Russian-French alliance: history and significance. Prerequisites and creation of the Russian-French alliance Why the Anglo-Franco-Russian alliance was created
RUSSIAN-FRENCH UNION
It was formed in 1891-93 and existed until 1917.
Prehistory of R.-f. dates back to the early 70s of the 19th century. - to the contradictions generated by the Franco-Prussian war and Treaty of Frankfurt 1871(cm.). Weakened and humiliated by defeat in the war of 1870-71, France feared new German aggression and, trying to overcome its foreign policy isolation, made every effort to win the trust and favor of Russia. Already on June 7, 1871, a month after the signing of the Frankfurt Peace Treaty, J. Favre instructed the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, General. Leflo is in this direction. Thiers(see), Broglie, Decaz in Lefleau's instructions emphasized the same task. In personal negotiations with the Russian ambassador in Paris N.A. Orlov(see) and in diplomatic relations with St. Petersburg, the leaders of French diplomacy tried in every possible way to please the tsar and Gorchakov(cm.). The diplomatic conflicts of 1873 and 1874 with France provoked by Bismarck's Germany prompted the French government to directly appeal to Russia for support and assistance in preventing German aggression. The Russian government provided France with significant diplomatic support.
In its clearest form, the role of Russia as the main obstacle to German aggression against France was revealed during the so-called. military alarm in 1875, when vigorous Russian intervention forced Germany to retreat and abandon its plan to attack France. In 1876, Bismarck's attempts to get Russia to guarantee Alsace-Lorraine in exchange for Germany's unconditional support for Russian policy in the East failed. In 1877, during the new Franco-German alarm provoked by Bismarck, Russia also maintained a position friendly to France.
Thus, at the most critical time for France, Russia, without accepting any formal obligations, nevertheless acted as the main factor in solving the security problem of France.
However, already the day before and during Berlin Congress 1878(see) French diplomacy, led Waddington(see), focusing on rapprochement with England and Germany, took a position hostile to Russia. During this period, French foreign policy, after some hesitation, subordinated to the selfish calculations of banking circles, the financial oligarchy and its political representation in the ranks of the ruling moderate Republicans, followed the path of colonial conquest. This path, long recommended to France by Bismarck, was naturally supposed to weaken France’s position in Europe, increase the number of its opponents on the basis of colonial rivalry, and therefore was possible only under the condition of reconciliation with Germany and even acquiring its support in colonial enterprises.
The consequence of this course should have been the deterioration of France’s relations with Russia, since, having become virtually dependent on Bismarck, French diplomacy was afraid of incurring his wrath by attempting rapprochement with Russia; as is known, the prevention of R.-f. With. was one of the main tasks of Bismarck's diplomacy.
Thus, France’s retreat from the policy of cooperation with Russia, which began at the end of 1877, led to the alienation of these two powers, which lasted for a number of years. Gambetta's attempt during his leadership of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (November 1881 - January 1882) to achieve rapprochement with Russia remained only a short-term episode that had no consequences.
Meanwhile, the policy of colonial conquest, especially vigorously pursued by J. Ferri(see), already in March 1885 was interrupted due to the defeat of French troops in Annam, which entailed the fall of the Ferry cabinet and the formation of new government combinations with the participation of radicals, who at that time were opponents of colonial enterprises. At the same time, Bismarck, who had previously pushed France towards colonial conquest, from the end of 1885 again spoke to it in a threatening language. At the beginning of 1887, a new Franco-German military alarm broke out.
Finding itself in a state of extreme, even more acute than in 1875, danger of a German attack, the French government directly turned to the Russian government with a call for help. “The fate of France is in your hands,” wrote the French Foreign Minister Flourens to the Ambassador in St. Petersburg Laboule in February 1887, calling on him to convince the Russian government not to bind itself to obligations towards Germany and to retain freedom of action. Flourens rightly believed that this would be enough to stop Bismarck in his aggressive plans.
The position taken by the Russian government during the crisis of 1887 forced Bismarck to retreat again; according to the remark of Alexander III, Bismarck “realized that they would not let him crush France...” So France was once again spared by Russia from an extremely serious danger. Moreover, during the conclusion in the same 1887 with Germany of the so-called. "Reinsurance agreement"(see) Russia insisted on maintaining for France the same conditions that Germany had negotiated for its ally, Austria.
This position of Russia, based on an understanding of the danger of excessive strengthening of Germany at the expense of weakening or crushing France, was also determined by the fact that Russia’s relations with Austria-Hungary and Germany continued to deteriorate. The Russian government was extremely irritated by the role of Austria and Germany, which supported it, in Bulgarian affairs. In the circles of the Russian industrial bourgeoisie there was also strong dissatisfaction with the significant penetration of German goods into the Russian market. Germany's large increase in duties on Russian grain in 1887 affected the interests of Russian landowners and merchants and marked the beginning of an acute customs war between the two countries (see. Russian-German trade agreements), as well as the campaign against the ruble raised by the Berlin stock exchange further aggravated the situation. In these conditions, the idea of the need to reorient Russian foreign policy towards cooperation with France - instead of a compromised policy Union of Three Emperors(see) - gained support in a certain part of government circles.
The political rapprochement that emerged in 1887 between Russia and France soon led to their business cooperation. Having encountered obstacles deliberately placed in the way of Russian credit in Berlin, the Russian government concluded the first loan in France in 1888, followed by new large loans in 1889, 1890, 1891. In 1888, the Russian government, by agreement with the French, placed an order in France for the production of 500 thousand guns for the Russian army. This business cooperation was based primarily on political and strategic interests.
At the same time, the progressive deterioration of Russian-German relations and the general aggravation of the international situation in Europe—Germany’s refusal to renew the “reinsurance treaty” in 1890, the Anglo-German Heligoland Treaty of the same year, the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891 and rumors that were very persistent in that time, about the accession of England to it - created the ground for a favorable perception in St. Petersburg of the French sounding for the conclusion of a political agreement. In the summer of 1891, the French squadron of Adm. visited Kronstadt. Gervais. This visit turned into a demonstration of Russian-French friendship. Negotiations between Giers and Labule, which began in mid-July, were continued during the Kronstadt celebrations and ended in August.
The agreement was given the form of an exchange of letters between the Russian (Girs) and French (Ribault) ministers of foreign affairs, carried out through the Russian ambassador in Paris Morenheim on 27. VIII 1891. In the letters of the ministers, after the preamble, which differed somewhat in particulars, two identical points followed: "1) In order to determine and establish the cordial consent that unites them, and desiring jointly to contribute to the maintenance of peace, which is the object of their most sincere desires, the two governments declare that they will consult with each other on every question capable of threatening the general peace. 2) In the event that the world were really in danger, and especially in the event that one of the two parties were under threat of attack, both parties agree to agree on measures, the immediate and simultaneous implementation of which will be imperative for both of them in the event of the occurrence of the said events governments."
Subsequently, France, interested in a military alliance, which it needed much more than Russia, sought to expand the agreement of 1891, adding certain military obligations to it. As a result of the ensuing negotiations, representatives of the Russian and French general staffs signed a military convention on August 17, 1892. It consisted of a very short preamble, emphasizing that both powers had the goal of “preparing for the demands of a defensive war,” and 7 articles. Art. 1 read: "If France is attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany, Russia will use all its available forces to attack Germany. If Russia is attacked by Germany or Austria supported by Germany, France will use all its available forces to attack Germany." Art. 2 determined that “in the event of the mobilization of the forces of the Triple Alliance or one of its member powers,” both powers immediately and simultaneously mobilize their forces. Art. 3 defined the forces deployed against Germany: for France - 1,300 thousand people, for Russia - from 700 to 800 thousand people, and stipulated that they should be quickly “put into action, so that Germany would have to fight immediately and in the east and in the west." Art. 4 and 5 established the obligation of both main headquarters to mutually consult and the mutual obligation of both powers not to conclude a separate peace. According to Art. 6 Convention remained in force for the same period as the Triple Alliance. Art. 7 stipulated the strictest secrecy of the convention.
After the signing of the convention, the French government tried to make changes to it in a spirit more beneficial for France, but, making sure that the tsar was generally delaying its approval, did not insist on this. The acute internal crisis (related to the Panama affair) experienced by France at this time prompted Alexander III to take his time in approving the convention. Only towards the end of 1893, after a return visit of the Russian squadron to Toulon, which turned into a new demonstration of friendship between Russia and France, did the tsar agree to approve the convention. Exchange of letters between the French ambassador in St. Petersburg Montebello and Giers 27. XII 1893-4. I 1894 both governments notified each other of their ratification of the military convention. Thus, the Russian-French military-political alliance was formalized by agreements of 1891, 1892 and 1893.
Historical place and significance of R.-f. With. was defined by J.V. Stalin. In a report at the XIV Party Congress in 1925, speaking about the history of the First World War, J.V. Stalin pointed out that one of the foundations of this imperialist war was the agreement between Austria and Germany in 1879. “Against whom was this agreement directed? Against Russia and France... The consequence of this agreement on peace in Europe, but in fact on war in Europe, was another agreement, the agreement between Russia and France in 1891-1893..."
Although the agreements of 1891-93 were kept strictly secret, thanks to the Kronstadt and Toulon demonstrations their meaning was understood in Europe. The German Charge d'Affaires in St. Petersburg, Bülow, in a report to the German Chancellor Caprivi, assessed the Kronstadt meeting as "... a very important factor that weighs heavily on the balance against the renewed Triple Alliance." Europe was divided into two hostile camps.
French imperialism acted together with Russian imperialism in the Far East, but directed the main efforts of its colonial policy to North-West and Central Africa; the presence of a strong ally - Russia - made France more courageous in relation to England. Forced to retreat after Fashoda conflict(see) before England, France then seeks to further strengthen the alliance with Russia. At the initiative of France, the agreement Delcasse(see) with Muravyov(see) 9. VIII 1899 validity period of the R.-f. With. as amended by Art. 6 of the Military Convention of 1892 was no longer bound by the duration of the Triple Alliance.
Even after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente(see) the leaders of French politics of those years (Delcasse, Clemenceau, Poincare, etc.) understood that British military support could not replace Russian military assistance.
For Russia, the alliance with France had a different meaning. If during the period of preparation, formalization and in the first years of the union, Russia played a decisive and, to a certain extent, leading role, and France, as a weaker and more interested party, put up with this, then over time the situation changed. Continuing to need money and concluding new loans (in 1894, 1896, 1901, 1904, etc.), reaching several billion, Russian tsarism eventually became financially dependent on French imperialism. Billions of loans from France (and England) to tsarism, the transfer into the hands and control of French (and English) capital of the most important branches of Russian industry, according to the definition of PL V. Stalin, “chained tsarism to Anglo-French imperialism, turned Russia into a tributary of these countries, into their semi-colony."
The cooperation of the general staffs of both countries, which had been established since the 90s (there was a short break at the beginning of the 20th century), took on closer forms in the pre-war years. 16. VII 1912 in Paris, the chief of the Russian naval general staff, Prince. Lieven and the chief of the French naval general staff, Auber, signed a Russian-French maritime convention on joint actions.
Russia and France entered the world imperialist war of 1914-18, bound by an alliance treaty. This had a decisive influence on the course and outcome of the war, since it forced Germany from the very first days of the war to fight simultaneously on two fronts, which led to the collapse of the Schlieffen plan, which provided for the defeat of opponents one by one, and then to the defeat of Germany. For Russia, French military assistance, due to the absence of large maneuver operations on the Western Front and the reluctance of the allies to adequately help Russia with military equipment, was of limited importance. But for France, the role of Russian military assistance was decisive. The Russian offensive in East Prussia in August - September 1914 saved France from defeat on the Marne and made impossible what happened in May 1940 - the lightning-fast crushing of the French military forces by the Germans. The Russian front, which drew back huge German forces with active operations and especially the offensive in 1916, saved France by forcing the Germans to stop the operation at Verdun. In general, it was Russia’s military assistance that gave France the opportunity to withstand the fight against Germany and achieve victory.
Diplomatic Dictionary. - M.: State Publishing House of Political Literature. A. Ya. Vyshinsky, S. A. Lozovsky. 1948 .
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RUSSIAN-FRENCH ALLIANCE, military-political alliance of Russia and France in 1891 1917. Opposed to the Triple Alliance led by Germany. Formalized by an agreement in 1891 and a secret military convention in 1892. The parties pledged to provide mutual assistance in... ... Russian history
Military-political alliance of Russia and France in 1891 1917. Opposed to the Triple Alliance led by Germany. Formalized by an agreement in 1891 and a secret military convention in 1892. The parties pledged to provide mutual assistance in the event of a German attack... encyclopedic Dictionary
Formalized by agreements in 1891-93, it existed until 1917. Strengthening of the German Empire, the emergence of the Triple Alliance of 1882 (See Triple Alliance of 1882), aggravation by the end of the 80s. Franco-German and Russian-German contradictions... ... Great Soviet Encyclopedia
In the 19th century, two opposing alliances were formed in the European arena - the Russian-French and the Triple Alliance. This suggests that a new stage has begun in international relations, characterized by a fierce battle between several powers for the division of influence in various spheres.
Economics in relations between France and Russia
French capital began to actively penetrate Russia in the third third of the 19th century. In 1875, the French created a large mining company in the southern part of Russia. Their capital was based on 20 million francs. In 1876, the French introduced gas lighting in St. Petersburg. A year later, they opened steel and iron-making concerns in Poland, which then belonged to the Russian Empire. Also, every year various joint-stock companies and factories were opened in Russia, which had capital of 10 million francs or more. They extracted salt, ore and other minerals for export.
At the end of the 19th century, the Russian government experienced certain financial difficulties. Then it was decided to begin negotiations in 1886 with French bankers. Two years later, dialogues with banks begin. They develop successfully and easily. The first loan amount was small - only 500 million francs. But this loan was a great start in this relationship.
Thus, we will look at the lively economic relations between Russia and France in the eighties of the 19th century, which were initiated by France.
Reasons for the development of economic relations
There are three good reasons. Firstly, the Russian market was very attractive to the French. Secondly, the richest deposits of raw materials of the Russian Empire actively attracted foreign investment. Third, the economy is the political bridge that France intended to build. Next we will talk about the formation of the Russian-French alliance and the consequences.
Cultural relations of allied countries
This state that we are considering has been bound by cultural traditions for many centuries. French culture significantly influenced Russian culture, and the entire domestic intelligentsia was brought up on the latest ideas of the French enlighteners. The names of philosophers and writers such as Voltaire, Diderot, Corneille were known to every educated Russian. And in the eighties of the 19th century, a radical revolution took place in these national cultures. In a short period of time, publishing houses appeared in Paris, specializing in the printing of Russian literary works. The novels of Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, as well as the works of Turgenev, Ostrovsky, Korolenko, Goncharov, Nekrasov and other pillars of Russian literature were actively translated. Similar processes are observed in a variety of forms of art. For example, Russian composers have received wide recognition in French musical circles.
Electric lanterns are lit on the streets of the French capital. The townspeople called them “yablochkof”. They received this name after the name of the inventor, who was a famous domestic electrical engineer and professor Yablochkov. French humanities are actively interested in history, literature, and the Russian language. And philology in general. The works of professors Kurire and Louis Léger became fundamental.
Thus, Russian-French relations in the field of culture have become multilateral and broad. If earlier France was a “donor” to Russia in the field of culture, then in the nineteenth century their relations became mutual, that is, bilateral. It is noteworthy that the residents of France are becoming acquainted with the cultural works of Russia, and are also beginning to develop various topics at a scientific level. And we are moving on to studying the reasons for the Russian-French alliance.
Political relations and prerequisites for the emergence of an alliance on the part of France
France fought small colonial wars during this period. Therefore, in the eighties, her relations with Italy and England became strained. Then, particularly difficult relations with Germany isolated France in Europe. Thus, she found herself surrounded by enemies. The danger for this state increased day by day, so French politicians and diplomats sought to improve relations with Russia, as well as get closer to it in various areas. This is one of the explanations for the conclusion of the Russian-French alliance.
Political relations and prerequisites for the emergence of an alliance on the part of the Russian Empire
Now let's look at Russia's position in the international arena. At the end of the 19th century, a whole system of unions developed in Europe. The first of them is Austro-German. The second is Austro-German-Italian or otherwise Triple. The third is the Union of Three Emperors (Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany). It was in it that Germany occupied a dominant position. The first two unions purely theoretically threatened Russia, and the presence of the Union of Three Emperors gave rise to doubts after the crisis in Bulgaria. The political benefit of Russia and France was not yet relevant. In addition, the two states had a common enemy in the East - Great Britain, which was a rival for France in the Egyptian state and the Mediterranean, and for Russia in the Asian lands. It is noteworthy that the strengthening of the Russian-French alliance became obvious when Anglo-Russian interests in Central Asia intensified, when England tried to drag Austria and Prussia into hostility with Russia.
The outcome of the confrontations
This situation in the political arena led to the fact that it was much easier to sign an agreement with the French state than with Prussia. This was evidenced by the agreement on concessions, the optimal volume of trade, as well as the absence of conflicts in this area. In addition, Paris considered this idea as a means of putting pressure on the Germans. After all, Berlin was extremely wary of formalizing a Russian-French alliance. It is known that the penetration of two cultures strengthened the political ideas of the powers.
Conclusion of the Russian-French alliance
This union took shape very difficult and slowly. This was preceded by various steps. But the main one was the rapprochement of the two countries. They were mutual. However, there was a little more action on the part of France. In the spring of 1890, Germany refused to renew the reinsurance agreement with Russia. Then the French authorities turned the situation in their direction. A year later, in July, a French military squadron visits Kronstadt. This visit is nothing more than a demonstration of Russian-French friendship. The guests were greeted by Emperor Alexander III himself. After this, another round of negotiations between diplomats took place. The result of this meeting was a pact between Russia and France, which was sealed with the signatures of the foreign ministers. According to this document, states were obliged, in the event of a threat of attack, to agree on joint measures that could be taken simultaneously and immediately. This is how the Russian-French alliance was formalized (1891).
Next steps and actions
It is noteworthy that the reception the emperor gave to the French sailors in Kronstadt was an event with far-reaching consequences. The St. Petersburg newspaper rejoiced! With such a formidable force, the Triple Alliance will be forced to stop and think. Then the attorney in Germany, Bülow, wrote to the Reich Chancellor that the Kronstadt meeting was a heavy factor that powerfully hit the renewed Triple Alliance. Then, in 1892, a new positive development took place in relation to the Russian-French alliance. The head of the French General Staff is invited by the Russian side to military maneuvers. In August of this year, he and General Obruchev signed a military convention consisting of three provisions. It was supposed to be prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giers, who delayed the presentation. However, the emperor did not rush him. Germany took advantage of the situation and started a new customs war with Russia. In addition, the German army grew to 4 million fighters. Having learned about this, Alexander III became seriously angry and defiantly took another step towards rapprochement with his ally, sending our military squadron to Toulon. The formation of the Russian-French alliance unnerved Germany.
Formalization of the convention
The French state gave the domestic sailors an enthusiastic welcome. Then Alexander III cast aside all doubts. He ordered Minister Giers to speed up the writing of the convention submission, and he soon approved it on December 14th. Then an exchange of letters took place, which was provided for by the protocol of diplomats between the capitals of the two powers.
Thus, in December 1893 the convention came into force. The French alliance was concluded.
Consequences of the political game between Russia and France
Similar to the Triple Alliance, the agreement between Russia and France was created from a defense point of view. In fact, both the first and the second alliance concealed a military aggressive principle in the seizure and division of spheres of influence of sales markets, as well as sources of raw materials. The formation of the Russian-French alliance completed the regrouping of forces that had been seething in Europe since the Congress in Berlin in 1878. As it turned out, the balance of military and political forces depended on whose interests would be supported by England, which at that time was the most economically developed state. However, Foggy Albion preferred to remain neutral, continuing a position called “brilliant isolation.” However, the growing colonial claims of Germany forced Foggy Albion to begin to lean toward a Russian-French alliance.
Conclusion
The Russian-French bloc was formed in 1891 and existed until 1917. This led to significant changes and the balance of power in Europe. The conclusion of the alliance is considered a turning point in the development of the French state during the era of the World War. This unification of forces led to France overcoming political isolation. Russia provided for its ally and Europe not only stability, but also strength in the status of a Great Power.
Rapprochement between Russia and France
The end of the Franco-Prussian War not in favor of France forced its government to look for new directions in foreign policy. The French people passionately desired revenge and regaining their lost power. The German Empire tried to keep its enemy isolated. To prevent this, France is seeking to enter into an alliance with Russia.
Definition 1
The Franco-Russian alliance is a military and political union of two states. Both countries actively sought unification in 1891-1917. Their friendly relations preceded the formation of the Entente (plus England), opposing the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.
The French, having suffered defeat from Germany, saw Russia as their savior. The volume of trade between countries increased significantly, and French investments in the Russian economy grew. The lion's share of them were government loans to the government. By the beginning of the 90s, the tsarist government owed French banks 2,600 million francs. Russia's financial dependence was extremely beneficial to France, creating the prospect of political rapprochement. A possible war with Germany and contradictions over colonies with England required France to look for an ally in Russia. Russia also saw France as a supporter: Germany was presented as an enemy after refusing to extend the “reinsurance treaty” and rapprochement with England.
Signing of treaties between Russia and France
President Sadi Carnot and Russian Foreign Minister Nikolai Giers are holding talks. In 1891, the countries sign an agreement between the democratic Republic of France and the authoritarian Russian Empire. They agree on a joint line of action in the event of a “threat to European peace.”
The following year (1892) a secret military convention was drawn up. The parties assumed obligations to assist each other in the following cases:
- during an attack on Russia by Austria-Hungary or Germany;
- during an attack on France by Italy or Germany.
Russia and France pledged to act synchronously. They had to mobilize their military forces and send them to the borders of the Triple Alliance. The countries had to force Germany to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously, supplying 1,300 thousand French and 800 thousand Russian soldiers.
In 1812, friendly relations were supplemented by a naval convention.
Note 1
The Franco-Russian Alliance was initially formalized as a defensive association against the Triple Alliance. In fact, both European unions were aggressive in nature. They sought territorial conquests and led to a new European war.
The significance of the Franco-Russian alliance
The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance led to the split of Europe into two warring military-political blocs. Which of them would be stronger depended on the position of England with its navy and economic resources. England continued to adhere to the course of “splendid isolation,” but maintaining traditional policies became increasingly difficult. In the 90s, Britain was in conflict:
- with Russia in the Far East and China,
- with France - in Africa,
- from the USA - in Latin America.
By the end of the 19th century, relations with Germany worsened. The desire of the German Empire to achieve a “place in the sun” forced England to look for allies to fight its aggressive plans for redividing the world.
Germany and Austria-Hungary perceived the formation of the Franco-Russian alliance as a serious blow to their position in Europe. Italy began to gradually withdraw from participation in the actions of the Triple Alliance, as it felt its own weakness after the defeat in Ethiopia. For the same reason, after the Spanish-American War of 1898, Spain retreated from active participation in European politics.
With these changes in priorities in international relations, Europe was approaching the First World War.
The prehistory of the Franco-Russian alliance dates back to the early 70s. XIX century - to the contradictions between the European powers generated by the Franco-Prussian War and the Frankfurt Peace Treaty. France and Russia received a common enemy - the German Empire; the creation of the Austro-German and then the Triple Alliance once again confirmed this.
France wanted to quickly recover from the blow it had received; Russia believed that a strong and prosperous France could be an additional guarantee of maintaining peace and the balance of power in Europe. The political interests of the two countries did not directly collide, while in the international arena they had another common adversary in the person of Great Britain - a rival of France, primarily in Egypt and the Mediterranean, and Russia in the Balkans and Asia. In addition to the military-political factors that were decisive in the Franco-Russian rapprochement, the latter was also facilitated by credit and financial cooperation.
In the fall of 1887, German Chancellor O. Bismarck, dissatisfied with the inadequacy of Russia’s obligations under the Reinsurance Treaty and the signs of Franco-Russian rapprochement, used various methods of pressure on St. Petersburg, including financial ones. The Prussian government ordered all its government institutions to sell Russian securities they owned, and a decree soon followed prohibiting the Reichsbank from accepting Russian securities as collateral. In such a situation, the tsarist government could not count on a new loan from German bankers, and meanwhile, Germany was then its main creditor, and 60% of Russian public and private (foreign) obligations were concentrated in German hands. But a way out of the difficult financial situation for St. Petersburg was found. At the end of the same year, the tsarist government received a loan from a syndicate of French banks. In 1890 and 1891 new loans were concluded on the Paris market. As a result of these operations, Paris, rather than Berlin, became the main market for Russian securities. The French government, in its relations with the Russians, began to use financial relations as a means of policy.
The question arises: why, despite all the naturalness and expediency of the alliance between France and Russia, did it take a lot of time to conclude it? There were serious reasons that prevented the formation of a Franco-Russian alliance. The leaders of the moderate republicans, who secured power in the Third Republic in 1879, advocated an energetic colonial policy and sought help in it from Berlin. At the same time, they were terrified of Bismarck. French politicians believed that rapprochement with Russia would only accelerate the threat of a new German invasion, the prevention of which was supposed to be the goal of this rapprochement. For its part, Russia persistently sought to solve its foreign policy problems with the help of the Alliance of the Three Emperors, and then while maintaining and maintaining close relations with Germany. Franco-Russian interaction was complicated by the internal political instability of the Third Republic. The frequent change of governments and at the same time the strengthening of revanchist sentiments explained the caution of Russian government circles. Particular concern on the banks of the Neva was caused by the adventurism of part of the bourgeois circles of France, expressed in the leadership of General J.
Boulanger revanchist movement. The incitement of anti-German chauvinism and the desire to return Alsace and Lorraine threatened to unleash a Franco-German war, into which Russia was extremely afraid of being drawn into. All these circumstances convinced the Minister of Foreign Affairs N.K. Giers is that even the unconditional support of Paris was less significant for St. Petersburg than the support of Berlin, and therefore cooperation with France does not give any practical effect, it will rather weaken than strengthen Russia’s position. And, of course, tsarism experienced understandable hostility towards the republican system and the constitutional way of government of France. Alexander III once said that an alliance with republican France filled him with horror. How negatively the Winter Palace treated French bourgeois figures is evidenced by Alexander’s reaction in connection with the funeral of the French Prime Minister, the leader of the Republicans L. Gambetta in 1882. National mourning was declared in France. Delegations from many European governments came to Paris to express condolences to the French people. When the question of sending a representative arose in St. Petersburg, the tsar said: “We will not send anyone. You should not attend a dog funeral.” The Tsar took as a personal insult the release in 1886 from a French prison, in connection with a political amnesty, of the famous Russian anarchist P.A. Kropotkin, instructing his ambassador to temporarily leave Paris. In 1889, Alexander indignantly rejected the offer to participate in the world exhibition in France, which was organized to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the revolution.
The internal political crisis of the mid-80s, the aggravation of relations with England and Italy on the basis of colonial policy and tense relations with Germany put France in an isolated position in Europe. The only non-hostile power on whose help one could count was Russia, with which the ruling elite of the country were seeking cooperation at this time.
The events of the stormy and dramatic year of 1887 moved the matter of Franco-Russian rapprochement forward. On January 11, German Chancellor Bismarck delivered a speech in the Reichstag full of threats against France. The chiefs of the General Staff and the Imperial War Cabinet identified candidates for the highest command positions in the expected war. The culminating moment
The moment of military alarm was the concentration at the beginning of February in Lorraine, near the French border, of about 100 thousand reservists. French politicians were gripped by mortal fear of Germany. The Paris cabinet, through an unofficial channel, asked St. Petersburg whether it could count on Russia’s moral support in the event of a German ultimatum. Alexander III answered categorically: “Of course, yes.” Russia did not provide Germany with guarantees of neutrality in the event of an attack on France and thereby forced Berlin to retreat. War anxiety had a great influence on the foreign policy orientation of the Third Republic. Foreign Minister E. Flourens planned to send a proxy to St. Petersburg to negotiate the establishment of Franco-Russian cooperation, but Guiret, a staunch supporter of an agreement with Germany, failed this project.
Another factor that strengthened the republican government’s desire to seek favor with Russia was the Anglo-French enmity over Egypt that had entered a new phase (in 1882 it was occupied by England, but formally remained a province of the Ottoman Empire). France fought for the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt. If England was supported on this issue by Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, then France and Russia were on the side of Turkey. The Anglo-Turkish Convention signed in May obliged the St. James Cabinet to withdraw troops after three years, but it received the right, if necessary, to send troops to Egypt again. This gave Great Britain the opportunity to maintain armed forces there indefinitely. Thanks to the activities of French and Russian diplomacy, the Sultan refused to ratify the convention. The desire for friendly relations between France and Russia manifested itself during the dynastic crisis in Bulgaria. Flourens supported Russian diplomacy on this extremely important issue for it. Following the tsarist government, Paris announced the non-recognition of Prince Ferdinand Coburg, an Austro-German protege, as a Bulgarian prince and supported Giers' program to resolve the Bulgarian problem by sending a Russian regent to Sofia.
In May 1890, Berlin refused to extend the Russian-German Reinsurance Treaty. A year later, the Triple Alliance was resumed early, accompanied by demonstrations of friendship between its participants and Great Britain.
And Europe was talked about joining the bloc of Central Powers. These events served as a catalyst for the formalization of Franco-Russian cooperation. An alliance between the monarchy and the republic became urgently necessary for both states.
The formation of the Franco-Prussian alliance occurred in three stages. The first public demonstration of the rapprochement of the two countries was the visit of the French naval squadron to Kronstadt in July 1891. Alexander III was present at the ceremonial meeting of the squadron. Standing with his head bare, the Russian autocrat listened to the national anthem of the Third Republic - the revolutionary “Marseillaise”. Simultaneously with the Kronstadt demonstration, a Franco-Russian political agreement was concluded, which was in the nature of a consultative pact. The agreement was formalized in the form of an exchange of letters - on August 21 and 27 - between the foreign ministers Giers and A. Ribot. The parties agreed to consult with each other on all issues that may threaten “universal peace”, and if the peace is in danger and, in particular, if one of the parties is under threat of attack, to agree on the immediate adoption of joint measures.
The next stage was the conclusion of a military convention. In an effort to avoid being drawn into a conflict for which Russia was not ready, the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry, while still not giving up hope for improved relations with Germany, was in no hurry to accept any military obligations, which the French side insisted on. The visit of the French squadron to Kronstadt caused serious concern in Berlin, Vienna, Rome and London. Giers' attempt to convince Alexander III, who was returning from Denmark to his homeland, to stop by the German capital in order to “balance” Russia's pro-French course was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, a tense situation has developed in Europe. The tsarist government was particularly concerned about reports from the Russian ambassador and military agent in Berlin that there were calls for war against Russia in military circles and those around Wilhelm II, about new appropriations for military needs and the introduction of a bill to the Reichstag to increase the number of German troops. army. Alexander III was distrustful of the Kaiser and his policies (“everything can be expected from the nervous and naughty Wilhelm”). It was supported by Alexander’s dislike for the Germans, constantly “fueled” by Empress Maria Fe-
good. The daughter of the Danish king, she never forgot about Denmark’s defeat in the war with Prussia in 1864. All together this pushed the king to conclude an alliance with France in the event of a Russian-German war.
In December 1891, Alexander, during an audience with the French ambassador, expressed the wish that representatives of the headquarters of both armies discuss the main provisions of the military convention. Gire convinced the tsar that such a convention was premature and that the political obligations already existing with France were sufficient. But we were in a hurry in Paris. Deputy Chief of the General Staff R. Bouderf, who arrived at the autumn maneuvers of the Russian army, brought the text of the convention, and the military began to discuss it. All disputes revolved around the main position: France sought to gain support in case of war with Germany, Russia - with any power of the Triple Alliance. The Russian point of view won.
On August 17, 1892 in St. Petersburg, Chief of the Russian General Staff N.N. Obruchev and Boisderf signed the draft convention. It provided for military assistance to France from Russia if the former was attacked by Germany or Italy supported by Germany. In turn, France was supposed to provide military assistance to Russia in the event of an attack on the latter by Germany or Austria-Hungary, supported by Germany. When mobilizing the troops of the Triple Alliance or one of its members, France and Russia had to immediately mobilize all their forces and advance them as close to the borders as possible. The number of active armies that the contracting parties fielded against Germany was determined (France - 1300 thousand people and Russia - from 700 to 800 thousand people), so that it would have to fight on two fronts - in the east and in the West.
Now the convention, which actually turned a political agreement into a military alliance, had to be ratified. Gire actually put the resulting document on the table for “further study and possible additions.” In August 1893, the German Reichstag passed a law to significantly strengthen the army. The military leadership of France and Russia, assessing it as having an exclusively offensive nature, considered it necessary to take military precautions and quickly seek ratification of the convention. In October, a Russian naval squadron arrived in Toulon for a return visit, which had been postponed for more than a year. The visit, which was a great success, caused a loud pan-European resonance. Contemporaries did not doubt the existence of some kind of agreement between Russia and France. In newspapers, the expression “the political situation created by Kronstadt-Toulon” becomes familiar when describing the international situation in Europe. Gire could no longer resist. On December 27, 1893 and January 4, 1894, the foreign ministers informed each other about the approval of the military convention by the heads of their states - the Russian Emperor Alexander III and the President of the French Republic S. Carnot. After these mutual notifications, the Franco-Russian military-political alliance became a fait accompli.
At the request of the Russian side, the consultative pact, like the military convention, was kept in the strictest confidence. An extremely narrow circle of people was privy to the essence of the matter, four to five people on each side. The heir to the Russian crown, Tsarevich Nicholas, learned about the agreement only after ascending the throne. The French side has repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought the possibility of its publication. Only in August 1897, during a farewell breakfast on board the French cruiser “Potuot”, which was stationed in the roadstead in Kronstadt, Nicholas II, raising a toast to the health of his guest, the President of the Republic F. Faure, finally said the long-awaited word “ allies." But secrecy continued to be maintained regarding the content and existence of the agreement.
Development of international relations from 1871 to the mid-90s. as its logical outcome, it led to the split of Europe into two powerful and opposing military-political coalitions - the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance. Their rivalry became the most important factor determining the course of events in the international arena until the First World War.
1.3 Russian-French alliance
The main reasons for the rapprochement with France include: acute contradictions in the Balkans between Russia, on the one hand, and Austria-Hungary and Germany on the other, predetermined the fragility of the “Union of the Three Emperors.” In 1882, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy created the Triple Alliance, directed against France and posing a danger to Russia, which refused to join it. At the end of the 80s. Russia's economic relations with Germany sharply deteriorated, while French capital actively penetrated into Russia, becoming an important source of financing its economy.
The emerging political and economic rapprochement between Russia and France leads to the conclusion in August 1891 of a secret agreement on mutual assistance in the event of military aggression by the countries of the Triple Alliance. In 1892, a military convention was signed on joint military action against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in the event of an attack on one of the countries. The final formalization of the alliance occurred in 1894 after Alexander III approved the Russian-French military convention.
Russian-French economic rapprochement paved the way for political rapprochement between republican France and monarchical Russia. This rapprochement was also dictated by the entire foreign policy situation of that time. At the beginning of June 1890, 3 months after Bismarck's resignation, Germany refused to renew the “reinsurance treaty”. This irritated even supporters of the German-Russian alliance among Russian government circles.
Under these conditions, the Russian government was forced to think about Russia's future foreign policy orientation. The fear of isolation forced the acceleration of the formation of a military-political alliance with France. In 1893, Germany launched a particularly fierce economic war against Russia; the Russian government demonstratively sent a Russian squadron on a return visit to Toulon. At the same time, as a result of preliminary negotiations between representatives of the general staffs of both countries, a Franco-Russian military convention was signed on December 27, 1893. The Franco-Russian alliance became a fact. The Franco-Russian Military Convention, developed in connection with the increase in the German army, laid the military basis for the Russian-French alliance. The convention stated that France should field an army of 1,300 thousand people against Germany, Russia - from 700 to 800 thousand. Both sides pledged to put these forces into action “fully and with all speed,” so that Germany would have to fight at the same time West and East. The provisions of the convention were also secret. They insisted on this in St. Petersburg, so as not to force the military-strategic rapprochement between Berlin and Vienna. But it was difficult to keep such an important international treaty secret for a long time, and within two years France and Russia officially recognized their allied obligations.
The final registration of the Franco-Russian agreement took place in January 1894.
1.4 Politics in Central Asia
By the beginning of the 20th century. Central Asia has become the main supplier of cotton for Russian industry.
The annexation of Central Asia was accompanied by the colonization of lands. On average, about 50 thousand people moved here every year. The political stability of the region, the availability of free land and relatively low taxes attracted residents from Russian provinces, China and other neighboring countries.
The annexation of the Central Asian peoples to Russia was accompanied by many progressive phenomena. Civil wars stopped, slavery and the slave trade were eliminated. In Central Asia, uniform legislation was established with Russia, reflecting the positive changes of the era.
The process of capitalist development began in Central Asia. Trade turnover is noticeably increasing, especially in connection with the development of cotton and sericulture. Secular schools began to be created in cities. Russian scientists launched extensive activities to study the nature, history and culture of Central Asia. A particularly notable contribution belongs to P.L. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, N.M. Przhevalsky, V.V. Bartold et al.
1.5 Results of foreign policy at the end of the 19th century
In the last quarter of the 19th century. European tension was constantly growing due to the deepening contradictions between the great powers: Russia, England, France, Germany and Austria-Hungary. Their confrontation determined the situation in the world, affecting the interests of other states. Conflicts spanned many regions: the Near and Middle East, the Balkan Peninsula. North Africa, Far East, Southeast Asia. Therefore, for Russia, as for other states, the most important problem has become the search for allies to solve their own problems in these conflicts. End of the 19th century beginning of the 20th century was marked by the creation of two hostile blocs..
The first of the blocks of the triple alliance began to form in the late 70s. In 1879, Germany and Austria-Hungary secretly entered into an alliance directed against Russia and France. After Italy joined, the Triple Alliance of Central European Powers emerged in 1882. This union pursued an aggressive policy in the Balkans, the Near and Middle East. Austria-Hungary was preparing to conquer Serbia. Germany increased its influence in Turkey and Iraq and intensified its colonial policy in Africa and the Far East. Chancellor O. Bismarck's figurative phrase that the Germans “also need their place in the sun” became the motto of German diplomacy.
Despite the two-fold extension (in 1881 and 1884) of the treaty of the three emperors and the signing of a “reinsurance agreement” in 1887, mistrust in Russian-German relations grew. Both sides imposed protective tariffs and unfavorable trade conditions on each other. Germany was preparing for war against Russia and France. The German general staff already in the 80s of the XIX century. began developing similar military-strategic plans.
In its foreign policy, Russia was forced to reconsider its traditional orientation towards Central European states and look for new allies. She began an active rapprochement with France. It was pushed to this by the anti-Russian policy of Germany in the Middle East, the growth of German militarism and the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891. In July 1891, the French squadron arrived in Kronstadt. Simultaneously with the visit of the warships, Russian-French negotiations between diplomats and military personnel on concluding an alliance took place. In 1891-1892 The first documents were signed (a political agreement and a military convention) on joint actions in case one of the parties was threatened by an attack by Germany or Austria-Hungary. Ratification of the convention in 1893 meant the final formalization of the Russian-French alliance, which had an anti-German orientation.
With the formation of two opposing alliances (Triple and Russian-French), a new stage in the history of international relations opened, associated with deepening contradictions in Europe and the fierce struggle of the great powers for the further division of the world into spheres of influence.
Chapter 2. Foreign policy of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century
Started in the 18th century. the policy of limiting and regulating class Cossack governance; it functioned within the strict framework of the autocratic system of government. We can conclude that the functions of local government at the beginning of the 19th century were constantly expanding due to the complication of local life and the aggravation of social relations; the administrative apparatus is constantly...
Regression. 2. Ideas of traditions and modernization in conservative ideology 2.1 From traditions to “conservative creativity” Before talking about how the ideas of traditions and modernization were expressed in the works of Russian conservatives of the late 19th – early 20th centuries, let’s define the content of these terms. The Great Soviet Encyclopedia gives this definition of the term “tradition” - (from the Latin traditio - ...
