173 oospn gru sergey bohan. 1st Separate Special Purpose Detachment GRU GSh
Knowledgeable people will say: "It is almost impossible for a simple soldier ...", and they will be right, because very few have even been awarded one such award. Alexander Serendeyev served in the reconnaissance company, performed complex operations to capture caravans of dushmans, has three wounds, after the last one he spent more than one year in hospitals. Despite his heroic past, Sasha is a very modest person. About his awards he says: "They are not mine, these are all our guys with whom I happened to serve." In that terrible battle near Kandahar, after which the epic with hospitals began, he lost his friend Andrei Goryachev and several other comrades in arms. Their blood was not shed, Guys, for nothing. And let many years and winters pass. Killed in battles near Kandahar, we will keep you in our memory Forever. October 24, 1987 became a black day for the 173rd separate special forces detachment of the GRU. 9 killed and 17 wounded - this is unthinkable for the legendary Kandahar special forces. The detachment not only occupied leading positions in the 40th Army in terms of effectiveness, but also suffered small, compared to other parts of the special forces, losses. In the village of Kobay, the military success turned away from the special forces, although the "spirits" lost 4 times more. But is this consolation? Samir Usmanov, a participant in that battle, recalls: - Shortly before the battle in the village of Kobay, an obstinate battalion commander, an arrogant staff officer, came to the commandos. Despite the lack of combat experience, he made decisions himself, without consulting anyone. As veterans of the 173rd detachment say, it was he who did not double-check the information from the KHAD (Afghan security service), sending a detachment of the 3rd company into a trap. Major Udovichenko was appointed senior (call sign “Boa”). - When approaching the Kobay kishlak, our group split up - senior lieutenant Sasha Tur entrenched himself on the next hill. We found ourselves in an abandoned cattle paddock with one meter thick mud walls. At dawn, the first spiritual patrol was filmed "quietly", then the second, the third. The fourth patrol rode bicycles. Here a misfire occurred, one of the cyclists started shooting, which became a signal for the attack of the main forces. As it turned out later, the spooks sat in the garden, and the "greenery" opened heavy fire. With shouts of "Allahu Akbar" 300 spirits rushed to the attack. In this meat grinder, the special forces did not have time to aim, and simply poured lead over the raging crowd 20 meters away. The special forces fought with fantastic doom, knowing what awaited them in captivity (in 1986, the fighters of the Assadabad battalion, the spooks gouged out their eyes, cut off their nose and ears, and smashed their heads with hoes). - I had to shoot at the windows, under the ceiling of the stables, raising the machine gun with outstretched hands. On the walls, spooks hollowed from grenade launchers. One soldier got a grenade in the back of the head, blew half his head off. Only jaws with teeth remained ... A grenade burst tore off the hand of machine gunner Sergeant Gorobets. Slava, in agony, continued to shoot until he died of blood loss. Sergeant Andrey Goryachev gave his machine gun to the commander, taking it jammed, opened a can of stew and greased the weapon. An hour later he was shot by a sniper. Risking his life, the commander dragged Andrey into the house. Soon a new attack began, in which Agndrey Goryachev died. It was especially bad in the group of Major Udovichenko. The walls of the adobe cattle corral were destroyed by the spooks. The "boa constrictor" was wounded by two bullets, he was dying ... And the spirits rolled up to the gun duval. The cover group of Lieutenant Sasha Tur could not help either. In the midst of the battle, a "barbuhaika" (Afghan truck) drove up with reinforcements to the "spirits". The commandos shot at point-blank the "barbukhaika" with three dozen dushmans. “Four out of ten of us who survived were bombarded with" lemons "that jumped like balls on the clay floor of the stables. The spooks shouted into a megaphone: "Russians, surrender." And we watered them with lead with a choice mat. I fall from a strong blow in the back. Shrapnel hit my back, blood dripping onto my stomach. And the terrible heat ... I remember shooting at the spirits, as in a dream. Sergeant Samir Asanov no longer saw how the "dryers" hit the spirits with rockets near their position. True, the "rook", leaving the combat course, was hit by the enemy "Stinger". The pilot was able to land the plane in Kandahar. As it turned out, after returning from Afgan, he went to a monastery. By the fifth hour of the battle, our armored group approached. Late, but came. In war, as in war, and in the army, as in the army: from feat to slovenliness - one step. New BTR-80s arrived from the Union were stationed at the special forces base - in grease, without ammunition. While this and that ... They say that the "new battalion commander" rose to the rank of colonel. And Major Udovichenko received from his Motherland a piece of land in a rural cemetery. This is how the battle in the village of Kobay ended, in which the Kandahar special forces lost 9 fighters, 11 were seriously wounded. But more than 100 dushmans also went to Allah in this battle. “For us, the“ spirits ”worked from all weapons: besides machine guns, they used grenade launchers and recoilless guns,” Sasha Serendeyev described the details of the battle in a letter to Stanislav Sergeevich (father of Andrei Goryachev) in December 1987. - The last time Andrei was seen when he, having shot his ammunition to the machine gun, came to another room for a machine gun, which he took from a deceased comrade. It was clear from the short lines that they were still alive, but then everything calmed down. " In that battle, Alexander was wounded and contused. He learned about Andrey's death only in the hospital. Today, a disabled Afghan war, holder of three orders of the Red Star, Alexander Serendeev lives in the Samara region. Even before the division of the groups and the start of the battle, he and Andrey were on guard for two hours. “I remember it was a quiet October moonlit night. In front of us lay the village and the greenhouse, - he recalls. - We talked quietly with Andrey. Both had a bad foreboding of trouble, although Andrei remained, as always, calm and focused. We knew that his daughter was born, we were happy for him. He was a fair and open man, he did not offend and protected young soldiers. As a senior reconnaissance grenade launcher, he was exposed to the greatest danger, since the AGS-17 grenade launcher was the most powerful firepower of the special forces and the "spirits" sought first of all to destroy his crew. "I must say that disability does not prevent Alexander Serendeev from living an active life. More than 12 years he worked as a machine operator on his native collective farm.For the past eight years, during the heating season, he has been working as a tractor driver in the Khanty-Mansiysk autonomous region... In the spring and summer, he is engaged in the cultivation of a land plot of 90 hectares, on which he grows grain crops, breeds cows, rabbits and chickens. Since 2002, Alexander Synurovich has been an active participant in the zonal and regional Paralympic Games. Winning prizes in athletics, bullet shooting, arm wrestling and power lifting. In 2009, Alexander SERENDEEV was awarded the medal "For Service in the Special Forces"
From Ustinov's reception I again arrived at Ivashutin, where I conveyed in detail what the conversation was about, in particular, that the Minister allowed me to enter the Academy of the General Staff out of competition this year. Ivashutin thanked me for the report and said: "Write a report to the Academy," which I did the next day. the medical board revealed I had an inguinal hernia, which I had in Kabul. During the reconnaissance, our UAZ got stuck on a mountain road. Apparently, dragging him in, I overextended myself. I had to go for an operation.
Then problems began with rewarding the participants in the operation. The political officer informed me about everything. He will either inform me that I am being introduced to the Order of Lenin, then to the Hero, in the end, the decree was signed on April 28. The hero was assigned to me, Ewald Kozlov and several other members of the Committee's special forces who died posthumously during the assault. The Order of Lenin was awarded to seven people, including Khalbaev and Sakhatov, although I represented him for the title of Hero Soviet Union... Twenty people were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, among them was O. U. Shvets. About sixty people were awarded the Order of the "Red Star" and almost three hundred more people were awarded medals "For Courage" and "For Military Merit". In total, three hundred and seventy people were awarded.
And problems
Every year in early May, the list of applicants to the Academy of the General Staff is signed by the head of the General Staff himself. Through my people at the Main Personnel Directorate, I learned that I was not on the list of applicants in 1980. Having asked permission from the head of the Directorate, I turned to Ivashutin, reminding me that the Minister of Defense allowed me to enter this year, the lists of applicants were approved, but I was not on them. In this regard, I asked the head of the GRU for permission to contact Ustinov on this matter. Ivashutin first asked how I knew this, but I reminded him that I had served in intelligence all my life. After that, he began to dissuade me from entering the Academy of the General Staff, offering to enter the Diplomatic Academy instead. At the end of it, he promised to send me to work abroad. But the Academy of the General Staff was my old dream, however, I think every commander dreams of it, so I resisted. Realizing that it was not possible to persuade me, he summoned the head of the personnel department, General Izotov, by phone, and escorted me out of the office, promising to report the decision on my issue tomorrow. The next day I found out that I was enrolled in the Academy. Ivashutin, apparently, wanted to give this place to someone else, and since I got stuck, our relationship deteriorated sharply. Since then, he has not noticed me.
Nine performances
After graduating from the Academy, I was appointed to the post of head of the special intelligence department - a general's position, however, submissions for the rank of major general went upstairs and disappeared without a trace.
The war was in full swing in Afghanistan. At the beginning of the eighty-fourth, it was decided to start the active use of special forces in Afghanistan. For this purpose, the first and second special forces battalions, which had a staff structure similar to the "Muslim" one, were redeployed to Jalalabad and Ghazni. A third such detachment arrived from Lagodekhi to Kandahar. By the end of the year, the fourth entered. In the eighty-fifth, brigade headquarters with special radio communications detachments and three more battalions, located in Loshkargakh, Shahdjoy and Asadobad, arrived in Kandahar and Lashkar Gakh. A little later, the eighth was created. All these events, as well as the intense hostilities conducted by the two special forces brigades, required my frequent presence in Afghanistan. As time went on, I remained a colonel in a general's position. But there was a lot of interesting work, and I didn't think too much about the title. I received the rank of general when Mikhailov became the head of the GRU, and Mikhail Alekseevich Moiseev, my classmate at the General Staff Academy, headed the General Staff. We met by chance at the Main Mob Directorate. When he saw me, he was sincerely surprised that I was still a colonel. I said that the nomination for the rank of general was sent nine times, but to no avail. We had lunch together, and I arrived at my office. Soon Mikhailov summoned me and began to scold me for going to complain to the chief of the General Staff. I explained to him that I did not go to complain and further, how everything turned out. I knew Mikhailov even when he was the Chief of Staff of the TurkVO. Even then he had no opinion. The information that Moiseev was my classmate was a signal for him. After some time, I was promoted to Major General.
C. Kozlov
173 separate special forces detachment
173 separate special forces detachment (ooSpN) was formed in accordance with the Directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces of February 29, 1980 as part of the 12th brigade, stationed in the city of Lagodekhi Georgian SSR (KZakVO) specially for entering the territory of the DRA. Around the same time, a similar detachment was formed on the territory of the Central Asian Military District and staffed with command and personnel according to the national-religious principle, similar to how the "Muslim battalion" was staffed, created almost a year earlier and distinguished itself during the capture of Amin's palace in Kabul ... The goals and objectives of the newly created units explain the unusual staffing structure. The detachment at that time consisted of management and headquarters, a separate group communications and anti-aircraft artillery group, consisting of four ZSU "Shilka", as well as six companies.
The 1st and 2nd companies were considered reconnaissance companies, they were armed with nine BMP-1 and one BRM-1. The 3rd company was considered an airborne reconnaissance company and was armed with a BMD-1 instead of an infantry fighting vehicle.
Each of these companies, in addition to the commander, political officer, deputy for those. unit, chief mechanic, gunner-operator BRM, foreman and clerk included three groups of special purpose. The group was headed by the commander, the staff category was the captain, he was assisted by the deputy, the staff category was the ensign. True, in fairness, it must be said that this position was performed by ensigns only at the very beginning. Subsequently, the group's deputy commanders were well-trained compulsory sergeants. The group consisted of three squads, each of which consisted of a squad leader, a senior reconnaissance officer, a driver-mechanic, a gunner-operator, a sniper, a reconnaissance orderly and two machine gunners.
4th company - a company of automatic grenade launchers consisted of three fire platoons with three squads each. The department consisted of two AGS-17 crews. The 5th company consisted of a RPO "Rys" flamethrower group and a mining group. The 6th company was a transport company.
Unlike the other two detachments, the 173rd was not immediately entered into Afghanistan. From the moment of formation and before entering the DRA, the unit was engaged in combat training and was repeatedly noted by the command as one of the best units in the district. During this period, the detachment consisted almost 100% of officers and warrant officers, recruited during the formation of motorized riflemen and tankers. The exception was the deputy. Airborne Training Commander Senior Lieutenant I. Pak, a graduate of the Ryazan Airborne School. Sergeants also trained in motorized rifle training units. The detachment was engaged in combat training according to a program far from the program of special-purpose units and formations. By the indicated time, the fighting fervor of the officers of the detachment, rather high at first, gradually faded away - the spring cannot be compressed for a long time. The officer experience of the bulk of the group commanders by the end of 1983 was estimated at 8-10 years. This is the age when the commander of the group is seen by his subordinates only in the general formation of the unit. The level of military discipline and combat training was maintained by sergeants. The detachment gradually turned into a well-trained motorized rifle battalion with an odd staffing table.
In the summer of 1983, the renewal of the detachment's officers began. Lieutenants Rozhkov and Kozlov were transferred from 12 special brigades. The first was transferred with the promise of a company commander, the second for obstinacy. In the fall, they conducted the first spetsnaz exercises with the 1st company in the detachment, which later affected the general level of combat training of this company. At the same time, officers of airborne assault units from the Western and Central groups of forces arrived to replace the detachment. This also poured a fresh stream into the combat training of the detachment, but since mid-December, the detachment was already in full swing preparing to enter Afghanistan, despite the fact that there were no official documents on this matter yet. A really high-quality update of the detachment took place immediately before its entry into the DRA, when special-purpose officers from the 12obrSpN were appointed to a number of command positions. Subsequently, this had a positive effect on the combat activities of the detachment. There have been changes in the armament of the detachment. The BMD of the third company, which had become unusable and unable to leave the box on its own, was replaced with an BMP. The 4th and 5th companies were put on the BTR-70.
C. Kozlov
173 separate special forces detachment
173 separate special-purpose detachment (ooSpN) was formed in accordance with the Directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces of February 29, 1980, as part of the 12th brigade, stationed in the city of Lagodekhi, Georgian SSR (KZakVO) specifically for entering the territory of the DRA. Around the same time, a similar detachment was formed on the territory of the Central Asian Military District and staffed with command and personnel according to the national-religious principle, similar to how the "Muslim battalion" was staffed, created almost a year earlier and distinguished itself during the capture of Amin's palace in Kabul ... The goals and objectives of the newly created units explain the unusual staffing structure. The detachment at that time consisted of a management and headquarters, a separate communications group and an anti-aircraft artillery group consisting of four Shilka ZSU, as well as six companies.
The 1st and 2nd companies were considered reconnaissance companies, they were armed with nine BMP-1 and one BRM-1. The 3rd company was considered an airborne reconnaissance company and was armed with a BMD-1 instead of an infantry fighting vehicle.
Each of these companies, in addition to the commander, political officer, deputy for those. unit, chief mechanic, gunner-operator BRM, foreman and clerk included three groups of special purpose. The group was headed by the commander, the staff category was the captain, he was assisted by the deputy, the staff category was the ensign. True, in fairness, it must be said that this position was performed by ensigns only at the very beginning. Subsequently, the group's deputy commanders were well-trained compulsory sergeants. The group consisted of three squads, each of which consisted of a squad leader, a senior reconnaissance officer, a driver-mechanic, a gunner-operator, a sniper, a reconnaissance orderly and two machine gunners.
4th company - a company of automatic grenade launchers consisted of three fire platoons with three squads each. The department consisted of two AGS-17 crews. The 5th company consisted of a RPO "Rys" flamethrower group and a mining group. The 6th company was a transport company.
Unlike the other two detachments, the 173rd was not immediately entered into Afghanistan. From the moment of formation and before entering the DRA, the unit was engaged in combat training and was repeatedly noted by the command as one of the best units in the district. During this period, the detachment consisted almost 100% of officers and warrant officers, recruited during the formation of motorized riflemen and tankers. The exception was the deputy. Airborne Training Commander Senior Lieutenant I. Pak, a graduate of the Ryazan Airborne School. Sergeants also trained in motorized rifle training units. The detachment was engaged in combat training according to a program far from the program of special-purpose units and formations. By the indicated time, the fighting fervor of the officers of the detachment, rather high at first, gradually faded away - the spring cannot be compressed for a long time. The officer experience of the bulk of the group commanders by the end of 1983 was estimated at 8-10 years. This is the age when the commander of the group is seen by his subordinates only in the general formation of the unit. The level of military discipline and combat training was maintained by sergeants. The detachment gradually turned into a well-trained motorized rifle battalion with an odd staffing table.
In the summer of 1983, the renewal of the detachment's officers began. Lieutenants Rozhkov and Kozlov were transferred from 12 special brigades. The first was transferred with the promise of a company commander, the second for obstinacy. In the fall, they conducted the first spetsnaz exercises with the 1st company in the detachment, which later affected the general level of combat training of this company. At the same time, officers of airborne assault units from the Western and Central groups of forces arrived to replace the detachment. This also poured a fresh stream into the combat training of the detachment, but since mid-December, the detachment was already in full swing preparing to enter Afghanistan, despite the fact that there were no official documents on this matter yet. A really high-quality update of the detachment took place immediately before its entry into the DRA, when special-purpose officers from the 12obrSpN were appointed to a number of command positions. Subsequently, this had a positive effect on the combat activities of the detachment. There have been changes in the armament of the detachment. The BMD of the third company, which had become unusable and unable to leave the box on its own, was replaced with an BMP. The 4th and 5th companies were put on the BTR-70.
By directive of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces No. 312/2/021 of January 14, 1984, the detachment was sent to Afghanistan to carry out combat missions on its territory. The detachment arrived in three echelons in Kushka on railroad , and on 10.02.84 crossed the state border with the DRA, arriving on its own on 14.02.84 to the new place of permanent deployment in Kandahar. Here the detachment received a month to settle, acclimatize and study the local features of this war. This time passed in hard work and combat training, everyone understood that everything was "grown-up" here. The discipline of the personnel has increased, which is already high by allied standards. In preparation for hostilities, the detachment was assisted by captains Turuntaev and Ivanov, officers who had already conquered in Afghanistan. Senior Lieutenant Krivchikov arrived from the Kabul company of special forces of army subordination with his group for the practical training of the commanders of the detachment groups. Having settled down, he began to perform combat missions in the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility of "Yug". Not without curiosities. As they say, seven nannies have a child without an eye. Despite the close tutelage of high-ranking officials and constant checks of the progress of combat training during this month, a serious mistake was made. Having paid the main attention to the combat units, they practically forgot about the "nerve of the army" - a communications group, which, according to the staff of a motorized rifle battalion, was equipped with communication means that did not allow working over long distances. However, performing the very first combat mission, the 1st and 2nd groups of the first company operated at a distance of 260-270 kilometers from the point of permanent deployment. To exchange experience and ensure communication with the Center, deputy group commanders - warrant officers - and radio operators with R-254 radio stations from the Kabul company were assigned to the groups. The ignorance of the chief of communications of the detachment of the rules of special radio communications played a cruel joke. He developed one communication program for two groups, which means that both groups will operate at the same time on the same frequency and with the same callsign. In this situation, the Center will never guess with whom it is contacting from the present moment. And so it happened. When the commander of WG # 312 discovered that he had been dropped off with an error of 12 kilometers, he reported this to the Center and requested permission to move, but instead, the command to move was received by the commander of the 311th group, who, following the order of the Center, found himself among the dunes of the Registan desert away from the caravan routes. When his group ran out of water, he asked to deliver it, but the water was brought to the 312th group, which did not feel much need for it, and was ordered to stay where it was. There is no need to talk about all the consequences of this miscalculation, I can only say that everything went without sacrifices. As it should be, the first pancake turned out to be lumpy, but they learn from their mistakes faster and later, literally from the first exits, the detachment proved that it was rightfully considered one of the most combat-ready units of the district, starting its combat history a major result. On the night of April 13-14, 1984, RSSPN No. 312 under the command of Lieutenant S. Kozlov, disguised in Afghan national clothes, ambushed the rebels' caravan route in the vicinity of the 1379 mark and destroyed 4 Simurg vehicles, 47 rebels, seized the Simurg car ", A large number of weapons, ammunition, and valuable documents. Fighting for five hours in an environment with an outnumbered enemy without aviation support, the group had no losses. For a long time, this result was a record 40 OA.
In May 1984, a reorganization took place. In the special-purpose companies, the post of deputy group commander - warrant officer was abolished, since rare representatives of this category, mainly recruited from the infantry before the detachment entered Afghanistan, corresponded to this difficult position. But the position of a company interpreter was introduced with the full-time category of "senior lieutenant". The 4th and 5th companies were disbanded, 4 groups of weapons were formed from their personnel in 1, 2, 3 companies. Three BMP-2s were added to the 1st company, and later they completely replaced the BMP-1. The 2nd and 3rd companies "moved" to the BTR-70. The mining group became separate. In 1985, an engineer-engineer platoon was introduced into the detachment's staff, and the 4th company was deployed on the basis of it and the mining group.
In the course of hostilities, the detachment gained more and more experience and during the entire time it was in Afghanistan occupied the leading positions in 40 OA in terms of effectiveness, bearing, at the same time, insignificant losses compared to other units.
So, on the night of September 20-21, 1985 RSSPN No. 333 under the command of senior lieutenant S. Krivenko, after an ambush on the road n. Sherjanaka village - Kandahar city destroyed a car and four American advisers traveling in it with security. This became clear from the captured documents of one of them - Charles Thornton.
In the spring of 1985, with the introduction of two separate detachments of the Special Forces and the headquarters of the 22nd Special Forces, 173 OOSPN entered the DRA.
Without stopping ambush operations, the detachment was looking for new forms of struggle against the Mujahideen, in 1986 it conducted a number of effective raids on major rebel base areas, such as the Khadigar Mountains, Wasaticignai, Chinartu, etc. These areas were completely cleared from the rebels, their infrastructure was destroyed, and as a result they ceased to exist as hotbeds of opposition to the existing regime. As a result of these operations, a large number of small arms and heavy weapons were captured, as well as a huge amount of ammunition for them. During the seizure of the fortified base area "Wasaticignai" Sergeant Arsenov covered the commander of the 3rd company, senior lieutenant A. Kravchenko, with his chest. For his feat, he was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.
In April 1986, the detachment applied an essentially new method of fighting the rebel caravans. RGSpN No. 322 under the command of Lieutenant Beskrovny organized an observation post at the altitude dominating in the area with a mark of 2014. Having discovered the movement of the Mujahideen convoy at night, the scouts pointed fire support helicopters at it, and after their impact, the detachment's armored groups quickly left the area, blocking the enemy. So, in fact, without risking the lives of soldiers and officers, 6 Simurg vehicles with a large amount of weapons and ammunition were seized. This method has been successfully used many times in the future.
Until leaving the RA, the detachment did not reduce combat activity in its area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility. During the withdrawal of Soviet units from the "South" zone of responsibility through the town of Kushka in 1988, the detachment ensured their safety, being in the rearguard, and left the last in August 1988. With the withdrawal to the Union, the organizational and staff structure of the detachment was brought into line with the staff of the usual separate special-purpose detachment, which is part of each brigade. Equipment and part of weapons that did not correspond to the new state were put into warehouses. In addition to the headquarters and management, the detachment retained three special-purpose companies, a communications company, a mining group, an auto platoon, and a mat platoon. provision and repair department. From the town of Kushka, a detachment of 22 special brigades arrived in August 1988 to a new place of permanent deployment. Perekeshkul settlement of the Azerbaijan SSR (KZakVO). Not having time to settle down, on November 23, 1988, the detachment was recruited to carry out tasks to maintain constitutional order in Baku. Located in the Kirov district of the city - a place of compact residence of Armenians - the detachment bore a special load to prevent acts of violence and robberies directed against them. 1989 was especially difficult. In the period from April to June 1990 and from May to July 1991, the detachment took part in the settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh... Groups of the detachment, operating on the territory of Armenia in the region of n. the village of Nayamberian and Shavar Shavan, destroyed 19 hail guns that fired settlements Azerbaijan. In June 1992, 173 ooSpN as part of 22 ooSpN was relocated to the village. Kovalevka, Aksai district of Rostov region (SKVO), where it is currently located. Also, not having time to settle down, the detachment on November 6 was recruited to settle the Ossetian-Ingush conflict. At its initial stage, the detachment's reconnaissance groups conducted reconnaissance of the locations of illegal armed formations of Chechen and Ingush militants in North Ossetia and Ingushetia. Subsequently, the detachment was entrusted with the task of protecting the Provisional Administration, escorting humanitarian aid cargo, as well as evacuating civilians from the conflict area. In August 1994, the detachment returned to the p. D, but three months later left the unit's location again and by December 2, 1994 was already in Mozdok - the Chechen campaign began. The detachment's intelligence agencies participated in it from the very beginning, conducting reconnaissance in the interests of the troops and, in particular, in the interests of General Rokhlin's corps before and during the assault on Grozny.
Until June 1995, the detachment waged active hostilities against illegal armed formations in Chechnya, having no military equipment in its staff. But by the indicated date, the repeated requests of the detachment command were satisfied and the battalion received a new staffing table, according to which the first company "sat down" on the BMP-2, and the second and third on the BTR-70. As in Afghanistan, their staff included groups of weapons, which consisted of two AGS-17 squads, three crews each, and ATGM squads, three ATGM “Fagot” or “Konkurs” squads. At the base of the platoon mate. a company was deployed. An engineering platoon was introduced into the staff, but it was not possible to unite it and the mining group into the company. The detachment has its own first-aid post for 10 beds - a dressing room AP-66. This state allowed the detachment to operate completely autonomously.
In June 1995, a unit of the detachment took part in the Budenov events, patrolling the outskirts of the city by helicopters and preventing the militants from leaving it.
An equally glorious page in the military history of the detachment is the participation of its unit under the command of Major V. Nedobezhkin in the operation to eliminate S. Raduev's bandit formations in the village. May Day in January 1996. It was this unit that took the blow of a group of militants breaking out of the ring with a total number of about 200 people. Forty-five commandos of the detachment killed 85 militants in battle. The Raduevites did not suffer such damage even as a result of all the previous actions of the assault groups, artillery and aviation. For the courage and heroism shown in this battle, Major V. Nedobezhkin, Captain V. Skorokhodov, Senior Lieutenant Kharin S. and Lieutenant A. Zaripov were awarded the high title Hero of Russia, and Captain S. Kosachev was awarded this title posthumously.
In the course of subsequent hostilities, the detachment's intelligence agencies conducted active ambush operations against Dudaev's militants. For example, on May 8, 1996, a branch of group No. 322 under the command of Warrant Officer Vetoshkin organized an ambush in the ford area near n. p. Grushevoe. Small arms fire destroyed: a UAZ-469 vehicle and five militants. Due to the inability to take out burned and undermined, RPO-A - 8 pcs., TM-62 mines - 4 pcs., F-1 grenades - 1 box, RGD-5 grenades - 1 box, AK assault rifles - 20 pcs. One of the killed was in a NATO camouflage uniform with the epaulettes of a colonel of the Russian Defense Ministry; documents and photographs of value were seized from him. The squad leader, Warrant Officer Vetoshkin, was wounded, but was evacuated to the n.
Not a single militant field commander could be calm when moving at night in the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility of 173 ooSpN.
The detachment left Chechnya only in November 1996, that is, three months after the end of hostilities. But from March 1998 to the present, the detachment has been performing special tasks on the territory of Dagestan.
The high combat skill of the command and personnel of the detachment is evidenced by the fact that over fifteen years of almost continuous participation in wars and conflicts of various tensions, the detachment lost only 124 people killed, 82 in Afghanistan and 42 in Chechnya. And this, given the fact that the detachment was constantly in the hottest spots of each conflict and carried out the most risky and responsible tasks of the command.
For courage and heroism shown in the performance of combat missions, one thousand eight hundred and forty-seven servicemen of the detachment were awarded military orders and medals, and six were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero Russian Federation... Two of them are posthumous.
For the distinction in performing combat missions, the detachment was awarded the title of Don Cossack Detachment.
At the moment, 173 ooSpN is one of the few units of the RF Armed Forces that have such a rich and glorious combat history in the period after the end of World War II.
... The fact that the stake in Afghanistan on special forces was made right was confirmed by the results of the combat activities of special forces, among which the Kandahar detachment clearly stood out (the place of deployment is the city of Kandahar).
... Among the best commanders of reconnaissance groups in the detachment are Sharaevsky V., Krivenko S., Kozlov S., Rozhkov L., Kravchenko A., Guseva V., Vesnin I., Lezhnev S., Prokopchuk K., Tutova A., Podushkov D ...
However, this is by no means all and not even a tenth of the officers who fought with dignity. Among the commanders of the detachment, T.Ya. Mursalova, S.K. Bohan.
WAR UNDER THE CURTAINarticle by D.L. Podushkova
He graduated from the Ryazan School in 1985, but got into the river only in 1987. The Afghan war was already in its seventh year. In Kandahar, he changed the Glory of Shishakin.
At that time, there were already more overflights and exits on the armor. There were many negotiations and the same number of truces. As a result, the area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility was severely curtailed. We did not go or fly over the Argandab River and the reservoir. In the southeast there was also a "treaty zone".
The east to Kalat and the Registan desert remained free for the war. The kishlach zone along the Kalat road was badly destroyed, the war years were felt.
On the fly
On January 21, 1988, my group flew to the northeast. We were already returning when on the road Mandzhikalay-Kanate-Khadzhibur near the river. Tarnak found a MAZ-500 truck with its nose towards Pakistan. There was no one near the car. Confused it. Already flew past, but returned. They opened the tarpaulin - to the eyeballs of ammunition: 100 rockets, 600 mines for an 82-mm mortar, individually capped. And the most interesting thing is -10 long-range rockets. The caliber is about 120 mm, the head is separate, the march with the engine is separate. Connected by thread. The height is about two meters. A real rocket. This piece, as they said later, was taken for the first time. I don’t know about Afghanistan, but in our zone for sure. It turned out that the car stalled, and it was left under guard. Apparently, when the helicopters approached, the "spirits" scattered. The armor of the second company was working nearby. Apparently, because of this, the route was closed. The battalion contacted the armor. She came over. MAZ was started from the pusher and under its own power we arrived at the PPD. Then, until the end of the war, these mines were fired when they left on the armor. In the morning, a group from the third company took two more GAZ-66s from the same convoy on a flyby.
At the same time, a commission arrived at the battalion, supposedly for an inspection, but with a secret mission to "dig up" material in order to remove the battalion commander from office. And here it is! They left with nothing.
In the Registan desert
In March I transferred to the third company. I would like to give an example, in my opinion, of a classic ambush on a pack caravan.
The route from Mount Tariqagar (from Pakistan) to the green zone near the city of Kandahar passed through the Registan Desert.
Information about the movement of the pack caravan was given by intelligence agents. In the evening of April 2, 1988, a reconnaissance group of the Kandahar special-purpose battalion under the command of the commander of st. Lieutenant A. Panin landed from helicopters a kilometer from the caravan trail, approximately in the middle of the route. The group of 30 people, in addition to the commander, included four more senior lieutenants: the castle company - I. Vesnin, A. Tur, myself and the chief of reconnaissance of the detachment D. Grebenichenko. He recently arrived to us from the Airborne Forces, and this was his first exit.
The path was approached quickly. The group remained behind the dunes. Having deployed observers, the officers went out on reconnaissance. Panin decided to separate two firing subgroups of ten people each and stretch them along the front in order to beat a long caravan or two caravan groups. The first firing subgroup, which included Panin and Vesnin, was located 20-30 meters from the trail. The second was commanded by Tour, and was assisted by the chief of intelligence. They lay 50-70 meters from the path. Each subgroup had one AGS-17. On the flanks, there were two support subgroups, three people each. They also played the role of observers. I was appointed senior to the right, which was on the Pakistani side, thirty meters from the trail. With me - a machine gunner and a sniper. It was very important to find a suitable caravan as early as possible. The desert is on one level, without serious heights. The camel caravan is not a car, it goes quite quietly and reveals itself at the last moment.
The entire ambush along the front occupied about 250 meters. Two people covered the rear. The control of the group was organized by the radio station with tones, the rest of the time there was complete radio silence. It should be added that an almost full moon hung in the sky, and in "BN" the area was visible as in the daytime.
On the first night, in order to check the route and provoke an ambush, an empty caravan of six camels and 15 unarmed escorts passed along the trail. I, through my night binoculars, seeing the lack of cargo on the camels and weapons from the "spirits", managed to warn Panin - they let him in. For the day, the group moved 200 meters from the ambush site. Observers were deployed. During the day, the route was also checked by enemy patrols.
On the second night, they took up their former positions. About midnight the caravan set off. From me the path in the direction of the probable passage of the caravan was visible about two hundred meters. At first I saw two figures in BN-2. This is how I remember them. On the way, the first figure split into a two-man lead patrol, and the second into a chain of camels and people. 13 camels and 15 escorts are walking. They move very quickly and noisily, they make noise. Between the patrol and the caravan, a hundred meters. I give a signal on the radio.
The caravan passes by, is pulled into a fire bag. Behind me I hear the crack of a motorcycle - rear patrol. But he has not yet entered the line of sight. Distance from the caravan five hundred meters.
The head patrol passed Panin's subgroup. The core of the caravan approached. The ambush began with the simultaneous throwing of a dozen grenades. The intense fire lasted five minutes. The killed camels created many obstacles. From my place I could clearly see the tail of the caravan and worked along it. There was practically no resistance. The rear patrol, without entering the line of sight, turned around and went back.
A preliminary search was carried out at night. The arrival of reinforcements was unlikely. They did not leave the ambush site. We intensified surveillance and sat until morning.
During the ambush, 12 people were killed. The head patrol and one person from the core left. Several wounded "spirits" managed to crawl two hundred meters during the night. They were found in the morning on the trail and finished off. Among the "spirits" we found two Egyptian instructors. One of them tried to surrender, but the chief of intelligence shot him. A missile launcher was captured, about thirty RS, five barrels, RPG shots and documents.
After this incident, the Kandahar garrison of Soviet troops for two nights was subjected to intensive shelling of rockets.
German instructor
On April 28, 1988, the group landed from the armor and sat down right next to the road, in the same place where MAZ took it. This place was generally happy for me. I took my first "Simurg" there. It was very convenient to work because of the large number of man-made ditches. Straight as a line of trenches in full profile.
On the second night, a motorcycle goes towards Pakistan. Watch, I think. Skip or beat? I decided to use a silent weapon. There are only three trunks in the group. I have a PB, an APSB warrant officer, an AKMS scout with a PBS-1. And the ensign at that moment, out of need, was impatient. Events developed rapidly. We are almost running. We had just left about twenty meters from the road when a motorcycle approached. Piled off two trunks. The motorcycle is on its side, wheels towards us. We send bullets for finishing. Suddenly a shadow darted from the motorcycle. Lit up! They began to hammer with machine guns.
Dark. Come over. It turned out that the motorcycle fell over a small bump, and all the bullets for finishing off went into it, into the motorcycle, and into the front "spirit" ... They looked, removed the jacket with the documents from the trunk, walked through the mandech - there was no one, but a drop of blood. I look at the documents from my jacket - the German is gone! Radio contact with the battalion - send armor! They answer - we will send it in the morning. The officer on duty did not wake up the battalion commander, then they pounded him for it. Re going.
Suddenly in "BN" I see two "spirits" walking through the ambush site in single file. Up to them two hundred meters. I also thought it was as if a motorcycle was being driven. Fire! We shot, did not go to watch at night. We went one and a half kilometers away. In the morning they approached. There is a motorcycle with a backpack. In the backpack there are films, photographs, diaries, books and drugs.
... There was a moment when the "spirits" of Kandahar were completely locked up. They wanted to send us to unblock. They even began to look for options for the Kandahar garrison to enter the Union through the Registan desert. But they realized in time that all equipment would simply get bogged down in the sand. All right. We left without serious incident. "Spirits" saved up their strength for internal disassembly.
During the withdrawal of troops in August 188 on the block at the river. Helmand was the moment when our company was the most extreme. All the troops had already passed and we then caught up with the columns that had gone ahead. We left through the Kushka. We sat under Iolotanya without light and normal water. The soldiers were fed disgustingly. It was easier for the officers.
Note: After the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, the detachment became part of the 22nd Special Forces Brigade of the GRU, which through Baku (participated in the "Baku events" of the end of 1989) left for Rostov-on-Don, where it is now time (Aksai). In 1990-2000. the detachment took part in both wars in the Caucasus. In 2002, for the first time after the Great Patriotic War, the 22nd brigade received the title of "Guards" for outstanding military successes (continuous participation in hostilities from 1979 to practically the present). I am proud that this title also includes my modest contribution.
From the book “Special Forces of the GRU. Afghanistan is the finest hour of special forces. 1979-1989 ". S. Kozlov and others. M., 2009.
© Shipunov A.V., 2014
© LLC "Publishing House" Yauza ", 2014
© LLC "Publishing house" Eksmo ", 2014
All rights reserved. No part of the electronic version of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any means, including posting on the Internet and corporate networks, for private and public use without written permission from the copyright holder.
© The electronic version of the book was prepared by Liters ()
* * *
"Nothing to regret"
In the period from the summer of 1985 to the fall of 1986, he served in the 3rd separate motorized rifle battalion, which was stationed in the Kandahar province of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.
The 3rd Omsb is the conditional closed name of the 173rd separate special forces detachment, which entered the DRA in February 1984 and from the first months of its stay in Afghanistan constantly inflicted very tangible blows on the Mujahideen, smashing their caravans and Islamic committees, while having minimal losses ...
I served in the mining company of the detachment and it is about my company, about its formation, about the different roles of officers in this process.
Kandahar Ariana Airport
About the mining company and its role
The mining company was formed in the summer of 1985. Before that, the detachment had a mining group. Shortly before the creation of the company, due to the increased volume of tasks related to the clearance of transport routes, an engineer-sapper platoon was introduced into the staff of the special forces units that fought in Afghanistan, and after that it was decided to bring both platoons into one company.
The main type of combat activity of our detachment was ambushes. The main task of demolitions is to increase the firepower of the reconnaissance group. As the effective work of the demolitions during the combat exit increased the capabilities of the group, so the competent work of the mining company increased the effectiveness of the entire detachment.
The area of \u200b\u200bresponsibility of the 173rd detachment had geographic features that made it possible to ambush enemy vehicles in its classic version, which made it possible for the detachment's minerals to fully demonstrate their professionalism. A competent specialist, by detonating groups of mines, could stop several vehicles at the same time, set the direction of the enemy's withdrawal and destroy him.
Based on the foregoing, a miner-reconnaissance officer in spetsnaz is, first of all, a fighter who has additionally received in-depth training in mine blasting.
Winding path to the squad
For six months I learned the military specialty of a scout-miner in the 1071st separate special-purpose training regiment in the town of Pechory Pskovskie, on the border with Estonia.
This science was given to me easily, I studied with interest. Therefore, the commander of the training platoon, Lieutenant Pavlov, decided to leave me in the company as a sergeant. Many people dreamed of such an offer. But not me. I myself am from Khabarovsk. At the time of his draft into the army, he had the first sports category in parachuting and more than two hundred jumps. Therefore, my desire was to get into the Ussuriysk special forces brigade closest to my house, where I expected to continue my career as an athlete-parachutist. However, the company command insisted on its own, and I remained with it. Therefore, at an interview with the battalion commander, as they say, "turned on the fool." After that, the commander of the training company, senior lieutenant Dikarev, the battalion commander expressed his sincere surprise that he wanted to appoint a person who was either stupid or did not want to fulfill this position for the responsible position of sergeant of the training company. Both the first and the second was not necessary for the commander of the training battalion.
Debt good turn deserves another. And now at Pulkovo airport I am expecting my flight to Tashkent.
The question why out of ten Uzbeks - graduates of the training company - not one went with us to the city of Chirchik, ceased to be a mystery immediately upon arrival in it. Here a new 467th separate training regiment of special forces was formed, of which I became a sergeant of the training mining company.
The creation in the spring of 1985 in the city of Chirchik of a training regiment for special forces battalions that fought in Afghanistan was an important event that seriously improved the quality of the contingent arriving in the war. A great advantage for the cadets of Chirchik was that from the first days, future fighters of individual "Afghan" units served in climatic conditions as close as possible to Afghan ones, in a unit specially created for the needs of these units. The regiment was stationed in the former barracks of the 15th separate spetsnaz brigade, which recently left for Jalalabad. The spirit of the "real" war going on nearby was felt from the first minutes of being in it.
The unit was commanded by the Knight of the Order of Lenin, the commander of the legendary Muslim battalion that stormed Amin's palace, Colonel Kholbaev. The regiment worked like a well-oiled machine.
Despite the fact that senior lieutenant Dikarev, against my wishes, managed to get me to become a sergeant in a training company, the saying “if you endure it, you will fall in love” is not about me. I was burdened by my position. Knowing that after training all the cadets would join the ranks of individual detachments fighting in Afghanistan, with youthful maximalism, I thought that I had no moral right to demand harshly from my wards. Also, I was haunted by the thought of the guys of my call, with whom I managed to make friends and who, in turn, went to the "warring" 154th Jalalabad detachment. Therefore, I began to "terrorize" the commander of the training company with reports with a request to send me to Afghanistan. The company commander, Captain Smazhny, holder of two Orders of the Red Star, who himself drank from the "Afghan bowl" in full, tried to reason with me: "Where are you going?" But I didn't get through. To vegetate in the "training" while my comrades are making history ?! The spirit of military romance drove me forward: "Again anxiety, again at night we enter the battle ..."
Not valuing my position, I “flew in a big way” and was sent “beyond the river”. So I ended up serving in the 173rd detachment, in the mining company.
The ways of the Lord are truly inscrutable!
When the content doesn't match the title
The company I got into surprised me unpleasantly. What I saw did not meet my expectations. And that's why. By the fall of 1985, there was not a single specialist in the company who had graduated from spetsnaz educational institution in the specialty "scout-miner". The overwhelming majority are graduates of combined arms training regiments. They became "spetsnaz" and "specialists" after being recruited into the staff. Arrived in the detachment - special forces! I got into a mining company - a miner! Their level of professional training was extremely low. Most did not know elementary things: the tactical and technical characteristics of the main mines, the rules for their installation and use.
As I learned a little later, the mining group of the detachment at the time of entry into Afghanistan was staffed with scout miners of the 173rd detachment and the 12th brigade, who had the appropriate training and special forces spirit. At the initial stage, the group commanders repeatedly tried to use mines, but they had to work under the very nose of the "spirits", and therefore every time, as soon as the miners went out to the road with charges, they, and therefore the group, were discovered. As a result, the group commanders gradually abandoned the idea of \u200b\u200busing mines in an ambush.
Although the demolitionists did not produce concrete results, the group honestly did their job. But those who were recruited and trained in the 12th special forces brigade gradually retired to the reserve and were replaced by fighters who arrived from ordinary engineering training regiments, which negatively affected the quality of the group, and then the company. Therefore, the group commanders were reluctant to take these "miners" to the "exits", and their role was reduced to the role of submachine gunners who have mines. There were no cases of competent, efficient work of the miners.
The internal situation in the company cannot be called healthy either. Low morale led to the fact that they did not rush to "war", and, if possible, even avoided. There were individual "copies" that went to "combat" four times in a year and a half of service. At the same time, the details of each, in my opinion, ordinary "exit" were recalled by them with sacred trepidation.
The mining company was more like a commandant's: it participated in escorting detachment columns, diligently carried out guard duty and was distinguished by maintaining an exemplary internal order. I even remember attempts to get the blankets on the beds to be “beaten off”, and this is in tents in the conditions of Afghanistan.
Therefore, as a person who had gone through two training regiments and had an idea of \u200b\u200bwhat the level of knowledge and training of a spy-miner in special forces should be, I assessed the level of the company's combat training at a weak C grade.
What is the pop, so is the arrival
“As is the priest, so is the parish” - says an old Russian proverb. It fully reflected the state of affairs in the company. No, outwardly everything was very good and even more than that, it was beautiful. It is just so wonderful that our company commander, Senior Lieutenant Kochkin, in Afghanistan, in one of the most combatant special forces units of the 40th Army, managed to get ahead of schedule the title of "captain" precisely for exemplary internal order without leaving the location for the war. On the day he was awarded the title, he built a company and announced: "I became a captain at 25, at 27 I will be a major." In response, a groan passed through the ranks of the soldiers ...
Internal order, line bearing, company economy - all this was his strong point. He was a typical good peacetime officer. And if it were possible, he would not go to war before being replaced, but would be engaged in what is close and dear to him. Unfortunately, close and dear to his heart as a careerist was knowledge of everything that was going on in the company. Therefore, he built a system of snitching and informing in the company, which Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria himself could appreciate. Through the efforts of Kochkin, a circle of the chosen ones was created in the company - “persons especially close”. As is usually the case, the human qualities of these individuals left much to be desired.
Nevertheless, life, like people, consists of semitones, and it would be unfair to smear Kochkin with only black paint. Be that as it may, he was a capable officer, not devoid of certain talents. But, as it seems to me, Kochkin realized late that it was not a Union here and the officer's activities were assessed by the results of his unit. And the results of the special forces in this war are overcrowded caravans and destroyed bases of the "mujahideen". The soldiers of the units of the 173rd detachment solved tasks that were much more important than sweeping paths and aligning the soldiers' beds. Being not a stupid person, Kochkin understood that over time they would demand more from him than to shine at reviews and inspections.
Trying to start fighting
He tried to pull the combat work in the company to the desired level. He himself was well prepared professionally, but he had no one to rely on in this in his company. Therefore, his bet was on me, who had recently arrived. In general, it suited me. At that time, my interests in creating a combat team coincided with the interests of a company commander. At the end of November, I learned that my former cadets from the Chirchik training regiment were waiting for distribution to brigades at the Kandahar transfer. I suggested to Kochkin to select the fighters for the company himself, explaining that I was a sergeant in a training company and I know their personal qualities. Kochkin became interested in the proposal and ordered me to make a list of names. Thus, already in the fall, well-trained reconnaissance miners of the first release of the 467th open special forces arrived in the company.
We gave the first result on January 13, 1986. Near Kandahar, a caravan of three vehicles was stopped by mines, two of them caught fire during the battle. The rockets lying in the bodies were launched and covered the nearby village where the Mujahideen were. The third car, loaded with trophies, was driven into the battalion under the cover of the "armor". There were no casualties on the part of the special forces.
Kochkin was overjoyed: "We were the first in the special naz to stop the cars with mines." I don't know how true this statement was, but one thing was true: now he could claim a place alongside the military officers of the detachment, who, frankly, noticeably avoided him. His careerism was too obvious.
Turning "face to war", he began to persistently introduce new means of detonation. The introduction of the PD-430 wireless radio lines into the arsenal of the company made it possible to control the detonation from long distances, without unmasking the group with wires. Here are just the time for training and coordination of the combat team was irretrievably spent on throwing dust in the eyes, the development of "snitching". In a word, Kochkin failed to create a combat team. Despite the "fresh blood", the pacifist spirit prevailed in the company.
Outcast among officers
The officers of the detachment did not in vain shun this upstart. For them, as for me and my comrades, the detachment is a family. With a clear hierarchy, its own problems, even "excesses", but a healthy, strong family. And that is why both officers and soldiers still have their hearts trembling at the word "Kandahar", and this is with me to the end.
The detachment did not become native to Kochkin. He used service in the detachment as a step, as a springboard in his career, capable of throwing him to the desired career height. And you could feel it in him. There was no main thing in this man - the ability to resist, "bite", stand to the end, there was no sacrifice, and these qualities are the basis of the spirit of the GRU special forces, the spirit of a warrior. The desire to get as many dividends as possible from two years of service in Afghanistan, regardless of anything and with anyone, played a cruel joke on him. While building a company to suit his narrow interests, engaging in fraud and observance of external decency, he forgot about his main task - the organization of the company's combat work and its integration into the detachment's combat work. Replacing general interest narrowly personal, he raised appropriate soldiers. Therefore, everything that happened to him in the future is the work of his own hands.
As soon as Kochkin began to encroach on the "privileges" of those on whom he relied and who feared war like devil of incense, a group of old-timers wrote a denunciation to the "special department." They relied on facts that, in my opinion, do not deserve harsh sanctions. But, despite the pettiness of the accusations, the case was set in motion. The battalion officers frankly did not like him as a foreign body in a close-knit team, interfering with normal life, like a pebble caught in a boot during a march, and therefore they simply "shook him out of this boot."
Events developed rapidly. In the morning he was expelled from the party. At lunchtime - removed from his post. In the evening, Kochkin had a nervous breakdown, which was reported by the political officer who ran into our tent after the lights out. He also warned that after a male conversation with the company officers, not finding sympathy and understanding from them, Kochkin grabbed a loaded Stechkin pistol, a grenade and headed towards the location of the company's personnel tents, shaking with rage and shouting threats to deal with those responsible for his fall. The scammers were numb. I think they will remember these minutes for the rest of their lives.
Kochkin, apparently, cooled down and calmed down. It is unlikely that he could commit such a reckless act, he was too prudent.
There was no one to blame for what had happened. He did the wrong work with people. After all, fighters need to persistently develop the best qualities a strong person: loyalty, love for the Motherland, troops, detachment; foster a desire to distinguish themselves by military work on the battlefield, and not by the ability to please the interests of the authorities. Having surrounded himself with people of the mouse breed, he did not take into account that at the right time they would fail.
In short, you have to pay for everything: you encourage the development of base qualities in a person - be ready, this will affect you too. "What goes around comes around".
Sidorenko
My warmest memories are associated with the personality of the company commander Nikolai Sidorenko. He was a kind-hearted, loyal and loving person. Having served for ten years as an ensign in Far East, he liked to say: "I became a lieutenant at 34 and therefore do not serve for titles." He came to the company shortly before the fall of Kochkin. Despite the imperious nature of the company commander, he did not "lie under him", but led an independent line. Pretty soon we realized that the company was finally lucky with the political officer. He took care of the personnel like a good father. The soldiers paid him the same. When Kochkin was removed, he took over the temporary command of the company and "ruled" it until a new commander was appointed. Wise with experience, he influenced us with a word, realizing that any normal person pays for good with good. Now we knew that there was a senior comrade, to whom in difficult times we could turn for help: he would objectively judge the dispute, give reasonable advice. For most “engineers of human souls,” this is a prime example of how to work. The company officers also respected him and listened to his opinion. A highly developed sense of justice never gave Sidorenko peace of mind. Often the political commander calmed down the hot and quick to reprisal commander of the mining group, Lieutenant Mikhailov, finding the necessary arguments. And he, being not a stupid person, cooled down and did not make hasty decisions.
Relying on his extensive life experience, Sidorenko was able to solve one of the most important tasks - to create a healthy microclimate in the company and to rally it.
"Raman Mikhalych"
The polar opposite of Captain Kochkin was the commander of the mining group, Lieutenant Mikhailov. The colonel's son, who went through the military service school, he was very well prepared physically and, most importantly, was a real special forces soldier "in spirit." Thanks to the square shoulders of the bodybuilder, the nickname "Rama" immediately stuck to him among the fighters. And since Pope Nikolai named him Michael, then later, as a sign of respect, they began to call him "Raman Mikhalych" from Rama and Misha, respectively.
After graduating from the Tyumen Military Engineering School, Mikhailov had in-depth knowledge of mine explosives and applied them to the fullest. He loved to fight, he constantly went out with groups. He was creative in the implementation of the task: he constantly invented and made new charges, surprise mines, developed and implemented previously unused mine installation schemes. In short, he was a fan of his business. Not a coward, a man capable of an act, a strong-willed officer, a romantic at heart, he became the undisputed leader in the company. Having received such an officer as a platoon commander, the company gradually began to "cleanse itself of slag." In the spring, when the last "pacifists" left for the reserve, the morale in the company noticeably increased.
In June Mikhailov was appointed company commander, having served as an officer for only a year. But he perceived this career growth not as a springboard for building a career, but rather as gaining new opportunities for the implementation of his plans for combat use. After becoming a company commander, he continued to ask severely about the disorder and lack of discipline. Without this, being in the PPD, the military unit ceases to be such. At the same time, he was looking for and found new solutions related to the use of the company.
To plant mines, we began to act, not only being in reconnaissance groups, but also as part of the mining group of our company. There were cases when the company went out in full force to mine individual directions, where the caravan routes passed. The activities of the unit under the new commander have changed dramatically.
There is no place for "deviators"
The guys who came from the "training" in the fall, watching how the senior conscription was actively fighting, followed us. There was an excitement, an unspoken competition arose as to who would more often come from the “war” with a result, or even better, would give the result himself with mines. Our two conscriptions became the backbone of the company. The fighters who were newly arriving in the company had nowhere to go. They ended up on an environment where there was no place for "deviators". You could be able to pull yourself up on the horizontal bar a hundred times, perfectly poison jokes, wear any number of stripes on your shoulder straps, but if you have not fought, then your voice is the last in the company. Moreover, we did not look at which combat arms the replenishment came from. The main thing is that they have the desire to honestly do their job - to fight. "Gruzdev called himself get in the body".
The combination of various factors and the fact that specific people were in the right time in the right place, had a favorable effect on the results of combat activities. Thanks to this, the company regularly produced results. Here are just a few examples.
In May, Lieutenant Shishakin's group hammered a car and a tractor in a hurry to the rescue. The car and the fleeing enemy were destroyed by exploding mines.
In August, Mikhailov hit the car with mines.
In September in Argentan, Lieutenant Gugin's group with minami stopped a car, destroying a group of fourteen "dushmans".
So the mining company finally stood on a par with the companies of the special forces of our detachment. The group leaders, who had previously preferred an extra machine gun to minerals, began to change their attitude. And the command of the detachment, seeing the results of the "mine war", insisted on a wider use of mine explosives in ambushes. As a result, by the fall of 1986, they did not go to the "war" without miners.
I may be mistaken, but, as far as I know from comrades from other detachments, no one has hammered cars in Afghanistan with mines more than us.
Epilogue
Concluding the story about our company, I want to say a few words about myself. At the very beginning of my combat career, an incident occurred that greatly changed both me and my attitude to the war. On October 27, 1985, I lost a friend in battle. His death shook me greatly and finally determined the goals of MY war, dispelling in my mind the myth of "providing international assistance." Now I understood that I was fighting in order to avenge my deceased comrade. The officers used my "obsession with war" to manipulate me: "You won't go to war if ..." They knew perfectly well that excommunication from the war was a harsh punishment for me.
Since the miners were not permanently assigned to a certain company, I had the opportunity to look at practically all the commanders of the detachment groups in the file. I went into an "ambush" thirty-three times, seven of which were effective. In three ambushes he personally effectively used mines. From the war did not run until the transfer to the reserve. The final exit was made at the end of October 1986. The guys of my call in blue berets and dress uniforms, on which military awards glittered, climbed aboard the “demobilized” Ilyushin, when I was riding with the next group in the “Blue Mule” along the taxiway of the Kandahar airfield to the helicopters. Tears welled up in my eyes when I thought that in a few minutes my comrades would go home, and I would go into another ambush. But this weakness lasted for seconds. Returning from the "war" to the battalion, on the third day I flew home, as it seems to me, having settled with the "spirits" for the death of a friend.
