Nuclear bomb: atomic weapons on guard of the world. The atomic bomb in the ussr: creation

History of failure and triumph

July 6, 1945 the United States, in an atmosphere of utter secrecy, in the desert of the state of New Mexico made the first ever test of atomic weapons. US President G. Truman, was shocked because he suddenly felt like "Lord of the World." After all, even as a senator, and then vice president, he could not have imagined, did not know and did not realize that billions of dollars were secretly spent on the creation of atomic weapons.

However, despite the strictest secrecy, the American atomic Manhattan Project (US Army Post Box 1663) was not a secret for Soviet foreign intelligence, which in 1941 had received information from London about attempts by a group of American scientists to create an “explosive substance” tremendous power, the so-called "Uranium bomb" (originally called atomic weapons).

I. Stalin has long been aware of the work being done in the United States and Britain on the creation of nuclear weapons. And when in August 1949, their own atomic bomb was blown up in the USSR, both the United States and Great Britain were shocked, as they believed that this could happen no earlier than 1955-1957. The American nuclear monopoly no longer existed!

How is the USSR, a country that has just suffered the terrible 4 years of war, a country lying in ruin, with blown up enterprises and factories, destroyed cities, burnt villages, a country that has lost more than 30 million people, a country of the Gulag, barracks, dugouts, post-war famine and bread on cards, could not only create an atomic bomb in the shortest possible time, but also establish its military power around the world?

In the most difficult conditions of the post-war economy, nuclear weapons in the USSR were created by the incredible, heroic work of both Soviet scientists and the whole people. And, of course, the merit of foreign intelligence is a clear and timely drawing of the attention of the political leadership of the country, and of "personally Comrade Stalin" (who was often extremely skeptical of intelligence) to the ongoing work in the West on the development of atomic weapons.

The foreign intelligence leadership has set clear tasks for all agents and employees - identifying countries conducting practical work on the development of atomic weapons; urgently informing the Center about the content of these works and acquiring through the agents the necessary scientific and technical information that could facilitate the creation of such weapons in the USSR.

A special unit of scientific and technical intelligence was also created, and the task was set to identify all the information related to the problem of creating a "uranium bomb."

Note that the problem of splitting the atomic nucleus and obtaining a new source of atomic energy, scientists in Germany, England, USA, France and other countries have come to grips with since 1939. Similar work was carried out in the Soviet Union by nuclear scientists J. Zeldovich, Yu. Khariton and others. However, the outbreak of the war and the evacuation of scientific institutions interrupted work on the creation of atomic weapons in our country.

Unfortunately, for a long time the task of obtaining atomic secrets was not allocated among foreign intelligence priorities , and the Soviet residency in the USA did not succeed for a long time to achieve tangible results - it was very difficult to overcome the powerful secrecy wall of the project, and only at the end of 1941 information was transmitted from New York that American professors Yuri, Bragg and Fowler had left for London "Over explosive of enormous power."

The information of the London residency also aroused mistrust of Lavrenty Beria, who believed that the “enemies” deliberately “slip misinformation” in order to force the USSR to make huge expenses in wartime and thereby weaken the country's defense capability.

In February 1942, front-line intelligence officers captured a German officer in whose briefcase a notebook with obscure notes was found. The notebook is sent to the People's Commissariat of Defense, and from there to the Commissioner for Science of the State Defense Committee. It was found that we are talking about the plans of Nazi Germany to create atomic (nuclear) weapons.

It was only in March 1942 that scientific and technical intelligence informed I. Stalin about the reality of creating atomic weapons and proposed the formation of a scientific advisory council at the State Defense Committee to coordinate work.

In November 1943, the Center for Foreign Intelligence received a message that a number of leading scientists of England, including Klaus Fuchs, a German emigrant and member of the Communist Party of Germany, had left for the United States.

K. Fuchs was recruited and went into cooperation out of a desire to neutralize Nazi Germany’s efforts to create nuclear weapons, he handed over to the Soviet side a number of calculations on fission of the nucleus and creation of the atomic bomb.

In total, seven valuable materials were received from C. Fuchs in 1941-1943, and in February 1944, in New York, he handed over copies of his theoretical works, which made it possible to shorten the period for the creation of atomic weapons by the Soviet Union from three to ten years and to outstrip the United States in creating hydrogen weapons.

In 1944-1945, Soviet intelligence managed to "establish" the "regular supply" of the Center with documentary information, and it was it that allowed Moscow to keep abreast of all the work carried out in the United States to create a "super-bomb."

Despite the fact that foreign intelligence is not attributed a leading role in the creation of atomic weapons in the USSR, nevertheless, scientists themselves recognize its important role. From 1943 until the test of the first American atomic bomb in 1945, intelligence received several thousand sheets of classified documentary information.

I.V. Kurchatov, to whom all the materials were sent, wrote that "... intelligence provided very rich and instructive material containing theoretically important instructions, and along with the methods and schemes developed by Soviet scientists, it also indicated opportunities that were not considered ...".

So, the role of foreign intelligence in the development of the "atomic project" was not only the collection of valuable information and the recruitment of agents.

Perhaps the most important thing is that she managed to attract serious attention of the leadership of the country and of Stalin personally to the problem of creating atomic weapons in the West and thereby initiate similar work in the USSR.

It is believed that it was thanks to the timely information received to Academician I.V. Kurchatov and his group managed to avoid big mistakes and dead ends and create an atomic bomb in just three years, while the United States spent more than five years on it, having spent five billion dollars.

But we note that intelligence materials give the maximum effect only if they fall precisely to those people who can understand, evaluate and use them correctly. And in the USSR, intelligence work was structured in such a way that the information received by the intelligence services could be implemented into decisions only after passing through Stalin’s “cabinet”, which controlled absolutely all important decisions under his personal control, and this was precisely the “basis for the effectiveness” of his unlimited power .

Information from agents came in the form of scientific reports and complex mathematical calculations, copies of research, and only highly qualified mathematicians, physicists and chemists could understand these materials. The reports were unread in the safes of the NKVD for more than a year, and only in May-June 1942 did Stalin receive a brief oral report on the atomic bomb submitted by L. Beria.

Thus, only high-level scientists could understand the scientific materials and reports ... And this happened ...

L.P. Beria informed Stalin about the findings of intelligence, and read out a letter from physicists, "much more popular than the NKVD," explaining what an atomic bomb was and why Germany or the United States could soon make it. They say that Stalin, having walked a little in his office, thought and said: “We need to do this!”

Stalin and Kurchatov - “Leader of the Country” and “Scientific Manager”

Appointments to important state or party posts have always been the monopoly of Stalin as the absolute leader of the state, and their design as decisions of the Politburo, GKO or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was only a formality.

As already noted, research on the mastery of atomic energy was actively conducted by Soviet scientists back in the thirties, and even then they were considered priority.

In 1933, the First All-Union Conference on Nuclear Physics was held with the invitation of foreign scientists, and in 1938 a commission on the atomic nucleus was formed under the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. However, after the outbreak of the war, work on the uranium problem was suspended, and scientists were involved in solving more pressing problems.

The organizational foundations of the USSR atomic project were laid by a series of Resolutions of the State Defense Committee (GKO) in 1942-1945, and on February 11, 1943, Stalin signed the decision "On the program of work for creating the atomic bomb." The general management of the problem was assigned to V.M. Molotov and it is believed that it was Molotov personally introduced to Stalin Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, and it was kurchatov's expert opinion on intelligence documents served as the beginning of the creation of the atomic bomb in the USSR.

The atomic bomb program required its “scientific leader” and Stalin knew perfectly well that this should be an authoritative and prominent scientist. Consultations about a possible leader were held, including, personally, by L. Beria - the chosen “leader from scientists” needed to get acquainted with almost two thousand pages of exclusively scientific materials, consisting of formulas, diagrams, calculations and explanations in English. Therefore, any physicist who would be entrusted with the leadership of the problem, the first months would have to work in the top-secret archives of the NKVD, and not in a quiet laboratory.

On March 10, 1943, Stalin appointed Igor Kurchatov to the post of scientific director of work on the use of atomic energy in the USSR, giving Kurchatov extraordinary powers to mobilize the necessary human and material resources to solve the problem. Throughout March 1943, without leaving the room for days, I.V. Kurchatov studied in the NKVD numerous intelligence documents, giving an expert opinion on 237 scientific papers!

But ... Neither I.V. Kurchatov, nor his colleagues, admitted to the secrets of intelligence, had no right to disclose the sources of their knowledge, both historians and those who worked in this project say, although they were silent for a very long time, which supposedly both Kurchatov and his colleagues had to give out the data obtained by the NKVD intelligence department for ... their own discoveries, which created a “halo of genius” for them and, paradoxically as it sounds, on the whole was good for the cause! It was a clearly and subtly calculated psychological move - everyone dreamed and sought to work under the auspices of a brilliant scientist!

Igor Vasilievich Kurchatov gathers a team, using very limited financial resources, organizes the necessary theoretical and experimental studies in a war-ravaged country, analyzes intelligence data and informs the government about the state of work and the flagrant mismatch of goals and means. At that time, 100 people were involved in the atomic project in the USSR, and 50 thousand in the USA!

Kurchatov’s high authority in the government also helped; he was able to defend the interests of the case and its executives in the highest public spheres, and be tolerant of the incompetence of the “supervisor”, unless, of course, it did not interfere with the research process. In addition, he could tell Stalin a lot ... There is a legend that when the Americans blew up the atomic bomb, Stalin immediately called Beria and Kurchatov and asked: "Well, comrade Kurchatov, you ... your scientific bomb?" “Do not fail ..., comrade Stalin,” Igor Vasilyevich boldly answered, “... stood in line!”

And Stalin in a matter of days takes fundamental decisions that for many decades determined the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear industry and all science in Russia. But these decisions were prepared precisely by Kurchatov and his “team” and never in world history has power transferred to such an extent the “reins of government” into the hands of scientists. For 17 years I.V. Kurchatov turned Russia into a global superpower.

Kurchatov clearly and clearly saw the main path leading to the goal, and confidently followed it, but at the same time supported the breadth of search, relying on the youth of the school of academician Ioffe: A.P. Alexandrova, A.I. Alikhanova, L.A. Artsimovich, I.K. Kikoina. And, most importantly, he pays special attention to creating an atomic bomb, and here his support is Yu.B. Hariton, Ya.B. Zeldovich, I.E. Tamm and A.D. Sugars.

Possessing the broadest scientific horizons and unique organizational abilities, the strength of his convictions, I.V. Kurchatov was able to quickly reorient entire research teams to work in new directions for them. With industrial facilities it was easier for him - an order from above was enough. But scientists were attracted precisely for creative work, which can be done by order, but it will not be effective.

July 19, 1948 under the leadership of I.V. Kurchatov launched the start of a nuclear reactor from zero and on June 22, its capacity reached its design value of 100 MW. The construction of the reactor took less than two years and approximately the same amount of time took the development and design of the reactor. In less than 4 years, a nuclear reactor was developed and put into operation in the USSR ...

And the first and successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb was carried out at a training ground in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan on August 29, 1949 ...

I. Stalin, satisfied that the American monopoly in the field of the atomic bomb does not exist, allegedly remarked: “If we were late for one and a half years, we would probably have tried this charge on ourselves.”

What worked here - fear of the omnipotent Stalin and Beria? And yes, and no ... But most likely there was an opportunity to prove himself as a scientist, pride in the country, because it was he who was given the right and the opportunity to create an atomic bomb, thereby strengthening the country's defenses.

And after successful trials, the whole team received both high government awards and large cash prizes, cars, summer cottages, apartments. Let me remind you - it was 1949, and half the country lay in ruins. So, the government also made a “psychological move” - encouraging not only the best, and not only scientists, but almost everyone who took part in the work, from academics to workers.

I.V. Kurchatov was the initiator of the creation of secret research centers in Arzamas, Obninsk, Dubna, Dmitrovgrad, Snezhinsk, industrial and scientific nuclear centers of the Urals and Siberia, it was he who “stimulated the birth” of the Moscow Physicotechnical and Moscow Engineering Physics Institutes, the Research Institute of Nuclear Physics Moscow State University, was able to strengthen and reorient the physics department of Moscow State University. And it was precisely these centers, “closed cities”, that made it possible in Soviet times, albeit “under supervision”, but also quite comfortably for its “inhabitants”, which also stimulated the development of industry and education — many sought to study at prestigious universities and then work at these universities. "Mailboxes".

L.P. Beria - "an effective manager"?

On August 20, 1945, Stalin signed Decree No. 9887 “On the Special Committee,” which consisted of key figures of the party and state apparatus. The Chairman of the Committee was appointed L.P. Beria, and the Special Committee was entrusted with all the guidance on organizing the development and production of atomic bombs, all activities related to the use of atomic energy in the USSR: scientific research, exploration of uranium mining deposits and the creation of the nuclear industry.

On August 30, 1945, the First Main Directorate was also created, which was responsible for the direct management of research, design, engineering organizations and enterprises for the use of atomic energy and the production of atomic bombs.

The most important component of the uranium problem was a clear, but incredibly difficult plan - to begin an intensive search for uranium deposits and organize its production. The First Main Geological Exploration Directorate was created, which was entrusted with the organization and management of special geological prospecting and exploration work on uranium in the USSR.

An important role in organizing the country's nuclear industry belonged to the USSR State Planning Commission and ... to the GULAG, or rather to the General Directorate of Camps of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (GULGMP), which is part of its "system".

The NKVD, through its representatives authorized by the Council of Ministers, clearly and ruthlessly controlled the implementation of the decisions of the Special Committee and the Government by the heads of enterprises and construction sites.

L.P. Beria, since 1944, has been in charge of all the work and research related to the creation of atomic weapons, while displaying outstanding organizational skills.

When it turned out that there were sorely lacking physicists to complete the tasks of the atomic project ... Beria immediately ordered the search for "scientific heads" in the Gulag camps. Yesterday’s prisoners, dying from exhaustion and overwork, were sent to specially created “sharashki” - scientific prisons. And so that they would not be spoken about, but it was they who saved the lives of many scientists, in particular, the physics teacher A.S. Solzhenitsyn. “Sharashki” was held by A. Tupolev, and S.P. dying in the mines of Kolyma Korolev and many other scientists.

But even after these emergency measures, scientists were still lacking - the fate of each specialist was dealt with by the Technical Council of the Special Committee under the USSR Council of Ministers.

But several scientists were generally involved in the physics of the atomic nucleus, and L. Beria quickly drew conclusions - in 1945 a decision was made to create special departments in a number of universities, and then to create special universities. At the same time, the leaders who were responsible for higher education in the USSR, were given ... ten days to “correct shortcomings in the training of physicists in the atomic nucleus and engineers of related specialties”

However, Beria’s “management efficiency” was rumored to be such. Arriving somewhere, he called the project managers or all scientists and engineers in general and asked how long it took to complete such and such a project. “Three months,” answered him. “A month,” Beria said, and, flashing his pince-nez, silently left. The project was delivered on time, or even in three weeks ... Nobody wanted to "become camp dust" ...

But everyone knew that L. Beria tried to delve into the work in detail, was extremely demanding on his subordinates and mercilessly parted with negligent workers. The world famous physicist Pyotr Kapitsa “for sabotage” (although he did it “scientifically exquisitely”, but Beria needed not “empty theorizing”, but the result) were removed from the “atomic project” and deprived of the post of director of the Institute of Physical Problems.

A kind of "merit" L.P. Beria, as an “effective government manager”, is that in three and a half years “from scratch” and “in the open field” in the country destroyed by the war, a highly knowledge-based nuclear industry was created.

And here was not only the fear of people about the opportunity to be at the gold mines of Kolyma or the mines of Vorkuta. Here was pride in their work, enthusiasm, and personal responsibility for the security of the country, the desire to do everything as best as possible and "not for fear, but for conscience."

And L. Beria understood very well that he himself could have got into the “millstone of the GULAG” if he had failed the project — Stalin would not have forgiven him for that. Naturally L.P. Beria he was able to show his “unique abilities of the organizer and manager” only with incredible capabilities and power.

Although I.V. Kurchatov subsequently wrote that "... Beria oversaw all the work and research related to the creation of atomic weapons, showing outstanding organizational skills, and if it weren’t for him, Beria, there would have been no bomb ...". Whether this is so or not ... But anyway - the “atomic project of the USSR” was given too high a price ...

Modern nuclear energy in Russia

In November 2005, Sergey Kiriyenko, ex-Prime Minister and ex-Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Region, headed the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), and since December 2007, he has been Director General of Rosatom State Corporation.

As experts noted, the reshuffling of leadership in Rosatom is a factor indicating that the attention of the Government of the Russian Federation on the development of the nuclear industry and energy has increased, and urgent, serious and operational reforms are needed.

Academician Evgeny Velikhov, President of the Russian Research Center Kurchatov Institute, commented on the appointment of Sergei Kiriyenko: “There is nothing wrong with the fact that Kiriyenko is not a nuclear scientist, no. The main thing is that he is a manager and a person with a strategic vision of not only the industry, but also the economy as a whole. There is an energy crisis in the world, carbon prices are rising, and a golden age is coming for nuclear energy, but nothing is developing in our country. I hope Kiriyenko will not miss this chance. ” Alas, the academician was deeply mistaken ...

With the advent of S. Kiriyenko to the post of head of Rosatom, it was expected that after four years of the disastrous leadership of Alexander Rumyantsev, the nuclear industry will face serious changes for the better. But, alas, Russian nuclear energy remains (in terms of the efficiency of using its capacities) at the 2003 level.

Sergey Kiriyenko and “his team” did not turn the tide, ineffective management decisions led to serious financial losses in the industry and direct losses of budget investments, and wrecked control over the work schedule in the nuclear industry.

The leadership of Rosatom did practically nothing to restore the construction and installation complex of nuclear energy, the program for building and completing nuclear power plants in Russia was actually disrupted, the experimental base of the research institutes of the industry was almost completely destroyed, work on the creation of new technologies and equipment for the nuclear fuel cycle was frozen, there are no plans for reconstruction and the construction of new research reactors. According to experts, the possible losses associated with inefficient management and inept use of investment funds in Rosatom exceed $ 36 billion.

The leader, the manager making key decisions, must understand the essence of what is happening, and not only at the level of organizational, but also all interconnected economic and technological issues and decisions made, and not only at the level of the central office, but also at the level of line units. Otherwise, he becomes a hostage to his close circle, which happened at Rosatom.

Unquestionable concern is the quality of management at Rosatom, as the corporation itself arose as a result of a “mass merger” of enterprises that have not yet been integrated into a single whole.

“Cadres decide everything!” - this phrase is attributed to Stalin. But in the leadership of the industry, institutes and enterprises, among the service workers of chief engineers, logistics workers responsible for the nomenclature and quality of the supplied materials and equipment of the nuclear industry you can find ... philosophers, teachers, pharmacists, uranium mining supervised (until 2012 ) ... a veterinarian by training. What can I say? Ambiguous and incompetent decisions in strategically important areas of the nuclear industry are simply inevitable, and the safety aspects of the operation of nuclear-hazardous facilities of the Rosatom system are especially vulnerable.

In addition, the leadership of Rosatom pursues a policy of informational closure of the industry, company managers are prohibited from publicly commenting in the media about the situation not only in the industry, but also at their enterprise, and many negative trends are categorically closed for public discussion.

At one time, only the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant forced to make the nuclear industry as open as possible, and in the current environment it is necessary to ensure its transparency. And this is not only a matter of security and warning the population about a possible threat, but also of the inefficient corporate governance of Rosatom, which, naturally, the leadership does not want to recognize. A clear control is needed - from public examination to the introduction of the “institute of independent directors” in state-owned companies in the industry, and strict and constant control of the Ministry of Finance, MEDT, Rostekhnadzor and the Audit Chamber is required.

The personnel problem remains one of the main problems for Russian nuclear scientists; the management of enterprises has to deal with a situation where qualified personnel are not enough to fulfill orders.

The situation with personnel for the nuclear industry was affected by the “preferences” of university applicants in recent years, when the competition for natural sciences and engineering professions declined sharply, while on specialties like “economics”, “management”, and “law” - on the contrary, it increased and students study not for knowledge, but for a diploma.

Only a few years ago, Russian nuclear scientists seriously took up the solution to this problem of personnel training. TVEL Corporation, a producer of nuclear fuel, pays the best students of the Moscow Engineering Physics Faculty who study in the specialties profile for the corporation, scholarships ranging from 6 to 10 minimum wages ... And that’s all for now ...

The incompetence of managing most branches of industry, education, science, health care, and the social sphere in the Russian Federation was reflected in Rosatom as in a mirror. But nuclear power plants and related plants are not pot factories. Do not forget Chernobyl ... April 25, 1986 ... Only a little more than 25 years have passed ...

A.A. Kazdym
Candidate of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences
Academician of the International Academy of Sciences
Member of MOIP

Works until 1941

In 1930-1941, work was actively carried out in the nuclear field.

Fundamental radiochemical studies were also carried out during this decade, without which any understanding of these problems, their development, and, especially, implementation, would be unthinkable.

Academician V. G. Khlopin was considered an authority in this area. Also, a significant contribution was made, among many others, by the staff of the Radium Institute: G. A. Gamov, I. V. Kurchatov and L. V. Mysovsky (creators of the first cyclotron in Europe), F. F. Lange (created the first Soviet atomic project bombs -), as well as the founder N. N. Semenov. The Soviet project was supervised by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V.M. Molotov

Work in 1941-1943

Foreign Intelligence Information

Already in September 1941, intelligence began to arrive in the USSR about conducting secret intensive research work in the UK and the USA aimed at developing methods for using atomic energy for military purposes and creating atomic bombs of enormous destructive force. One of the most important documents received back in 1941 by Soviet intelligence is the report of the British MAUD Committee. From the materials of this report, obtained through foreign intelligence channels of the NKVD of the USSR from Donald Macklin, it followed that the creation of the atomic bomb is real, that it can probably be created before the end of the war and, therefore, can affect its course.

Reconnaissance information on work on the problem of atomic energy abroad, available in the USSR at the time of the decision to resume work on uranium, was obtained both through the NKVD intelligence channels and through the channels of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) of the Red Army.

In May 1942, the GRU leadership informed the Academy of Sciences of the USSR that there were reports of work abroad on the problem of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and requested information on whether this problem currently had a real practical basis. The answer to this request in June 1942 was given by V. G. Khlopin, who noted that over the past year, the scientific literature has almost never published any works related to solving the problem of using atomic energy.

An official letter from the head of the NKVD L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin with information on works on the use of atomic energy for military purposes abroad, proposals for organizing these works in the USSR and secret acquaintance with materials of the NKVD of prominent Soviet specialists, the options for which were prepared by the NKVD officers back in late 1941 - early 1942 was sent to JV Stalin in October 1942, already after the adoption of the order of the State Defense Committee on the resumption of uranium work in the USSR.

Soviet intelligence had detailed information about the creation of the atomic bomb in the United States, coming from experts who understood the danger of a nuclear monopoly or sympathized with the USSR, in particular, Klaus Fuchs, Theodore Hall, Georges Koval and David Greenglas. However, a decisive value, as some believe, was addressed to Stalin in early 1943 by a letter from the Soviet physicist G. Flerov, who managed to explain the essence of the problem popularly. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the work of G. N. Flerov on the letter to Stalin was not completed and it was not sent.

Nuclear project launch

GKO Decree No. 2352ss “On the Organization of Uranium Works”.

On September 28, 1942, a month and a half after the start of the Manhattan project, GKO Decree No. 2352ss “On the Organization of Uranium Works” was adopted. It prescribed:

To oblige the USSR Academy of Sciences (Academician Ioffe) to resume work on the feasibility of using atomic energy by splitting the uranium nucleus and submit to the State Defense Committee by April 1, 1943 a report on the possibility of creating a uranium bomb or uranium fuel ...

The order provided for the organization for this purpose at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR of a special laboratory of the atomic nucleus, the creation of laboratory facilities for the separation of uranium isotopes and a set of experimental works. The order obliged the SNK of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to provide the USSR Academy of Sciences in Kazan with a room of 500 m² to accommodate an atomic nucleus laboratory and living space for 10 researchers.

Atomic bomb work

The primary tasks were the organization of industrial production of plutonium-239 and uranium-235. To solve the first problem, it was necessary to create an experimental and then industrial nuclear reactors, and to build a radiochemical and special metallurgical workshops. To solve the second problem, the construction of a plant for the separation of uranium isotopes by the diffusion method was launched.

The solution to these problems was possible as a result of the creation of industrial technologies, the organization of production and production of the necessary large quantities of pure metallic uranium, uranium oxide, uranium hexafluoride, other compounds of uranium, high-purity graphite and a number of other special materials, the creation of a complex of new industrial units and devices. The insufficient volume of uranium ore mining and production of uranium concentrates in the USSR during this period was offset by trophy raw materials and products of uranium enterprises in Eastern Europe, with which the USSR entered into relevant agreements.

In 1945, the Government of the USSR adopted the following major decisions:

on the creation on the basis of the Kirov Plant (Leningrad) two special experimental design bureaus designed to develop equipment that produces 235 uranium enriched by the gas diffusion method;
about the start of construction in the Middle Urals (near the village of Verkh-Neyvinsky) of a diffusion plant for the production of enriched uranium-235;
the organization of a laboratory for the creation of heavy water reactors on natural uranium;
on choosing a site and starting construction in the South Urals of the country's first plutonium-239 production enterprise.

The structure of the enterprise in the South Urals should include:

uranium-graphite reactor on natural (natural) uranium (plant "A");
radiochemical production for the separation of plutonium-239 from natural (natural) uranium irradiated in the reactor (plant “B”);
chemical and metallurgical production for the production of highly pure metallic plutonium (plant "B").

The participation of German experts in the nuclear project

In 1945, hundreds of German scientists related to the nuclear issue were brought from Germany to the USSR on a voluntary basis. Most of them (about 300 people) were brought to Sukhumi and secretly placed in the former estates of the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich and the millionaire Smetsky (sanatoriums "Sinop" and "Agudzery"). In the USSR, equipment was exported from the German Institute of Chemistry and Metallurgy, the Kaiser Wilhelm Physical Institute, the Siemens Electrotechnical Laboratories, and the Physical Institute of the German Ministry of Posts. Three of the four German cyclotrons, powerful magnets, electron microscopes, oscilloscopes, high voltage transformers, and high-precision instruments were brought to the USSR. In November 1945, the Office of Special Institutions (9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR) was created as part of the NKVD of the USSR to supervise the work on the use of German specialists.

The Sinop Sanatorium was named Object A, which was led by Baron Manfred von Ardenne. The “Agudzers” became the “Object G” ”- it was headed by Gustav Hertz. At facilities “A” and “G” outstanding scientists worked - Nikolaus Riel, Max Volmer, who built the first heavy water production plant in the USSR, Peter Thyssen, designer of nickel filters for gas diffusion enrichment of uranium isotopes, Max Shteenbek, author of the method of isotope separation with using a gas centrifuge and the holder of the first Western patent for a centrifuge, Gernot Zippe. On the basis of facilities “A” and “G”, the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology was later created.

Some leading German experts for this work were awarded government awards of the USSR, including the Stalin Prize.

In the period 1954 - 1959, German specialists at different times moved to the GDR (Gernot Zippe - to Austria).

Construction of Chelyabinsk-40

To build the first enterprise in the USSR to produce plutonium for military purposes, a site was selected in the South Urals in the area of \u200b\u200bthe ancient Ural cities Kyshtym and Kasli. Surveys for site selection were carried out in the summer of 1945, in October 1945 the Government Commission found it appropriate to place the first industrial reactor on the southern shore of Lake Kyzyl-Tash, and under the housing estate choose a peninsula on the southern shore of Lake Irtyash.

At the site of the chosen construction site, over time a whole complex of industrial enterprises, buildings and structures were erected, interconnected by a network of roads and railways, a heat and power supply system, industrial water supply and sewage. At different times, the secret city was called differently, but the most famous name is “Sorokovka” or Chelyabinsk-40. Currently, the industrial complex, originally named Combine No. 817, is called the Mayak Production Association, and the city on the shore of Lake Irtyash, in which Mayak workers and their families live, is called Ozersk.

In November 1945, geological surveys began at the selected site, and the first builders began to arrive in early December.

The first construction manager (1946-1947) was J. D. Rappoport, and was subsequently replaced by Major General M. M. Tsarevsky. The chief engineer of construction was V. A. Saprykin, the first director of the future enterprise - P. T. Bystrov (from April 17, 1946), who was replaced by E. P. Slavsky (from July 10, 1947), and then B. G. Muzrukov (from December 1, 1947). I.V. Kurchatov was appointed the supervisor of the plant

Construction of Arzamas-16

Tactical and technical tasks for the design of the RDS-1 and RDS-2 should have been developed by July 1, 1946, and the design of their main components - by July 1, 1947. A fully manufactured bomb of the RDS-1 should have been submitted to state tests for an explosion when installed on the ground on January 1, 1948, in an aircraft version - on March 1, 1948, and the RDS-2 bomb - respectively on June 1, 1948 and by January 1, 1949. Work on the creation of structures was carried out in parallel with the organization of special laboratories in KB-11 and the deployment of the work of these laboratories . Such short deadlines and the organization of parallel operations became possible also due to the receipt in the USSR of some intelligence data on American atomic bombs.

Research laboratories and design departments of KB-11 began to expand their activities directly in Arzamas-16 in the spring of 1947. In parallel, the first production workshops of pilot plants No. 1 and No. 2 were created.

Nuclear reactors

The first in the USSR experimental nuclear reactor F-1, the construction of which was carried out in Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences, was successfully launched on December 25, 1946.

On November 6, 1947, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov made a statement regarding the secret of the atomic bomb, saying that "this secret has long ceased to exist." This statement meant that the Soviet Union had already discovered the secret of atomic weapons, and it had these weapons at its disposal. The US scientific community regarded this statement by V.M. Molotov as a bluff, believing that the Russians could take possession of atomic weapons no earlier than 1952.

In less than two years, the building of the first atomic industrial reactor “A” of Plant No. 817 was ready, and work began on the installation of the reactor itself. The physical start-up of reactor “A” took place at 00:30 on June 18, 1948, and on June 19 the reactor was brought to its design capacity.

On December 22, 1948, the first products from the nuclear reactor arrived at the radiochemical plant “B”. At Plant B, plutonium accumulated in the reactor was separated from uranium and radioactive fission products. All radiochemical processes for Plant B were developed at the Radium Institute under the supervision of Academician V. G. Khlopin. A. Z. Rothschild was the general designer and chief engineer of the B plant project, and J. I. Zilberman was the chief technologist. Boris A. Nikitin, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, was the supervisor of the launch of Plant B.

The first batch of finished products (plutonium concentrate, which consisted mainly of plutonium and lanthanum fluorides) in the refining department of Plant B was obtained in February 1949.

Obtaining weapons-grade plutonium

The plutonium concentrate was transferred to the B plant, which was intended to produce high-purity metallic plutonium and products from it.

The main contribution to the development of the technology and design of Plant B was made by: A. A. Bochvar, I. I. Chernyaev, A. S. Zaimovsky, A. N. Volsky, A. D. Gelman, V. D. Nikolsky, N P. Aleksakhin, P. Ya. Belyaev, L. R. Dulin, A. L. Tarakanov and others.

In August 1949, factory B manufactured parts from high-purity metallic plutonium for the first atomic bomb

Test

A successful test of the first Soviet atomic bomb was carried out on August 29, 1949 at the constructed training ground in the Semipalatinsk region of Kazakhstan. It was kept secret.

On September 3, 1949, an aircraft from the US Special Meteorological Intelligence Service took air samples in the Kamchatka region, and then American experts discovered isotopes in them that indicated that a nuclear explosion had been carried out in the USSR.

... We have evidence that an atomic explosion occurred in the Soviet Union in recent weeks. Since atomic energy was released by man, a corresponding development of this new force by other nations was to be expected. This probability has always been taken into account. Almost four years ago, I pointed out that scientists virtually unanimously believed that the essential theoretical information on which the discovery is based was already widely known.

On September 25, 1949, the Pravda newspaper published a TASS message “in connection with a statement by US President Truman on the conduct of an atomic explosion in the USSR”:

In the Soviet Union, as you know, large-scale construction work is underway - the construction of hydroelectric power stations, mines, canals, roads, which necessitate large explosive works using the latest technical equipment.<…> It is possible that this could attract attention outside the Soviet Union.

Notes

References

Chronology of the main events in the history of the nuclear industry of the USSR and Russia
Vladimir Gubarev “The White Archipelago. Unknown pages of the "atomic project of the USSR" "
Vladimir Vasiliev "Abkhazia is a forge of nuclear weapons. Over half a century ago, German atomic specialists were secretly brought to Sukhumi
Norilsk in solving the atomic issue or the fate of the Norilsk "pasta"
Broadcast Radio Liberty 1949: American Response to the Soviet Atomic Explosion
The atomic project of the USSR. To the 60th anniversary of the creation of Russia's nuclear shield. July 24 - September 20, 2009. Description of the exhibition. Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation, Federal Archival Agency, State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom, State Archive of the Russian Federation (2009). Archived from the original on March 2, 2012. Retrieved October 23, 2011.
I. A, Andryushin A. K. Chernyshev Yu. A. Yudin Taming the core. Pages of the history of nuclear weapons and nuclear infrastructure of the USSR. - Sarov: Red October, 2003 .-- 481 p. - ISBN 5-7439-0621-6
R. Jung Brighter than a thousand suns. - M., 1961.

Atomic research in the USSR before the launch of the first reactor
Research base	· (1918) RIAN · (1922) FTI them. A. F. Ioffe · (1923) KIPT · (1928)

The "father" of the Soviet atomic bomb, academician Igor Kurchatov, was born on January 12, 1903 in the Simsky Plant of the Ufa province (today it is the city of Sim in the Chelyabinsk region). He is called one of the founders of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Having graduated with honors from Simferopol Men's Gymnasium and evening craft school, in September 1920 Kurchatov entered the Physics and Mathematics Department of Taurida University. Three years later, he successfully completed high school ahead of schedule. In 1930, Kurchatov headed the physics department of the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology.

"RG" talks about the stages of the creation of the first Soviet atomic bomb, the tests of which were successfully held in August 1949.

Dokurchatov era

Work in the field of the atomic nucleus in the USSR began back in the 1930s. Physicists and chemists of not only Soviet scientific centers, but also foreign experts took part in all-Union conferences of the USSR Academy of Sciences of that time.

In 1932, samples of radium were obtained; in 1939, the chain reaction of fission of heavy atoms was calculated. The year 1940 became a landmark in the development of the nuclear program: employees of the Ukrainian Institute of Physics and Technology submitted an application for a breakthrough invention at that time: the design of the atomic bomb and methods for producing uranium-235. For the first time, conventional explosives were proposed to be used as a fuse to create a critical mass and initiate a chain reaction. In the future, nuclear bombs were detonated in exactly this way, and the centrifugal method proposed by UFTI scientists to this day is the basis for the industrial separation of uranium isotopes.

There were significant flaws in the proposals of Kharkiv citizens. As Candidate of Technical Sciences Alexander Medved noted in his article for the scientific and technical journal "Engine", "the uranium charge scheme proposed by the authors was, in principle, not workable .... However, the value of the authors' proposal was great, since it is this scheme that can be considered the first in our country to be discussed at the official level, the proposal for the construction of the actual nuclear bomb. "

The application went through the authorities for a long time, but was never accepted, and eventually lay on the shelf with the stamp "top secret".

By the way, in the same fortieth year, at the All-Union Conference, Kurchatov presented a report on the fission of heavy nuclei, which was a breakthrough in solving the practical issue of the implementation of a nuclear chain reaction in uranium.

What is more important - tanks or a bomb

After the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, nuclear research was suspended. The main Moscow and Leningrad institutes dealing with the problems of nuclear physics were evacuated.

Beria, as the head of strategic intelligence, knew that major physicists in the West considered atomic weapons an achievable reality. According to historians, as far back as September 1939, Robert Oppenheimer, the future supervisor of work on the creation of the American atomic bomb, came to the USSR incognito. From him, the Soviet leadership could for the first time hear about the possibility of obtaining a superweapon. Everyone - both politicians and scientists - understood that the creation of a nuclear bomb is possible, and its appearance in the enemy will bring irreparable troubles.

In 1941, intelligence began to arrive in the USSR from the USA and Great Britain on the deployment of intensive work to create nuclear weapons.

Academician Petr Kapitsa, speaking on October 12, 1941 at an anti-fascist rally of scientists, said: "... even a small atomic bomb, if feasible, could easily destroy a large metropolitan city with several million people ...".

On September 28, 1942, a decree "On the organization of work on uranium" was adopted - this date is considered the start of the Soviet nuclear project. In the spring of next year, Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was created specifically for the production of the first Soviet bomb. The question arose: to whom to entrust the leadership of the newly created structure.

“We need to find a talented and relatively young physicist so that the solution to the atomic problem becomes the only thing in his life. And we will give him power, make him an academician and, of course, we will vigilantly control him,” Stalin ordered.

Initially, the list of candidates was about fifty names. Beria suggested stopping the choice on Kurchatov, and in October 1943 he was summoned to Moscow for bride-shows. Now the scientific center, into which the laboratory has transformed over the years, bears the name of its first head - the Kurchatov Institute.

"Stalin's jet engine"

On April 9, 1946, a decision was made to create a design bureau at Laboratory No. 2. The first production buildings in the zone of the Mordovian Reserve were only ready in early 1947. Some of the laboratories are located in the monastery buildings.

The Soviet prototype was called RDS-1, which meant, according to one version - "special jet engine." Later, the abbreviation began to decipher as "Stalin's jet engine" or "Russia makes itself." The bomb was also known under the names "product 501", atomic charge "1-200". By the way, to ensure the secrecy regime, the bomb was referred to in the documents as a "rocket engine."

RDS-1 was a device with a capacity of 22 kilotons. Yes, the Soviet Union conducted its own development of atomic weapons, but the need to catch up with the States that had gone ahead during the war prompted domestic science to actively use intelligence data. So, the American “Fat Man” was taken as the basis. The bomb under this codename the United States dropped on August 9, 1945 on the Japanese Nagasaki. The “fat man” worked on the basis of the decay of plutonium-239 and had an implosive detonation scheme: charges of a conventional explosive explode around the fissile material, which create an explosive wave that “compresses” the substance in the center and initiates a chain reaction. By the way, in the future, this scheme was recognized as ineffective.

RDS-1 was made in the form of a free-falling bomb of large diameter and mass. The charge of an atomic explosive device is made of plutonium. Ballistic bomb body and electrical equipment were of domestic design. Structurally, the RDS-1 included a nuclear charge, a large-diameter ballistic bombs, an explosive device and equipment for charge detonation automation systems with safety systems.

Uranium deficiency

Based on the American plutonium bomb, Soviet physics was faced with a problem that had to be solved in a short time: at the time of development, the production of plutonium in the USSR had not yet begun.

At the initial stage, captured uranium was used. But a large industrial reactor required at least 150 tons of material. At the end of 1945, mines in Czechoslovakia and East Germany resumed operations. In 1946, uranium deposits were discovered in the Kolyma, in the Chita region, in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and the North Caucasus, near Pyatigorsk.

The first industrial reactor and the Mayak radiochemical plant began to be built in the Urals, near the city of Kyshtym, 100 km north of Chelyabinsk. The laying of uranium in the reactor was personally led by Kurchatov. In 1947, the construction of three more atomic cities was launched: two in the Middle Urals (Sverdlovsk-44 and Sverdlovsk-45) and one in the Gorky Region (Arzamas-16).

Construction work was progressing rapidly, but there was not enough uranium. Even in early 1948, the first industrial reactor could not be started. Uranium was loaded by the seventh of June 1948.

Kurchatov assumed the functions of the main operator of the reactor control panel. Between eleven and twelve o'clock in the morning he began an experiment on the physical start-up of the reactor. At zero hours thirty minutes on June 8, 1948, the reactor reached a power of one hundred kilowatts, after which Kurchatov drowned out the chain reaction. The next stage of reactor preparation lasted two days. After the supply of cooling water, it became clear that the uranium present in the reactor was not enough to carry out a chain reaction. Only after loading the fifth portion did the reactor reach a critical state, and again a chain reaction became possible. This happened on June 10th at eight in the morning.

On June 17, in the operational log of shift supervisors, Kurchatov wrote: “I warn you that if there is a stoppage of water supply there will be an explosion, therefore, under no circumstances should the water supply be stopped ... It is necessary to monitor the water level in emergency tanks and the operation of pumping stations "

On June 19, 1948 at 12 hours 45 minutes the industrial launch of the first atomic reactor in Eurasia took place.

Successful test

The quantities planted in the American bomb were accumulated in the USSR in June 1949.

The head of the experiment, Kurchatov, in accordance with the instructions of Beria, ordered the test of RDS-1 on August 29.

A plot of anhydrous Irtysh steppe in Kazakhstan, 170 kilometers west of Semipalatinsk, was allocated for the test site. A metal lattice tower 37.5 meters high was mounted in the center of the experimental field with a diameter of about 20 kilometers. RDS-1 was installed on it.

The charge was a multilayer structure in which the active substance was transferred to a critical state by compression by means of a converging spherical detonation wave in an explosive.

After the explosion, the tower was completely destroyed, in its place a funnel formed. But the main damage was from the shock wave. Eyewitnesses described that when the trip to the experimental field took place the next day, on August 30, the test participants saw a terrible picture: the railway and highway bridges were distorted and cast back 20-30 meters, cars and cars were scattered across the steppe at a distance of 50-80 meters from the installation site, residential buildings were completely destroyed. The tanks, on which the force of impact was tested, lay on their side with downed towers, the guns turned into a pile of mangled metal, and ten “experimental” Victory vehicles burned down.

In total, 5 RDS-1 bombs were manufactured. They were not transferred to the Air Force, but were stored in Arzamas-16. Currently, the model of the bomb is on display at the Museum of Nuclear Weapons in Sarov (formerly Arzamas-16).

- the original name of an aviation nuclear bomb, the action of which is based on an explosive chain nuclear fission reaction. With the advent of the so-called hydrogen bomb, based on a thermonuclear fusion reaction, a common term for them was established - a nuclear bomb.

The development of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 ("product 501", atomic charge "1-200") began at KB-11 of the Ministry of Medium Engineering (now the All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics, Russian Federal Nuclear Center (RFNC-VNIIEF), city \u200b\u200bof Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod region) July 1, 1946 under the leadership of Academician Julius Khariton. The USSR Academy of Sciences, many research institutes, design bureaus, and defense plants participated in the development.

To implement the Soviet atomic project, it was decided to go by approaching American prototypes, the operability of which has already been proven in practice. In addition, scientific and technical information about American atomic bombs was obtained by reconnaissance.

Moreover, from the very beginning it was clear that many technical solutions of the American prototype are not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions to both the charge as a whole and its individual units. But the requirement of the leadership of the country was to guarantee, with the least risk, an active bomb by its first test.

Presumably, the design of the RDS-1 relied heavily on the American Fat Man. Although some systems, such as ballistic housing and electronic filling, were Soviet-developed. Reconnaissance materials on the plutonium bomb of the United States made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes in the creation of the bomb by Soviet scientists and designers, significantly reduce the time for its development, and reduce costs.

The first domestic atomic bomb was officially designated RDS-1. It is deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it herself”, “the Motherland gives Stalin”, etc. But to ensure the secrecy regime, in an official resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 21, 1946 it was referred to as “Special Jet Engine” (“C” )

Initially, the atomic bomb was developed in two versions: using "heavy fuel" (plutonium, RDS-1) and using "light fuel" (uranium-235, RDS-2). In 1948, work on the RDS-2 was curtailed due to relatively low efficiency.

Structurally, RDS-1 consisted of the following principal components: a nuclear charge; an explosive device and an automatic charge detonation system with safety systems; ballistic corps of the bomb, which housed a nuclear charge and automatic detonation.

A nuclear charge (from especially pure plutonium) with a capacity of 20 kilotons and automation system blocks was located inside the case. The charge of the RDS-1 bomb was a multilayer structure in which the transfer of the active substance (plutonium to the supercritical state) was carried out due to its compression by means of a converging spherical detonation wave in the explosive. Plutonium was located in the center of the nuclear charge and constructively consisted of two spherical semi-parts. A neutron initiator (detonator) was installed in the cavity of the plutonium core. On top of plutonium were two layers of explosives (an alloy of TNT with hexagen). The inner layer was formed from two hemispherical bases, the outer was collected from separate elements. The outer layer (focusing system) was designed to create a spherical detonation wave. The bomb automation system ensured the implementation of a nuclear explosion at the desired point on the bomb trajectory. To increase the reliability of the operation of the product, the main elements of the blasting automation were performed according to a duplicate scheme. In the event of a high-altitude fuse failure, a shock type fuse is installed to carry out a nuclear explosion when the bomb hits the ground.

In tests, the operability of bomb systems and mechanisms was first checked when dropped from an aircraft without plutonium charge. The development of the ballistics of the bomb was completed by 1949.

To test the nuclear charge in 1949, a training ground was built in the region of the city of Semipalatinsk, Kazakh SSR, in the anhydrous steppe. On the experimental field there were numerous structures with measuring equipment, military, civil and industrial facilities for studying the impact of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion. In the center of the experimental field was a metal tower 37.5 meters high for the installation of RDS-1.

August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site was an atomic charge placed on a tower with automatic equipment, without a bomb body. The power of the explosion was 20 kilotons of TNT.

The technology for creating domestic nuclear weapons was created, and the country had to deploy its mass production.

Even before testing the atomic charge in March 1949, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on the construction of the USSR’s first plant for the industrial production of atomic bombs in the closed area of \u200b\u200bfacility No. 550, consisting of KB-11, with a production capacity of 20 RDS units per year.

The development of a serial technological process for the assembly of an atomic charge required no less effort than the creation of the first prototype. To do this, it was necessary to develop and commission technological equipment, additional operations, and the latest technologies at that time.

On December 1, 1951, in the closed city of Arzamas-16 (since 1995, Sarov), serial production of the first model of the Soviet atomic bomb called "RDS-1 product" began, and by the end of the year the first three serial atomic bombs of the RDS-1 type "went out" from the factory.

The first serial enterprise for the production of atomic weapons had a number of conventional names. Until 1957, the plant was part of KB-11 and after, when it became independent, until December 1966, it was called "Union Plant No. 551". This was a private name used exclusively in secret correspondence. For internal use, in parallel with this closed name, another one was used - Plant No.

3. Since December 1966, the company received an open name - Electromechanical plant "Vanguard". Since July 2003, it has been a structural unit within the RFNC-VNIIEF.

The first RDS-1 atomic bomb, tested in 1949, automatically deprived the Americans of a monopoly on nuclear weapons. But only when the release of the first serial atomic bombs started in 1951, it was possible to say with confidence about the guaranteed maintenance of the peaceful life of the people and the creation of a reliable "nuclear shield" of the country.

Currently, the RDS-1 charge model, the remote control from which this charge was detonated, and the aircraft bomb body made for it are on display at the Museum of Nuclear Weapons in the city of Sarov.

On combat duty, the first atomic bomb RDS-1 was replaced by repeatedly improved "descendants".

Material prepared on the basis of RIA Novosti information and open sources

The emergence of such a powerful weapon as a nuclear bomb was the result of the interaction of global factors of an objective and subjective nature. Objectively, its creation was caused by the rapid development of science, which began with the fundamental discoveries of physics in the first half of the twentieth century. The strongest subjective factor was the military-political situation of the 40s, when the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition - the USA, Great Britain, the USSR - tried to get ahead of each other in the development of nuclear weapons.

Prerequisites for creating a nuclear bomb

The starting point of the scientific path to the creation of atomic weapons was 1896, when the French chemist A. Becquerel discovered the radioactivity of uranium. It was the chain reaction of this element that formed the basis for the development of terrible weapons.

At the end of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century, scientists discovered alpha, beta, and gamma rays, discovered many radioactive isotopes of chemical elements, the law of radioactive decay, and laid the foundation for the study of nuclear isometry. In the 1930s, the neutron and positron became known, and the nucleus of a uranium atom with neutron absorption was first split. This was the impetus for the beginning of the creation of nuclear weapons. The first to invent and in 1939 patented the design of the nuclear bomb, the French physicist Frederic Joliot-Curie.

As a result of further development, nuclear weapons have become a historically unprecedented military-political and strategic phenomenon that can ensure the national security of the possessing state and minimize the capabilities of all other weapons systems.

The design of an atomic bomb consists of a number of different components, among which there are two main ones:

case
automation system.

Automation, together with a nuclear charge, is located in a housing that protects them from various influences (mechanical, thermal, etc.). The automation system controls that the explosion occurs at a strictly set time. It consists of the following elements:

emergency blasting;
safety and cocking device;
source of power;
detonation sensors.

Delivery of atomic charges is carried out with the help of aviation, ballistic and cruise missiles. At the same time, nuclear munitions can be an element of a land mine, torpedo, aerial bomb, etc.

Nuclear bomb detonation systems are different. The simplest is the injector device, in which the impetus for the explosion is getting into the target and the subsequent formation of supercritical mass.

Another characteristic of atomic weapons is the size of the caliber: small, medium, large. Most often, the power of the explosion is characterized in TNT equivalent. The small caliber of nuclear weapons implies a charge power of several thousand tons of TNT. The average caliber is already tens of thousands of tons of TNT, and the large one is measured in millions.

Operating principle

The atomic bomb scheme is based on the principle of using nuclear energy released during a nuclear chain reaction. This is a process of heavy fission or fusion of light nuclei. Due to the release of a huge amount of intranuclear energy in the shortest period of time, a nuclear bomb is a weapon of mass destruction.

During this process, two key points are identified:

the center of a nuclear explosion in which the process takes place directly;
epicenter, which is the projection of this process onto the surface (earth or water).

A nuclear explosion releases an amount of energy that, when projected onto the ground, causes seismic shocks. The range of their distribution is very large, but significant damage to the environment is done at a distance of only a few hundred meters.

Atomic weapons have several types of damage:

light emission
radioactive contamination
shock wave
penetrating radiation
electromagnetic pulse.

A nuclear explosion is accompanied by a bright flash, which is formed due to the release of a large amount of light and thermal energy. The strength of this outbreak is many times higher than the power of sunlight, so the danger of damage by light and heat extends to several kilometers.

Another very dangerous factor in the impact of a nuclear bomb is the radiation generated by the explosion. It acts only the first 60 seconds, but has maximum penetrating power.

The shock wave has great power and significant destructive effect, therefore, in a matter of seconds it causes great harm to people, equipment, buildings.

Penetrating radiation is dangerous for living organisms and is the cause of the development of radiation sickness in humans. An electromagnetic pulse only affects technology.

All of these types of lesions together make the atomic bomb a very dangerous weapon.

The first tests of a nuclear bomb

The United States was the first to show the greatest interest in nuclear weapons. At the end of 1941, enormous funds and resources were allocated in the country for the creation of nuclear weapons. The result of the work was the first atomic bomb test with the Gadget explosive device, which took place on July 16, 1945 in the US state of New Mexico.

It is time for the United States to act. For the victorious end of World War II, it was decided to defeat the ally of Nazi Germany - Japan. At the Pentagon, targets were chosen for the first nuclear strikes, on which the United States wanted to demonstrate how powerful weapons they possess.

On August 6 of the same year, the first atomic bomb under the name "Kid" was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, and on August 9 a bomb called "Fat Man" fell on Nagasaki.

The hit in Hiroshima was considered ideal: a nuclear device exploded at an altitude of 200 meters. The blast wave overturned stoves in Japanese homes, heated by coal. This led to numerous fires even in urban areas remote from the epicenter.

The initial outbreak was followed by a shock from a heat wave, which lasted seconds, but its power, covering a radius of 4 km, melted tiles and quartz in granite slabs, incinerated telegraph poles. After the heatwave came shock. The wind speed was 800 km / h, and its gust blew almost everything in the city. Of the 76 thousand buildings, 70 thousand were completely destroyed.

A few minutes later, a strange rain fell from large drops of black. It was caused by condensate formed in the colder atmosphere from steam and ash.

People who fell under the influence of a fireball at a distance of 800 meters were burned and turned into dust. For some, charred skin was torn off by a shock wave. Drops of black radioactive rain left incurable burns.

The survivors fell ill with a previously unknown disease. They started nausea, vomiting, fever, bouts of weakness. In the blood, the level of white bodies fell sharply. These were the first signs of radiation sickness.

3 days after the bombing of Hiroshima, a bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. She had the same power and caused similar consequences.

Two atomic bombs destroyed hundreds of thousands of people in seconds. The first city was almost wiped out by the shock wave. More than half of civilians (about 240 thousand people) died immediately from their wounds. Many people were exposed, which led to radiation sickness, cancer, infertility. In Nagasaki, 73,000 people were killed in the early days, and after some time another 35,000 people died in great pain.

Video: nuclear bomb tests

Tests RDS-37

The creation of the atomic bomb in Russia

The consequences of the bombing and the history of the inhabitants of Japanese cities shocked I. Stalin. It became clear that the creation of their own nuclear weapons is a matter of national security. On August 20, 1945, the Atomic Energy Committee began its work in Russia, headed by L. Beria.

Research in nuclear physics has been conducted in the USSR since 1918. In 1938, a commission on the atomic nucleus was created at the Academy of Sciences. But with the outbreak of war, virtually all work in this direction was suspended.

In 1943, Soviet intelligence transferred from England closed scientific works on atomic energy, from which it followed that the creation of the atomic bomb in the West advanced far ahead. At the same time, reliable agents were introduced into the USA in several centers of American nuclear research. They transmitted information on the atomic bomb to Soviet scientists.

The terms of reference for the development of two versions of the atomic bomb were made by their creator and one of the supervisors, Yu. Khariton. In accordance with it, it was planned to create a RDS ("special jet engine") with an index of 1 and 2:

RDS-1 - a bomb with a charge of plutonium, which was supposed to undermine by spherical compression. His device was transmitted by Russian intelligence.
RDS-2 is a cannon bomb with two parts of a uranium charge that must come together in the barrel of a gun before a critical mass is created.

In the history of the famous RDS, the most common decoding - “Russia does it herself” - was invented by the deputy Yu. Khariton for scientific work K. Shchelkin. These words very accurately conveyed the essence of the work.

The information that the USSR possessed the secrets of nuclear weapons caused an impulse in the USA for the quickest start of a preemptive war. In July 1949, the Troyan plan appeared, according to which the fighting was planned to begin on January 1, 1950. Then the date of the attack was postponed to January 1, 1957, with the condition that all NATO countries enter the war.

Information obtained through intelligence channels accelerated the work of Soviet scientists. According to Western experts, Soviet nuclear weapons could not have been created before 1954-1955. However, the test of the first atomic bomb took place in the USSR at the end of August 1949.

At the Semipalatinsk training ground on August 29, 1949, the RDS-1 nuclear device, the first Soviet atomic bomb, was invented by a team of scientists led by I. Kurchatov and Yu. Khariton. The explosion had a power of 22 Kt. The charge design imitated the American "Fat Man", and the electronic filling was created by Soviet scientists.

The Troyan plan, according to which the Americans were going to drop atomic bombs on 70 cities of the USSR, was disrupted because of the likelihood of a retaliatory strike. The event at the Semipalatinsk test site informed the world that the Soviet atomic bomb put an end to the American monopoly on the possession of new weapons. This invention completely destroyed the militaristic plan of the United States and NATO and prevented the development of World War III. A new story began - the era of world peace, existing under the threat of total destruction.

Nuclear Club of the world

Nuclear club - a symbol of several states that possess nuclear weapons. Today, such weapons are:

in the USA (since 1945)
in Russia (originally the USSR, since 1949)
in the UK (since 1952)
in France (since 1960)
in China (since 1964)
in India (since 1974)
in Pakistan (since 1998)
in the DPRK (since 2006)

Israel is also considered to have nuclear weapons, although the country's leadership does not comment on its presence. In addition, US nuclear weapons are located on the territory of NATO member states (Germany, Italy, Turkey, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada) and allies (Japan, South Korea, despite the official refusal).

Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus, which owned part of the nuclear weapons after the collapse of the USSR, in the 90s transferred it to Russia, which became the sole heir to the Soviet nuclear arsenal.

Atomic (nuclear) weapons are the most powerful tool of global politics, which has firmly entered the arsenal of relations between states. On the one hand, it is an effective means of intimidation, and on the other, a weighty argument for preventing a military conflict and strengthening peace between the powers that own these weapons. This is a symbol of an era in the history of mankind and international relations, which must be handled very reasonably.