The Germans attacked a little west of the Cherkasy direction. The first tank attacks ended in failure for the Germans. Strong defense led to heavy losses in German armored units. And yet the enemy managed to break into the depths of 10 kilometers. On the southern front, the offensive began at three in the morning. The main blows fell on the settlements of Oboyan and Korochi.

The Germans did not succeed in breaking through the defenses of the Soviet troops, since they were carefully prepared for battle. Even the Wehrmacht’s elite tank divisions hardly advanced. As soon as it became clear that German forces could not break through on the northern and southern faces, the command decided that it was necessary to strike in the prokhorov direction.

On July 11, hard battles began near the village of Prokhorovka, which grew into the largest tank battle in history. Soviet tanks in the Battle of Kursk outnumbered the German in numbers, but despite this, the enemy resisted to the end. July 13-23 - Germans are still trying to conduct offensive attacks that end in failure. On July 23, the enemy completely exhausted his offensive potential and decided to go on the defensive.

Tank battle

It is difficult to answer how many tanks participated on both sides, as data from different sources differ. If we take the average data, then the number of tanks of the USSR reached about 1 thousand vehicles. Whereas the Germans had about 700 tanks.

A tank battle (battle) during a defensive operation on the Kursk Bulge took place on July 12, 1943.   Enemy attacks on Prokhorovka began immediately from the western and southern directions. Four panzer divisions advanced in the west and about 300 more tanks were sent from the south.

The battle began early in the morning and the Soviet troops gained an advantage, since the rising sun shone directly on the Germans directly in the sightings of tanks. The battle formations of the parties mixed rather quickly, and within a few hours after the start of the battle it was difficult to make out where their tanks were.

The Germans found themselves in a very difficult situation, since the main strength of their tanks lay in long-range guns, which were useless in close combat conditions, and the tanks themselves were very slow, while maneuverability was decisive in this situation. The 2nd and 3rd tank (anti-tank) armies of the Germans were defeated near Kursk. On the contrary, Russian tanks gained an advantage, since they had a chance to heal the vulnerabilities of heavily armored German tanks, and they themselves were very maneuverable (especially the famous T-34s).

However, the Germans nevertheless gave a serious rebuff to their anti-tank guns, which undermined the fighting spirit of the Russian tankers - the fire was so dense that the soldiers and tanks could not keep up and could not form orders.

While the bulk of the armored forces were connected in battle, the Germans decided to use the Kempf tank group, which was advancing on the left flank of the Soviet army. To repel this attack, the Red Army's tank reserves had to be used. In the south, by 2:00 p.m., Soviet troops began to push German tank units, which did not have fresh reserves. In the evening, the battlefield was already far behind the Soviet tank units and the battle was won.

The loss of tanks on both sides during the battle of Prokhorovka during the Kursk defensive operation was as follows:

• about 250 Soviet tanks;
• 70 German tanks.

The above figures are irrevocable losses. The number of damaged tanks was significantly large. For example, the Germans after the battle of Prokhorovka had only 1 \\ 10 fully operational vehicles.

The battle of Prokhorovka is called the largest tank battle in history, but this is not entirely true. In fact, this is the largest tank battle that lasted only one day. But the largest battle took place two years earlier, also between the forces of the Germans and the USSR on the Eastern Front near Dubno. During this battle, which began on June 23, 1941, 4,500 tanks collided with each other. The Soviet Union had 3,700 units of equipment, while the Germans had only 800 units.

Despite such a numerical advantage of the tank units of the Union, there was not a single chance of victory. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the quality of the tanks of the Germans was much higher - they were armed with new models with good anti-tank armor and weapons. Secondly, in Soviet military thought at that time there was a principle that "tanks do not fight tanks." Most tanks in the USSR at that time had only bulletproof armor and themselves could not penetrate thick German armor. That is why the first largest tank battle was a catastrophic failure for the USSR.

The results of the defensive phase of the battle

The defensive stage of the Battle of Kursk ended on July 23, 1943 with the complete victory of the Soviet troops and the crushing defeat of the Wehrmacht forces. As a result of bloody battles, the German army was exhausted and bloodless, a significant number of tanks were either destroyed or partially lost their combat readiness. The German tanks participating in the battle of Prokhorovka were almost completely disabled, destroyed or fell into the hands of the enemy.

The ratio of losses during the defensive phase of the Battle of Kursk was as follows: 4.95: 1. The Soviet army lost five times as many soldiers, while the German losses were much smaller. However, a huge number of German soldiers were wounded, as well as tank troops were destroyed, which significantly undermined the military power of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

As a result of the defensive operation, Soviet troops entered the line that they occupied before the German offensive, which began on July 5. The Germans turned to deep defense.

During the Battle of Kursk, a radical change occurred. After the Germans depleted their offensive capabilities, the counterattack of the Red Army on the Kursk Bulge began. From July 17 to July 23, the Soviet troops conducted the Izyum-Barvenkovo \u200b\u200boffensive operation.

The operation was carried out by the South-Western Front of the Red Army. Its key goal was to hold down the enemy Donbass grouping, so that the enemy could not transfer fresh reserves to the Kursk Bulge. Despite the fact that the enemy threw almost the best tank divisions into battle, the forces of the Southwestern Front nevertheless managed to capture the bridgeheads and with powerful blows fettered and surrounded the Donbass group of Germans. Thus, the Southwestern Front significantly helped in the defense of the Kursk Bulge.

Miuss offensive operation

From July 17 to August 2, 1943, the Miuss offensive operation was also carried out. The main task of the Soviet troops during the operation was to delay the fresh reserves of the Germans from the Kursk Bulge to the Donbass and the defeat of the 6th Army of the Wehrmacht. To repel the attack in the Donbass, the Germans had to transfer significant aviation forces and tank units to defend the city. Despite the fact that the Soviet troops failed to break through the German defense near the Donbass, they still managed to significantly weaken the offensive on the Kursk Bulge.

The offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk continued successfully for the Red Army. The following important battles on the Kursk Bulge took place near Orel and Kharkov - the offensive operations were called “Kutuzov” and “Rumyantsev”.

The offensive operation "Kutuzov" began on July 12, 1943 in the area of \u200b\u200bthe city of Oryol, where two German armies opposed the Soviet troops. As a result of bloody battles, the Germans could not hold the bridgeheads on July 26, they retreated. On August 5, the city of Oryol was liberated by the forces of the Red Army. It was on August 5, 1943, for the first time in the entire period of hostilities with Germany, that a small parade with a salute took place in the USSR capital. Thus, it can be judged that the liberation of the Eagle was an extremely important task for the Red Army, with which it successfully coped.

  Offensive operation "Rumyantsev"

The next main event of the Battle of Kursk during its offensive phase began on August 3, 1943 on the southern edge of the arc. As already mentioned, this strategic offensive was called the Rumyantsev. The operation was carried out by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front.

Two days after the start of the operation, on August 5, the city of Belgorod was liberated from the Nazis. And two days later, the forces of the Red Army liberated the city of Bogodukhov. During the offensive on August 11, Soviet soldiers managed to cut the railway line of the Germans Kharkov-Poltava. Despite all the counterattacks of the German army, the forces of the Red Army continued to advance. As a result of fierce fighting, the city of Kharkov was repelled on August 23.

The battle of Kursk at that moment was already won by the Soviet troops. The German command also understood this, but Hitler gave a clear order to "stand to the last."

The Mginsky offensive operation began on July 22 and lasted until August 22, 1943. The main goals of the USSR were as follows: to finally disrupt the Germans' plan of attack on Leningrad, to prevent the enemy from throwing forces west and completely destroy the 18th Wehrmacht army.

The operation began from a powerful artillery strike in the enemy direction. The forces of the parties at the time the operation began on the Kursk Bulge looked like this: 260 thousand soldiers and about 600 tanks on the side of the USSR, and 100 thousand people and 150 tanks on the side of the Wehrmacht.

Despite the strong artillery bombardment, the German army offered fierce resistance. Although the Red Army forces managed to immediately capture the first echelon of enemy defense, they could not advance further.

In early August 1943, having received fresh reserves, the Red Army again began to attack German positions. Thanks to the numerical advantage and powerful mortar fire, Soviet soldiers managed to capture the enemy defensive fortifications in the village of Porechye. However, the spacecraft could not advance further, the German defense was too dense.

A fierce battle between the opposing sides during the operation unfolded over the Sinyaevo and Sinyaevsky heights, which several times captured the Soviet troops, and then they returned to the Germans. The fighting was fierce and both sides suffered heavy losses. The German defense was so strong that the command of the spacecraft decided to stop the offensive operation on August 22, 1943 and move on to defensive defense. Thus, the Mginsky offensive operation did not bring final success, although it played an important strategic role. To repel this attack, the Germans had to use the reserves, which were supposed to go to Kursk.

  Smolensk offensive operation

Until the Soviet counterattack in the Battle of Kursk in 1943 began, it was extremely important for the Stavka to defeat as many enemy units as possible, which the Wehrmacht could send under the Course to deter Soviet troops. In order to weaken the enemy’s defenses and deprive him of reserves, the Smolensk offensive operation was carried out. Smolensk direction adjacent to the western region of the Kursk ledge. The operation was codenamed Suvorov and began on August 7, 1943. The offensive was launched by the forces of the left wing of the Kalinin Front, as well as the entire Western Front.

The operation ended in success, since its course marked the beginning of the liberation of Belarus. However, most importantly, the warlords of the Battle of Kursk managed to hold down as many as 55 enemy divisions, preventing them from going to Kursk - this significantly increased the chances of the Red Army during the counter-offensive near Kursk.

To weaken the enemy’s position near Kursk, the Red Army carried out another operation - the Donbass offensive. The parties' plans for the Donbass basin were very serious, because this place served as an important economic center - the Donetsk mines were extremely important for the USSR and Germany. In Donbass there was a huge German group, which numbered more than 500 thousand people.

The operation began on August 13, 1943 and was carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front. On August 16, Red Army forces met serious resistance on the Mius River, where a heavily fortified defensive line stood. On August 16, forces of the Southern Front entered the battle, who managed to break through the enemy defenses. Especially in battles the 67th showed up from all regiments. The successful offensive continued and on August 30 the spacecraft liberated the city of Taganrog.

On August 23, 1943, the offensive phase of the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Kursk itself ended, however, the Donbass offensive operation continued - space forces had to push the enemy over the Dnieper River.

Now for the Germans important strategic positions were lost and the threat of dismemberment and death loomed over Army Group South. To prevent this, the leader of the Third Reich nevertheless allowed her to retreat beyond the Dnieper.

September 1, all German units in the area began to retreat from the Donbass. On September 5, Gorlovka was liberated, and three days later, during the fighting, Stalin was taken or, as the city is now called, Donetsk.

The retreat for the German army was very difficult. Wehrmacht forces ran out of ammunition for artillery pieces. During the retreat, German soldiers actively used the scorched earth tactics. The Germans killed civilians and burned villages, as well as small towns on their way. During the Battle of Kursk in 1943, retreating by the cities, the Germans robbed everything that came to hand.

On September 22, the Germans managed to be thrown across the Dnieper River in the area of \u200b\u200bthe cities of Zaporozhye and Dnipropetrovsk. After this, the Donbass offensive operation came to an end, ending with the complete success of the Red Army.

All the operations undertaken above led to the fact that the Wehrmacht forces, as a result of the fighting in the Battle of Kursk, were forced to withdraw beyond the Dnieper in order to build new defensive lines. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was the result of the increased courage and fighting spirit of Soviet soldiers, the skill of commanders and the competent use of military equipment.

The Battle of Kursk in 1943, and then the Battle of the Dnieper, finally consolidated the initiative on the Eastern Front for the USSR. No one doubted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War would be for the USSR. This was also understood by the allies of Germany, who began to gradually abandon the Germans, leaving the Reich even less likely.

Many historians also believe that the Allied offensive on the island of Sicily, which at that time was occupied mainly by Italian troops, played an important role in the victory over the Germans during the Battle of Kursk.

On July 10, the Allies launched an offensive on Sicily, and Italian troops surrendered to the British and American forces almost without resistance. This greatly spoiled Hitler's plans, since in order to keep Western Europe he had to transfer part of the troops from the Eastern Front, which again weakened the position of the Germans at Kursk. Already on July 10, Manstein told Hitler that the offensive near Kursk needed to be stopped and went into deep defense beyond the Dnieper River, but Hitler still hoped that the enemy would not succeed in defeating the Wehrmacht.

Everyone knows that the Battle of Kursk during the Great Patriotic War was bloody and the date of its beginning is associated with the death of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers. However, there were also funny (interesting) facts during the Battle of Kursk. One such case is associated with the KV-1 tank.

During a tank battle, one of the Soviet KV-1 tanks stalled and the crew ran out of ammunition. He was opposed by two German tanks Pz.IV, which could not penetrate the armor of the KV-1. German tankers tried to get to the Soviet crew, sawing through the armor, but nothing came of it. Then two Pz.IV decided to drag the KV-1 to their base in order to deal with the tankers there. They hitched a KV-1 and began towing it. Somewhere halfway around, the KV-1 engine suddenly started and the Soviet tank dragged two Pz.IVs to its base. German tankers were shocked and simply abandoned their tanks.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

If the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad completed the period of defense of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War, then the end of the Battle of Kursk marked a radical change in the course of hostilities.

After the report on the victory in the Battle of Kursk came to Stalin’s table, the Secretary General said that this was only the beginning and very soon the Red Army forces would push the Germans out of the occupied territories of the USSR.

Events after the Battle of Kursk, of course, did not unfold simply for the Red Army. Victories were accompanied by huge losses, because the enemy stubbornly held the defense.

The liberation of cities after the Battle of Kursk continued, for example, in November 1943, the capital of the Ukrainian SSR, the city of Kiev, was liberated.

A very important result of the Battle of Kursk is change in the attitude of the allies towards the USSR. In a report to the US president, written in August, it was said that the USSR now occupies a dominant position in World War II. There is evidence of this. If Germany allocated only two divisions to the defense of Sicily from the combined forces of Great Britain and the USA, then on the Eastern Front of the USSR he attracted the attention of two hundred German divisions.

The United States was very worried about the success of the Russians on the Eastern Front. Roosevelt said that if the Soviet Union continued to pursue such success, the opening of a “second front” would be unnecessary and the United States would then be unable to influence the fate of Europe without self-interest. Consequently, the opening of a "second front" should follow as soon as possible, while US assistance was generally required.

The failure of the operation "Citadel" entailed the failure of further strategic offensive operations of the Wehrmacht, which were already prepared for execution. A victory near Kursk would allow the advance on Leningrad to be developed, and after the Germans set off to occupy Sweden.

The outcome of the Battle of Kursk was the erosion of the authority of Germany among its allies. The successes of the USSR on the Eastern Front made it possible for the Americans and British to turn around in Western Europe. After such a crushing defeat of Germany, the leader of fascist Italy, Benito Mussolini, broke off agreements with Germany and left the war. Thus, Hitler lost his faithful ally.

For success, of course, had to pay dearly. The losses of the USSR in the Battle of Kursk were enormous, as, indeed, the German ones. The balance of power has already been rendered above - now it is worth taking a look at the losses in the Battle of Kursk.

In fact, determining the exact number of deaths is quite difficult, since data from different sources are very different. Many historians take the average figures - this is 200 thousand dead and three times as many wounded. The least optimistic data indicate more than 800 thousand people who died on both sides and the same number of wounded. The parties also lost a huge number of tanks and equipment. Aviation in the Battle of Kursk played almost a key role and the loss of aircraft amounted to about 4. thousand units on both sides. Moreover, aviation losses are the only ones where the Red Army lost no more than the German - each lost about 2 thousand aircraft. For example, the ratio of human losses looks like this 5: 1 or 4: 1 according to different sources. Based on the characteristics of the Battle of Kursk, we can conclude that the effectiveness of Soviet aircraft at this stage of the war was not inferior to the German, while at the beginning of hostilities the situation was radically different.

Soviet soldiers near Kursk showed extraordinary heroism. Their exploits were noted even abroad, especially by American and British publications. The heroism of the Red Army was also noted by German generals, including Manshein, who was considered the best commander of the Reich. Several hundred thousand soldiers received awards "for participation in the Battle of Kursk."

Another interesting fact is that the children also participated in the Battle of Kursk. Of course, they did not fight on the front line, but provided serious support in the rear. They helped deliver supplies and shells. And before the start of the battle, with the help of children, hundreds of kilometers of railways were built, which were necessary for the rapid transportation of military and supplies.

Finally, it is important to consolidate all the data. Date of the end and beginning of the Battle of Kursk: July 5 and August 23, 1943.

Key dates of the Battle of Kursk:

• July 5 - 23, 1943 –Kursk strategic defensive operation;
• July 23 - August 23, 1943 - Kursk strategic offensive operation;
• July 12, 1943 - bloody tank battle near Prokhorovka;
• July 17 - 27, 1943 –Izyum-Barvenkovo \u200b\u200boffensive operation;
• July 17 - August 2, 1943 - Mius offensive operation;
• July 12 - August 18, 1943 - Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov";
• August 3 - 23, 1943 - Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Rumyantsev";
• July 22 - August 23, 1943 - Mginsky offensive operation;
• August 7 - October 2, 1943 - Smolensk offensive operation;
• August 13 - September 22, 1943 - Donbass offensive operation.

Results of the battle on the Arc of Fire:

• radical turn of events during World War II and World War II;
• complete fiasco of the German campaign to seize the USSR;
• the Nazis lost confidence in the invincibility of the German army, which reduced the morale of the soldiers and led to conflicts in the ranks of the command.

After the battle of Stalingrad, which ended in disaster for Germany, the Wehrmacht attempted revenge as early as the next, 1943. This attempt went down in history as the Battle of Kursk and became the point of a final turning point in World War II and World War II.

Background to the Battle of Kursk

During the counterattack from November 1942 to February 1943, the Red Army managed to defeat a large group of Germans, encircle and force the 6th Wehrmacht army near Stalingrad, and also liberate very vast territories. So, in January-February, Soviet troops managed to seize Kursk and Kharkov and thereby cut through the German defense. The gap reached about 200 kilometers wide and 100-150 in depth.

Realizing that a further Soviet offensive could lead to the collapse of the entire Eastern Front, the Hitler command in early March 1943 took a series of vigorous actions in the Kharkov region. A strike force was created very quickly, which by March 15 again captured Kharkov and made an attempt to cut off a ledge in the Kursk region. However, here the German advance was stopped.

As of April 1943, the line of the Soviet-German front was almost even along its entire length, and only in the Kursk region it bent, forming a large ledge protruding into the German side. The configuration of the front made it clear where the main battles would unfold in the 1943 summer campaign.

Plans and forces of the parties before the Battle of Kursk

In the spring, heated debate broke out in the German leadership regarding the fate of the 1943 summer campaign. A part of the German generals (for example, G. Guderian) generally proposed to refrain from the offensive in order to accumulate strength in the large-scale offensive campaign of 1944. However, most German military leaders were decisive for the offensive as early as 1943. This offensive was to become a kind of revenge for the humiliating defeat at Stalingrad, as well as the final turning point of the war in favor of Germany and its allies.

Thus, in the summer of 1943, the Nazi command again planned an offensive campaign. However, it is worth noting that from 1941 to 1943 the scale of these campaigns was steadily decreasing. So, if in 1941 the Wehrmacht launched an offensive on the entire front, then in 1943 it was only a small section of the Soviet-German front.

The meaning of the operation, called the "Citadel", consisted in the offensive of large Wehrmacht forces at the base of the Kursk Bulge and their striking in the general direction to Kursk. The Soviet troops in the ledge would inevitably have to get encircled and destroyed. After that, it was planned to launch an offensive in the educated gap in the Soviet defense and go to Moscow from the south-west. This plan, if it were successfully implemented, would be a real disaster for the Red Army, because in the Kursk ledge there was a very large number of troops.

The Soviet leadership learned important lessons from the spring of 1942 and 1943. Thus, by March 1943 the Red Army was thoroughly exhausted by offensive battles, which led to the defeat near Kharkov. After that, it was decided not to start the summer campaign with an offensive, since it was obvious that the Germans were planning to attack. Also, the Soviet leadership had no doubt that the Wehrmacht would attack precisely on the Kursk Bulge, where the configuration of the front line contributed to this as much as possible.

That is why, having weighed all the circumstances, the Soviet command decided to exhaust the German troops, inflict serious losses on them and then go on the offensive, finally fixing the turning point in the war in favor of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition.

For the advance on Kursk, the German leadership concentrated a very large group, the number of which was 50 divisions. Of these 50 divisions, 18 were tank and motorized. From the sky, the German group was covered by aircraft of the 4th and 6th Luftwaffe air fleets. Thus, the total number of German troops at the beginning of the battle of Kursk was approximately 900 thousand people, about 2700 tanks and 2000 aircraft. Due to the fact that the northern and southern Wehrmacht groups on the Kursk Bulge were part of different army groups (“Center” and “South”), the leadership was carried out by the commanders of these army groups - Field Marshals Kluge and Manstein.

The Soviet group on the Kursk Bulge was represented by three fronts. The northern face of the ledge was defended by the troops of the Central Front under the command of Army General Rokossovsky, the southern - by the troops of the Voronezh Front under the command of Army General Vatutin. Also in the Kursk ledge were troops of the Steppe Front, commanded by Colonel General Konev. General leadership of the troops in the Kursk ledge was carried out by Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov. The number of Soviet troops was approximately 1 million 350 thousand people, 5000 tanks and about 2900 aircraft.

Beginning of the Battle of Kursk (July 5 - 12, 1943)

On the morning of July 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive on Kursk. However, the Soviet leadership knew about the exact time of the beginning of this offensive, thanks to which it was able to take a number of countermeasures. One of the most significant measures was the organization of artillery counter-training, which allowed in the first minutes and hours of the battle to inflict serious losses and significantly reduce the offensive capabilities of German troops.

Nevertheless, the German offensive began, and in the early days he managed to achieve some success. The first line of Soviet defense was broken, but the Germans failed to achieve serious success. On the northern front of the Kursk Bulge, the Wehrmacht launched a strike in the direction of Olkhovatka, but, failing to break through the Soviet defenses, they turned towards the settlement of Ponyri. However, here, the Soviet defense was able to withstand the onslaught of German troops. As a result of the fighting, on July 5-10, 1943, the 9th German army suffered terrible losses in tanks: about two-thirds of the vehicles were out of order. July 10, army units went on the defensive.

A more dramatic situation unfolded in the south. Here, the German army in the early days managed to break into the Soviet defense, but did not break through it. The offensive was carried out in the direction of the settlement Oboyan, which was held by Soviet troops, which also caused significant damage to the Wehrmacht.

After several days of fighting, the German leadership decided to shift the direction of the lava strike to Prokhorovka. The implementation of this decision would make it possible to cover a larger territory than planned. However, parts of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army stood in the way of German tank wedges.

On July 12, one of the largest tank battles in history took place in the Prokhorovka area. From the German side, about 700 tanks participated in it, while from the Soviet side about 800. Soviet troops launched a counterattack on parts of the Wehrmacht in order to eliminate the enemy’s penetration into the Soviet defense. However, this counterattack did not achieve significant results. The Red Army only managed to stop the advance of the Wehrmacht in the south of the Kursk Bulge, but only two weeks later restored the situation at the beginning of the German offensive.

By July 15, having suffered huge losses as a result of continuous violent attacks, the Wehrmacht had practically exhausted its offensive capabilities and had to go over to the defensive all along the front. By July 17, German troops began to withdraw to their starting lines. Given the current situation, as well as pursuing the goal of inflicting a serious defeat on the enemy, the Supreme Command Headquarters on July 18, 1943 authorized the transfer of Soviet troops on the Kursk Bulge to a counterattack.

Now German forces were forced to defend themselves in order to avoid a military catastrophe. However, parts of the Wehrmacht, seriously worn out in offensive battles, could not provide serious resistance. Soviet troops, reinforced by reserves, were full of power and readiness to crush the enemy.

Two operations were developed and carried out to defeat the German troops that covered the Kursk Bulge: “Kutuzov” (to defeat the Wehrmacht Oryol group) and “Rumyantsev” (to defeat the Belgorod-Kharkov group).

As a result of the Soviet offensive, the Oryol and Belgorod groups of German troops were defeated. On August 5, 1943, Oryol and Belgorod were liberated by Soviet troops, and the Kursk Bulge virtually ceased to exist. On the same day, Moscow saluted for the first time the Soviet troops who liberated the city from the enemy.

The last battle of the Battle of Kursk was the liberation of Kharkov by the Soviet troops. The fighting for this city took on a very fierce character, but thanks to the decisive onslaught of the Red Army, the city was liberated by the end of August 23. It is the capture of Kharkov that is considered the logical conclusion of the Battle of Kursk.

Loss of parties

Estimates of the losses of the Red Army, as well as the Wehrmacht troops, have different estimates. Even greater confusion is brought by large differences between the estimates of the losses of the parties in different sources.

So, Soviet sources indicate that during the Battle of Kursk the Red Army lost about 250 thousand people killed and about 600 thousand wounded. At the same time, some Wehrmacht data indicate 300 thousand dead and 700 thousand wounded. Losses of armored vehicles range from 1,000 to 6,000 tanks and self-propelled guns. Losses of Soviet aviation are estimated at 1,600 aircraft.

However, regarding the assessment of Wehrmacht losses, the data vary even more. According to German data, the losses of German troops ranged from 83 to 135 thousand people killed. But at the same time, Soviet data indicate the number of dead Wehrmacht soldiers about 420 thousand. Losses of German armored vehicles range from 1,000 tanks (according to German data) to 3,000. Aviation losses amount to approximately 1,700 aircraft.

The results and significance of the Battle of Kursk

Immediately after the battle of Kursk and immediately during it, the Red Army began a series of large-scale operations to liberate the Soviet lands from German occupation. Among these operations: “Suvorov” (operation to liberate Smolensk, Donbass and Chernihiv-Poltava.

Thus, the victory near Kursk opened up wide operational scope for action for the Soviet troops. German troops, bloodless and defeated as a result of the summer battles, ceased to be a serious threat until December 1943. However, this does not mean at all that the Wehrmacht at that time was not strong. On the contrary, snapping fiercely, the German troops sought to maintain at least the Dnieper line.

For the Allied command, which landed troops on the island of Sicily in July 1943, the battle of Kursk became a kind of “help”, since the Wehrmacht was no longer able to transfer reserves to the island - the Eastern Front was more priority. Even after the defeat at Kursk, the Wehrmacht command was forced to transfer fresh forces from Italy to the east, and to send in their place units battered in battles with the Red Army.

For the German command, the battle of Kursk was the moment when plans to defeat the Red Army and defeat the USSR finally became an illusion. It became clear that for a sufficiently long time the Wehrmacht would be forced to refrain from conducting active actions.

The battle of Kursk was the end of a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic and World War II. After this battle, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army, thanks to which by the end of 1943 vast territories of the Soviet Union were liberated, including such large cities as Kiev and Smolensk.

Internationally, the victory in the Battle of Kursk was the moment when the peoples of Europe enslaved by the Nazis perked up. The people's liberation movement in Europe began to grow even faster. Its culmination came in 1944, when the sunset of the Third Reich became very obvious.

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In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge ledge was formed on the line of the Soviet-German front between the cities of Oryol and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. On the bend of the arc were the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh Fronts and the German Army Groups Center and South.

Some representatives of the highest command circles of Germany suggested the Wehrmacht to go on defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring their own forces and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking immediately on all fronts. Therefore, it was decided to limit the offensive action to only one segment of the front. Logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were supposed to strike in convergent directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed Citadel, were approved on May 10–11, 1943.

To solve the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance during the summer period of 1943 was not difficult. The Kursk ledge, extending many kilometers deep into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, a decision was made to move to deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The troops of the Red Army were to restrain the onslaught of the Nazi forces, exhaust the enemy, and then go on a counterattack and defeat the enemy. After that, it was supposed to launch a general offensive in the western and south-western directions.

In case the Germans decided not to attack in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kursk Bulge, an offensive action plan was also created by forces concentrated on this sector of the front. However, the defense plan remained a priority, and it was to its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.

The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to the mining of approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields amounted to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front. Anti-tank artillery was not evenly distributed along the front, but assembled in the so-called "anti-tank areas" - localized clusters of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped the shelling sectors. Thus, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and the shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once.

Before the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20 000 guns and mortars, as well as 2800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1,500 tanks, 7,400 guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.

From the German side, 50 German divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10 000 guns and about 2.5 thousand aircraft.

Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command was able to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the necessary concentration of troops in the breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in sufficient quantities new heavy Tiger tanks and medium Panthers, as well as Ferdinand heavy self-propelled guns, which were only 89 in the troops (out of 90 built) and which, however , by themselves, represented a considerable threat, provided that they were correctly used in the right place.

The German Air Force was armed with new combat aircraft at that time: the Fokke-Wulf-190A fighters and the Henschel-129 attack aircraft. During the battles on the Kursk Bulge the first mass use by the Soviet Air Force of the La-5, Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters took place.

On May 6-8, Soviet aviation, using six air armies, launched a strike on a 1,200-kilometer front from Smolensk to the coast of the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov. The goal for this strike was the airfields of the German Air Force. On the one hand, this really made it possible to inflict certain damage on both cars and airfields, however, on the other hand, Soviet aircraft suffered losses, and these actions did not have a significant impact on the situation in the upcoming Battle of Kursk.

In general, the same can be said about the actions of the Luftwaffe. German planes bombed railways, bridges, places of concentration of Soviet forces. It is worth noting that German aviation often acted more successfully. Claims in this regard were made to parts of the Soviet air defense. One way or another, the German troops could not achieve serious damage and disruption to the communications of the Red Army.

Both commands — the Voronezh and Central Fronts — predicted the date of the German troops on the offensive quite accurately: according to them, the attack should have been expected from July 3 to 6. The day before the battle, Soviet intelligence managed to capture the "language", which reported that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.

The northern face of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the beginning of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this event was quite controversial. According to reports of Soviet artillery, German troops suffered substantial damage. However, apparently, it was still not possible to inflict big damage. It is precisely known about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the violation of the enemy’s wired lines. In addition, now the Germans knew for sure that a sudden attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.

Aviation was supposed to support Soviet troops in the process of counteracting artillery raids, but due to the dark time of the day, all sorties were canceled. At 2:30 on July 5, a readiness directive was received by the aviation units from the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rudenko. In accordance with it, the fighter units should have been ready to repel possible Luftwaffe raids already at dawn, and attack aircraft and bombers were ordered to be ready by 6:00 in the morning.

In the early morning, Soviet fighters began a battle with German bombers and attack aircraft. In the area of \u200b\u200bMaloarkhangelsk, German Ju-88s, operating under the guise of Fokke-Wulf fighter jets, bombed the location of Soviet units. The pilots of the 157th fighter regiment shot down three Ju-88s and two FW-190s. The Germans shot down five Soviet fighters. In this battle, the Luftwaffe lost the commander of the unit, German Michael, whose plane, according to German data, exploded in the air.

Until half-past seven in the morning on the first day of the battle on the Central Front section, Soviet pilots managed to quite successfully repel the Luftwaffe attacks. However, then the Germans began to act much more actively. The number of enemy aircraft in the air also increased. Soviet aircraft continued to fly out in groups of 6-8 fighters: the organizational mistake made by the air command affected. This led to serious difficulties for fighters of the Red Army Air Force. In general, on the first day of the battle, the 16th Air Army suffered quite serious losses in both destroyed and damaged aircraft. In addition to the errors mentioned above, the small experience of many Soviet pilots also affected.

On July 6, the 16th Air Army accompanied the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps at Maloarkhangelsk. Aircraft of the 221st Bomber Division took off until the afternoon, attacking German troops in Senkovo, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyana and other settlements. At the same time, German planes continuously bombed the positions of Soviet troops. According to Soviet data, Soviet tanks did not suffer heavy losses from bombs - most of the vehicles destroyed and damaged by that time were hit by land means.

Until July 9, the 16th Air Army continued not only to conduct active battles, but also simultaneously try to change the tactics of using aviation. Before the bombers, they tried to send large groups of fighters to "clear" the airspace. Air division commanders and regiments began to receive more initiative in planning operations. But when conducting operations, the pilots had to act in accordance with the set goals, without being distracted from the plan.

In general, during the battles of the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, units of the 16th Air Army completed about 7.5 thousand sorties. The army suffered heavy losses, but did everything possible to provide proper support to its ground forces. Starting from the third day of fighting, the command of the army changed the tactics of the aircraft, resorting to massive attacks on the accumulations of enemy equipment and manpower. These attacks had a positive impact on the development of events on July 9-10 in the battle zone of the Central Front.

In the Voronezh Front’s range of operations (commander is Army General Vatutin), hostilities began as early as July 4 with attacks by German units on positions of the front’s military security and lasted until late at night.

On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. The fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was significantly more intense and was accompanied by more serious losses of the Soviet troops than on the northern. The reason for this was the area more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front command.

The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 am on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed with the support of tanks and aircraft. Both were repelled, after which the Germans moved the direction of the attack towards the settlement of Butovo. In the battles of Cherkassky, the enemy practically managed to make a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses the Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the personnel of the units.

Air support of the Red Army units on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was carried out by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. In the early morning of July 5, German aviation began bombing the battle formations of the first and second lines of Soviet defense. Departures by fighter squadrons managed to inflict quite substantial damage to the enemy, but the losses of the Soviet troops were also high.

On July 6, German tanks launched an assault on the second line of defense of the Soviet troops. On this day, among the other Soviet units, it should be noted the 291st assault and the 2nd guards assault air divisions of the 16th air army, which for the first time used cumulative bombs PTAB 2.5-1.5 in battle. The effect of these bombs on enemy vehicles was described as "excellent."

The problems and shortcomings that were noted in the actions of Soviet aviation of the 2nd and 17th air armies are very similar to similar problems in the 16th army. However, even here the command tried to correct the tactics of using airplanes, solve organizational problems as quickly as possible, and by all means strive to increase the effectiveness of the air forces. Apparently, these measures have reached their goal. Increasingly, in the reports of the commanders of ground units, words began to appear that the Soviet attack aircraft significantly facilitate the reflection of German tank and infantry attacks. Fighters also inflicted significant damage to the enemy. So, it was noted that only the 5th fighter air corps in the first three days reached the mark of 238 enemy aircraft shot down.

On July 10, bad weather set in the Kursk. This sharply reduced the number of sorties from both the Soviet and German sides. Among the unconditionally successful battles of this day, one can note the actions of 10 La-5 from the 193 fighter regiment, who were able to “disperse” a group of 35 Ju-87 dive bombers with a cover of six Bf.109. Enemy aircraft randomly dropped bombs and began to leave on their territory. Two Junkers were shot down. Heroic feat in this battle was made by junior lieutenant M.V. Kubyshkin, who, saving his commander, went to the oncoming ram of the Messerschmitt and died.

On July 12, at the height of the Prokhorov battle, aviation on both sides could provide only very limited support to ground units: weather conditions continued to be bad. The Red Army Air Force made only 759 sorties on this day, and the Luftwaffe - 654. At the same time, there are no references to destroyed Soviet tanks in the reports of German pilots. Subsequently, the advantage in the air on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge gradually passed to Soviet aviation. By July 17, the activity of the 8th German air corps fell to almost zero.

July forty-third ... These hot days and nights of war are an integral part of the history of the Soviet Army with Nazi invaders. The front in its configuration in the area near the Kursk front resembled a giant arc. This segment attracted the attention of the fascist command. The German command was preparing an offensive operation as revenge. The Nazis spent a lot of time and effort on developing a plan.

Hitler’s operational order began with the words: “I decided, as soon as weather conditions permit, to carry out the Citadel offensive - the first offensive this year ... It should end with quick and decisive success” Everything was collected by the Nazis in a powerful fist. Swift tanks "tigers" and "panthers" super heavy self-propelled guns "ferdinand" according to the Nazis planned to crush, sweep the Soviet troops, turn the tide of events.

Operation Citadel

The Battle of Kursk began on the night of July fifth, when a German sapper captured during the interrogation said that at three in the morning the German operation “Citadel” would begin. Only a few minutes remained before the decisive battle ... The most important decision should be made by the Military Council of the front, and it was adopted. On July 5, 1943, at two hours and twenty minutes, silence exploded with the thunder of our guns ... The battle that began lasted until August 23.

As a result, events on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War turned into a defeat for Hitler's groups. The strategy of the Wehrmacht operation “Citadel” on the Kursk bridgehead is crushing strikes using surprise on the forces of the Soviet Army, their encirclement and destruction. The triumph of the Citadel plan was to ensure the fulfillment of further plans of the Wehrmacht. To disrupt the plans of the Nazis, the General Staff developed a strategy aimed at defending the battle and creating conditions for the liberation actions of the Soviet troops.

Battle of Kursk

The actions of the Army Group Center and the Kempf Task Force of the South Army, which came forward from Orel and Belgorod in the battle on the Middle Russian Upland, were to decide not only the fate of these cities, but also change the entire subsequent course of the war. The reflection of the blow from the side of the Eagle was assigned to the formations of the Central Front. The units of the Voronezh Front were to meet the advancing units from Belgorod.

The steppe front, consisting of a rifle, tank, mechanized and cavalry corps, was entrusted with a bridgehead in the rear of the Kursk bend. On July 12, 1943, the Russian field under the Prokhorovka railway station experienced the greatest through tank battle, noted by historians unseen in the world, the largest through tank battle. Russian power in its own land passed another test, turned the course of history to victory.

One day of the battle cost the Wehrmacht 400 tanks and nearly 10,000 casualties. Hitler groups were forced to go on the defensive. The battle on the Prokhorovsky field was continued by units of the Bryansk, Central and Western fronts, having begun the operation "Kutuzov", whose task is to defeat enemy groups in the Orel region. From July 16 to July 18, the corps of the Central and Steppe Fronts liquidated the Nazi groups in the Kursk triangle and began to pursue it with the support of the air forces. Together, Hitler’s formations were driven back 150 km to the west. The cities of Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov were liberated.

The significance of the Battle of Kursk

• An unprecedented force, the most powerful tank battle in history, was the key to the development of further offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War;
• The Battle of Kursk is the main part of the strategic tasks of the General Staff of the Red Army in the plans of the 1943 campaign;
• As a result of the implementation of the Kutuzov plan and the operation Rumyantsev Commander, parts of the Nazi troops were defeated in the cities of Oryol, Belgorod and Kharkov. The strategic Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads were eliminated;
• The end of the battle meant the complete transfer of strategic initiatives into the hands of the Soviet Army, which continued to advance to the West, freeing cities and towns.

Results of the Battle of Kursk

• The failure of the Wehrmacht operation "Citadel" presented the world community with powerlessness and the complete defeat of the Nazi company against the Soviet Union;
• A radical change in the situation on the Soviet-German front and the whole as a result of the "fiery" Kursk battle;
• The psychological breakdown of the German army was obvious, there was no longer any confidence in the superiority of the Aryan race.

BATOV Pavel Ivanovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 65th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Higher Officer Courses "Shot" in 1927, the Higher Academic Courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950.

Member of the First World War since 1916. Awarded for excellence in battles

2 St. George's Crosses and 2 medals.

In 1918, he voluntarily joined the Red Army. From 1920 to 1936, he successively commanded a company, a battalion, and a rifle regiment. In 1936-1937, he fought on the side of republican troops in Spain. Upon returning the commander of the rifle corps (1937). In 1939-1940 he participated in the Soviet-Finnish war. Since 1940, Deputy Commander of the Transcaucasian Military District.

With the beginning of World War II, the commander of the special rifle corps in Crimea, the deputy commander of the 51st Army of the Southern Front (from August 1941), the commander of the 3rd Army (January - February 1942), the assistant commander of the Bryansk Front (February October 1942). From October 1942 until the end of the war, commander of the 65th Army participating in hostilities as part of the Don, Stalingrad, Central, Belorussian, 1st and 2nd Belorussian fronts. The troops under the command of P.I. Batov distinguished themselves in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the battle for the Dnieper, during the liberation of Belarus, in the Wislo-Oder and Berlin operations. The combat successes of the 65th Army were noted about 30 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

For personal courage and courage, for organizing a clear interaction of subordinate troops during the crossing of the Dnieper, P.I. Batov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, and for forcing the river. Oder and the mastery of Stettin (the German name for the Polish city of Szczecin) was awarded the second Golden Star.

After the war - commander of the mechanized and combined arms armies, first deputy commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, commander of the Carpathian and Baltic military districts, commander of the Southern Group of Forces.

In 1962-1965, the chief of staff of the United Armed Forces of the States Parties to the Warsaw Pact. Since 1965, a military inspector has been an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1970, Chairman of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.

He was awarded 6 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky of the 1st degree, "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree, "Badge of Honor", Honorary weapons, foreign orders, medals.

VATUTIN Nikolay Fedorovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumous). In the Battle of Kursk he took part in the post of commander of the Voronezh Front.

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from the Poltava Infantry School in 1922, the Kiev Higher Combined Military School in 1924, and the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze in 1929, the operational faculty of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1934, the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1937

Member of the Civil War. After the war, he commanded a platoon, company, worked at the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Division. In 1931-1941 He was the chief of staff of the division, the chief of the 1st staff department of the Siberian Military District, the deputy chief of staff and the chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District, the chief of the Operations Directorate and the deputy chief of the General Staff.

Since June 30, 1941, the chief of staff of the North-Western Front. In May - July 1942, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In July 1942 he was appointed commander of the Voronezh Front. During the Battle of Stalingrad, he commanded the troops of the Southwestern Front. In March 1943 he was again appointed commander of the Voronezh Front (from October 1943 - the 1st Ukrainian Front). On February 29, 1944, he was seriously wounded while leaving the army and died on April 15. He was buried in Kiev.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, Suvorov 1st degree, Kutuzov 1st degree, Czechoslovak Order.

JADOV Alexey Semenovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 5th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from cavalry courses in 1920, military-political courses in 1928, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1934, Higher academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1950

Member of the Civil War. In November 1919, as part of a separate detachment of the 46th Infantry Division, he fought against Denikinists. Since October 1920, in the position of platoon commander of the cavalry regiment of the 11th cavalry division of the 1st Cavalry Army, he participated in battles with Wrangel’s troops, as well as with gangs operating in Ukraine and Belarus. In the years 1922-1924. fought with the Basmachi in Central Asia, was seriously wounded. Since 1925, the commander of the training platoon, then the commander and political officer of the squadron, the chief of staff of the regiment, the chief of the operational part of the staff of the division, the chief of staff of the corps, and the assistant inspector of cavalry in the Red Army. Since 1940, the commander of the mountain cavalry division.

In World War II, commander of the 4th Airborne Corps (since June 1941). As chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the Central, then the Bryansk Fronts, he took part in the battle of Moscow, in the summer of 1942 he commanded the 8th cavalry corps on the Bryansk Front.

Since October 1942, the commander of the 66th Army of the Don Front, operating north of Stalingrad. Since April 1943, the 66th Army was transformed into the 5th Guards Army.

Under the leadership of A. S. Zhadov, the army as part of the Voronezh Front participated in the defeat of the enemy near Prokhorovka, and then in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation. Subsequently, the 5th Guards Army participated in the liberation of Ukraine, in the Lviv-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, Prague operations.

Army troops for successful military operations were noted 21 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander. For skillful command and control of the troops in the struggle against the Nazi invaders and the courage shown at the same time, A. S. Zhadov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

In the post-war period - Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for combat training (1946-1949), head of the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze (1950-1954), Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces (1954-1955), Deputy and First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces (1956-1964). Since September 1964 - First Deputy Chief Inspector of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since October 1969, a military inspector was an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 5 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, Orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Died in 1977

KATUKOV Mikhail Efimovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 1st Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from the Mogilev infantry courses in 1922, the higher officer courses "Shot" in 1927, the academic advanced training courses for the command staff at the Military Academy of Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army in 1935, the higher academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1951.

Member of the October armed uprising in Petrograd.

In the Civil War, an ordinary soldier fought on the Southern Front.

From 1922 to 1940, he successively commanded a platoon, company, was the head of a regimental school, the commander of a training battalion, the chief of staff of a brigade, and the commander of a tank brigade. Since November 1940, the commander of the 20th Panzer Division.

At the very beginning of World War II, he participated in defensive operations in the area of \u200b\u200bthe cities. Lutsk, Dubno, Korosten.

On November 11, 1941, for brave and skillful combat operations, the brigade of M.E. Katukov was the first in the tank troops to receive the rank of guards.

In 1942, M.E. Katukov commanded the 1st Tank Corps, which reflected the onslaught of enemy troops in the Kursk-Voronezh direction, and then the 3rd Mechanized Corps.

In January 1943, he was appointed to the post of commander of the 1st Panzer Army, which, as part of the Voronezh, and later 1st Ukrainian Front, distinguished itself in the Battle of Kursk during the liberation of Ukraine.

In June 1944, the army was transformed into a guard. She participated in the Lviv-Sandomierz, Vistula-Oder, East Pomeranian and Berlin operations.

In the postwar years, M.E. Katukov commanded the army, armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Since 1955 - Inspector General of the Main Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Since 1963, military inspector-adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was awarded 4 orders of Lenin, 3 orders of the Red Banner, 2 orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky of the 1st degree, Kutuzov of the 2nd degree, the Order of the Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR »3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

KONEV Ivan Stepanovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated as commander of the Steppe Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior personnel at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1926, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1934

In World War I he was drafted into the army and sent to the Southwestern Front. Having been demobilized from the army in 1918, he took part in the establishment of Soviet power in the city of Nikolsk (Vologda Oblast), where he was elected a member of the Nikolsky district executive committee and appointed district military commissar.

During the Civil War, he was the commissar of an armored train, then an infantry brigade, division, headquarters of the people's revolutionary army of the Far Eastern Republic. He fought on the Eastern Front.

After the Civil War, he was the military commissar of the 17th Primorsky Rifle Corps, the 17th Rifle Division. After completing advanced training courses for senior command personnel, he was appointed commander of the regiment. Later he was an assistant to the division commander in 1931-1932. and 1935-1937., He commanded a rifle division, corps and the 2nd separate Red Banner Far Eastern Army.

In 1940-1941 - commanded the troops of the Transbaikal and North Caucasian military districts.

At the beginning of World War II he was commander of the 19th army of the Western Front. Then he successively commanded the Western, Kalinin, North-Western, Steppe and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

In the Battle of Kursk, troops under the command of I. S. Konev successfully acted during the counterattack on the Belgorod-Kharkov direction.

After the war, he held the posts of Commander-in-Chief of the Central Group of Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces - Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army - Deputy Minister of War of the USSR, Commander of the Carpathian Military District, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Member States Warsaw Pact, inspector general of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense, commanders guide the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (1970), Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic (1971).

He was awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, Order of the Red Star, medals and foreign orders.

He was awarded the highest military order "Victory", an honorary weapon.

MALINOVSKY Rodion Yakovlevich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the South-Western Front.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze.

Since 1914 he participated as a private in the First World War. He was awarded the St. George Cross 4th degree.

In February 1916 he was sent to France as part of the Russian Expeditionary Force. Upon returning to Russia, he voluntarily entered the Red Army in 1919.

During the Civil War he participated in battles as part of the 27th Rifle Division of the Eastern Front.

In December 1920, the commander of a machine-gun platoon, then the head of the machine-gun team, the assistant commander, and the battalion commander.

Since 1930, the chief of staff of the cavalry regiment of the 10th cavalry division, then served in the headquarters of the North Caucasian and Belarusian military districts, was the chief of staff of the 3rd cavalry corps.

In the years 1937-1938. He participated as a volunteer in the Spanish Civil War, for military distinctions he was awarded the Orders of Lenin and the Battle Red Banner.

Since 1939, a teacher at the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze. Since March 1941, the commander of the 48th Rifle Corps.

During the Great Patriotic War, he commanded the 6th, 66th, 2nd Guards, 5th Assault and 51st Armies, the South, Southwest, 3rd Ukrainian, 2nd Ukrainian Fronts. He took part in the Battle of Stalingrad, Kursk, Zaporizhzhya, Nikopol-Krivorozh, Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya, Odessa, Iasi-Kishinev, Debrecen, Budapest, Vienna operations.

Since July 1945, the commander of the Transbaikal Front, who dealt the main blow in the Manchurian strategic operation. For high military art, courage and courage, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he commanded the troops of the Trans-Baikal-Amur Military District, was commander in chief of the troops of the Far East, commander of the Far Eastern Military District.

Since March 1956, First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR - Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

Since October 1957, Minister of Defense of the USSR. He remained in this post for the rest of his life.

He was awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, the Order of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

He was awarded the highest military order "Victory".

POPOV Markian Mikhailovich

Army General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated in the post of commander of the Bryansk Front.

Born on November 15, 1902 in the village of Ust-Medveditskaya (now the city of Serafimovich, Volgograd Region).

In the Red Army since 1920

He graduated from infantry command courses in 1922, the higher officer courses "Shot" in 1925, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze.

He fought in the Civil War on the Western Front as an ordinary.

Since 1922, the platoon commander, assistant company commander, assistant chief and chief of the regimental school, battalion commander, inspector of military schools of the Moscow Military District. Since May 1936, the chief of staff of the mechanized brigade, then the 5th mechanized corps. Since June 1938, deputy commander, since September chief of staff, since July 1939, commander of the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East, and since January 1941, commander of the troops of the Leningrad Military District.

During World War II, the commander of the Northern and Leningrad Fronts (June - September 1941), the 61st and 40th armies (November 1941 - October 1942). He was deputy commander of the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts. He successfully commanded the 5th shock army (October 1942 - April 1943), the Reserve Front and troops of the Steppe Military District (April - May 1943), Bryansk (June-October 1943), the Baltic and the 2nd Baltic (October 1943 - April 1944) fronts. From April 1944 until the end of the war, the chief of staff of the Leningrad, 2nd Baltic, and then again Leningrad fronts.

He participated in the planning of operations and successfully led troops in the battles of Leningrad and near Moscow, in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, during the liberation of Karelia and the Baltic states.

In the postwar period, the commander of the troops of Lviv (1945-1946 gg.), Tauride (1946-1954 gg.) Military districts. From January 1955, he was deputy chief, and then head of the Main Directorate of Combat Training, and from August 1956, the chief of the Main Staff was the first deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces. Since 1962, a military inspector is an adviser to the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was awarded 5 orders of Lenin, 3 orders of the Red Banner, 2 orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, 2 orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, the Order of the Red Star, medals, as well as foreign orders.

Rokossovsky Konstantin Konstantinovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the Central Front.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the cavalry advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, and advanced training courses for senior command personnel at the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze in 1929

In the army since 1914. Member of the First World War. He fought as part of the 5th Dragoon Kargopol Regiment, an ordinary and junior non-commissioned officer.

After the October Revolution of 1917, he fought in the ranks of the Red Army. During the Civil War, he commanded a squadron, a separate division and a cavalry regiment. For personal courage and courage, he was awarded 2 Orders of the Red Banner.

After the war, he successively commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, the Cavalry Regiment, and the 5th Separate Cavalry Brigade. For military distinctions under the CER, he was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Since 1930, he commanded the 7th, then 15th cavalry divisions, from 1936 - the 5th cavalry divisions, and from November 1940 - the 9th mechanized corps.

Since July 1941, he commanded the 16th Army of the Western Front. From July 1942 he commanded Bryansk, from September Donskoy, from February 1943 the Central, from October 1943 the Belorussian, from February 1944 the 1st Belorussian and from November 1944 until the end of the war the 2nd Belorussian fronts.

Troops under the command of K.K.

After the war, the commander in chief of the Northern Group of Forces (1945-1949). In October 1949, at the request of the Government of the Polish People’s Republic, with the permission of the Soviet Government, he went to the NDP, where he was appointed Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the NDP Council of Ministers. He was awarded the title of Marshal of Poland.

Upon his return to the USSR in 1956 he was appointed deputy minister of defense of the USSR. Since July 1957, the chief inspector was the Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. Since October 1957, the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Military District. In 1958-1962 Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR and Chief Inspector of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. Since April 1962, the chief inspector of the Group of Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was awarded 7 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 6 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals.

He was awarded the highest military order "Victory". Awarded with an honorary weapon.

ROMANENKO Prokofy Logvinovich

Colonel General. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 2nd Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from advanced training courses for command personnel in 1925, advanced training courses for senior command personnel in 1930, and the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze in 1933, the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948

In military service since 1914. Member of the First World War, ensign. Decorated with 4 St. George's Crosses.

After the October Revolution of 1917, he was a volost military commissar in the Stavropol province, then in the Civil War he commanded a partisan detachment, fought on the South and Western fronts as squadron commander, regiment and assistant commander of the cavalry brigade.

After the war he commanded a cavalry regiment, since 1937 a mechanized brigade. He participated in the national liberation struggle of the Spanish people in 1936-1939. For heroism and courage he was awarded the Order of Lenin.

Since 1938, the commander of the 7th Mechanized Corps, a participant in the Soviet-Finnish War (1939-1940). Since May 1940, the commander of the 34th Rifle, then the 1st Mechanized Corps.

During World War II, the commander of the 17th army of the Transbaikal Front. From May 1942, commander of the 3rd Tank Army, then deputy commander of the Bryansk Front (September-November 1942), from November 1942 to December 1944, commander of the 5th, 2nd Tank Armies, 48th the army. The troops of these armies took part in the Rzhev-Sychevsky operation, in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, in the Belarusian operation.

In 1945-1947 Commander of the troops of the East Siberian Military District.

He was awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, 2 Orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, medals, and a foreign order.

ROTMISTROV Pavel Alekseevich

Chief Marshal of the Armored Forces, Hero of the Soviet Union, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from the Military United School. All-Russian Central Executive Committee, Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze, Military Academy of the General Staff.

In the Civil War, he commanded a platoon, company, battery, was deputy commander of a battalion.

From 1931 to 1937 he worked in the headquarters of the division and the army, commanded a rifle regiment.

Since 1938, lecturer in the Tactics Department of the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. commander of a tank battalion and chief of staff of the 35th tank brigade.

From December 1940, deputy commander of the 5th Panzer Division, and from May 1941, chief of staff of the mechanized corps.

He fought in the Great Patriotic War on the Western, North-Western, Kalinin, Stalingrad, Voronezh, Stepnoy, South-Western, 2nd Ukrainian and 3rd Belorussian fronts.

He participated in the battle of Moscow, the Stalingrad, Kursk battles, as well as the Belgorod-Kharkov, Uman-Botoshanskaya, Korsun-Shevchenkovskaya, Belorussian operations.

After the war, the commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, then the Far East. Deputy chief, then head of the department of the Military Academy of the General Staff, head of the Military Academy of Armored Forces, assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR, chief inspector of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, Orders of Suvorov and Kutuzov 1st degree, Suvorov 2nd degree, Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

FISHER Pavel Semenovich

Marshal of armored forces, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

Born on November 4, 1894 in the village of Small Istorop (Lebedinsky district of Sumy region, Republic of Ukraine).

In the Red Army since 1919

He graduated from advanced training courses for senior personnel in 1926 and 1930, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1934

Member of the First World War, private.

During the Civil War, the commissar of the regiment and brigade, the squadron commander, the commander of the cavalry regiment and brigade.

At the end of the academy, he was sent as an assistant commander of the mountain cavalry division, then a military attache to Poland, China.

During World War II, the deputy commander of the 5th Panzer Army, later commanded the 5th, 3rd, 3rd Guards Tank Armies in Bryansk, Southwest, Central, Voronezh, 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

He participated in the Battle of Kursk, in the Ostrogozh-Rossoshansk, Kharkov, Kiev, Zhytomyr-Berdychiv, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Lviv-Sandomir, Lower Silesian, Upper Silesian, Berlin and Prague operations.

For the successful military operations of the troops commanded by P.S. Rybalko

22 times were noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

After the war, first deputy commander, and then commander of the armored and mechanized forces of the Soviet army.

He was awarded 2 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, the Order of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky of the 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders.

SOKOLOVSKY Vasily Danilovich

Marshal of the Soviet Union, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the Western Front.

Born on July 21, 1897 in the village of Kozliki, Bialystok Uyezd (Grodno Region, Republic of Belarus).

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army in 1921, the Higher Academic Courses in 1928.

During the Civil War, he fought on the Eastern, Southern and Caucasian fronts. He served as company commander, adjutant of the regiment, assistant commander of the regiment, commander of the regiment, senior assistant chief of staff of the 39th Infantry Division, brigade commander, chief of staff of the 32nd Infantry Division.

In 1921, the assistant to the chief of the operational management of the Turkestan front, then the chief of staff of the division, the commander of the division. He commanded the Group of Forces of the Ferghana and Samarkand regions.

In 1922 - 1930 chief of staff of the rifle division, rifle corps.

In 1930 - 1935 commander of the rifle division, then chief of staff of the Volga Military District.

From May 1935, the chief of staff of the Urals, from April 1938 the Moscow military districts. Since February 1941, deputy chief of the General Staff.

During World War II, he held the posts of chief of staff of the Western Front, chief of staff of the Western direction, commander of the troops of the Western Front, chief of staff of the 1st Ukrainian Front, deputy commander of the 1st Belorussian Front.

For the skillful leadership of military operations in the Berlin operation, he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

After the war, he served as deputy commander in chief, then commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, chief of the General Staff - first deputy minister of war.

He was awarded 8 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, 3 Orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals, Honorary weapons.

CHERNYAKHOVSKY Ivan Danilovich

Army General, twice Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 60th Army.

In the Red Army since 1924

He graduated from the Kiev artillery school in 1928, the Military Academy of mechanization and motorization of the Red Army in 1936.

From 1928 to 1931, he acted as platoon commander, chief of the regiment’s topographic detachment, assistant battery commander for political affairs, and commander of a reconnaissance training battery.

At the end of the academy, he was appointed chief of staff of the battalion, then commander of a tank battalion, tank regiment, deputy commander of a division, commander of a tank division.

During the years of World War II, he commanded a tank corps, the 60th army on the Voronezh, Central and 1st Ukrainian fronts.

The troops under the command of I. D. Chernyakhovsky distinguished themselves in the Voronezh-Kastornensky operation, the Battle of Kursk, when crossing the rr. Desna and the Dnieper. Subsequently, they participated in the Kiev, Zhytomyr-Berdychiv, Rivne-Lutsk, Proskurov-Chernivtsi, Vilnius, Kaunas, Memel, East Prussian operations.

For successful military operations during World War II, the troops commanded by I. D. Chernyakhovsky 34 times were noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

In the region of Melzak he was mortally wounded and died on February 18, 1945. He was buried in Vilnius.

He was awarded the Order of Lenin, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 2 Orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, the Order of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, the Order of Bogdan Khmelnitsky of the 1st degree and medals.

Chibisov Nikandr Evlampievich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 38th Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1935

In World War I he fought on the Western and South-Western fronts. He commanded a company.

During the Civil War, he took part in battles on the Karelian Isthmus, near Narva, Pskov, in Belarus.

He was the commander of a platoon, company, battalion, regiment, assistant chief of staff and chief of staff of the infantry brigade. From 1922 to 1937 in staff and command posts. Since 1937, the commander of the rifle division, from 1938 - the rifle corps, in 1938-1940. Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District.

During the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. Chief of Staff of the 7th Army.

From July 1940, deputy commander of the troops of the Leningrad military district, and since January 1941, deputy commander of the troops of the Odessa military district.

Troops under the command of N. E. Chibisov took part in the Voronezh-Kastornenskaya, Kharkov, Belgorod-Kharkov, Kiev, Leningrad-Novgorod operations.

For the skillful leadership of the army during the crossing of the Dnieper, courage and heroism was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

Since June 1944, he served as head of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze, from March 1949 - deputy chairman of the Central Committee of DOSAAF, and since October 1949 - assistant commander of the troops of the Belarusian Military District.

He was awarded 3 Orders of Lenin, 3 Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov of the 1st degree and medals.

SHLEMIN Ivan Timofeevich

Lieutenant General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk, he participated in the post of commander of the 6th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from the first Petrograd infantry courses in 1920, the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1925, the operational department of the Military Academy. M.V. Frunze in 1932

Member of the First World War. During the Civil War, the platoon commander participated in battles in Estonia and near Petrograd. Since 1925, the chief of staff of the rifle regiment, then the chief of the operational unit and the chief of staff of the division, since 1932 he worked at the headquarters of the Red Army (since 1935, the General Staff).

Since 1936, the commander of the rifle regiment, since 1937 the chief of the Military Academy of the General Staff, since 1940 the chief of staff of the 11th Army, in this position entered the Great Patriotic War.

Since May 1942, he was the chief of staff of the North-Western Front, then the 1st Guards Army. Since January 1943, he successively commanded the 5th Panzer, 12th, 6th, 46th armies on the Southwest, 3rd and 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

Troops under the command of I.T. Shlemin took part in the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, Donbass, Nikopol-Krivorozh, Bereznegovato-Snigirevskaya, Odessa, Iasi-Chisinau, Debrecen and Budapest. For successful actions 15 times were noted in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

For the skillful command of the troops and the heroism and courage shown at the same time, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

After World War II, the chief of staff of the Southern Group of Forces, and since April 1948, the deputy chief of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces - the chief of the operational directorate; since June 1949, the chief of staff of the Central Group of Forces. In 1954-1962 Senior Lecturer and Deputy Head of Department at the Military Academy of the General Staff. Since 1962 in stock.

He was awarded 3 orders of Lenin, 4 orders of the Red Banner, 2 orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, Bogdan Khmelnitsky of the 1st degree, medals.

SHUMILOV Mikhail Stepanovich

Colonel General, Hero of the Soviet Union. In the Battle of Kursk he participated in the post of commander of the 7th Guards Army.

In the Red Army since 1918

He graduated from command-political courses in 1924, the higher officer courses "Shot" in 1929, the higher academic courses at the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1948, and before the Great October Revolution, the Chuguev Military School in 1916.

Member of the First World War, ensign. In the Civil War he fought on the Eastern and Southern Fronts, commanded a platoon, company, regiment. After the war, the commander of the regiment, then the division and corps, participated in the campaign in Western Belarus in 1939, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940.

During World War II, the commander of the rifle corps, the deputy commander of the 55th and 21st armies on the Leningrad, South-Western fronts (1941-1942). From August 1942 until the end of the war, the commander of the 64th Army (transformed in March 1943 into the 7th Guards), operating as part of the Stalingrad, Don, Voronezh, Stepny, 2nd Ukrainian fronts.

The troops under the command of M. S. Shumilov participated in the defense of Leningrad, in battles in the Kharkov region, heroically fought near Stalingrad and together with the 62nd army in the city, defended it from the enemy, participated in the battles near Kursk and the Dnieper, in Kirovograd , Uman-Botoshanskoy, Iasi-Kishinev, Budapest, Bratislava-Brnovsk operations.

For excellent military operations, army troops were noted 16 times in the orders of the Supreme Commander.

After the war, he commanded the troops of Belomorsky (1948-1949) and Voronezh (1949-1955) of the military districts.

In 1956-1958 retired. Since 1958, military consultant of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He was awarded 3 orders of Lenin, 4 orders of the Red Banner, 2 orders of Suvorov of the 1st degree, orders of Kutuzov of the 1st degree, the Red Star, "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR" 3rd degree, medals, as well as foreign orders and medals .