During these random classes, which I had time from the internship, I managed to come across an almost unknown monograph by L. Fleck “The Emergence and Development of a Scientific Fact” (Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Basel, 1935), which anticipated many of my own ideas. The work of L. Fleck, along with the comments of another intern, Francis X. Sutton, made me realize that these ideas should perhaps be considered within the framework of the sociology of the scientific community. Readers will find further few references to these works and discussions. But I owe them a great deal, although now often I can no longer fully understand their influence.

In the last year of my internship, I received an offer to give a lecture course for the Lowell Institute in Boston. Thus, for the first time I had the opportunity to experience in my student audience my not yet fully formed ideas about science. The result was a series of eight public lectures delivered in March 1951 under the general title The Quest for Physical Theory. The following year, I began to teach the history of science itself. Almost 10 years of teaching a discipline, which I had never systematically studied before, left me little time to more accurately formulate ideas that once led me to the history of science. Fortunately, however, these ideas implicitly served me as a source of orientation and a kind of problematic structure for most of my course. Therefore, I must thank my students for invaluable lessons both in terms of developing my own views and in terms of their ability to express them to others. The same problems and the same orientation gave the unity of most of the predominantly historical and at first glance very different studies that I published after the end of my Harvard internship. Several of these works were devoted to the important role that certain metaphysical ideas play in creative scientific research. Other studies examine the way in which the experimental basis of the new theory is perceived and assimilated by adherents of the old theory, incompatible with the new. At the same time, all studies describe the stage in the development of science, which below I call the “emergence” of a new theory or discovery. In addition, other similar issues are also being considered.

The final stage of this study began with an invitation to spend one year (1958/59) at the Center for Contemporary Research in Behavioral Sciences. Here again, I got the opportunity to focus all my attention on the issues discussed below. But perhaps more importantly, after spending one year in a society consisting mainly of specialists in the field of social sciences, I suddenly faced the problem of the difference between their community and the community of natural scientists, among whom I studied. In particular, I was struck by the number and degree of open disagreement between sociologists about the legitimacy of the formulation of certain scientific problems and methods for solving them. Both the history of science and personal acquaintances made me doubt that natural scientists can answer these questions more confidently and more consistently than their sociological colleagues. However, be that as it may, the practice of scientific research in the field of astronomy, physics, chemistry or biology usually does not give any reason to dispute the very foundations of these sciences, while this is common among psychologists or sociologists. Attempts to find the source of this difference led me to realize the role in scientific research of what I later began to call "paradigms." By paradigms, I mean recognized scientific achievements that for a certain time give the scientific community a model for posing problems and their solutions. As soon as this part of my difficulties was resolved, the initial draft of this book quickly arose.

There is no need to tell the whole subsequent story of the work on this initial draft. A few words should only be said about its form, which he retained after all the processing. Even before the first version was completed and largely corrected, I assumed that the manuscript would be published as the one in the series “Unified Encyclopedia of Sciences”. The editors of this first work first stimulated my research, then monitored their implementation according to the program and, finally, with extraordinary tact and patience, waited for the result. I owe a lot to them, especially C. Morris for the fact that he constantly encouraged me to work on the manuscript, and for useful advice. However, the framework of the Encyclopedia forced me to express my views in a very concise and schematic form. Although the subsequent course of events to some extent eased these restrictions and presented the possibility of simultaneously publishing an independent publication, this work remains more likely an essay than a full-fledged book, which this topic ultimately requires.

Since the main goal for me is to achieve a change in the perception and appreciation of facts well known to everyone, the schematic nature of this first work should not be blamed. On the contrary, readers prepared by their own research for such a change in orientation, the need for which I uphold in my work, may find its form more suggestive and easier to perceive. But the form of the short essay also has drawbacks, and they can justify the fact that at the very beginning I show some possible ways to expand the boundaries and deepen the research, which I hope to use in the future. Much more historical facts could be cited than those that I mention in the book. In addition, from the history of biology, one can select no less than the actual data than from the history of the physical sciences. My decision here to confine myself exclusively to the latter is dictated partly by the desire to achieve the greatest coherence of the text, partly by the desire not to go beyond my competence. In addition, the idea of \u200b\u200bscience, which should be developed here, suggests the potential fruitfulness of many new types of both historical and sociological research. For example, the question of how anomalies in science and deviations from expected results are increasingly attracting the attention of the scientific community requires a detailed study, as well as the emergence of crises that can be caused by repeated unsuccessful attempts to overcome the anomaly. If I am right that every scientific revolution changes the historical perspective for the community that is experiencing this revolution, then such a change in perspective should affect the structure of textbooks and research publications after this scientific revolution. One such consequence - namely, a change in the citation of special literature in research publications - probably should be considered as a possible symptom of scientific revolutions.

The need for an extremely concise presentation also compelled me to refuse to discuss a number of important problems. For example, my distinction between pre-paradigmatic and post-paradigmatic periods in the development of science is too schematic. Each of the schools, the competition between which is characteristic of an earlier period, is guided by something very reminiscent of a paradigm; there are circumstances (although, as I think, quite rarely) in which the two paradigms can coexist peacefully in a later period. The mere possession of a paradigm cannot be considered a completely sufficient criterion for the transitional period in development, which is considered in Section II. More importantly, I did not say anything, except for short and few digressions, about the role of technological progress or external social, economic and intellectual conditions in the development of sciences. It is enough, however, to turn to Copernicus and the methods of compiling calendars to make sure that external conditions can help turn a simple anomaly into a source of acute crisis. Using the same example, it would be possible to show how conditions external to science can influence a number of alternatives that are available to a scientist seeking to overcome the crisis by proposing some kind of revolutionary reconstruction of knowledge 4
  These factors are considered in the book: T.S. Kuhn. The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought. Cambridge, Mass., 1957, p. 122-132, 270-271. Other effects of external intellectual and economic conditions on scientific development itself are illustrated in my articles: “Conservation of Energy as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery”. - “Critical Problems in the History of Science”, ed. M. Clagett. Madison, Wis., 1959, p. 321–356; Engineering Precedent for the Work of Sadi Carnot. - “Archives internationales d’histoire des sciences”, XIII (1960), p. 247–251; "Sadi Carnot and the Cagnard Engine." - "Isis", LII (1961), p. 567-574. Therefore, I consider the role of external factors to be minimal only in relation to the problems discussed in this essay.

A detailed examination of this kind of consequences of the scientific revolution would not change, I think, the main points developed in this work, but it would certainly add an analytical aspect that is of paramount importance for understanding the progress of science.

Finally (and it is possible that this is the most important), the limitations associated with the lack of space prevented the philosophical significance of the historically oriented image of science, which emerges in this essay, from being revealed. There is no doubt that this image has a hidden philosophical meaning, and I tried to point to it and isolate its main aspects as far as possible. True, in doing so, I usually refrained from examining in detail the various positions that modern philosophers take when discussing the corresponding problems. My skepticism, where it manifests itself, refers more to the philosophical position in general than to any of the clearly developed areas in philosophy. Therefore, some of those who know one of these areas well and work within its framework may have the impression that I have lost sight of their point of view. I think that they will be wrong, but this work is not designed to convince them. To try to do this, one would have to write a book of a more impressive volume and, in general, a completely different one.

I began this introduction with some autobiographical information in order to show what I owe the most to both the work of scientists and the organizations that contributed to the formation of my thinking. The rest of the points on which I also consider myself a debtor, I will try to reflect in this work by quoting. But all this can give only a faint idea of \u200b\u200bthat deep personal gratitude to the many people who have ever supported or directed my intellectual development with advice or criticism. Too much time has passed since the ideas in this book began to take on a more or less distinct form. The list of all those who could find the stamp of their influence in this work would almost coincide with the circle of my friends and acquaintances. Given these circumstances, I am forced to mention only those whose influence is so significant that it cannot be overlooked even with a bad memory.

I must call James W. Conant, then the rector of Harvard University, who first introduced me to the history of science and thus laid the foundation for the restructuring of my ideas about the nature of scientific progress. From the very beginning, he generously shared ideas, criticisms and did not spare time to read the initial version of my manuscript and suggest important changes. An even more active conversationalist and critic during the years when my ideas began to emerge was Leonard K. Nash, with whom I spent 5 years teaching a course on the history of science, founded by Dr. Conant. In the later stages of the development of my ideas, I really lacked the support of L.K. Nesha. Fortunately, however, after leaving Cambridge, my colleague from Berkeley, Stanley Cavell, took on the role of a stimulator of creative searches. Cavell, a philosopher who was mainly interested in ethics and aesthetics and came to conclusions that largely coincided with my own, was for me a constant source of stimulation and encouragement. Moreover, he was the only person who understood me perfectly. Such a way of communicating testifies to such an understanding that gave Cavell the opportunity to show me the way in which I could pass or bypass many of the obstacles encountered in the preparation of the first version of my manuscript.

After the original text of the work was written, many other friends of mine helped me to finalize it. They, I think, will forgive me if I name only four of them whose participation was the most significant and decisive: P. Feyerabend from the University of California, E. Nagel from Columbia University, G.R. Noyes from Lawrence Radiation Laboratory and my student J.L. Heilbron, who often worked directly with me in the process of preparing the final version for printing. I find that all their comments and advice are extremely useful, but I have no reason to think (there are some reasons to doubt) that everyone I mentioned above fully approved the manuscript in its final form.

Finally, my appreciation to my parents, wife, and children is of a substantially different kind. In different ways, each of them also put a particle of his intellect into my work (and so that it is just the hardest for me to evaluate this). However, they also did, to varying degrees, something even more important. They not only approved of me when I started work, but also constantly encouraged my interest in it. All who fought for the implementation of a plan of this magnitude are aware of the effort it takes. I cannot find words to express my gratitude to them.

Berkeley California

february 1962

I
Introduction The role of history

History, if we consider it not just as a repository of jokes and facts arranged in chronological order, could become the basis for a decisive restructuring of the ideas about science that we have developed to date. These ideas arose (even among the scientists themselves) mainly on the basis of studying ready-made scientific achievements contained in classical works or later in textbooks, according to which each new generation of scientists is trained in the practice of their field. But the purpose of such books for their very purpose is a convincing and accessible presentation of the material. The concept of science, derived from them, probably corresponds to the actual practice of scientific research no more than the information gleaned from advertising brochures for tourists or from language textbooks corresponds to the real image of national culture. The proposed essay attempts to show that such ideas about science are diverted away from its main routes. Its purpose is to outline at least a completely different concept of science, which emerges from the historical approach to the study of scientific activity itself.

However, even from the study of history, a new concept will not arise if we continue the search and analysis of historical data mainly in order to answer the questions posed in the framework of the anti-historical stereotype formed on the basis of classical works and textbooks. For example, one can often conclude from these works that the content of science is represented only by observations, laws, and theories described on their pages. As a rule, the aforementioned books are understood in such a way as if the scientific methods simply coincide with the methodology for selecting data for the textbook and with the logical operations used to link this data with the theoretical generalizations of the textbook. As a result, such a concept of science arises, which contains a significant proportion of conjectures and preconceived notions regarding its nature and development.

If science is considered as a totality of facts, theories and methods collected in textbooks in circulation, then scientists are people who more or less successfully contribute to the creation of this totality. The development of science with this approach is a gradual process in which facts, theories and methods are compiled into an ever-growing stock of achievements, which is a scientific methodology and knowledge. At the same time, the history of science becomes such a discipline that captures both this successive increase and the difficulties that prevented the accumulation of knowledge. It follows that the historian, who is interested in the development of science, sets himself two main tasks. On the one hand, he must determine who and when discovered or invented every scientific fact, law, and theory. On the other hand, it should describe and explain the presence of a mass of errors, myths and prejudices that prevented the early accumulation of the components of modern scientific knowledge. Many studies have been carried out, and some still pursue these goals.

However, in recent years, it has become more and more difficult for some historians of science to perform the functions that are prescribed to them by the concept of the development of science through accumulation. Taking on the role of registrars of accumulation of scientific knowledge, they find that the further the research progresses, the more difficult and by no means easier is it to answer some questions, for example, when was oxygen discovered or who first discovered energy conservation. Gradually, some of them suspect that such questions are simply incorrectly formulated and the development of science is probably not a simple accumulation of individual discoveries and inventions. At the same time, it is becoming increasingly difficult for these historians to distinguish between the “scientific” content of past observations and beliefs from what their predecessors readily called “error” and “prejudice”. The more deeply they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics or the chemistry and thermodynamics of the era of phlogiston theory, the more distinctly they feel that these once generally accepted concepts of nature were generally neither less scientific nor more subjectivistic than those that currently prevail. If these obsolete concepts should be called myths, then it turns out that the source of the latter can be the same methods, and the reasons for their existence turn out to be the same as those with which scientific knowledge is achieved today. If, on the other hand, they should be called scientific, then it turns out that science included elements of concepts that were completely incompatible with those that it currently contains. If these alternatives are inevitable, then the historian must choose the last one. Obsolete theories cannot, in principle, be considered unscientific only on the grounds that they have been discarded. But in this case, scientific development can hardly be considered as a simple increase in knowledge. The same historical study, which reveals difficulties in determining the authorship of discoveries and inventions, at the same time gives rise to deep doubts about the process of accumulating knowledge, through which, as previously thought, all individual contributions to science are synthesized.

The rules and standards of scientific practice, as a commonality of attitudes and apparent consistency, are, the author believes, the prerequisites for normal science, genesis and continuity of a certain direction of research. At the same time, he replaces a number of recognized terms with one, a paradigm that represents the basis of a “more esoteric type of research” and, in this case, as the author believes, “is a sign of the maturity of the development of any scientific discipline”. Making an excursion into the history of science, the author also says that “the study approached the esoteric type (secret knowledge)  at the end of the Middle Ages and regained a more or less understandable form for all. ” Where is the combination of incompatible concepts “esoteric”, that is, knowledge hidden from the masses, with the term “universal comprehensibility”.

Assessing this proposed theory of science and its ideology, the philosopher of science P. Feyrabend, whom the author thanks in the foreword for his consultations, notes the impossibility of agreeing with it and, being an apologist for "epistemological anarchism" speaks of it as ensuring the prosperity of the most vain and narrow-minded specialization ". Seeing the author’s legal nihilism in the methodology of science, he further says that “every Kuhn’s statement about normal science will remain true if the words“ normal science ”are replaced by the words“ organized crime ”, and any statement about the“ individual scientist ”is equally applicable to a separate safe cracker.

Without taking the philosophical positions of this researcher, one can agree with his conclusion by adding his reference to the problem that is created in science and society by esoterics, repeatedly and favorably mentioned by the author in this work. On the basis of which the Nazi ideology and the third Reich were built. Including savage “scientific experiments” on living prisoners in concentration camps. He stopped the atrocities of those criminals against humanity in the military feat of the people of Orthodox Russia, committed in unity with the sane Christian community. And they were brought to justice by justice on the basis of the ideology of law and law, built on Christian philanthropy, the truth and the law of God, revealed by God the Heavenly Father in Christ the Savior and His Church Body, enlightening the minds with the whole truth, freedom and grace of Holy Orthodoxy.

Chapter 3 The Nature of Normal Science

The author puts professionalism and isoterism of scientific research in one row, which becomes possible after a group of scientists adopts one paradigm. In its development, normal science solves three classes of problems: "establishing significant facts, comparing facts and theory, developing a theory." Although extraordinary problems are also allowed, which, in the author’s opinion, should not “especially concern us here”. Work within the framework of the paradigm cannot proceed otherwise; when the paradigm is abandoned, scientific research also ceases.

From how “normal” develops and what results leads, according to Kuhn, science can judge its nature, that is, its origin, far from God and Christ, God's truth and humanity. To such a “scientific community”, the words of Christ are addressed: “Your father is the devil; and you want to fulfill the lusts of your father. He was a murderer from the beginning and did not stand in the truth, for there is no truth in him. When he speaks a lie, he speaks his own, for he is a liar and the father of a lie ”(John 8:44). Moreover, the science of knowing God, himself and the creation of God began in the moment when the Creator breathed in the person of the first person “the breath of life, and the person became a living soul” (Genesis 2: 7).

Chapter 4 Normal science as a solution to puzzles

The peculiarity of normal science, as the author notes, is that it is slightly oriented toward major discoveries in the field of new facts or theories. At the same time, a new scientific term “puzzle task” is introduced, a definition is given and the corresponding qualification “specialist in solving puzzle problems” is established. Puzzle tasks - a category of problems that have rules and a guaranteed solution, which serve to test the talent and skill of the researcher. This indicates the elimination of the need to explain the goals of scientific research, that "why scientists storm them with such passion and enthusiasm." And the motives of the researchers are noted: "the desire to succeed, inspiration from the discovery of a new field, the hope to find a pattern and the desire to critically verify established knowledge."

The paradigm serves as a criterion for choosing solvable and socially important problems (puzzles) for a given community, the rest are considered only distracting attention. Laws are replaced by prescriptions by the author, subdivided into a number of levels of their sets, the highest of which is the metaphysical. The existence of such a network of prescriptions, conceptual, instrumental and methodological, likens normal science to solutions to puzzles and reveals its nature. At the same time, the deciding puzzles are not the rules, but the paradigms (community of researchers), which themselves can conduct research even in the absence of rules.

The highest criterion of truth in this chapter is a certain collective, and the ideology of a metaphysician, in the elimination of science and its laws, the Orthodox Church, God's humanity and humility to God in Christ. Presumably, the result of the activities of such a group will be the creation of a totalitarian organization, varying in size from a small sect to an entire state. What can we see on the historical example of the development of the multi-caliber totalitarianism of the 20th century and the devastation brought into society in the results of its activities. “But how they, having known God, did not glorify Him as God, and did not thank, but became vain in their mindsets, and their senseless heart was darkened, calling themselves wise, mad” (Rom. 1:21, 22), - the Message says The Romans, where the true content of the proposed "puzzles" is revealed, is shattered thinking, mind plunging into darkness, and, therefore, the whole life of man and society.

Chapter 5 Paradigm Priority

The relationship between rules, paradigms and normal science is examined. It is noted that finding a paradigm is easier than rules that may differ for one paradigm and finding the basis of which constantly leads to deep disappointments. The existence of a paradigm may be without a complete set of rules, but it determines the direction of research, allowing the scientist to develop for himself the rules of the game, which, however, are not binding on him. Normal science can develop without rules while the scientific community takes advantage of the achievements of previous researchers. The relevance of the rules arises with the loss of confidence in the paradigm.

Indeed, “normal science”, according to Kuhn, like any criminal organization, can exist without legal laws until it is eaten, the last piece of bread baked by workers according to the rules, truth and law of God.

Chapter 6 Anomaly and the emergence of scientific theories

Normal science does not aim at finding a new fact or theory, ”the author believes. This leads to the conclusion that the emergence of scientific theory in such paradigms, of course, is an anomaly for them. At the same time, the professionalization noted by the researcher in the scientific community is “the development of the esoteric vocabulary and skill, and the refinement of concepts whose similarities with their prototypes taken from the field of common sense are constantly decreasing”.

Another example typical of the process of existence and development of criminal organizations and sects. Creating your own terminology, ambiguous, encoded, with a constantly changing meaning to maintain conspiracy. And in the case of sects, for the disorganization of social relations and the thinking of adherents who are brought into a state of easy manipulation of their consciousness and behavior. And not only individuals, but also society. In the context of the Jewish origin of this work, we should recall the history of the development of the Jewish heresy and the conspiracy, initiated at the end of the 15th century in Russia by Sharia, who, as I. Volotsky points out, was trained in “sorcery and the Black Book, astrology and astrology” and began his work with the destruction of the Orthodox faith and seduction in the secret organization of priests.

Chapter 7 The crisis and the emergence of scientific theories

Scientific discoveries are the causes or factors contributing to a paradigm shift through crisis.

The state of the soul, family, economy or politics in society, “suddenly” discovered scientifically in a hangover from esoteric research is a factor in changing the composition or leadership of such organizations. For example, the awareness of deceit that came in the hunger, cold and unwashed condition of the taiga camp, after all the efforts to wait for Christ to come with the corresponding transfer of property, finances and housing into the hands of “legal representatives of the coming Kingdom of God.” If these souls do not return to the Orthodox Church and to the order created by It in the mind, family and society, then they continue to wander in search and development of new “scientific theories”.

Chapter 8 Responding to Crisis

“Crises are a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of new theories,” arising as a result of the corresponding reaction of scientists. At the same time, the author says, during the crisis, scientists of normal science do not turn to philosophy as the basis of scientific knowledge, to the extent that there is a paradigm. In the process of crisis, there is a transition from normal to extraordinary science. Symptoms of which are "an increase in competing options, a willingness to try something else, an expression of obvious discontent, seeking help from philosophy and discussing fundamental principles."

The direction to a wise reaction to the crisis is given by Scripture, always turning souls to God and His truth, as well as to its true carriers: “Do not listen to empty ears, do not give your hand to the wicked, to be a witness to untruth. Do not follow the majority to evil, and do not solve the lawsuit, retreating from the majority by the majority ... ”(Exodus 23: 1,2). But Christ always teaches first to seek the kingdom of God and His righteousness (Matthew 6:33). He calls to go to Him in prayer, hearing, and fulfilling His instruction, in order to find the Lord’s peace, his power of wisdom, love and fruitfulness instead of fuss (Matthew 11: 28-30; John 15: 1-9).

Chapter 9 Nature and the need for scientific revolutions

The definition is given, “scientific revolution” - non-cumulative episodes of the development of science, during which the old paradigm is largely or completely replaced by a new one. A parallel is drawn between science and politics, the paradigm is compared with institutions of power that have ceased to fulfill their functions and are replaced by techniques prohibited by these institutions. There is a choice between competing paradigms. At the same time, logic and experiment are not used because of the uselessness proved by history.

An accurate and illustrative example of such a scientific revolution was the fall of man (Genesis 3), who doubted the truth of the commandments and laws of God, respectively, leaving behind the logic, replacing the fruitful experiment prescribed by God in doing good deeds, with pernicious atrocities inspired by the evil one. At the same time, a person falls into a crisis, changing the Kingdom of God to a paradigm, a “scientific community” with Satan and the spirits of the dull mind.

As a result of the loss of peace and the leadership of God, a person gains rebellion, fighting in its members and community, plunging everyone into endless revolutions, driven by the spirits of destruction and death. “You desire - and you have not; you kill and envy - and you cannot achieve; bicker and enmity - and do not have ”(James 4: 2), - says James about the problems and driving forces of such revolutions. “Adulterers and adulterers! don’t you know that friendship with the world is enmity against God? ”(James 4: 4), the Lord asks through the lips of the apostle of the ungodly, who at least became deaf to the Word of God, who wished for the omnipotence of God, but who became clouded by membership in“ paradigms ” ”, Unintelligible terminologies, theories, and related communities.

Chapter 10 Revolution as a change in worldview

Based on the history of the development of science, it is shown that “after the revolution, scientists work in a different world,” that is, with a changed worldview and social institutions and the environment. Carried away by the new paradigm, scientists get new tools and their areas of application.

This fully corresponds to the position of man after his revolutionary fall, the elimination of the presence of God and the acquisition of a community of godly spirits and captive human souls.

The attempts of revolutions in the Orthodox Church began with the Garden of Eden and continue to this day. In Russia, the heresies of the Judaizers are especially distinguished, the essence of which lies in various mixtures of Judaism and occultism. About which Joseph Volotsky warns, instructing to fight them with all the methods prescribed by God. Firstly, by educating, as well as conducting church and state investigations and legal proceedings, with sincere and reasonable support of the whole society, followed by punishment of the guilty, up to the death penalty, and encouragement of all faithful to the Orthodox Church and the Fatherland.

Chapter 11 The Indistinguishability of Revolutions

The examples used in the previous chapter to characterize scientific revolutions are actually considered by the author, in his own words, not as a revolution, but as an addition to existing knowledge. At the same time, it is suggested that there are extremely good reasons that impede clearly distinguishing their borders, and the revolutions are almost invisible.

The author proposes to consider a special aspect of scientific work, "which most clearly distinguishes it from any other creative research, with the possible exception of theology." The source of authority is taken from textbooks, popular science publications and philosophical works that describe the achievements of past times and form the basis of normal science. During revolutions they correspond, supplemented by new data.

Based on the arguments of the author himself, we can conclude that the title of the work and the emphasis on the revolutionary development of normal science are inconsistent, most likely caused by the desire to demonstrate the sensationalism of the material of the work, characteristic of the creators of the base tabloid press, thus attracting the attention of an idle public.

Chapter 12 Resolution of Revolutions

The revolution produces textbooks, becoming the basis of a new tradition and normal science. Their data are the result of researchers choosing paradigms, programs, and theories from alternative ones. Researchers' decisions are determined by faith. From its infancy, the paradigm is thus formed into a mature one and attracts more and more supporters to this community.

“Have the faith of God” (Mar. 11:23), Christ and the Orthodox Church teach, nourishing souls with the Word of God, in the formation of this faith. In the departure from which similar revolutions arise and their consequences. And Basil the Great directs souls to stay in the glory of God, to true heights, to enlighten the wisdom of God, to amuse eternal life and its blessings, warning you not to cultivate more false, which leads to the fall and loss of everything. Continuing, he says that since the fall of man, “the greatest salvation for him, healing from illness and a way to return to his pristine state is modesty, that is, in order not to invent the endowment of some glory from himself, but to seek glory from God. This will only correct the mistake; this disturbs the ailment; through this, he will return to the sacred commandment that he left. ”

Chapter 13 Progress that the revolutions carry

The author poses a series of questions at the end of the work, the answers of which are not formulated as conclusions needed in a work of any genre close to science, but refers the reader to the previous text with the caveat that these questions still remain open. We list them:
   - Why should the evolutionary process be carried out?
   - What should be nature, including man, so that science is possible at all?
- Why should scientific communities achieve lasting coherence, unattainable in other areas?
   - Why should coherence accompany the transition from one paradigm shift to another?
   - And why should a paradigm shift constantly create tools that are more perfect in any sense than those that were known before?

One conclusion is made that a person and his environment must have a certain nature, capable of developing science.

You must be born again (John 3: 7), says Christ the Savior, directing every person in obedience to God the Father and knowledge of His truth and love, in obedience to Him, His truth, judgment and mercy, humble to God by introducing the Word and the Cross deed into His Church and the Kingdom of God.

1969 Supplements

They were made after many years of reflection on the issues raised in the book, in an attempt to clarify their descriptions that were not clear enough.

1. Paradigms and structure of the scientific community

The concept of a paradigm is separated from the concept of the scientific community. The definition is given: "a paradigm is what unites members of the scientific community, and, conversely, the scientific community consists of people who recognize the paradigm." The structure of scientific communities as founders and architects of scientific knowledge is considered. In a professional form, their scientific activity is isoteric and aimed at solving puzzles (obviously solvable problems), based on proven facts. In the transition to a new paradigm, such a scientific community is ready to sacrifice something very significant and at the same time find new tools for work.

2. Paradigms as sets of prescriptions for a scientific group

The proposed term “paradigm”, as practice has shown, is used in several dozen ways. Therefore, it needs to be clarified. The author gives another definition of the paradigm - the main philosophical elements of the book. That which gives full professional communication and unanimity in judgment.

The term disciplinary matrix is \u200b\u200bproposed, according to scientific discipline and the orderliness of its constituent elements. Including, the prescriptions, which the author calls a paradigm, formally expresses and characterizes as a powerful apparatus of mathematical and logical formulas used in solving puzzles.

The second type of components of the disciplinary matrix, metaphysical paradigms or metaphysical parts of paradigms, which means generally accepted prescriptions, as beliefs in specific models.

The third component of the matrix is \u200b\u200bthe values \u200b\u200bthat form the unity of the group of researchers, although they can be individual.

The fourth, but not the last component - samples, specific solutions to problems, supplemented by technical solutions.

3.Paradigms as recognized patterns

“The paradigm, as a universally recognized model, is the central element of what I now consider the newest and least understood aspect of this book,” the author notes. And after demonstrating a number of examples, he characterizes it as ““ implicit knowledge ”, which is acquired more by practical participation in scientific research than by assimilation of the rules governing scientific activity”.

4. Implicit knowledge and intuition

The appeal to implicit knowledge and the corresponding rejection of the rules highlights one more problem and will serve as the basis for accusation of subjectivity and irrationalism, the author states and explains this by the opponents' incomprehension of the principles of intuition having a collective origin and use, and also professes the immutability of ideas that protects from individual and collective solipsism. Thus, again returning to the patterns and rules, however, as we see, through the denial of the logic of rational thinking replaced by the internal impulses, will and values \u200b\u200bof a certain group.

5. Samples, disproportionality and revolutions

“The superiority of one theory over another cannot be conclusively established in the course of such discussions. Instead, as I have already emphasized, each participant is trying, guided by his convictions, to “convert others” into his faith, ”says the author. Clarifying that the basic criteria of scientificness, such as accuracy, simplicity, effectiveness and others are the values \u200b\u200bof these groups. Each group begins to develop its own language and there is a violation of communication, requiring additional participation of translators for restoration. At the same time, “neither sufficient grounds, nor translation from one language to another provide persuasion. This is a process that we must explain in order to understand the important form of change in scientific knowledge. ”

6. Revolutions and relativism

Reflecting on the development of science and the successive change of its theories, the author admits: “Although the temptation to characterize such a position as relativistic is quite understandable, this opinion seems erroneous to me. And vice versa, if this position means relativism, then I can’t understand what the relativist lacks to explain the nature and development of sciences. ” Scientific development, like the development of the biological world, is a unidirectional and irreversible process. Later scientific theories are better than earlier ones adapted to solve puzzles in those often completely different conditions in which they are applied. This is not a relativistic position, and it reveals the meaning that determines my faith in scientific progress.

7. The nature of science

In this section, regardless of its name, the author summarizes his work.

“My descriptive generalizations are obvious from the point of view of the theory precisely because they can also be deduced from it, while from other points of view on the nature of science they lead to anomalies.”
   - Firstly, "the book describes the development of science as a sequence of interconnected periods of tradition, interrupted by non-cumulative leaps."
   “And also,“ apparently, the concept of a paradigm as a concrete achievement, as a model, is my second contribution to the development of problems in the development of science. ”
   “In this book I intended to consider issues of a slightly different plan, which many of its readers could not clearly see.”

It emphasizes "the need to study the community as a structural unit in the organization of scientific activity ... the need for a close, and above all comparative, study of the relevant communities in other areas."

  Conclusion

The work touches upon an important and relevant topic for the development of science, its foundations and nature. When developing, its author does not indicate the application of a certain philosophical methodology for covering these issues, but speaks of metaphysics as the highest supersensible level of the paradigm rules, and of isoterics, by definition, not all available knowledge that divides society into clans of more or less elected ones. Previous work on science is rated by him as “tourist guides”. Accordingly, there are no references, for example, to the works of Aristotle on the first principles and causes of everything, the “first philosophy” called metaphysics, which Plato already consciously used as a scientific method.

Apart from the mentioned metaphysics, work is distinguished from positivism by the absence of a well-defined logical order in the statement of facts. Which is more consistent with the irrationalism of the postmodern time of the previous century, for example, Nietzsche. This is also evidenced by the priority given to the paradigm (“scientific” community) in determining truth as an expression of collective consensual voluntarism. And the disorder in the construction of reasoning, replete with violations of the laws of classical logic, is probably an attempt to give the work a sign of isotericity, which hides secret knowledge in the depths of confused reasoning. The style of which, to convey the "logic" and the spirit of work, is partially preserved in the abstract in a summary of chapters.

The work does not mention dialectics and one of its main laws of the transition of quantity into quality. The building of the theory of the development of science, as scientific revolutions, is further constructed from data doubtful even for the author, with his reservation on the blurring of the boundaries of the described revolutions. A number of “scientific” terms are introduced into circulation, such as extraordinary and normal science, a paradigm, anomaly, and a disciplinary matrix, which do not have a clear logical definition and contribute to the disorganization of thinking and scientific work, and as a result, the destruction of public order and beautification. Which, combined with a very noticeable legal nihilism in the methodology of research and the formation of scientific communities, is more characteristic of the process of creating totalitarian-destructive sects and criminal organizations, as a rule, with a significant religious, nationalist or racial component.

In general, the work was built without taking into account previous studies in the field of general philosophy, history, philosophy and theory of science, with a number of violations of the logic of definitions and judgments, has no reliable generalized provisions, significant conclusions and novelty in the results. Inclines readers to use isoteric knowledge.

The work can be used in criminological studies of criminal, administrative, canon law and other related branches of science and practice, as a fact of the formation of the ideology of legal and methodological nihilism. What is relevant for consideration and prevention in modern state, church and public construction. In particular, in the context of a historically visible tendency towards the development of Orthodox heresies and sects in Orthodox Russia, to which the Jewish origin of the author draws attention.

Explaining the reason for all the disturbances, which is inherent to the truth of Holy Orthodoxy, Gregory the Theologian says that this is natural ardor and pride of the spirit, “however, it is not simple ardor and greatness (I do not at all condemn that ardor without which it is impossible to catch up in piety, nor in another virtue), but firmness combined with imprudence, ignorance, and the evil product of the latter is insolence, for insolence is the fruit of ignorance. ” And then it shows the basis of true theology in the purity and order of thought and life, and therefore the performance of any scientific work, warning: "Talking about God is a great thing, but much more - to cleanse ourselves for God."