Preparing the USSR for war: a feat worthy of the titans. USSR on the eve of the great patriotic war
About the readiness of the Red Army for the war in June 1941
Versions of Stalin’s miscalculation in the timing of Germany’s likely attack on the USSR as the main reason for our failures are accompanied by the assertion that our troops in 1941, before the war, were not inferior to the Wehrmacht in their ability to fight, in professionalism and, if they had been put on combat alert in time, they they would have successfully repelled an attack by aggressors. Under combat readiness, they understand only the ability of troops to occupy deployment lines on alarm, missing the main component of combat readiness - the ability to successfully perform a combat mission to repel a surprise attack, a cat Roe with this ability to the army and will not be sudden.
Many consider the very fact of their defeats the main "evidence" of not putting our troops on alert before aggression, although there is no direct connection. Instead of vague allegations that the troops were not in combat readiness, it would be time to determine a concrete list of the main measures that had to be implemented to achieve the required readiness before the war. And to reveal - which of them were put into practice before the war, in time; what was not done and how it affected the outcome of the first battles.
In the years 1935-1941. The leadership of the USSR carried out a number of major measures to increase the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces:
1) the transfer of the Red Army in 1935-1939. on a personnel basis;
2) the introduction of universal military duty in 1939;
3) the creation and deployment of mass production of a new generation of tanks and aircraft in 1939-1941, before the war;
4) strategic mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces in 1939-1941. from the peacetime army to the wartime army (before the war), from 98 divisions to 303 divisions;
5) the creation and concentration on the western borders in 1939-1941. cover armies unprecedented in the history of mankind in peacetime in the number of 186 divisions, taking into account 16 divisions of the second strategic echelon, who arrived in the cover army before the war;
6) preparation of the Western theater of war for war - airfields, fortified areas, roads.
In April-June 1941, with the growing threat of war, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including:
The call in April-May of 793 thousand reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts almost to wartime states;
The Directive of the Chief of the General Staff of April 14 on urgent putting into combat readiness all long-term fire installations, fortified areas with the installation of weapons of field troops in them in the absence of personnel;
The hidden transfer from May 13 from the internal districts of the troops of the second strategic echelon to the western districts while bringing them into combat readiness - 7 armies of 66 divisions (16, 19, 20, 22, 24 and 28th army, 41st infantry, 21- th and 23rd mechanized corps);
Putting into combat readiness 63 divisions of reserves of the western districts and putting them out by night marches, secretly, from June 12 into the army of covering these districts (NCO Directive of 12.6.41);
Putting into combat readiness and covert withdrawal under the guise of exercises in the place of concentration of 52 divisions of the second echelon of the covering army from places of permanent deployment (Order of the NCO of 16.6.41);
The withdrawal of divisions of the first echelon of cover armies to fortified areas by telegram from the Chief of the General Staff from 10.6.41 and the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense from 11.6.41 - from the beginning of June;
Bringing all PribOVO and OdVO troops on alert 18-21.6.41;
Creation of command posts since April 1941 and their occupation by urgently formed front-line departments on June 18-21;
Creation of the army group of S.M. Budenny on the Dnieper line - 21.6.41;
Early release by order of NPO of May 14 from all schools and the direction of graduates in the western border districts;
NPO order No. 0367 of 12/27/40 and its repetition of 19.6.41 on the dispersal and camouflage of aircraft, etc .;
Direction Deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the General K.A. Meretskov I.V. Stalin in ZapOVO and PribOVO to check the combat readiness of the air forces of the districts 14.6.41;
The publication of the NGO Directive and the Headquarters (No. 1) on putting the troops of the western military districts into combat readiness (signed on 21.6.41 at 22.00, since S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov left Stalin at 22.20, having received their approval of this Directive and sending it with N.F. Vatutin to the communications center of the General Staff).
Altogether, 225 of the 237 divisions of the Red Army intended for the war against Germany and its allies on defense plans were put on alert before the German attack.
Before the war, only two important measures were not implemented: general mobilization in the country and troop deployment in the foreground of fortified areas.
The strategic mobilization deployment of the Red Army before the war into the wartime army (5.4 million people), the creation of huge armies of cover, the hidden mobilization of an additional 793 thousand spare and others made it possible to carry out almost the majority of the measures provided for by general mobilization, due to which the need to conduct it before the war disappeared. Already in peacetime, all 303 divisions planned for war were formed. Everything important was done that the country should and could do to successfully repel the impending aggression, if not to address the issue of the quality of our troops in comparison with the Nazi ones. In fact, from March 1941 there was a counter strategic concentration and deployment of the German armed forces for aggression and the Red Army units - for its reflection.
In fact, now a miscalculation in the probable timing of the Germans' attacks is called quite different - Stalin’s decision, despite the obvious inevitability of German aggression in June 1941, did not declare general mobilization and did not send troops into the precincts of the fortified areas before the Germans attack, considering the events carried out in the spring of 1941 sufficient, and covering armies of 186 divisions - capable of repelling any sudden attack by Germany and its allies!
This is not a miscalculation in terms, but a conscious decision that takes into account all the pros and cons. At the same time, Stalin was mistaken in one thing - he overestimated the combat effectiveness of our troops, which looked much stronger than the Wehrmacht in the number of divisions and military equipment. It was the main and only miscalculation of Stalin (and NPO as well).
There was no miscalculation in anticipating the likely direction of the Wehrmacht’s main strike, but there was a decision by Stalin and the NPO - allowing the main strike of the Germans in Belarus to concentrate our main forces in Ukraine, believing that 44 Soviet divisions in Belarus would be enough for a successful defense against 50 German divisions . And it is more profitable for us to strike back from Ukraine - to Krakow ... Here again, a miscalculation in the combat effectiveness of our troops, and nothing more.
The version about the defeat of our troops on the very first day of the war is nothing more than a legend. In fact, only 30 divisions of the first echelon of cover armies from the Baltic to the Carpathians from 237 divisions of reserve border districts and the second strategic echelon were hit by the aggressor on June 22. The tragedy of the defeat of the main forces of the three special military districts (118 divisions) did not occur on June 22, but later, during the oncoming battles of June 24-30, 1941 between the new and old borders.
To prove the superiority of the Wehrmacht in the number of troops and weapons, as the reasons for our failures, the number of Soviet troops, the quantity and quality of their military equipment, and, conversely, all this is exaggerated by the Wehrmacht, have been greatly minimized for many years.
So, in fact, Germany against the USSR did not expose 4.6 million people, as is commonly believed, but 3.3 million, because in the air force, air defense and navy should be considered (like ours) only military equipment, not personnel. In total, the aggressor, therefore, had not 5.5 million people, but 4.2 million against more than 3 million people. in the western border districts and troops of the second strategic echelon.
The correlation in artillery is distorted - we take into account guns and mortars of 76 mm caliber and higher (without anti-tank guns), and the Germans counted 14 thousand anti-tank guns (37 and 50 mm) and 5 thousand artillery barrels from 28 divisions of the OKH reserve. In fact, the troops of only the western border districts had 37 thousand guns and mortars, and the troops of all aggressors - no more than 31 thousand barrels.
It is not true that almost all Wehrmacht artillery was motorized. The states of the German infantry division of the first waves had 6,300 horses, of which almost half were in the artillery regiment. This means that all the artillery of the infantry divisions was horse drawn. Only artillery of anti-tank missile systems, RGKs, and tank and motorized infantry divisions was motorized.
A total of 3300 tanks and 250 self-propelled guns, and not 4-5 thousand, were thrown by the Wehrmacht against the USSR, of which 1600 were light (T-1, T-2 and T-38) and 1610 medium (T-3 and T-4). So, against 1610 German medium tanks in the western districts of the USSR, there were 160 heavy and medium tanks KB and T-34, which far exceeded the German ones in combat qualities. And against 1,600 German light tanks, there were about 9 thousand Soviet light tanks, not inferior to German ones. The result is an overwhelming superiority over the Wehrmacht in the quantity and quality of tanks. This does not include 2 thousand tanks of mechanized corps of the second strategic echelon.
Against 3,046 all German combat aircraft (1,067 fighters, 1,417 bombers and 562 reconnaissance aircraft), the Air Forces of the western districts, fleets and long-range bomber aircraft had 9917 combat aircraft, including in the districts 7133, 1339 in the DBA and 1445 in the fleets.
The Soviet Air Force did not accept aircraft of new types from factories, not 2739, as they say, but 3719, because Among the new ones, aircraft of the 1939-40 model must also be taken into account. DB-ZF, Ar-2, Su-2, Tu-2, Yak-4, Pe-8, BB-2, of which there were more than a thousand. So, our Air Force could and should have had against the Germans in June 1941 not 1540 new types of planes, as they now think, but more than 3 thousand. Of all 3046 combat aircraft, the Wehrmacht had less than 2 thousand new ones, if we exclude outdated Yu planes -87, Xe-111, Do-217, etc.
As of 22.6.41, our rifle divisions of the western border districts had not an average of 8-9 thousand, how long they believed, and 12 360 (with a staff of 14 483) - 20 divisions each had 14 thousand people, 70 - 12 thousand each and 6 to 11 thousand. The data cited sometimes as of June 1, 1941 do not take into account the income of 500 thousand people from these additional divisions in these divisions in June 1941.
Of those dismissed as a result of the repressions of 1937-38. 38 thousand commanders and political workers 12 thousand returned to the army in 1939-40, 9 thousand were dismissed for political reasons (natural decline), and about 17 thousand people were expelled from the army for political reasons - unreasonably and illegally. Of these, about 9.5 thousand were arrested.
The opinion that the repressed high commanders were the best and the worst remained in the army is unproven. The best of the repressed (MN Tukhachevsky and others) are often compared in print with the worst of the rest. The question has not been investigated - what experience of the modern war (except the Civil War) could have been obtained by our top command of the 30s (including the repressed), serving from the end of the Civil War until 1937 in our small, backward then territorial-personnel army, of which there were two dozen personnel divisions (26%) in twenty military districts (in the internal districts there were none at all), army administrations did not exist from 1920 to 1939, large-scale maneuvers began only in 1935-37. etc. No wonder 120 of our military commanders traveled to Germany to study military affairs in the 1920s and 1930s.
And the ideas associated with the name of Tukhachevsky were not rejected, as they say, they were not always justifiably introduced into the army before the war, reflected in the charters. In particular:
The idea of \u200b\u200ba “retaliatory strike” became the core of the plan of war instead of the idea of \u200b\u200bstrategic defense more suitable for our army;
Theories of deep combat and operations overshadowed for our army issues of defense, maneuver warfare, counter operations, etc .;
The idea of \u200b\u200bcreating cover armies was implemented on a large scale, which saved us in 1941.
The consequences of the repression of 1937-1938 against the command staff were partially overcome by the summer of 1941, so they can not be attributed to the main reasons for the failure of our army at the beginning of the war.
The trouble is that the Red Army never managed to become a cadre either in 1936, or by 1939, or by June 1941. Since 1935, it has been developing extensively, increasing by 5 times - but all to the detriment of quality, especially the officer’s and sergeant formations.
The Soviet military leadership, preparing for a war with Germany, intensely sought by 1941 a quantitative superiority over the Wehrmacht, especially in tanks and aircraft, but it remained a mystery to the multiple lag of the Red Army from the German as troops, headquarters, and command personnel of all degrees, especially the younger .
The troops were poorly trained in the methods of modern warfare, poorly knit together, not organized enough. At a low level were radio communications, control, interaction, intelligence, tactics ...
The transition of the army on a personnel basis, an increase in its number by 5 times in 1939 and the reorganization of 1940-1941. exacerbated the shortage of command personnel and worsened its quality. The real main reason for the defeat of our troops in the summer of 1941 was the unwillingness of the Red Army to wage a modern maneuver war with the enemy, who had rich experience in it and excellent preparation for such a fleeting war. Our Armed Forces did not know how to realize the enormous technical and human potential that surpassed the potential of the aggressors by the beginning of the war. The reason for this lag of our army is a complete failure in 1930-37. advance training of command personnel of the technical link for the multiple increase (deployment) of the Armed Forces before the war. Hasty, emergency measures of 1939-41, and especially in the spring of 1941, could not rectify this situation.
Military Herald (APN). 1992. No. 9. S. 3-8.
http://www.hrono.info/statii/filipp_rkka.html
Russia. WWII. Preparation of the USSR for war
Preparation of the Red Army for war:
Since 1931, at the initiative of Tukhachevsky, mechanized corps, mass airborne forces. The total strength of the USSR Armed Forces in 1938 reached 1.5 million. But in 1937-1938. there were repressions on the military elite of the country. In 1940, 70 commanders and chiefs of staff had no basic military training; they completed only short-term courses. They had no combat experience.
AT 1940 S.K. was appointed People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko, Army General G.K. appointed head of the General Staff Zhukov, who proved himself at Khalkhin Gol.
Building up the country's military-economic potential.In the Five Five-Year Plan (1938-1942) fixed assets were allocated for developmentheavy industry especiallymilitary . In the Urals and Siberia were built backup enterprises. Warehouses were created. State reserves of metal, oil, coal, and food were formed. The growth of defense products amounted to 1939-1840. 39% off.
Was walking the militarization of labor in 1940 d.: a 7-day working week has been established, an 8-hour working day has been introduced (before that it was a 7-hour working day), the ban is threatened by criminal penalties for dismissal at will and the transfer from one enterprise to another without the permission of the administration. The formal attachment of workers and employees to their jobs was carried out. Delays in work were punishable under the criminal code. Delays over 20 min. equated to truancy. The production of substandard products was considered an “anti-state crime”. Thus, the industry has established itself team leadership .
AT 1939 introduced general conscription. The strength of the Red Army was increased to 5.5 million. The draft age was reduced from 21 to 18 years, the service life was increased to 3-5 years, the status of the stock was increased from 40 to 50 years.
Lack of command staff. In the years 1937-1938. was arrested, expelled from the party and retired from the army 35 thousand person. Of the 733 people in the top management team, 579 people died. Of the 16 commanders, 15 were killed. Of the 169 division commanders, 136. Thousands of regiment, battalion, and squadron commanders were arrested and executed. Deficit the command staff was partially reimbursed the return to the army of part of the repressed officers (12 thousand). In 1938 - 1940 combat experience was gained at Khalkhin Gol, Poland, Finland
The rearmament of the Red Army with new military equipment began (from 1939-1940). Serial production of aircraft began (Yak-1, Mig-3 fighters, Il-2 attack aircraft, Pe-20 bombers; tanks (T-34 and KV), which were not inferior to the German ones. However, their equipment was unsatisfactory.
Was developedstrategy upcoming war. Stalin insisted on an offensive strategy, but did not seriously consider defense plans. Operational plans for a preemptive strike were developed. But they were not approved. However, serious miscalculations were made. Management considered that A). war will be fought on two fronts, against Germany and Japan. B) Counter strike concept: it was assumed that The Red Army will repel an enemy attack near the western border of the USSR, transfer the fighting to enemy territory. AT). Main battles deploy at the border. The idea of \u200b\u200bthe possibility of a retreat of the Red Army inland was not allowed.. It was believed that the war will be fought on the territory of the enemy with "little blood". D) defenses on the old border of the USSR were dismantled. But at the new borders did not have time to build defensive structures. E). It was assumed that Germany will try to seize the lands and resources of Ukraine and strike its main blow to the South. Therefore, the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated in the South-West direction. According to Zhukov, by June 22, 1941, there were no operational and mobilization plans approved by the government.
The troops did not study the experience of the Wehrmacht battles in Europe in 1939-1940.
Ideological and moral preparation for war. A) 1934 published the work of Stalin "A Short History of the CPSU (b). It developed the idea of \u200b\u200bcontinuity between the Russian Empire and the USSR in confronting external enemies. He was called to form a patriotic worldview. In the 1930s Stalin wrote the work "Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism", creating his image as the main theorist of Marxism in the USSR, the successor of the work of Marx and Lenin. B) The prestige of the Red Army was increased (the film "Tractor Drivers"; songs that claimed that "the armor is strong and our tanks are fast"). People were sure that if the war began, it would be waged on foreign territory and with "little blood."
However, according to Zhukov, on the eve of the war, the organization and armament of our troops was not up to par, the air defense remained extremely low, and there were practically no mechanized formations.
Before the war, Soviet aviation was inferior to German; artillery was poorly provided with tractors.
Miscalculations of Hitler and his entourage(did not doubt a quick victory):
1. Underestimated the forces of the Red Army, believing that the repression led to the loss of its combat effectiveness. The rearmament of the army has just begun.
2. Underestimated the economic potential of the USSR.
3. Underestimated the patriotism of the peoples living in the USSR. They hoped for an explosion of ethnic hatred in the USSR.
4. Hoping for the support of collective farmers forcibly driven into collective farms. It was believed that the collective farmers were opposed to Soviet power
Before the invasion of German troops
Stalin hoped for an opportunity to delay the war at least until 1942. He doubted the reliability of information about the preparation of Germany for the invasion of the USSR. He was sure that Germany would attack the USSR only after the defeat of England and the conquest of the Middle East, i.e. in 1942, Stalin regarded intelligence information (Richard Sorge) as misinformation.
Stalin and his entourage made serious political and military-strategic miscalculations when analyzing the pre-war situation. The country was preparing for war, but the war was quick and victorious. These miscalculations turned into enormous losses. Preparations for the war were not completed.
In order to avoid a war on two fronts, in 1941 a neutrality pact was signed between the USSR and Japan.
To strengthen the central leadership, Stalin was appointed in May 1941 as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
The balance of power in June 1941 before the invasion
The Red Army was inferior to the enemy in numbers, motorization of troops.
In the early days of the war, the Soviet leadership did not understand the extent of the German invasion. This is evidenced by the directive sent at 7 o’clock. The morning of June 22, 1941: "... the troops by all means and forces fall upon the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they violated the Soviet border."
Recall from the course of recent history, what goals did A. Hitler have in relation to the Slavic peoples.
USSR and Germany: diplomatic maneuvers
The plans of A. Hitler did not include long-term cooperation with the USSR. At a meeting with the top German generals on November 23, 1939, he announced a speech against Russia, which would be carried out immediately after the resistance to the West could be ended.
In the spring of 1940, Germany invaded Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium. This was followed by the lightning defeat of France, which was unexpected for the leadership of the USSR.
By the fall of 1940, Germany had only one adversary - England. However, in conditions when the British fleet dominated the sea, the invasion of the British Isles was impossible for Germany. In this situation, Hitler tried to achieve victory by other means. In November 1940, during the visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov in Berlin he received a proposal to join the Soviet Union to the Triple Pact. For opposing England, the USSR proposed a sphere of influence in the region of the southern seas, at the expense of Iran and India. However, the USSR did not agree to this conspiracy.
The Barbarossa Plan
After the failure of negotiations with the USSR, A. Hitler on December 18, 1940 approved the plan “Barbarossa” developed by the German General Staff from July 22, 1940. He envisioned a blitzkrieg in 1941, a blitzkrieg against the Soviet Union. In three months, German troops were to reach the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. Having seized the resources and industrial potential of the USSR, Hitler and his entourage hoped in 1942 to reach Iran through Soviet territory and capture “the pearl of the British crown” - India, forcing England to cease the struggle.
From a military point of view, this plan was adventurous from the very beginning. The German command underestimated the military power of the USSR, its mobilization capabilities, the solidarity of the people, and established the obviously unrealistic pace of advancement of its troops to the East.
The leaders of fascist Germany primarily hoped to use the multinational character of the Soviet state. It was assumed that the USSR, as during the Civil War, would break up into national-state formations.
Subsequently, the calculations for the explosion of nationalism in the USSR were justified only partially. In the Baltic states, in Western Ukraine, among the Crimean Tatars, Chechens and Kalmyks, movements arose whose leaders believed that with the help of Germany they would be able to realize their nationalistic ideas. However, the majority of the population of these regions participated in the resistance to German aggression, defending their homeland.
In addition, fascist leaders relied on the internal weakness of the Soviet regime, moral and political factors. The processes of 1937-1938. they were perceived as an indicator of the existence of opposition in the USSR to the regime of I.V. Stalin. The fascist leaders did not expect that patriotic feelings would be much stronger than political differences. During the war years, many political prisoners were released from the camps and made a feasible contribution to the victory.
Sympathy and support for the motherland were expressed by many Russian emigrants during the Civil War. They refused to cooperate with the German authorities.
Preparation of the USSR for the war with Germany
The USSR began to strengthen its defenses in the mid-1930s, when the growth of military danger in Europe and Asia became apparent. During the years of the second five-year plan, an increase in the production of military products by almost 300% was planned. Since 1939, general military service was introduced in the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1940, a law was passed according to which instead of a 7-hour working day, an 8-hour day was established, and the day off was canceled. Violations of labor discipline, tardiness and absenteeism were equated with a criminal offense.
Given the likelihood of a war with the powers of the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviet leadership sought to create an army that, in terms of basic types of equipment and weapons, would not be inferior to the total power of the troops of Germany and its allies combined. The lag in the number of personnel was supposed to be overcome after the mobilization.
In the years 1940-1941. The USSR continued to strengthen its military power. The army was reequipped with more advanced equipment, in particular T-34 and KV tanks, which far surpassed the German ones. The rearmament was to be completed in 1942. The troops received new aircraft, which were not inferior to the German in speed and armament (in total, there were 1,540 of them at the beginning of the war).
The basis of the striking power of the Red Army, like that of Germany, was large mechanized formations capable of a swift offensive. However, by the beginning of the war, many of them were only at the formation stage.
The success of Soviet diplomacy was the signing in April 1941 of a treaty of neutrality with Japan. Although the leadership of the USSR was not sure that this treaty would be respected, it still partly ensured the security of the Far East.
Table
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Forces and means |
Germany |
Finland |
In total, the countries of the fascist bloc |
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People (million) |
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Guns and mortars (thousand) |
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Tanks (thousand) |
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Combat aircraft (thousand) |
The reasons for the failures of the Red Army in the initial period of the war
In the spring of 1941, both the US and British governments and Soviet intelligence informed I.V. Stalin about the possibility of a German attack on the USSR. These warnings were mistrusted.
I.V. Stalin believed that the source of rumors about the impending attack was England, which was in a difficult situation and was interested in a clash between the USSR and Germany. He underestimated Hitler’s adventurism and did not believe that Germany would decide to fight on several fronts (in 1941 she continued the air and sea war with England; conducted, together with Italy, operations in North Africa; carried out a campaign in the Balkans against Yugoslavia and Greece).
Stalin and his entourage, who knew that the Red Army needed at least another year to complete rearmament and reorganization, hoped to delay the start of the war by political means. Based on the fact that these possibilities have not yet been exhausted, Stalin rejected the proposals of the General Staff put forward in May 1941 to launch a preemptive strike against the German troops deployed on the Soviet border. Any measures to increase the combat readiness of the border districts were forbidden so as not to provoke an attack by the German troops.
Nevertheless, in April 1941, 800 thousand reservists were called up to the Red Army. In May, additional forces secretly advanced from the internal military districts to the border.
After the conflict with Finland, which revealed the unpreparedness of the Red Army for a serious war, the highest level of its command was replaced. People's Commissar of Defense instead of K.E. Voroshilov was appointed S.K. Tymoshenko (1895-1970), commander of the front, whose troops broke through the Mannerheim line. The chief of the General Staff was G.K. Zhukov (1896-1974), distinguished himself in battles with Japan at Khalkhin Gol.
Their analysis of the state of the army showed that, although in terms of staffing it was a formidable force, its level of readiness for military operations is insufficient.
The top command of the army was weakened by repression. By the beginning of the war, 70-80% of the commanders of the districts, armies, corps and division commanders were in office for less than a year and did not have time to gain experience in commanding the troops. Only 4.3% of the officers had a higher military education, 15.9% of the commanders did not undergo military training, the rest completed short-term military courses. However, the conditions of modern warfare required commanders to be able to establish interaction between various branches of the armed forces (armored, infantry, artillery, aviation), coordinate actions with neighbors on the front line, and take initiative in difficult situations. In addition, the equipment of the troops with communications was very weak.
Ordinary military personnel did not have experience using modern military equipment. Only 15% of pilots underwent retraining for flights on new, high-speed aircraft. A significant part of the equipment was faulty. By the beginning of the war, tank units were only 25-30% equipped with repair facilities. The army experienced an acute shortage of cars, with 45% of them in need of repair. Identified deficiencies required a long time to correct them.
G.K. Zhukov. 1941
The country's military leadership made a gross miscalculation in the deployment of large forces of the Red Army near the new state border. This deployment of troops was determined by the military doctrine adopted in the USSR, demanding to respond to an enemy strike with a counterattack (or counter strike). She rejected the possibility of a strategic retreat and underestimated the importance of defense. Plans for the construction of defensive lines on the new border were implemented only by 25%. The previously dismantled defenses were restored on the old border, but by the beginning of the war they could not be completely restored.
Front-line airfields were overloaded. On many of them, aircraft deployment standards were exceeded 4-6 times, which facilitated the destruction of most of the aircraft by the first strike of the enemy. The stocks of fuel and ammunition were too close to the border. They were immediately captured by advancing German tank columns.
All this facilitated the defeat of the Wehrmacht by the main forces of the Red Army at the initial stage of the war.
§ 23 Questions and tasks
1 How did German-Soviet relations develop in 1939-1940?
2 Tell us about the preparation of the USSR for war with the countries of the Anti-Comintern Pact. What circumstances led to the fact that the German attack on the Soviet Union was unexpected?
3 Describe the Barbarossa plan. What were the calculations of fascist Germany in preparation for aggression against the USSR?
4 What can you say about the combat effectiveness of the Red Army, its readiness for war with Germany?
So, what happened after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed? Despite the great friendship, on the joint partition of Poland, on the subsequent actions of the Soviet Union in relation to Finland and the Baltic states, it was quite obvious that each of the opposing sides was trying to use the remaining time to build up the material and technical basis, military muscles.
It is worth noting that the Soviet Union used this time very, very effectively. That is, for the period from 1939 - the summer of 1941 to the beginning of the war, according to Soviet historiography, we produced about 18 thousand combat aircraft, not counting those that were produced before 1939. The figures for tank production are even more impressive. Their total number was approaching 26 thousand, of which T-26 was 9998 units, BT - 7519, T-28 - 481, T-35 - 59, T-37 of various modifications - about 6 thousand, T-40 - 132, T -34 - 1225 units and Klimentiy Voroshilov (KV) - 636 vehicles. Such was the potential of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
To strike at the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht managed to allocate 3932 tanks and 266 assault guns. Moreover, we note that in 1941 the Germans managed to produce only 3094 tanks of all types, including 678 Czech light tanks.
What was that? The classic formulation that was used in Soviet times: all our tanks were hopelessly outdated, were no good, except for the T-34 and KV. However, there is a certain figure of cunning here, because if we consider what the tank units of the Wehrmacht were armed with, the picture emerges very, very curious.
At the beginning of the war, the Wehrmacht was armed with a significant number of tanks, not T-Is, which weighed only 5.5 tons and were armed with machine guns; T-II tanks, which weighed 9 tons and had a 20-mm automatic cannon and, as our veterans recalled, could not stand the bullet of a heavy machine gun. There was simply no way that they could survive after hitting at least a 37 mm shell. As a matter of fact, these tanks were originally created as training tanks. Later, during the war, they were used in counterguerrilla and patrol operations. And such a technique was a good half of what the Wehrmacht had at the time of the outbreak of war.
Wehrmacht soldier at the burned-out Soviet tank T-34, 1941
In addition, the Wehrmacht included a certain number of Czech tanks, which the German tankers loved very much because they were better than the T-I and T-II. These are Skoda LT vz. 35 tanks, which had a weight of 10 tons, a crew of four and more or less decent booking. This tank withstood the impact of a 20-mm shell, but anything larger was already deadly for him. The Germans had 218 of such tanks. In addition, there were Czech tanks LT vz. 38, which were of a later release, with a weight of about 10 tons; their armor was slightly larger, but by December 10, 1941, the last LT vz.38 was out of order, and later all such tanks (those that survived) were used by the Germans, as already mentioned, for counterguerrilla and patrol purposes.
As for decent equipment, which could be called a tank, it was the T-III, which were in service with the Panzerwaffe. The weight of this tank was 19.5 tons, at first it was equipped with a 37 mm cannon, then a 50 mm short-barreled gun.
This tank became, if I may say so, a draft horse, which during the first years of the war took out everything and everything that fell to the Panzerwaffe on its ridge, although these machines could not be compared with our later tanks. There were 1,440 such tanks at the disposal of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war. And, in fact, they managed to allocate 965 vehicles to the Soviet front.
Not a single French trophy tank was in service with the Panzerwaffe
Well, the most formidable car, which was lighter than the T-34 and which for some reason we call the "heavy tank", was the T-IV. The T-IV appeared in 1938, it was armed with a short 75-mm cannon, and it really was a machine that could provide some more or less serious resistance to our tanks, although in terms of its parameters it was also inferior to what we had.
Of course, you can endlessly list which tanks the Germans got from the French as trophies, but these machines were simply unsuitable for any purpose other than for training purposes. There was a very interesting trend in arms production in Germany after the end of the Strange War. As Halder noted in his memoirs, the word "impossible" ceased to exist for the supreme command of the Wehrmacht and, accordingly, the political leadership of Germany in general. That is, a period of some euphoria and hatred began, which, in general, later acquired quite pronounced consequences.
As for the Soviet Union, the actions of Germany in Poland and the lightning defeat of the French army, which at the time of the outbreak of the war was not the weakest, having at its disposal more than 3 thousand tanks, showed that the enemy was very, very serious and needed to be treated with a certain, if not reverence, then with a consciousness of the degree of danger that he represents. Accordingly, in the Soviet Union in 1939-1941 there was active research and development work in almost all areas of the creation of equipment and weapons. You can repeat indefinitely and sing praises to the T-34 and KV tanks, but, indeed, at the time the war began, these machines were unparalleled in any country in the world and until 1943 were (no doubt) out of competition. And I must say that if in 1941 there were not so many of them, somewhere a little more than 1.5 thousand, then already in 1942 the Soviet industry produced 24718 tanks, of which 12.5 thousand were T-34s.
Soviet I-16 fighters captured by the Germans at the airport, 1941
Work really went, as they say, at an accelerated pace, and the development of tanks capable of withstanding the hit of shells of anti-tank and tank guns was quite successful. You can cite a lot of reservations and a certain reluctance of the military to load up with adopting new equipment (quite often this came up with a conservative approach), nevertheless, these tanks began to arrive in military units. The question is how they were used in 1941? ..
As for aviation, quite active work was also going on here. There were several aviation schools that created aircraft in the Soviet Union. This is the school of Nikolai Polikarpov, the “king of fighters” of the 30s, who built the I-15, I-16, I-153 (a rather curious car, a biplane with retractable landing gear, which had become obsolete even when it was just born ), I-180, I-185 (later developments). During the test of these aircraft, Valery Chkalov died, which led Nikolai Polikarpov to a certain career decline. Indirectly, this was blamed on him, and work on these aircraft, unfortunately, was stopped, although the characteristics of such a machine as I-185, it must be said, were outstanding.
By the summer of 1941, the forces of the Soviet Union were the largest army in the world.
A group of young designers: Yakovlev, Lavochkin, Gorbunov, Gudkov and Mikoyan also created fighters. The undisputed leader was Yakovlev, the favorite of Stalin, who built the Yak-1 aircraft. In his book Time, People, Aircraft, test pilot Rabkin cites documents about the state of the Yak-1, as well as LAG-1 (subsequently LAG-3), and MiG-1 (MiG-3) were received at armament. Perhaps the most terrifying picture was with the Yakovlev machine. The number of flaws in the aircraft exceeded 120 positions, including failures of carburetors, a generator, engine overheating, flaws in the cooling system, oil and water, and much, much more. As a matter of fact, the history of the birth of such aircraft as the Yak-1 and LAG-1 is quite curious.
The fact is that both the one and the other aircraft had the same propeller group - a French-made Spanish-Suise motor purchased under license. He had been in production with the French since 1936, and by the time the license was purchased, the engine was called M-105 (later there was also a modification of the M-107, super-forced and non-viable). Actually, the French removed this engine from production, replacing it with a more efficient one. In a word, this “new” motor was on Yakovlev’s planes and on Lavochkin’s first generation planes.
Yakovlev’s plane was a structure made of metal tubes, covered with fabric, sometimes plywood, and in its characteristics was largely close to a sports aircraft. The survivability factor was relatively small, but due to the fact that the fabric was used, it was quite light.
As for the Lavochkin plane, it was made of delta wood, plywood, and had greater survivability, but also more weight, for which the pilots during the war called the LAG-1 “flying guaranteed coffin”, because the machine did not have sufficient maneuverability . And if we add to this the problems with carburetors and many others that were encountered on these aircraft, then, in general, we can imagine how difficult it was for our pilots to fight them.
Wehrmacht unit at the Catholic service before the invasion of the USSR, 1941. Photo by Alois Beck
A very interesting car was Mikoyanovskaya, MiG-1, subsequently MiG-3, which was discontinued in 1941. Also a vague and incomprehensible story. The German test pilot Hans-Werner Lerche, who was responsible for testing captured Soviet aircraft in Germany, noted the very high performance of the MiG-3 for 1941 and even 1942. The fact is that this machine developed about 640 km / h, while later modifications of the Messerschmitt Bf.109 developed only 600. Nevertheless, the MiG was discontinued. It was believed that this machine was strict enough for piloting, that it had insufficiently powerful weapons, and the main thesis, which is given in Yakovlev’s memoirs, is that the aircraft had an engine for flights at high altitudes. The same test pilot, Rabkin, refutes Yakovlev, saying that the altitude of the aircraft is determined by how it is configured with the fuel system, carburetors and how enrichment or depletion of the mixture is ensured. That is, the MiG-3 could be made an airplane for fighting at medium and low altitudes. And by the way, Alexander Pokryshkin, who started the war precisely on the MiG-3, despite its declared altitude characteristics, completely coped with this aircraft and used it very effectively at low altitudes in battles with Messerschmitt Bf.109.
Thus, the total number of our aircraft at the time the war began was very, very impressive. The total number of aircraft in the Red Army Air Force fleet was approaching the number of tanks in tank fleets. At the same time, the IL-2 aircraft was developed and brought to production - a very ambiguous machine, the most massive in our aviation. Almost 40% of the pilots who died during the war are IL-2 pilots who had the most bitter bread: they plowed the front edge and, accordingly, died more often than all other aces. According to statistics, shooters of the IL-2 were killed seven times more often than pilots. That is, before one IL-2 pilot died, he had seven shooters changing.
Our aviation at the beginning of the war numbered somewhere under 30 thousand cars. It would seem that a huge mass of equipment and weapons ... Torpedo boats were built in large quantities, as a cheap, economical and, when used wisely, effective means of combating naval targets. Produced under the German license, 85-mm guns (in fact an analogue of the famous 88-mm gun), guns of other calibers. That is, the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union worked at full speed, and by the time Germany attacked our country, the numerical superiority in technology was enormous. We have repeatedly exceeded the Wehrmacht, Panzerwaffe and Luftwaffe.
On the side of Germany was quality, on the side of the USSR - quantity
As for the use of this technique, this is another, reverse side of the issue. The fact is that it is not enough to produce a lot of weapons, we must also be able to use them. As many of our pilots and tankers wrote in memoirs, in parts there was a struggle to save fuel and lubricants, firing was extremely rare, but the work with the chores, with all kinds of political classes, lectures, seminars, marching, and other completely " necessary ”in the preparation of the armed forces affairs. A quote comes to mind from Eike Mitteldorf, an officer of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, who wrote instructions for operating the army, which, among other things, says that soldiers should be trained in drill training in order to be able to decently go into service. Of the 16 hours of daily training in the Wehrmacht, most of the time was devoted to practicing tactics, shooting, and other activities necessary for survival on the battlefield.
Such a picture developed by June 1941. At the same time, interestingly, each of the opposing sides had its own euphoria: ours, because we had a huge technical park, Germans - because they managed to get through half of Europe with small forces and it seemed that this would go on forever. However, the events that began to take place in the summer of 1941 and subsequent years showed that a quantitative advantage is far from always a guarantee of success, while a qualitative advantage is not always a guarantee of victory.
War. Preparation of the USSR for war.
From the moment he came to power in ruined agrarian Russia, Stalin directed all efforts to boost the economy and, first of all, to create powerful armed forces that would protect the first socialist state - the USSR from the invasion of capitalist armies. He conducted industrialization and laid the foundation for a powerful industrial base for the production of means of production, primarily for the production of military equipment, weapons and ammunition. He implemented the Leninsky GOELRO plan, that is, the electrification of the whole country, to create modern military technologies: “winged metal” aluminum was obtained only by electrolysis.
aluminum smelter. Stalin collectivized the village with the formation of collective farms and state farms in order to eliminate private ownership of land, and at the same time to pump huge funds and masses of people from rural to industrial.
In the first half of the 30s in the USSR, millions of peasants torn from the ground built powerful power plants, new mines and mines, the world's largest metallurgical plants for the production of metals, from which all kinds of machines will be made, but mainly military equipment and weapons. Hundreds of universities appeared in a completely illiterate country, which were trained by thousands of engineers: metallurgists, designers, technologists, chemists, engine builders, military men, radio engineers, etc. At the same time, huge factories were laid for future production, mainly military, in unprecedented quantities: tanks, planes, warships and submarines, guns, small arms, ammunition, bombs, shells and mines, gunpowders and explosives.
By the mid 30s. the industrial base was basically created, and the production of the armament itself began. Soviet designers have developed the most modern military equipment, weapons and ammunition. Trained personnel were needed for the Red Army, and thousands of military schools, schools and academies grew up in the country to train combat commanders, pilots, tankmen, navigators, artillerymen, naval specialists, radio engineers, sappers.
In each large city, parachute towers grew in the parks, for training future paratroopers. It was considered indecent for young men to appear without the badge of the TRP, the Voroshilovsky shooter, Osoaviahim, the badge of the paratrooper. After work and study, it was recommended that young people and girls go in for parachuting, learn to fly gliders, and then transfer to airplanes. The standard of living in the country steadily declined, light industry and agriculture served the army more and more.
Stalin saw the growth of military power in Germany and understood that sooner or later Hitler would attack the USSR, Germany needed Russian natural and human resources. Stalin invited European leaders to discuss joint action in the event of German aggression. The delegations of France and England arrived in Moscow. They insisted on military assistance from the USSR in the event of a German attack on one of the contracting countries. Since the USSR had no common borders with either England or France, the head of the Soviet delegation, People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, demanded that the Red Army pass through Poland. The delegations of France and England categorically refused. This ended the negotiations.
Stalin understood that Germany would soon attack Poland, and then it would inevitably go east, and he offered Hitler negotiations. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop arrived in the USSR. On August 23, 1939, the Non-aggression and Mutual Assistance Pact was signed between Germany and the USSR (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact).
On September 1, 1939, Hitler attacked Poland, but Stalin said that the Red Army was not yet ready for war. So Hitler was the only culprit of the war, England and France declared war on Germany. Only on September 17, when the Polish army was defeated, did the Red Army enter Poland to defend its borders against German aggression.
The USSR annexed Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, pushed its border 200-300 km to the west. Thousands of Polish officers were captured. They were invited to join the Red Army. The part agreed, and they organized the Polish Army, which later successfully fought with the Nazis along with the Red Army. Those who did not agree were shot in Katyn.
The United States had a great influence on the drawing of the USSR into the war. Hitler’s inhumane policies and his bloody anti-Semitism frightened all the capitalists of the world. But the oligarchs of the whole world, especially the American ones, were even more afraid of the communist threat from the USSR. Indeed, according to the theory of Marx and Lenin, the USSR, as a result of the world revolution, was supposed to destroy the entire capitalist society and build a world communist society without private property and without human exploitation by man.
As far back as the 1930s, a call was made at the US Congress to draw the USSR into the war against Hitler and to do this provide all possible assistance to the USSR in strengthening its military power. And when both sides mutually deplete themselves, the United States, in alliance with European countries, will destroy both the fascist and the communist threats. Congressman G. Truman, with the approval of Roosevelt, said: “Let Germany and Russia fight among themselves. If we see that Russia wins, we will help Germany. If we see Germany winning, we will help Russia. And may they kill each other as much as possible. ”
In the USSR, long before the war, American technology, American materials and American equipment went in a massive stream. American experts helped build the latest plants in the USSR and develop them. America even supplied military equipment to the USSR. So, under the guise of agricultural tractors, the United States sold unique high-speed BT tanks to the USSR. The USSR paid for all this at speculative prices in gold, works of art and valuable raw materials.
Large Western countries correctly assessed US policy and, instead of the previous boycott, also began to help Stalin in the construction of factories, they sold the latest technologies and valuable raw materials to the USSR. Even Hitler supplied the USSR with unique equipment and military equipment - in exchange for valuable raw materials, grain and timber, which were not in Germany.
On September 1, when the world had not yet suspected that the Second World War had begun, the 4th extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was held. The main decision of the session was the introduction of draft age from 18 years. Prior to that, the draft age was 21 years old and not all were drafted into the Army, but selectively. Now, during 1939–40, all the recruits were simultaneously mobilized into the Red Army at once 4 draft years: 21st, 20th, 19th and 18th years of birth and at the same time all men who had not been drafted before. It was a gigantic appeal, the size of which no one can still name. These conscripts should be demobilized after 2 years, i.e. at the end of 1941. It was impossible to repeat such a set. That is, Stalin already in 1939. planned to enter the Second World War in 1941 and no later.
Using the Pact with Germany, Stalin continued to push the western border. The border with the Finns passed only 30 km from Leningrad. 11.11.39 Stalin declared war on Finland, but the Red Army was stuck in front of the Mannerheim Line, which the Finns had been building for 20 years, and which throughout the world was considered absolutely insurmountable. Frost below -40 degrees, snow 1.5-2 meters deep, huge boulders under the snow, on which tanks and cars were breaking, under the snow nonfreezing swamps and lakes. And the Finns covered it all with minefields, mined the bridges. The columns of our troops turned out to be locked on narrow forest roads, and the Finnish snipers, “cuckoos,” targeted our commanders, drivers, and sappers. The wounded died of blood loss in severe frost, from frostbite.
The Red Army suffered heavy losses, but managed to completely rebuild, commissioned the invulnerable KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, the maneuverable T-34s and, by March, crushed the theoretically insurmountable Mannerheim Line. The Finns requested peace, and our border here was pushed back almost 200 km. Militarily, it was the most brilliant victory in the 20th century, but it went unnoticed, because The West raised a noisy scandal about Soviet aggression, and the League of Nations expelled the USSR from its members as an aggressor.
Stalin did not pay much attention to this noise and continued his policy. He demanded that Romania return the USSR to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. June 28, 1940, these territories became part of the USSR.
Stalin demanded that the Baltic countries (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) consent to the introduction of Red Army garrisons in large cities. The Balts, unlike other countries, perfectly understood the significance of the victory of the Red Army in Finland and did not object. And soon here the workers demanded accession to the USSR, and these countries in 1940 became part of the USSR: Lithuania - August 3, Latvia - August 5, Estonia - August 6 ..
As a result, throughout the western border of the USSR he came into direct contact with Germany. This made it possible in the event of war to immediately transfer hostilities to German territory, but also created a serious danger of a sudden German attack on the USSR.
In the USSR, with the help of Western countries, intensive production of military equipment continued. In unimaginable quantities, ammunition was produced for all types of weapons: shells, bombs, mines, grenades, cartridges. The T-26 light tanks (under the English license), which made up the bulk of Soviet tanks, and the BT wheeled and tracked light tanks (according to American technology), for rapid raids on European highways, were produced in huge series. Factories in large quantities produced the latest and best guns, howitzers and mortars in the world.
The Red Army, the only one in the world, had powerful all-terrain tanks with low-combustible diesel fuel: invulnerable heavy tanks KV, medium tanks T-34, light tanks T-50, amphibious tanks T-37 and T-40, high-speed wheeled tracked tanks BT -7m, which on European freeways developed speeds of up to 140 km / h on wheels. For comparison: besides the USSR, England had “Matilda” heavy tanks, but they could only move on level ground and could not climb a single hill, and their armor on rivets was loosened by shells and fell off.
The USSR began mass production of modern aircraft. The Yak-1, LaGG-3, and MiG-3 fighters were not inferior to the German Messerschmitt, Focke-Wulf, and Heinkel. The fully armored Il-2 attack aircraft, the “flying tank”, had no analogues in the world at all. The Pe-2 front-line bomber remained the best in the world until the end of the war. The DB-3F (IL-4) long-range bomber exceeded all German bombers. The strategic bomber Pe-8 was unparalleled in the world. On it, the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M.Molotov during the war twice flew through Germany to England and the United States and vice versa, but the German air defense forces did not notice him.
The gunsmiths developed the best in the world and easy-to-manufacture Shpagin assault rifles (PPSh) - the most massive in the Red Army; Degtyareva (PPD); Goryunova (BCP); Sudaeva (PPS) - recognized as the best in the 2nd World War - which any bed workshop could produce, and prepared their mass production. One such production of PPSh began to operate before the war in Zagorsk (ZEMZ - “Skobyanka”).
For the first time in the world, rocket launchers of the RS were developed for aviation, which were used by all fighters and attack aircraft. On June 21, 1941, a completely new weapon was adopted by the Red Army: the BM-13 (130 mm caliber) and BM-8 (68 mm caliber) multiple-launch rocket launchers, the famous Katyusha rockets.
At the urgent request of Prime Minister Churchill with unspoken US pressure, I.V. Stalin finally agreed to open in July 1941 a Second Front against Hitler if the Wehrmacht attacked England. Stalin began to concentrate troops near our Western border, the Red Army gathered huge forces for offensive operations. However, this concentration of the Red Army at the eastern border of Germany alarmed Hitler. He in July 1940 issued an order to develop a plan of war with the USSR. In December 1940 this Barbarossa plan was ready. Hitler began to prepare a “blitzkrieg” against the USSR and draw troops to our border. This is a real competition ahead of the curve.
Hitler won the competition, because our General Staff, headed by G.K.Zhukov, was blindly guided by the statement of Stalin that Hitler would not dare to start a war on two fronts. But Stalin is not a military man, but a politician. G.K.Zhukov, as a strategist in office, was obliged to convince Stalin or, at least on his own initiative, to prepare measures for the defense of the country. But this did not happen, the chief of the General Staff of the Red Army did not dare to object to Stalin and only assented to him. The Red Army was completely unprepared for defense. As a result, Hitler on 22.06.41 dealt an unexpected blow to the Red Army, which was almost entirely on the move — on the march, in echelons. This blow was crushing and ultimately fatal for the USSR.
