Soviet propaganda during the Second World War. Propaganda during the Great Patriotic War

Chapter 1. Material and personnel base of Soviet propaganda 1. Propaganda: essence and main categories 2. Institutional dimension of propaganda 3. Resources and personnel of Soviet propaganda

Chapter 2. Propaganda forms and images 1. Mechanisms, forms and methods of propaganda work 2. Main propaganda images and symbols 3. Patriotic propaganda is the central direction of ideological work

Chapter 3. Military propaganda: successes and failures 1. The effectiveness of Soviet propaganda during the war 2. Miscalculations of propaganda work

Recommended list of dissertations in the specialty "Domestic history", 07.00.02 code VAK

• Soviet-party propaganda during the Great Patriotic War as a problem of historical and political analysis 2005, Candidate of Historical Sciences Galimullina, Nadia Midkhatovna

• Activities of propaganda and agitation bodies in the rear areas of the European part of the RSFSR during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. 2010, candidate of historical sciences Smirnova, Marina Vasilievna

• Seal of the period of the Great Patriotic War on the territory of the Kursk region 2010, candidate of historical sciences Bormotova, Alexandra Rumenovna

• Military-patriotic printed propaganda in the pre-war years and during the Great Patriotic War 2005, candidate of historical sciences Sribnaya, Tatiana Aleksandrovna

• Functioning of the Voronezh Region mass media during the Great Patriotic War 2010, candidate of historical sciences Golovchenko, Ekaterina Ivanovna

Please note that the above scientific texts are posted for review and obtained by means of recognition of original dissertation texts (OCR). In this connection, they may contain errors related to imperfection of recognition algorithms. There are no such errors in PDF files of dissertations and abstracts that we deliver.

War propaganda during the Great Patriotic War 1. A lie said a hundred times becomes true. I. Goebbels War is not just an armed confrontation between the fighting sides. The main goal of military operations is to carry out a set of tasks that cannot be limited simply by the physical destruction of the enemy army. Therefore, the desire to influence the enemy by means of propaganda, disinformation, intimidation, etc. since ancient times it has been an unchanging companion of all wars. 2. Psychological warfare specialist P.G. Warburton wrote the following: “In modern times, the main task in war is not the destruction of the enemy's armed forces, as it was before, but undermining the morale of the population of the enemy country as a whole and to such a level that it would force its government to go to peace. An armed clash of armies is only one of the means to achieve the same goal. Of particular importance in the confrontation between the warring parties is the psychological impact on the enemy, the desire to somehow shake his faith in the correctness of his ideas, faith in future victory. ” War propaganda is the use of information channels in the interests of political support for ongoing hostilities and common goals set for themselves by the belligerent parties. The skillful organization of work on the impact on the moral and psychological potential of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War was quite high. Having begun to form as a means of intimidation, the information-psychological impact during the war became an integral part of military art. 3. The purpose of the Information-psychological impact is to have a demoralizing effect aimed at weakening the human psyche, sharpening his sense of self-preservation in order to reduce moral and combat qualities up to refusal to participate in hostilities, as well as to form positive attitudes in the enemy in relation to surrender captured as the only reasonable and safe way out of the current situation. The main forms of psychological influence during the Great Patriotic War were printed and radio propaganda. On a smaller scale, oral propaganda and visual agitation were presented. 4. The main bodies responsible for the provision of informational and psychological influence on the enemy troops and population were in the USSR - the Bureau of Military-Political Propaganda, in Germany - the Ministry of Public Education and Propaganda. 5. The German propaganda ministry, headed by Josef Paul Goebbels, gathered the best Nazi propaganda cadres. The main merit in promoting the "horrors of Bolshevism" belongs to Goebbels's closest collaborator, Dr. Taubert. In parallel, the propaganda system worked in the department of A. Rosenberg, the imperial minister of the eastern territories. Under the General Staff of the German Army, a special department worked to conduct propaganda among the enemy forces and the population of the occupied territories. Since February 1941, in connection with the preparation of the invasion of the USSR, the Wehrmacht propaganda department began to develop a plan for the propaganda support of the military campaign. By the time of the invasion of Soviet territory, 19 propaganda companies and 6 platoons of SS war correspondents were formed in the German troops intended for the war on the Eastern Front. They included: military journalists, translators, personnel for the maintenance of propaganda radio vehicles, employees of field printing houses, specialists in the publication and distribution of anti-Soviet literature, posters, leaflets. Under the control of the Ministry of Propaganda was all German broadcasting. In 1943, foreign broadcasting was conducted in 53 languages. Much attention during the Second World War was paid to black propaganda from secret radio stations located in Germany. So three radio stations worked against the USSR. One of them was of a Trotskyist character, the second was separatist, and the third was posing as a national Russian. According to the provisions of a special directive on propaganda, the German troops were ordered to emphasize in every possible way that the enemy of Germany was not the peoples of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the German armed forces came to the country not as enemies, but, on the contrary, as liberators striving to save people from Soviet tyranny. The fierce resistance of the Red Army two months after the start of the war demanded that the Wehrmacht propaganda department make adjustments to its work. By this time, the Germans had already produced and distributed 200 million leaflets. These were mainly brief calls to go over to the Germans, to destroy commanders and commissars (in some leaflets for the commissioner's commission they promised 100 rubles) or just small books with passes for the whole unit in the form of vouchers. They are called "For you and your friends." There were also more complex materials, for example, multi-page photo collages that illustrated the delights of German captivity. Goebbels reminded his subordinates in the Proposals for the preparation of leaflets for enemy troops that for a propagandist in his work all means are good if they contribute to the achievement of the goal: 7. “The propaganda of corruption is a dirty business that has nothing to do with faith or worldview. In this case, only the result itself is decisive. If we manage to win the enemy's trust ... and if we manage to penetrate the souls of the enemy's soldiers, plant slogans corrupting them into them, it makes no difference whether they are Marxist, Jewish or intellectual slogans, as long as they are effective! And Ordinary people are usually much more primitive than we imagine. Therefore, propaganda, in essence, should always be simple and endlessly repetitive. Ultimately, the most significant results in influencing public opinion will be achieved only by those who are able to reduce problems to the simplest expressions and who have the courage to constantly repeat them in this simplified form, despite the objections of intellectuals. " Goebbels In contrast to the propaganda posters addressed to the population of the occupied territories, the trench leaflets intended for distribution in the war zone soviet troops , differed in a small format - the size of a postcard. It was more convenient to scatter such leaflets from airplanes over enemy positions, and to saboteurs to carry them across the front line for distribution to the rear of the Red Army. Finally, it was easier for any Red Army man to pick up such a leaflet from the ground and put it in his pocket unnoticed from the eyes of the political commissars. Special efforts of German propaganda were concentrated on the figure of I. Stalin. In one of the leaflets, the usual abbreviation of the USSR was deciphered as the death of Stalin Save Russia. Immediately a caricature of a proletarian hammer strikes Stalin on the head, and a peasant sickle is pressed to his neck. In another leaflet, a caricatured Stalin with a predatory grin planes coffins, on the coffins - the numbers of the dead divisions and armies. The caption under the picture "Father Stalin takes care of his divisions ..." 8. The assortment of anti-Semitic leaflets was the most plentiful in the arsenal of the Reich propagandists. Various methods and means of ideological decomposition of Soviet soldiers were used here - from primitive slogans to fiery appeals to start a new - anti-Bolshevik-anti-Jewish revolution "Kill the Jew-political leader, his face is asking for a brick!" “Soldiers, commanders and political workers! It is your sacred duty to start the second revolution for the happiness of the Motherland and your families. Know that victory is yours since the weapon is in your hands. Save the Fatherland from the Jewish boor! Down with the traitors to Russia - Jewish accomplices! Death to the Jewish Bolshevism! Forward, for freedom, for happiness and life! " The propagandists of the Third Reich kept saying that the German soldier was bringing land and freedom to Russia. The propaganda onslaught brought its results. In Soviet villages, the Germans were often greeted with bread and salt as liberators from collective farms, taxes and repression. However, the peasants of the occupied territories understood the essence of the new agrarian order quite quickly: the collective farms were never liquidated, the German authorities simply renamed them community farms. The peasants did not receive individual land allotments and were obliged to cultivate the communal land under the strict supervision of a manager appointed by the occupation authorities. Those who deviated from general work faced a severe punishment by a military court. The entire crop was at the disposal of the German authorities, and the peasants received payment for their work. Sizes and forms of payment were set at the discretion of local superiors. In general, the German new order did not give the peasants anything new in comparison with the Bolshevik government.9 All Nazi propaganda was based on false theses. The central thesis of Nazism is the racial superiority of the Germans. The second thesis was the existence of a threat to Europe from the Jews and the Communists, and, between the first and second, an identity sign was put. During the operational pause (April-May 1943), the activity of German troops at the front, with the exception of ordinary shootings in individual sections, was limited to the operation of the Silver Strip, the largest German propaganda campaign of all time during the war. This operation was a reflection of the intention of the command of the German army to make the Russian people their ally in the struggle against the Soviet regime. 10. In April, the OKH prepared Basic Order No. 13 on the policy towards deserters from the enemy army. They were to be separated from the rest of the prisoners and placed in the best barracks. After crossing the front line, they were advised to provide plentiful rations, and then sent to the rear in trucks, without forcing to walk. Officers should be appointed orderlies. Prisoners of war who voluntarily entered the German service were assigned to units of one officer and twenty-four soldiers; such units should have been incorporated into every German division. Their task was to conduct radio propaganda broadcasts for enemy soldiers; in addition, they had to ensure the reception of new deserters from the Soviet troops. Operation Silver Stripe was carried out in May, June and July with the aim of bringing Main Order No. 13 to the Russian soldiers. In May and June, 49 million propaganda leaflets were distributed in Army Group North. The propaganda officers believed that this campaign could be more successful if it was carried out, as originally planned, was linked to Operation Citadel, that is, if it was not conducted during a lull at the front, when it is much more difficult to desertion ... *** 11. On June 25, a Soviet bureau of military-political propaganda was created, headed by L.Z. Mekhlis and deputy D.Z. Manuel. The functions of the bureau included conducting propaganda and counter-propaganda among the troops and population of the enemy. German counterintelligence recognized that the Soviet side possessed the entire arsenal of methods of ideological struggle. So, in November 1942, the headquarters of the 2nd German army noted the systematic, well thought-out and purposeful work of Soviet propaganda on German soldiers and the population. The propagandists did not speculate with communist rhetoric, spared the church, did not affect the peasantry and the middle class of Germany. The main blow was directed against the Führer and the NSDAP (National Socialist German Workers Party) in order to tear them from the people. “We must tirelessly see before us the face of the Nazi is that target that you need to shoot without a miss, this is the personification of the fascism that we hate. Our duty is to incite hatred of evil and strengthen the thirst for beauty, goodness, justice. ” I. Ehrenburg The term fascist has become synonymous with an inhuman, a werewolf born of the dark forces of capitalism, an inhuman economic political system and the ideology of Nazi Germany. The fascists were portrayed as soulless assault rifles, methodical assassins, exploiters, rapists, barbarians. The leaders of the Reich seemed professional losers in civilian life, perverts, murderers and exploiters, modern slaveholders. The appearance of the Soviet soldiers: simple and modest people, very gentle in peacetime, real friends. It was about the exceptional art of a new man, our warrior-knight with new psychotechnical qualities. It was an epic hero freeing Mankind from the Universal Evil. Wartime posters were a powerful means of information and psychological impact. They performed two important functions - to inform and create a clear negative image of the enemy among the population, and therefore contributed to the attitude to destroy the enemy and help their state with all their might. Some of the most famous posters of the Great Patriotic War were "Windows TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union. The propaganda included the image of the superiority of the Allied forces, the vastness of Russian territory and the unfair nature of the war on the part of Germany.) 13. After Operation Citadel, German psychological warfare specialists left Soviet propaganda seized the initiative forever. The Russians managed to take advantage of the fact that for two years the Germans behaved cruelly and unjustly in the occupied Soviet lands. The passionate belief of a part of the Soviet people that after the return of the Red Army to live In addition, the people were promised that the war was about to be over. The radio was also used for propaganda purposes. The radio broadcast not only front-line news, but also actively created heroic images of their own army and the image of a hated enemy. From 1941 to 1945 year many ra zlichny leaflets were created to influence the behavior of both their own population, military, partisans, and enemy troops, the population of Germany and the liberated countries. The leaflets were informative and misinformative, with different functions, calling for action and causing a depressive mood, creating meaning and making senseless. The propaganda of both opposing sides served to achieve the victory of each of the countries.

Political and literary propaganda

The need for propaganda in the pre-war and wartime became immediately obvious - the Red Army had to mobilize more and more forces, involving the population, counteract enemy propaganda in the occupied territories, stimulate patriotism among the partisans, and even influence the enemy army with propaganda methods.

Famous Soviet posters and leaflets, radio broadcasts and recordings in enemy trenches became popular propaganda tools. The propaganda raised the morale of the Soviet people and made them fight more courageously.

During the Battle of Stalingrad, the Red Army used revolutionary methods of psychological pressure on the enemy. From the loudspeakers installed at the front line, favorite hits of German music were heard, which were interrupted by reports of the victories of the Red Army in the sectors of the Stalingrad Front. But the most effective means was the monotonous beat of the metronome, which was interrupted after 7 beats with a comment in German: "Every 7 seconds one German soldier dies at the front." At the end of a series of 10-20 "timer reports", tango rushed from the loudspeakers.

The decision to organize propaganda was made in the early days of the Great Patriotic War. The formation of the images involved in propaganda was carried out by the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Department for Work with the Enemy Troops of the Red Army.

Already on June 24, 1941, the Soviet Information Bureau became responsible for propaganda on the radio and in the press. In addition to military-political propaganda, there was also literary propaganda: the group, which was created specifically for propaganda and coverage of the military life of Soviet soldiers, included such famous writers as K.M. Simonov, N.A. Tikhonov, A.N. Tolstoy, A.A. Fadeev, K.A. Fedin, M.A. Sholokhov, I. G. Ehrenburg and many others. German anti-fascists - F. Wolf, V. Bredel also collaborated with them.

Soviet authors were read abroad: for example, Ehrenburg's articles were distributed in 1,600 newspapers in the United States, and Leonov's letter to an Unknown American Friend was listened to by 10 million overseas radio listeners. “Literature becomes all defense-oriented,” said V. Vishnevsky.

The responsibility of the writers was enormous - they had to not only show the qualities of the Soviet army and foster patriotism, but also to influence different audiences using different approaches. For example, Ehrenburg believed that "different reasons were required for the Red Army and for the neutral Swedes."

In addition to the rise of the Red Army, the Soviet man and the allied troops, propaganda was also supposed to expose the German troops, expose Germany's internal contradictions, and demonstrate the inhumanity of her attacks.

The USSR possessed the entire arsenal of methods of ideological struggle. Acting in the camp of the enemy, our propagandists did not use excessive communist rhetoric, did not denounce the church in front of the German population, did not take up arms against the peasants.

Propaganda was mainly directed against Hitler and the NSDAP, and used the opposition of the Fuhrer and the people.

The German command followed the Soviet propaganda and saw that it was perfectly differentiated: “ she speaks in folk, soldier and specific local expressions, appeals to the original human feelings, such as fear of death, fear of battle and danger, longing for a wife and child, jealousy, homesickness. All this is contrasted with going over to the side of the Red Army ...».

Political propaganda knew no restrictions: Soviet propaganda aimed at the enemy not only denounced the injustice of the war, but also appealed to vast lands Russia, cold weather, superiority of the forces of the allied forces. Rumors were spread at the front, aimed at all strata of society - peasants, workers, women, youth, intellectuals. However, the propaganda also had common points - the image of the fascist enemy.

Enemy image

The image of the enemy at all times and in all countries is formed about the same - it is necessary to divide the world of the good, kind people, who are fighting exclusively for the good, and the world of "non-humans" who do not mind killing in the name of the future peace on earth.

If the national socialist (and not fascist) organs of Germany used the term "subhuman", then in the USSR the word "fascist" became such a common bogey.

Ilya Ehrenburg thus defined the task of propaganda: “We must tirelessly see before us the appearance of a Hitlerite: this is the target that must be fired at without a miss, this is the personification of what is hated by us. Our duty is to incite hatred for evil and to strengthen the thirst for the beautiful, the good, the just. "

The word "fascist" instantly became synonymous with an inhuman monster that kills everyone and everything in the name of evil. The fascists were portrayed as soulless rapists and cold killers, barbarians and rapists, perverts and slave owners.

If the courage and strength of the Soviet fighters were extolled, then the forces of Germany's allies contemptuously criticized: "In the Donbass, Italians surrender - they do not need leaflets, they are driven crazy by the smell of our camp kitchens."

Soviet people were portrayed as kind and peace-loving in non-war times - during the war they instantly managed to become heroes, destroying with their bare fists to the teeth armed professional murderers-fascists. And, importantly, the fascists and Fritzes were not killed - they were only destroyed.

The well-oiled machine of Soviet propaganda was quite flexible: for example, the very image of the enemy changed several times. If from 1933 until the beginning of the Second World War, a discourse of the separation of the images of the innocent German people and the insidious Nazi government was formed, then in May 1941 the anti-fascist connotations were eliminated.

Of course, after June 22, they returned and the propaganda was launched with renewed vigor. Another cardinal turn marked by the German propaganda organs is the mobilization of spiritual reserves in 1942-1944.

It was at that time that Stalin began to encourage the previously condemned communist values: tradition, nationality, churchism.

In 1943, Stalin authorized the election of a new Moscow patriarch, and the church became yet another patriotic instrument of propaganda. It was at that time that patriotism began to be combined with pan-Slavic themes and motives for helping fellow Slavs. "By changing the political and ideological line and the slogan" Expel the German occupiers from their native land and save the Fatherland! " Stalin achieved success, "wrote the Germans.

USSR about allies

The military propaganda of the Soviet Union did not forget about the allied countries, relations with which were not always the most idyllic. First of all, the allies appeared in propaganda materials as friends of the Soviet people, cheerful and selfless fighters. The material support that was provided by the allied forces of the USSR was also praised: American stew, egg powder and British pilots in Murmansk. Polevoy wrote about the allied forces: “Russians, British, Americans, this is a mountain. Whoever tries to break a mountain with his head breaks his head ... ”.

Propaganda was also carried out among the population of the Allied countries: Soviet delegations were given instructions on how to form a positive image of the USSR, how to convince the Allies of the need to open a Second Front, etc.

Soviet realities were often compared to American ones: “The battle for the Volga is the battle for the Mississippi. Have you done everything to protect your native, your wonderful river, American, ”- wrote Fedin.

The motive of cosmopolitanism and the all-conquering friendship of peoples was predominant in the allied propaganda aimed at the United States, England and France, while at home these terms were not always given the same role. Despite the fact that immediately after the Second World War, the old anti-Western clichés in Soviet propaganda revived, posters were drawn and songs were composed: for example, the jazz song "James Kennedy" told about the heroic British in the Arctic.

One of the features of World War II was the active information war between the Soviet and Nazi regimes. Moscow and Berlin actively used the technical innovations of the 20th century: radio, cinema, mass printing. Great powers actively studied and used methods to influence the psyche of people, their consciousness and subconsciousness.

The methods were the same for the "democratic" United States and for the totalitarian Germany and the Soviet Union. Constant influence on people, from a very early age, their inclusion in various mass children's, youth, women's, trade union and other organizations. Constant hammering into the mind of slogans, theses. Tight control of the media. Creation of the image of the enemy - internal and external. In the West, these were communists, Jewish Bolsheviks and Jews (in the Third Reich), “commissars,” in the USSR, bourgeois plutocrats.

The regimes of Mussolini and Hitler were distinguished by their great belligerence, the militarization of their propaganda. The cult of strength became the basis of their ideology - constant military parades, militant speeches, and paramilitary mass movements were held. European inhabitants were intimidated, they tried to break their will to resist even before the start of the big war. For example, the German film Baptism by Fire of 1939, about the actions of the Luftwaffe in the Polish campaign, was designed for this very effect.

The peculiarity of the United States' propaganda was their appropriation of the position of a "fighter for peace", "democracy", and they have retained this distinction to this day. This is confirmed by the names of several American organizations of that time: the American Committee for the Struggle Against War, the World Congress against War, the American League against War and Fascism, etc. The Soviet Union sinned the same, although Soviet foreign policy was really aimed at maintaining peace in the USSR, in unlike Italy, Germany, the USA, which deliberately kindled the world fire of war.

They helped in the most powerful informational impact on people, the widespread elimination of illiteracy, the growth of the role of radio and cinema. Already at that time, psychologists knew that people were divided into two categories - the easily suggestible majority (90-95%) and a small category of hard-to-hear people. The work is carried out with both groups of the population: for the first, rather ordinary, simple agitation, the idea is stubbornly hammered into the heads every day, until it takes over the masses. The second group is carried away with more sophisticated teachings and ideas.

For the illiterate and semi-literate, there were posters that were supposed to explain in the simplest way the essence of the phenomenon, the event.

Cinematography began to play a huge role and is still playing. Films carry a big message of persuasion. They can be used both for the benefit of the people and for their corruption, deception. For example, in the USSR socialist realism played the most important role, when people's lives were idealized. He set a high social and cultural bar towards which the Soviet people should strive. Films were made about workers, historical and patriotic films, for example: "Steel Way (Turksib)" in 1929, "Alexander Nevsky" in 1938.

In the 30s in the USSR, they began to correct mistakes and abuses that were made after October revolution 1917. Thus, they reduced the pressure on Christianity, began to restore the images of the heroes of the period of "accursed tsarism". Although back in the 1920s it was believed that the "tsarist legacy" should be done away with completely, including with Kutuzov, Suvorov, Ushakov, Nakhimov, Rumyantsev, etc. Gradually it came to the understanding that the Soviet patriot must be educated by examples pre-revolutionary times. The great figures of Russian culture - Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Pushkin, Lermontov - were also rehabilitated. Chekhov, etc.

Posters were still of great importance, the wartime painters Sokolov-Skalya, Denisovsky, Lebedev were the most famous masters of their creation, the Kukryniksy collective is the pseudonym of three famous Soviet artists, which was derived from the initial letters of their surnames. They have worked together for 20 years - Mikhail Kupriyanov, Porfiry Krylov and Nikolai Sokolov. Many of these works reminded of the exploits of long-standing Russian national heroes, as one of the posters depicted Alexander Nevsky, the hero-prince, the winner of the Swedes and German knights, the invincible commander Alexander Suvorov, who beat the Turks and the French, Vasily Chapaev, soviet hero Civil War. In parallel with the big counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow in 1941-1942, a poster with Mikhail Kutuzov, who had defeated Napoleon's “Great Army” 130 years earlier, was massively issued.

Some of the works of Soviet artists were of a satirical nature; they drew cartoons of Hitler's leaders, in particular Goebbels. Others described the atrocities of the Nazis - robbery, murder, violence. They were quickly distributed throughout the Union, at every factory, collective farm, in universities and schools, hospitals, units of the Red Army, on ships, so that they would affect almost every Soviet citizen. It happened that such campaign materials were accompanied by caustic verses, the authors of which were poets such as Samuil Marshak. The popularity of military posters and cartoons was achieved thanks to the talent of Soviet artists, who painted them in the simplest and most accessible form for people.

To maintain a fighting spirit and at the same time for a certain relaxation of the psyche of people, propaganda trains, agitation brigades were created. Moving teams of lecturers, artists, poets, singers, and actors were recruited. They traveled throughout the Union, including to the front, held talks, lectures, showed films, organized concerts, and provided people with information about the course of the war.

Cinema also played a huge role, it was during the war that famous films such as "Kutuzov" (1943), "Zoya" (1944), about the short life of the Moscow schoolgirl Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, who at the beginning of the war became a partisan saboteur and was executed by the Germans.

During the Great Patriotic War, a series of excellent documentaries was shot: "The Defeat of the German Army near Moscow" (1942), "The Siege of Leningrad" (1942), "Battle for Ukraine" (1943), "Battle for the Eagle" (1943 years), "Berlin" (1945), "Vienna" (1945).

Soviet propaganda during the Second World War, both within the country and abroad, was surprisingly successful. Abroad, Moscow was able to play on the sympathies of the peoples of the world for the Soviet system and the people who suffered so much from the atrocities of the Nazis. For most people, the Soviet people were the liberators of Europe, the winners of the "brown plague". And the USSR was the model of the state of the future.

Domestically, strict discipline and appeal to deeply rooted feelings of love for their homeland and fatherland allowed Stalin to conduct such a successful military campaign that they were very surprised in Berlin, London and Washington. They believed that the USSR was a colossus with feet of clay that would not withstand the blow of the armed forces of the Third Reich.

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Gorlov Andrey Sergeevich. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War: institutional and organizational aspects: dissertation ... Candidate of Historical Sciences: 07.00.02 / Gorlov Andrey Sergeevich; [Place of protection: Ros. state University of Tourism and Service] .- Moscow, 2009.- 270 p .: ill. RSL OD, 61 10-7 / 41

Introduction

Chapter 1. Material and personnel base of Soviet propaganda 26

1. Propaganda: nature and main categories 28

2. The institutional dimension of advocacy 37

3. Resources and personnel of Soviet propaganda 67

Chapter 2. Propaganda forms and images 87

1. Mechanisms, forms and methods of advocacy 89

2. The main propaganda images and symbols 129

3. Patriotic propaganda is the central direction of ideological work 151

Chapter 3. War propaganda: successes and failures 170

1. The effectiveness of Soviet propaganda during the war 173

2. Miscalculations of propaganda 193

Conclusion 228

List of sources and literature 232

Applications 263

Introduction to work

Relevance of the research topic. The history of wars and military conflicts clearly shows that the outcome of armed clashes ultimately depends on two factors - material and moral. In turn, the experience of World War II convincingly showed that the successful fulfillment of combat missions largely depended on the effectiveness of educational and propaganda work in the troops. Modern research shows that the combat effectiveness of military units by two-thirds depends on the psychophysical state of the soldiers, and only a third falls on equipment and other factors. An equally important factor in victory is the psychological and moral state of the rear. It is obvious that these indicators can be influenced by active propaganda and counter-propaganda activities.

The war against fascism has become a battle of ideologies and national characters. During the period of the most difficult military, economic, political and informational confrontation, Soviet propaganda accumulated experience in managing social processes in the extreme conditions of wartime. For this reason, it seems socially significant to analyze the specific historical content of such an ideological and communication phenomenon as propaganda and, above all, its influence on the course of hostilities and the achievement of victory in the war.

The degree of knowledge of the problem. The literature on the problem under consideration can be conditionally divided into several groups. The first make up general research about the Great Patriotic War, from which you can glean information about the course of hostilities that affected the organization of military propaganda. The second the group highlights the role of the CPSU during the period under study. These are both general works on the history of the party and works devoted to the study of the features of the party's propaganda work during the war years. Third the group includes works that provide an overview of Soviet propaganda during the period of hostilities. Within this group, one can single out works in which emphasis is placed on the effectiveness of the perception of promotional activities; studies devoted to the analysis of certain forms of propaganda in 1941-1945: in print, on the radio, in poster graphics, through culture and the religious sphere, as well as studies of the organization of propaganda among certain categories of the population of the rear and occupied territories, enemy troops, work with prisoners of war and the foreign public.

IN fourth the group includes works that highlight theoretical issues related to the concept of "propaganda", its structure, goals and objectives. First of all, these are the works of foreign authors who analyze Soviet propaganda from the outside. In particular, the leading aspects of Soviet propaganda were studied in the monograph by D. Berber and M. Harrison, who emphasized that the main emphasis in propaganda was placed on the Russian Motherland, which was natural, but at the same time looked like a serious deviation from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The result of the "new propaganda course" was a conscious appeal to the past of Russia in order to ensure a "patriotic impulse". In turn, "heroes of epic victories" over foreign conquerors became role models. American historians emphasized the immutability in Soviet propaganda of the image of Stalin, whose name during the war was turned into a “symbol of the patriotic cause,” a source of patriotic inspiration and moral support. After the battle of Stalingrad, references to "Stalin's strategy" and "Stalin's school of military art" became frequent, and at the end of the war, Stalin's identification with victory reached its climax with his acceptance of the title of generalissimo. The fifth the group is represented by literature of a source study, which considers various groups of propaganda sources: soundtracks and front and rear folklore, stamps and medals, handwritten almanacs and letters.

In general, one can distinguish four stages studying the problems considered in the dissertation.

Most publications the first period (1940s - first half of 1950s) is characterized by purposeful politicization, propaganda in style and essay in form. Social and political literature from June 1941 to the mid-1950s was devoted to the disclosure of essentially one topic - the heroism of the Soviet people in the war through the prism of successes in the ideological work of party bodies. Nevertheless, already within this stage, not only propaganda myths were formed, but also the foundations for promising research were laid.

On the second stage covering the second half of the 1950s - the first half of the 1980s, priority in scientific works also devoted to the leading role of the party in campaigning at the front and in the rear. The study of the institution of Soviet propaganda during the war years was intended, first of all, to demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet system. However, in spite of strict censorship and total control of the party organs over historical science, there has also been a significant expansion of the research field. In particular, in the 1970s, essays on the history of party organizations in various regions became widespread, in which, among other subjects, issues of propaganda work during the war years were considered. In addition, during these years a significant number of works accumulated, in which consideration of the ideological work of the party during the war years formed a holistic view of the manifestation of high moral qualities Soviet people, as a result not only of direct ideological influence on the part of party political bodies, but also as a result of the activities of cultural institutions. In the early 1970s. the first works related to the activities of propaganda bodies in the occupied territories of the USSR appeared.

On the third stage in the second half of the 1980s. The study of propaganda work in the territories occupied by German troops continued. Attempts were also made to systematize the leading directions of propaganda work during the war years. The expansion of interest in the activities of institutions and artists during the war, in particular, the work of front-line brigades and the practice of “patronage” at hospitals, is also obvious.

However, a breakthrough in the study of propaganda campaigns occurred only in the 1990s, when within fourth of the (modern) historiographic period, a number of authors turned to the topic of the relationship of ideology and spiritual life during the war. The surge of interest in Russian historiography towards social history, microhistory and historical anthropology stimulated the study of the “human dimension of war”. The theme of public sentiment in the Red Army was also reflected. In particular, I.V. drew attention to the prospects of studying the political and moral state of the defenders of the capital. Maximov, and V.A. Selyunin, in the first chapter of his dissertation, among other things, investigated the problems of spiritual mobilization of workers to repulse aggressors.

The study of the work of various propaganda institutions during the period under study received a new impetus. For example, the main goal of I.I. Shirokorad became a study of the activities of the central periodical press during the Great Patriotic War, which is estimated by the authors as an integral part of the political organization and an instrument for managing Soviet society. In the monograph by N.A. Sannikov's attention is focused on the study of newspapers and magazines, as well as combat leaflets of flotillas, fleets and individual warships. Separate paragraphs of the monograph are devoted to revealing the implementation of such tasks of Soviet newspapers as, for example, fostering friendship between peoples and loyalty to the ideas of socialism, creating an image of the enemy and uniting the front and rear. N.L. Volkovsky subjected to a detailed analysis of the changes that took place in the media system during the war years, investigated the propaganda aimed at the enemy troops and partly at the population of the occupied territories.

The gender aspect of Soviet military propaganda was explored in G.N. Kameneva, who reconstructed the main directions, forms and methods of work of party bodies with women, including questions of ideological work in general and the activities of the anti-fascist committee of Soviet women, in particular. In the works of E.S. Senyavskaya analyzes the content and transformation of the enemy image in the minds of opponents during the First and Second World Wars. Considering xenophobia as the most important prerequisite for the emergence of this phenomenon, the author simultaneously draws attention to the influence of the personal experience of soldiers and citizens in the formation and comprehension of the enemy's image. The use of song and poetic front-line folklore as one of the main types of sources allowed E.S. Senyavskaya show not only the perception of war by representatives different types and types of troops, but also the formation of heroic symbols of the era. In the publications of N.D. Kozlova, G.A. Kumaneva, M.S. Zinich, O. V. Friendship and V.F. Winters, among other things, contain a systematic study of ideological stereotypes in 1941-1945. A separate section of A.V. Fateeva is devoted to the analysis of the experience of Soviet propagandists in creating the image of the enemy-fascist during the Patriotic War. The author emphasized the systematic, comprehensive and culturally sensitive nature of Soviet military propaganda. In the monograph by A.V. Golubev, on a wide source base, covered stories related not only to expectations of the war, but also to the images of the enemy and allies in the Soviet caricature of the war years.

The writings of Russian historians contain information about changes in the system of ideological influence at the initial stage of the war, showing the expansion of the scale of ideological and educational impact on public consciousness, carried out by employees of cultural and educational institutions. For example, an attempt by A.M. Mazuritsky on identifying the characteristic features of the professional activity of librarians during the war years and determining its content at various stages.

Despite the numerous studies, the role of propaganda during the Great Patriotic War remains insufficiently studied. In addition, in recent years, certain historiographic stereotypes have been formed. For example, attempts to present treason to the Motherland as disagreement with the existing Soviet system or the conclusion that the attitude of the people to the Great Patriotic War was based on "grandfather's" rules, and there was nothing specifically "Soviet" in it. " It can be stated that in domestic and foreign historiography there is no generalizing and comprehensive study of the functioning of the Soviet propaganda machine in the extreme conditions of the Great Patriotic War.

The purpose of the study is a comprehensive historical and political analysis of the institution of Soviet-party propaganda during the Great Patriotic War.

The objectives of the study. Based on the stated goals, the following tasks were identified:

identify the main structures and resource potential of propaganda;

to identify the forms and determine the main stages of propaganda work in the army and in the rear during the war;

to isolate the main propaganda images;

to determine the degree of effectiveness of Soviet military propaganda, as well as the reasons for the miscalculations and the forms of their manifestation.

Object of study the institute of party political propaganda acts as a combination of material, financial, personnel and other resources. This single complex includes central and regional periodicals, news agencies and censorship bodies, party and state bodies, public organizations and creative unions. Moreover, the dissertation research is limited to questions reflecting propaganda conducted in the rear and at the front and aimed at Soviet citizens. The issues of counter-propaganda and propaganda campaigns abroad remained outside the scope of work.

Subject of study forms and methods of propaganda work during the Great Patriotic War, including the main propaganda images.

Chronological framework the studies cover June 1941 - May 1945, that is, the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, when large-scale hostilities were accompanied by active propaganda in various directions and at different levels. However, in order to reconstruct the propaganda potential (including the experience of agitation and propaganda work), in a number of cases, the chronological boundaries of work are expanded for the pre-war years.

Territorial framework dissertations cover the entire territory of the USSR.

Theoretical and methodological basis of the study. Research approaches are determined by the following principles: reconstructive capabilities of the available source base; highlighting two goals in propaganda: short-term, providing a mechanism for mobilizing the masses to achieve victory in a war, and long-term, aimed at political socialization of various segments of the population; taking into account the ratio of methods of direct and indirect propaganda and the differentiation of propaganda by social and professional groups.

An important role in the study is played by the fundamental principles of social history, in particular, the study of social processes not “from above”, through “official discourse”, which embodies the language of power and ideology, but “from below”, “from within”. However, you must see historical events versatile, considering them from different points of view, both "from below" and "from above", in the totality of political, ideological and spiritual processes.

Source base of the thesis. The dissertation is based mainly on archival sources deposited in the funds of the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), as well as on documents published in print.

The source base of the study, in accordance with the structure of the work, includes several groups. So, the first a group of published sources is made up of party and government decrees that determine the structure, composition and general directions of the work of propaganda institutions. Second the group of sources is the propaganda materials of the wartime, which can be used to restore the main directions, forms and methods of propaganda influence. IN third the group includes official materials (summaries, reviews, and references to political moods) and documents of personal origin (letters, memoirs, and memoirs), as well as oral stories that make it possible to reconstruct the “feedback” mechanism in the system of propaganda work. However, when working with these documents, it is necessary to take into account the social conditioning of the thinking of their creators and their subjectivity. But along with this, firstly, according to many moments of history, they serve as the only evidence, and secondly, sources of personal origin play a paramount role in the reconstruction of the image of a person and the atmosphere of that era. In addition, materials of a subjective nature are often an expression of views and moods typical of that era.

Archival materials, whose characteristics are given below, have a similar division. Among the basic funds of these archives are materials of the bodies responsible for propaganda work (the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Glavpura of the Red Army, TASS, the Radio Committee, etc.), censorship documents of the Glavlit and the personal fund of R.S. Compatriots, as well as front and rear letters of Soviet citizens, deposited in the funds of the leaders of the party and state. In particular, the materials of censorship, in addition to the obviousness of establishing the external "framework" of propaganda material, reflect to a certain extent the limits of self-censorship of various levels of the propaganda apparatus.

The dissertation candidate, first of all, attracted the funds of the State Archives of the Russian Federation, which directly presented propaganda materials of that period: leaflets (F. 9550), photo albums (F. 10050), postcards (F. 10048), transcripts of radio broadcasts "Listen, Front" and "Krasnoarmeiskiy hour" (F. R-6903), helping to recreate the general picture of the printed and radio propaganda of the period studied in the work. A separate and very specific source is represented by leaflets and posters, compactly deposited in several funds of the State Archives of the Russian Federation and in a number of files of the former archive of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The materials of the TASS fund contain messengers of various TASS editions, which allow not only to determine the degree of differentiation of information emanating from the bowels of the department (special messengers for Moscow and regional newspapers, for the Political Administration of the Red Army and for newspapers of the liberated regions, for front-line and youth newspapers, etc.), but also to trace the transformation of basic propaganda cliches and images. The propaganda materials of the Radio Committee play a similar role, with the exception that the funds contain a complex of letters from front to front. Indirect forms of propaganda are reflected in the documents of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Cultural Workers and the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Art Workers. A specific layer of propaganda documents are materials from the Sovinformburo and Osoaviahima. In particular, the reports of the Sovinformburo, which were printed in newspapers and sold in millions of leaflets, were largely propagandistic in nature. Various lecture forms of propaganda and the content of the lecture work can be traced from the materials of the All-Union Lecture Bureau. And the fund of the All-Union Committee for Higher Education contains documents covering the content and specifics of propaganda work in the country's universities.

The RGASPI funds contain significant information on the topic of the dissertation. Thus, the materials of the fund of the Central Committee of the CPSU (F. 17. Op. 125) contain documents defining the general directions of the work of Soviet propaganda in the war years. Their study allows, in particular, to see the evolution of forms of propaganda aimed at the population of temporarily occupied territories (D. 145), and to trace the main stages of planning propaganda operations (D. 155). The materials of the organizational and instructor department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) (Op. 122) reflect the deployment of propaganda in the rear (file 17). Fund A.S. Shcherbakov (F. 88) provided the study with the necessary examples of propaganda texts from the Soviet Information Bureau (for example, D. 989-991), as well as information on the strategy of ideological work during the war years.

It should be noted that there is a wide variety of sources that make it possible to assess certain aspects of Soviet propaganda and its effectiveness during the war years. If the propaganda materials of party and state bodies deposited in the archives allow showing various forms, methods and techniques of propaganda influence, then letters, reviews and reports on public sentiments help to identify feedback mechanisms between the authorities and society in the propaganda and agitation system.

Scientific novelty of research lies in the fact that prior to the dissertation presented, a systematic analysis of Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War was not carried out. For the first time in domestic science, a comprehensive review of the problem has been undertaken, including such little-developed aspects as imaginative presentations and the effectiveness of propaganda work. Rejection of ideological stereotypes, the use of interdisciplinary approaches and the introduction of a new set of sources into scientific circulation made it possible to bring the problem of Soviet propaganda during the war years to a new level of scientific comprehension.

Scientific novelty was embodied in the following the main provisions of the study submitted to the defense:

propaganda is an integral part of the ideology, politics and culture of any society, for which the state creates a special organizational and ideological apparatus;

in certain historical periods (especially during the war), propaganda activity becomes one of the priority directions of state policy and one of the key factors in achieving victory over the enemy;

the main functions of Soviet propaganda during the war years were: mobilization of public opinion to support goals and values \u200b\u200bclaiming national status and political socialization of the population;

the documents testify to the effectiveness of the propaganda influence on different age, regional, social and professional "strata". The mechanism of “feedback”, manifested in various verbal forms (for example, in letters and folk art) and, most importantly, in the mass movement at the front and rear to mobilize forces and means to defeat the enemy, is a clear evidence that propaganda found your audience.

These provisions correspond to the following points of the Passport of specialties of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Russian Federation: clause 4 "History of relations between the authorities and society, state bodies and public institutions of Russia and its regions", clause 23 "History of the Great Patriotic War" and clause 25 "History of state and social ideology , public sentiment and public opinion. "

Theoretical and practical significance of the research. The results of this study can be used in writing general works on the history of Russia, as well as special studies on the history of the Great Patriotic War, problems of propaganda support of military operations, etc. The materials of the dissertation can also be used in the preparation of lecture and special courses on Russian history.

The identification and systematization of propaganda methods of influence on the mass consciousness and behavior can be of practical importance. After all, agitation and propaganda to this day are the most important methods of ideological influence. The latest political technologies (political advertising and PR), despite the abundance of scientific developments (usually Western), adapted to the Russian electorate, are acquiring familiar features.

Approbation of research results. The dissertation was discussed and recommended for defense at a meeting of the Department of History and Political Science of the Russian state university tourism and service. The materials of the dissertation were published in three scientific articles, with a total volume of 1.9 pp.

Dissertation structure is based on a problematic principle, which is due to the very concept of work: a characteristic of the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda during the war years, taking into account real and potential resources, forms and methods of work and the relevance of propaganda material. In view of the foregoing, the dissertation research consists of three chapters, introduction, conclusion, list of sources and literature and applications, which is illustrative.

Institutional dimension of propaganda

It is no secret that the historical experience of our country was closely related to the large-scale ideological indoctrination of the population and the intensive use of a wide range of propaganda tools over the past century. This required an extensive and integral system of propaganda institutions, including material, organizational and human resources.

In general, the party leadership system of propaganda, the top of which during the years of World War II was the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.), Requires a separate analysis. It should be borne in mind that the general vector of propaganda work was set at the highest state level. From the log of the records of persons taken by I.V. Stalin on June 22, 1941, it is clear that among the first visitors (at 5:45 am), together with G.K. Zhukov, L.P. Beria, V.M. Molotov and S.K. Tymoshenko was the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army L.Z. Mehlis. 124 Administrator of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Ya.E. Chadayev recalled that at a meeting with Stalin, members of the Politburo and a number of deputy chairpersons of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on July 18, 1941, Secretary of the Party Central Committee A.S. Shcherbakov declared the need to "increase attention to the conduct of political propaganda, especially at the front," including the expansion of the army press and the transfer of political literature to German rear. At the same time, the main political work in the occupied territory was assigned to the underground party organizations. Chaadaev testified that Stalin reacted positively to Shcherbakov's proposals and in his short speech dwelt on the content of political propaganda: “Everything can be expected from the cannibal Hitler and his henchmen, even more than what he had in mind at this time. But his plans on the water are written with pitchforks ... And the proposal to highlight these plans in print should be accepted. " On September 1, 1942, at a meeting with the leaders of the partisan movement, Stalin set the task of conducting constant political work among the population and at the same time exposing "false German propaganda."

But, of course, the party leadership of Soviet propaganda during the war years was not limited to the establishment of a general framework and leading directions of ideological work. Often we are dealing with a detailed regulation of not only the content, but also the forms, methods and techniques of propaganda.

By 1941, the government had at its disposal many effective institutions for communicating the goals of its policy to people. The most important of these was the Communist Party's agitation and propaganda apparatus, which had cadres at all levels of its activity: activists with special responsibilities at the level of grassroots party cells, special departments and secretariats, professional agitators and propagandists at the highest levels. The Soviet people were exposed to a continuous stream of party propaganda through party cells in every enterprise and in every institution, the Red Corners, which supplied people with literature and visual materials, and mobile propaganda teams.

In accordance with the main tasks of propaganda in wartime (mobilization and socialization of the population), the propaganda apparatus was a clear pyramid, the top of which was occupied by the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee. Without the approval of the latter, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made no serious decisions. Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.)

The Department, which was directly responsible for the organization and effectiveness of propaganda work, in 1941-1945 included the following divisions: the agitation department, which included: a group of rapporteurs on current politics and international situation; print and oral advocacy trainers and consultants; assistant head of the department for the publication of campaign literature; the magazine "Sputnik Agitator"; Department of Cinematography (since February 1943); Department of cultural and educational institutions (consultants on film, broadcasting and theater; sector of political education institutions); department of Marxist-Leninist training and retraining of party personnel (sector of party and Leninist courses; sector of retraining and training of propaganda and newspaper workers); Department of Science (since May 1942); Department of Party Propaganda (lecturer group; sector of printed and oral propaganda of Marxism-Leninism; sector of propaganda of Marxism-Leninism in universities12); print department (sectors of magazines, publishing houses, regional, regional and republican newspapers, printing and paper, district printing, fiction, and central newspapers); advocacy group department; department of broadcasting and radioification (since November 1944);

The effectiveness of institutions is largely determined not only by their organizational structure, but also by available resources, including personnel. So, according to G.F. Aleksandrov, made in March 1944, during the war years there was a discrepancy between the high requirements for ideological and political work and the material, technical and resource base of political, cultural and agitation and propaganda work. For example, the circulation of newspapers (including Pravda) has decreased by more than three times.

During the Great Patriotic War, the leading place among the propaganda resources was occupied by printed propaganda. The latter circumstance determined the significant place of paper resources in the organization of the propaganda space. Already on June 26, 1941 G.F. Alexandrov in a note addressed to A.S. Shcherbakova proposed "in connection with the need to ensure the uninterrupted publication of central political newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia, Krasnaya Zvezda)" to temporarily reduce the frequency or circulation of a number of departmental and other newspapers, including Pionerskaya Pravda and Atheist. 194 In order to resolve the paper crisis in the bowels of the Propaganda Department in August 1941, a note was born "On the organization of newsprint production in the eastern regions of the country." Completion of the construction of the Krasnoyarsk and the beginning of the construction of the Kirovo-Chepetsk pulp and paper mills were considered the "most correct solution" to the issue of increasing the production of newsprint. Another “paper source” was the reorientation of the Kama Paper Mill in the Molotov Region and the Kuibyshev Factory in the Vologda Region to newsprint production.195 the adoption of a rather compromise resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which placed the main emphasis on the construction of a pulp and paper mill in the city of Chepts, Kirov region and the expansion of the capacities of the Kama plant. It is significant that the construction of the plant in Chepets, which was equated with regard to material and technical supply to defense construction projects, was entrusted to the GULAG of the NKVDSSSR.196

However, the paper crisis was not overcome in 1942 either. So, at the end of February, the head of the Political Department of the People's Commissariat for Railways M. Belousov turned to A.S. Shcherbakov with a request to increase the circulation of the newspaper “Gudok” to 150 thousand copies, but received a negative answer. In June 1942, the Propaganda Directorate opposed the resumption of the release of the newspaper Rybnaya promyshlennost because the paper situation did not improve. As an informational "compensation" to the editors of the newspapers Pravda and Izvestia, instructions were given on the systematic coverage of socialist competition in the fishing industry.199 There is another illustrative example. The head of the Kuibyshev oblast, M. Semykina, in a note to the Propaganda Department at the beginning of March 1942, noted that the regional party committee at a number of evacuated enterprises allowed the publication of "Battle sheets", which, in terms of their content, are actually large-circulation newspapers, and even more frequently than any large circulation ... Fighting leaflets were also published by visiting editions of the newspapers Komsomolskaya Pravda and Volzhskaya Kommuna. In addition, several cases of increasing the frequency of the publication of a number of newspapers were noted, which violated the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on this issue. As we can see, in conditions of a paper shortage, local authorities and departments were looking for various ways to circumvent the bans on the publication of their printed publications, and the controlling bodies (including censorship bodies) in every possible way suppressed such attempts.

It should be clarified that the volume of production of newsprint and printed paper at the enterprises of the Narkombumprom even before the war did not allow to fully meet the ever-increasing demands for newspapers, magazines, as well as mass political and fiction literature. It was just that during the war the situation with the paper became even more difficult. If in the I quarter. 1941 the average monthly production of newsprint was 19 thousand tons, and printing - 9.8 thousand tons, then in the I quarter. In 1944, the average monthly production fell to 3.5 thousand tons (18.4% of the pre-war output), and printed output fell to 1150 tons (or 12.7%). It is clear that such a sharp decrease in paper production did not allow a sufficiently widespread development of print propaganda. At the same time, the drop in paper production was explained not only by the loss of a number of enterprises as a result of hostilities, 202 but also by the "completely unsatisfactory work of the existing factories."

For example, the Balakhninsky Combine, designed for 11 thousand tons of newsprint, worked only at 30% of its capacity due to the fact that Narkomles did not provide the mill with wood, and the Gorky Thermal Power Station systematically limited the supply of electricity. The Kama plant, capable of producing more than 8 thousand tons per month, actually produced no more than 350-700 tons. The Sokol plant in the Vologda Oblast did not fulfill production plans due to the emergency condition of the equipment and the lack of provision of timber and chemicals from the People's Commissariat.

Key advocacy images and symbols

Modern researchers proceed from the assumption that the symbols created during the war years were a bizarre combination of real facts and fiction, genuine events and propaganda cliches. Of course, the content of Soviet propaganda was very extensive. For example, during the war years, only the Military Department prepared materials and propaganda information for the leadership of the Soviet Information Bureau on a wide range of issues: fabrications of the enemy press and radio about the use of explosive dum-dum bullets by Soviet pilots; about the heroism of Soviet pilots; the myth of the invincibility of the German army; indicative figures of German losses; about the mood of German prisoners; about the defectors of the German, Romanian and finnish armies; on the relationship between soldiers of the German and Hungarian armies; the losses of the German army on the Soviet-German front; Soviet aircraft "destroyed" by the German Information Bureau; the introduction of the institute of military commissars and their role in the construction and organization of victories of the Red Army; about the partisan movement in areas occupied by German troops; on the imaginary and true results of air raids on Moscow; elements of the moral decay of the German army; the collapse of the German plan for a lightning war. 3 The bird of God does not know - 6 drawings Transport - 5 drawings The best enemy divisions and the best aviation units are broken - 3 drawings Waste, not a fairy tale about German helmets - 3 drawings Dog's joy - 3 drawings Feuilleton window - 3 drawings Model house - panel. The action of our artillery - panel. Window-feuilleton. - Fascism consists of fakes alone - 5 drawings. Down with rubbish from the attics! - 2 drawings An iron horse, a living horse - 1 panel But behind this broad problematic there was a certain set of images that can be conditionally reduced to two groups - positive (patriotic and heroic) and negative (enemy image) symbols, most often presented in opposition to each other ... For example, an analysis of the content of TASS front-line information for the end of 1941 - the beginning of 1942 demonstrates the prevalence of the following topics: examples of the heroic exploits of soldiers, commanders and political workers of the Red Army; facts testifying to the "evolving process of the moral decline of the German fascist armies", the violence and robberies perpetrated by the Nazi invaders over the civilian population, and the "atrocious treatment of Soviet prisoners of war"; materials showing active assistance to the population of the Red Army, including correspondence about the actions of partisan detachments and assistance from residents. 321 But this does not mean at all that publishing during the war was reduced to the production of ideological and propaganda literature. For example, at the beginning of January 1942, the authorized Glavlita at the central publishing houses of the OGIZ Tsyrulnikov sent the head of the Kuybyshev oblit M. Semykina the manuscripts of the central publishing houses for commissioning. Among them were not only works about Lenin, Stalin's works and historical and propaganda publications, but also works of the classics of Russian and foreign literature. When Semykina, in a letter to the Propaganda Department on March 4, 1942, voiced the untimely publication of a number of works (for example, “ Captain's daughter"Pushkin," Woe from Wit "by Griboyedov," Twelve Chairs "by Ilf and Petrov and" Gorny Nest "by Mamin-Sibiryak), then a harsh reaction followed to her letter. The department instructed the chief of Glavlit, Skochilov, to explain to the overly zealous employee “the erroneousness of her views and the expediency of publishing” these works.32 Heroic symbols During the war years heroism was the main behavioral-forming principle, both at the front and in the rear. Quiet heroism, the ability of people to preserve human dignity in the most extreme conditions, was no less significant. By virtue of this, heroic symbols could not but become objects of military propaganda. In addition, in an environment of “personality cult,” the cult of individual heroes became natural, serving the first. Hero-symbols also served as the support of the Stalinist system, since the main quality that propaganda endowed them with was precisely their loyalty to the system. The famous slogan “For the Motherland, for Stalin!”, Of course, did not arise “on the initiative from below”, but was purposefully imposed by ideological structures. But these and other symbols of the all-Union scale supplemented their own experience in the minds of people (the exploits of fellow soldiers or personal tragedies)

Miscalculations of propaganda work

As already noted, the attitude towards military reality and towards propaganda influence was determined by many factors, including the mood on the eve of the fascist attack on our country. Let us imagine a rather typical section of the mass moods reconstructed from the list of questions asked to the agitator in the transport-horse-dropping artel of the Voroshilovgrad region sent from the “Agitator Sputnik” journal at the end of 1940. Having made a short journey along the corridors of power, on January 2, 1941, from the agitation department of the Propaganda and Agitation Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (b), the letter of the local agitator, along with a list of questions, got "as intended" to the NKVD of the USSR. In a letter, the “communist of the Leninist draft” asked the editorial board of the magazine to answer “insidious and vicious” questions that confused the agitator with experience. From the vast list presented, we will choose questions that are somehow related to defense-patriotic and foreign policy topics.469 In many ways, unpleasant questions were generated by the monopoly of the official communist press: "... in our USSR there are newspapers like crackers - you have nothing to expand and read." For this reason, the workers of the artel were very interested in whether Germany would attack the USSR from the west, and Japan from the east in the spring of 1941? At the same time, Soviet-German relations, undoubtedly, were in the first place: "Answer, why did Comrades Molotov and Stalin agree to an agreement with Hitler?" “Will Hitler cheat the USSR, and how is it now in Germany and when will Soviet power be formed?”; “Why and why does our press not scold the fascists since the autumn of 1939?”; “Does the German people want to fight or not?”; "Why is Hitler pulling Germans from everywhere, will he not take the Germans from our republic. Germans to the Volga region?"; "Does Hitler really love the USSR, or is he double-dealing?" The Italian theme sounded most often in the context of the German one: “In what conditions do the Communist Parties of Germany and Italy work? And why are there no friendship societies with the Soviet Union in Germany and Italy? ”; "Will there be Soviet power in Germany and Italy, and when and what will happen to Hitler and Mussolini then?"

Relations with other countries were not ignored either: Turkey (“Why does the USSR not take its cities and lands from Turkey?”); Finland ("Why did the USSR 13.III. 1940 not capture Helsinki, did the proletarians of Finland come with us? Or did Hitler forbid us?"), The Baltic states ("Answer, do the working power in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia really rejoice, after all, they are now tails, but queues for everything? ") and the Entente countries (" Tell me, why did the USSR not declare war on England and France?).

A number of those who asked questions were interested in broader problems of the world order: "Is the second imperialist war beneficial for our revolution?"; "Answer, if the war ends, will America and England exist then?" There were also frankly provocative questions: "If, in one way or another, the USSR gets involved in a world war, tell me, will the soviet power in the USSR hold out and where will the communists be sent?"; “Answer, what if all the countries ultimately grab the Bolsheviks by the throat during the war, then who will be in power in the USSR, and will he then?”; "Answer, what would have happened if the proletariat had rebelled all over the world against the bourgeois and Bolsheviks, and that there were neither one nor the other, would it be good for the working people then, and then there would be wars?" All this aroused bewilderment: “Tell me, because everything shows that the USSR is preparing for war, with whom to fight and when?” or “When will there be a social revolution in the world?” 470 There is, as we can see, the disorientation of the population caused by sharp turns in the foreign policy and, accordingly, in the propaganda line.

To a large extent, the propaganda bodies themselves, especially in the field, contributed to the formation of an inadequate image of the enemy. About "very strange" methods of political propaganda among the population of Rostov-on-Don reported to the editor of the newspaper "Bezbozhnik" its correspondent I.S. Zubkovsky in May 1941 According to the correspondent, in the center of the city, on the Budyonny Avenue, a huge map of Europe hung in a display case, richly decorated with national-socialist flags, which marked the advance of the German troops every day. The reaction of the crowds on the map of residents to events at the front is indicative: "he is a German, cunning," "no one can go against him," "he will go where

Archival documents also testify to a general underestimation of the defense-patriotic themes, in particular in such a spectacular form as cinema. From a note by G.F. Aleksandrova "On the plan for the production of feature films for 1941", sent to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the end of March 1941, it followed that the Committee for Cinematography "had not learned the necessary lessons from past mistakes and was unsatisfactorily prepared for 1941." The plan provided for the release in 1941 of 45 films, of which only 3 were devoted to defense. Films of historical and historical-revolutionary (12) and everyday themes (11) predominated. As for the scripts of 3 films on defense topics, they, according to the head of Agitprop, did not reflect "the heroic deeds of the Red Army in recent years, its daily life and combat training." In particular, there were no films about Soviet aviation in the plan, and the script for the Dead Loop picture incorrectly portrayed “the first steps of Russian aviation”. Aleksandrov believed that the film, built on "Utochkin's frivolous charm and trickery, would not have a positive educational value." Similarly, the script of the film "Two Commanders" was criticized, according to which it was possible to conclude that "the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army perform heroic deeds not due to high political consciousness, not as a result of hard work and excellent combat training, but by chance, due to simple luck ". The author of the memo was outraged by the presence in the script of the film "Harvest" "politically ambiguous witticisms." For example, at the moment the Red Army crossed the Polish border, the collective farmers had a fashionable hairstyle "if tomorrow is a warrior."

Soloviev Maxim Valentinovich