Battle of Kursk - Ural State Military History Museum. Kursk Bulge

Despite the artistic exaggerations associated with Prokhorovka, the Battle of Kursk was indeed the last attempt by the Germans to recapture the situation. Taking advantage of the negligence of the Soviet command and inflicting a major defeat on the Red Army near Kharkov in the early spring of 1943, the Germans received another “chance” to play a summer offensive map based on the 1941 and 1942 models.

But by 1943, the Red Army was already different, just like the Wehrmacht, was worse than itself two years ago. Two years of a bloody meat grinder were not in vain for him, plus the delay with the start of the attack on Kursk made the fact of the attack obvious for the Soviet command, which quite reasonably decided not to repeat the mistakes of the spring-summer of 1942 and voluntarily ceded to the Germans the right to launch offensive actions in order to exhaust them on the defensive, and then smash the weakened strike force.

On the whole, the implementation of this plan once again showed how much the level of strategic planning of the Soviet leadership has grown since the outbreak of war. And at the same time, the inglorious end of the “Citadel” once again showed the Germans, who were trying to break this difficult strategic situation with deliberately inadequate means, sinking this level.

Actually, even Manstein, the most intelligent German strategist, had no illusions about this decisive battle for Germany, arguing in his memoirs that if everything had turned out differently, it would have been possible to somehow jump off the USSR to a draw, that is, in fact he admitted that after Stalingrad the victory was no longer discussed for Germany at all.

In theory, the Germans could certainly push through our defenses and go to Kursk, surrounded by a couple of dozen divisions, but even in this wonderful scenario for the Germans, their success did not lead them to solve the problems of the Eastern Front, but only led to a delay before the inevitable end, for German military production by 1943 was already clearly inferior to the Soviet one, and the need to close up the “Italian hole” did not make it possible to gather any large forces for further offensive operations on the Eastern Front.

But our army did not allow the Germans to amuse themselves with the illusion of even such a victory. The shock groups were bloodless during the week of heavy defensive battles, and then the rink of our offensive rolled, which since the summer of 1943 was practically unstoppable no matter how much the Germans rested in the future.

In this regard, the Battle of Kursk is indeed one of the iconic battles of World War II, and not only due to the scale of the battle and the millions of soldiers and tens of thousands of military equipment involved. It was finally demonstrated to the whole world and especially to the Soviet people that Germany is doomed.

Remember today all those who died in this landmark battle and those who survived in it, reaching Kursk to Berlin.

Below is a selection of photos of the Battle of Kursk.

Commander of the Central Front Army General K.K. Rokossovsky and member of the Military Council of the Front Major General KF Telegin at the forefront before the battle on the Kursk Bulge. 1943 year.

Soviet sappers are installing anti-tank mines TM-42 in front of the front line of defense. Central Front, Kursk Bulge, July 1943

Transfer of "Tigers" for operation "Citadel".

Manstein and his generals "at work".

German traffic controller. Rear tracked tractor RSO.

The construction of fortifications on the Kursk Bulge. June 1943.

At rest.

On the eve of the Battle of Kursk. Running in infantry tanks. The soldiers in the trench and the T-34 tank, which overcomes the trench, passing over them. 1943 year.

German machine gunner with MG-42.

The Panthers are getting ready for Operation Citadel.

Self-propelled howitzers "Vespe" ("Wespe") of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Great Germany" on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943

German tanks Pz.Kpfw.III before the operation "Citadel" in a Soviet village.

The crew of the Soviet tank T-34-76 "Marshal Choibalsan" (from the tank column "Revolutionary Mongolia") and the dowry landing on vacation. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

A smoke break in the German trenches.

A peasant woman tells Soviet intelligence about the location of enemy units. North of the city of Orel, 1943.

Petty Officer V. Sokolova, medical officer of the fighter anti-tank artillery units of the Red Army. Oryol direction. Kursk Bulge, summer of 1943.

The German 105-mm self-propelled guns Vespe (Sd.Kfz.124 Wespe) from the 74th self-propelled artillery regiment of the 2nd Wehrmacht tank division, passes next to the abandoned Soviet 76-mm gun ZIS-3 near the city of Oryol. German offensive operation "Citadel". Oryol Region, July 1943.

"Tigers" go on the attack.

Photojournalist of the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda O. Knorring and cameraman I. Malov are filming the interrogation of prisoner corporal A. Bauschhof, who voluntarily sided with the Red Army. The interrogation is conducted by Captain S.A. Mironov (right) and translator Jones (center). Oryol-Kursk direction, July 7, 1943.

German soldiers on the Kursk. The part of the hull of the radio-controlled tank B-IV is visible from above.

Destroyed by Soviet artillery German B-IV robotic tanks and Pz.Kpfw control tanks. III (one of the tanks has the number F 23). Northern face of the Kursk Bulge (near the village of Glazunovka). July 5, 1943

Tank landing of sappers-demolition personnel (sturmpionieren) from the SS division "Das Reich" on the armor of the StuG III Ausf F. assault gun. Kursk Bulge, 1943.

Damaged Soviet tank T-60.

Burning self-propelled guns "Ferdinand". July 1943, the village of Ponyri.

Two wrecked Ferdinand from the headquarters company of the 654th battalion. The area of \u200b\u200bPonyri station, July 15-16, 1943. Left staff "Ferdinand" No. II-03. The car was burned with kerosene mixture bottles after a shell damaged its shell.

Ferdinand heavy assault gun, destroyed by direct hit of an aerial bomb from a Soviet diving bomber Pe-2. Tactical number unknown. The area of \u200b\u200bPonyri station and state farm "May 1".

Heavy assault gun "Ferdinand", tail number "723" from the 654th division (battalion), shot down in the area of \u200b\u200bthe state farm "May 1". The caterpillar was destroyed by shelling and the gun was jammed. The machine was part of Major Kal’s “strike group” as part of the 505th heavy tank battalion of the 654th division.

Tank column moves to the front.

Tigers "from the 503rd heavy tank battalion.

Katyusha firing.

Tanks "Tiger" SS Panzer Division "Das Reich."

A company of American M3s General Lee tanks, which were supplied to the USSR through Lend-Lease, was advanced to the front line of defense of the Soviet 6th Guards Army. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Soviet soldiers at the wrecked Panther. July 1943.

Ferdinand heavy assault gun, tail number 731, chassis number 150090 of the 653rd division, blown up by a mine in the defense zone of the 70th army. Later, this car was sent to the exhibition of captured equipment in Moscow.

SPG Su-152 Major Sankovsky. His crew destroyed 10 enemy tanks in the first battle during the Battle of Kursk.

T-34-76 tanks support the infantry attack in the Kursk direction.

Soviet infantry in front of a wrecked Tiger tank.

Attack T-34-76 near Belgorod. July 1943.

The defective Panthers of the 10th Panther Brigade of the von Lauchert Tank Regiment abandoned near Prokhorovka.

German observers are watching the progress of the battle.

Soviet infantrymen are hiding behind the corps of the destroyed Panther.

Soviet mortar calculation changes the firing position. Bryansk front, Oryol direction. July 1943

The Grenadier SS looks at the just-shot down T-34. It was probably destroyed by one of the first modifications of Panzerfaust, which were first widely used on the Kursk Bulge.

Padded German tank Pz.Kpfw. V modification D2, knocked out during the operation "Citadel" (Kursk). This photo is interesting in that there is a signature on it - "Ilyin" and the date "26/7". This is probably the name of the gun commander who knocked out the tank.

The advanced units of the 285th Infantry Regiment of the 183rd Infantry Division are fighting the enemy in the captured German trenches. In the foreground is the body of a murdered German soldier. Battle of Kursk, July 10, 1943.

The sappers of the SS division "Leib Standard Adolf Hitler" have a damaged T-34-76 tank. July 7, the area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Pselec.

Soviet tanks at the turn of the attack.

Padded tanks Pz IV and Pz VI near Kursk.

Pilots of the Normandy-Niemen squadron.

Reflection of a tank attack. The area of \u200b\u200bthe village of Ponyri. July 1943.

Padded Ferdinand. Nearby are the corpses of his crew.

Gunners are fighting.

Padded German equipment during the fighting on the Kursk direction.

German tanker inspects the track from getting into the frontal projection of the Tiger. July 1943

The soldiers near the downed diving bomber Yu-87.

Padded Panther. In the form of a trophy I reached Kursk.

Machine gunners on the Kursk Bulge. July 1943.

Self-propelled guns Marder III and panzergrenadiers at the starting line before the attack. July 1943.

Broken Panther. The tower was blown up by an explosion of ammunition.

Burning German self-propelled guns Ferdinand from the 656th regiment on the Oryol face of the Kursk Bulge, July 1943. The photo was taken through the hatch of the driver of the tank control tank Pz.Kpfw. III tanks-robots B-4.

Soviet soldiers at the wrecked Panther. A huge hole from the 152-mm St. John's Wort is visible in the tower.

Burnt tanks of the column "For Soviet Ukraine". On the tower torn down by the explosion, the inscription "For Radyansk Ukraine" (For Soviet Ukraine) is visible.

Murdered German tankman. In the background is the Soviet T-70 tank.

Soviet soldiers visiting the German heavy self-propelled artillery installation of the tank destroyer class Ferdinand that was hit during the Battle of Kursk. The photo is also interesting with the SSH-36 steel helmet rare for 1943 on a soldier on the left.

Soviet soldiers at a damaged Stug III assault gun.

Destroyed on the Kursk Bulge German tank robot B-IV and a German motorcycle with a stroller BMW R-75. 1943 year.

SAU "Ferdinand" after the detonation of ammunition.

The calculation of the anti-tank gun fires on enemy tanks. July 1943.

The picture shows a padded German medium tank PzKpfw IV (modifications H or G). July 1943.

Tank commander Pz.kpfw VI "Tiger" No. 323 of the 3rd company of the 503rd heavy tank battalion, non-commissioned officer Futermeister, shows the track from the Soviet projectile on the armor of his tank to headquarters sergeant major Heiden. Kursk Bulge, July 1943.

Statement of the combat mission. July 1943.

Pe-2 diving front-line bombers on a combat course. Oryol-Belgorod direction. July 1943.

Towing a faulty Tiger. On the Kursk, the Germans suffered significant losses due to non-combat damage to their equipment.

T-34 goes on the attack.

Captured by the Der Der Führer regiment of the Das Reich division, the British Churchleep tank was delivered under a lend-lease.

Tank destroyers Marder III on the march. Operation Citadel, July 1943.

and in the foreground on the right is a wrecked Soviet T-34 tank, then at the left edge of the photo German Pz.Kpfw. VI "Tiger", in the distance is another T-34.

Soviet soldiers visiting the exploded German tank Pz IV ausf G.

Soldiers of the unit of senior lieutenant A. Burak with the support of artillery are leading the offensive. July 1943

German prisoner of war on Kursk in the wrecked 150-mm infantry gun sIG.33. On the right lies a dead German soldier. July 1943

Oryol direction. Soldiers under cover of tanks go on the attack. July 1943.

The German units, which include captured Soviet tanks T-34-76, are preparing for an attack during the Battle of Kursk. July 28, 1943.

RONA soldiers (Russian Liberation People's Army) among captured Red Army soldiers. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

Soviet tank T-34-76 crashed in a village on the Kursk Bulge. August, 1943.

Under fire from the enemy, the tankers pull out a wrecked T-34 from the battlefield.

Soviet soldiers rise to the attack.

The officer of the division "Great Germany" in the trench. The end of July-beginning of August.

A participant in the battles on the Kursk Bulge is a scout, guards senior sergeant A.G. Frolchenko (1905 - 1967), awarded the Order of the Red Star (according to another version, Lieutenant Nikolai Alekseevich Simonov is depicted in the photo). Belgorod direction, August 1943.

A column of German prisoners captured in the Oryol direction. August 1943.

German soldiers from the SS troops in the trench with a machine gun MG-42 during the operation "Citadel". Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

Left anti-aircraft self-propelled gun Sd.Kfz. 10/4 on the basis of a half-track tractor with a 20 mm FlaK 30 anti-aircraft gun. Kursk Bulge, August 3, 1943.

The priest blesses the Soviet soldiers. Oryol direction, 1943.

The Soviet T-34-76 tank and the killed tanker were shot down in the Belgorod region.

A column of captured Germans in the Kursk region.

Captured on the Kursk Bulge German anti-tank guns PaK 35/36. In the background is the Soviet ZiS-5 truck towing a 61-mm 37-mm anti-aircraft gun. July 1943

Soldiers of the 3rd SS division Totenkopf (Dead Head) are discussing a defensive action plan with the Tiger commander from the 503rd heavy tank battalion. Kursk Bulge, July-August 1943.

Captured Germans in the Kursk region.

Tank commander, lieutenant B.V. Smelov shows a hole in the tower of the German Tiger tank, shot down by Smelov’s crew, lieutenant Likhnyakevich (who killed 2 fascist tanks in the last battle). This hole was made by an ordinary armor-piercing shell from a 76-mm tank gun.

Senior lieutenant Ivan Shevtsov next to the German Tiger tank that he had been wrecked.

Trophies of the Battle of Kursk.

The German heavy assault gun "Ferdinand" of the 653rd battalion (division), captured in good condition along with the crew of soldiers of the Soviet 129th Oryol Rifle Division. August 1943

The eagle is taken.

The 89th Infantry Division enters the liberated Belgorod.

70 years ago the Great Battle of Kursk began. The battle on the Kursk Bulge in its scope, forces and means involved, tension, results and military-strategic consequences is one of the most important battles of the Second World War. The Great Battle of Kursk lasted 50 incredibly difficult days and nights (July 5 - August 23, 1943). In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide this battle into two stages and three operations: the defensive stage - the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-12); offensive - Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3 - 23) offensive operations. The Germans called the offensive part of their operation "Citadel". About 2.2 million people, about 7.7 thousand tanks, self-propelled guns and assault guns, over 29 thousand guns and mortars (with a reserve of more than 35 thousand), more than 4 participated in this great battle from the USSR and Germany. thousand combat aircraft.

During the winter of 1942-1943. the offensive of the Red Army and the forced withdrawal of Soviet troops during the Kharkov defensive operation of 1943, the so-called Kursk ledge. The Kursk Bulge, a ledge facing west, was up to 200 km wide and 150 km deep. During April - June 1943, an operational pause occurred on the Eastern Front, during which the Soviet and German armed forces were intensely preparing for the summer campaign, which was to be decisive in this war.

The forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts were located on the Kursk ledge, threatening the flanks and rear of the German Army Groups Center and South. In turn, the German command, having created powerful strike groups on the Oryol and Belgorod-Kharkov bridgeheads, could inflict strong flanking attacks on Soviet troops defending in the Kursk region, encircle them and destroy them.

Plans and forces of the parties

Germany. In the spring of 1943, when the forces of the adversaries were exhausted, and there was a debauchery, nullifying the possibility of a quick attack, it was time to prepare plans for the summer campaign. Despite the defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and the battle for the Caucasus, the Wehrmacht retained its offensive power and was a very dangerous opponent who longed for revenge. Moreover, the German command held a series of mobilization events, and by the beginning of the summer campaign of 1943, compared with the number of troops at the beginning of the summer campaign of 1942, the number of Wehrmacht increased. There were 3.1 million people on the Eastern Front, without taking into account the SS troops and the Air Force, almost as many as 3.2 million people were in the Wehrmacht before the start of the campaign to the East on June 22, 1941. In terms of the number of formations, the Wehrmacht of the 1943 model was superior to the German armed forces of the 1941 period.

For the German command, unlike the Soviet, a wait-and-see strategy, pure defense, was unacceptable. Moscow could afford to wait with serious offensive operations, time played for it - the power of the armed forces grew, enterprises evacuated to the east began to work at full capacity (they even increased production compared to the pre-war level), the partisan struggle in the German rear expanded. The likelihood of an Allied army landing in Western Europe and the opening of a second front increased. In addition, it was not possible to create a solid defense on the Eastern Front, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. In particular, Army Group South was forced to defend a front with length of 760 km with 32 divisions - from Taganrog on the Black Sea to the Sum region. The balance of forces allowed the Soviet troops, if the enemy was limited only to defense, to carry out offensive operations in various sectors of the Eastern Front, concentrating the maximum amount of forces and means, tightening reserves. The German army could not only adhere to the defense, it was the path to defeat. Only a maneuvering war, with breakthroughs of the front line, with access to the flanks and rear of the Soviet armies, allowed us to hope for a strategic turning point in the war. Major success on the Eastern Front gave hope, if not victory in the war, then a satisfactory political solution.

On March 13, 1943, Adolf Hitler signed operational order No. 5, where he set the task to forestall the advance of the Soviet army and "impose its will on at least one of the sectors of the front." In other sectors of the front, the task of the troops is to bleed off the advancing enemy forces at well-established defensive lines. Thus, the Wehrmacht strategy was chosen back in March 1943. It remained to determine where to hit. The Kursk ledge arose at the same time, in March 1943, during the German counterattack. Therefore, Hitler, in order No. 5, demanded the application of convergent attacks on the Kursk ledge, wanting to destroy the Soviet troops located on it. However, in March 1943, German troops in this direction were significantly weakened by previous battles, and the plan of attack on the Kursk ledge had to be postponed indefinitely.

On April 15, Hitler signed Operation Order No. 6. Operation Citadel was planned to begin as soon as the weather allowed. Army Group South was supposed to strike from the Tomarovka-Belgorod line, break through the Soviet front at the Prilepy-Oboyan line, and unite at Kursk and east of it with the compounds of the Center group of amines. Army Group Center launched a strike from the line of Trosn, a region south of Maloarkhangelsk. Her troops were to break through the front in the Fatezh-Veretenovo section, concentrating the main efforts on the eastern flank. And connect with Army Group South in the Kursk region and east of it. The troops between the strike groups, on the western front of the Kursk ledge - the forces of the 2nd Army, were to organize local attacks and, when the Soviet troops withdraw, immediately go on the offensive with all their forces. The plan was quite simple and obvious. They wanted to cut off the Kursk ledge by converging blows from the north and south - on the 4th day it was supposed to surround and then destroy the Soviet troops located on it (Voronezh and Central Front). This made it possible to create an extensive gap in the Soviet front and seize strategic initiative. In the Orel region, the 9th Army represented the main striking force; in the Belgorod region, the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf Task Force. Operation Citadel was to be followed by Operation Panther — a strike in the rear of the South-Western Front, an offensive in the north-east direction in order to reach the deep rear of the central group of the Red Army and create a threat to Moscow.

The beginning of the operation was scheduled for mid-May 1943. The commander of the Army Group South, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that the strike should be done as early as possible, preempting the Soviet offensive in the Donbas. He was supported by the commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Gunter Hans von Kluge. But not all German commanders shared his point of view. Walter Model, commander of the 9th Army, had great authority in the eyes of the Führer and on May 3 prepared a report in which he expressed doubts about the possibility of the successful implementation of Operation Citadel if it began in mid-May. The basis of his skepticism was intelligence on the defensive potential of the opposing 9th Army of the Central Front. The Soviet command prepared a deeply layered and well-organized line of defense, strengthened the artillery and anti-tank potential. And the mechanized units were diverted from forward-facing positions, leading out of a possible enemy strike.

On May 3-4, a discussion of this report took place in Munich. According to Model, the Central Front under the command of Konstantin Rokossovsky had almost double superiority in the number of military units and equipment over the 9th German army. The Model’s 15 infantry divisions had half the number of infantry, in some divisions 3 out of 9 full-time infantry battalions were disbanded. Artillery batteries had three guns instead of four, and in some batteries 1-2 guns. By May 16, the 9th Army divisions had an average "combat strength" (the number of soldiers directly involved in the battle) of 3.3 thousand people. For comparison, 8 infantry divisions of the 4th Panzer Army and the Kempf group had a “combat strength” of 6.3 thousand people. And the infantry was necessary to crack the defensive lines of the Soviet troops. In addition, the 9th Army was experiencing serious transport problems. Army Group South, after the Stalingrad disaster, received formations that underwent reorganization in the rear in 1942. Model, however, had mainly infantry divisions that had been at the front since 1941 and needed urgent replenishment.

The report of the Model made a strong impression on A. Hitler. Other military leaders could not put forward serious arguments against the calculations of the commander of the 9th Army. As a result, they decided to shift the start of the operation by a month. This decision of Hitler will then become one of the most criticized by German generals, who blamed their mistakes on the Supreme Commander.

Otto Moritz Walter Model (1891 - 1945).

It must be said that although this delay led to an increase in the striking power of the German troops, the Soviet armies were also seriously strengthened. The balance of forces between the Model’s army and the Rokossovsky front from May to early July did not improve, but even worsened for the Germans. In April 1943, the Central Front numbered 538.4 thousand people, 920 tanks, 7.8 thousand guns and 660 aircraft; in early July - 711.5 thousand people, 1785 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12.4 thousand guns and 1050 aircraft. In the middle of May, the 9th Model Army had 324.9 thousand people, about 800 tanks and assault guns, and 3 thousand guns. In early July, the 9th Army reached 335 thousand people, 1014 tanks, 3368 guns. In addition, it was in May that the Voronezh Front began to receive anti-tank mines, which will become the real scourge of German armored vehicles in the Battle of Kursk. The Soviet economy worked more efficiently, replenishing troops with technology faster than German industry.

The plan for the offensive of the 9th Army from the Oryol direction was somewhat different from that typical for the German school of admission - the Model was going to break the enemy’s defenses with infantry, and then bring tank units into battle. The infantry was supposed to attack with the support of heavy tanks, assault guns, aircraft and artillery. Of the 8 mobile units that the 9th Army had, only one was immediately introduced into the battle - the 20th Panzer Division. In the zone of the main attack of the 9th Army, the 47th Panzer Corps was to advance under the command of Joachim Lemelsen. The strip of his advance lay between the villages of Gnilets and Butyrki. Here, according to German intelligence, there was a junction of two Soviet armies - the 13th and 70th. In the first echelon of the 47th Corps, the 6th Infantry and 20th Panzer Divisions advanced, they struck on the first day. In the second echelon were located more powerful - 2nd and 9th tank divisions. They should have been introduced already into the breakthrough, after breaking the Soviet line of defense. In the direction of the Ponyrei, on the left flank of the 47th Corps, the 41st Panzer Corps advanced under General Joseph Harpe. The 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions were in the first echelon, and the 18th Panzer Division was in reserve. To the left of the 41st Panzer Corps was the 23rd Army Corps under General Frisner. He was supposed to deliver a distracting blow with the forces of the 78th assault and 216th infantry divisions in Maloarkhangelsk. On the right flank of the 47th Corps, the 46th Panzer Corps of General Hans Zorn was advancing. In its first strike echelon there were only infantry formations - the 7th, 31st, 102nd and 258th infantry divisions. Three more mobile units — the 10th Motorized (Tank Grenadier), the 4th and 12th Panzer Divisions were in reserve of the army group. After von Kluge, they had to transfer them to the Model after breaking the strike forces into the operational space behind the defensive lines of the Central Front. It is believed that the Model did not initially want to attack, but was waiting for the Red Army, even prepared additional defensive lines in the rear. And he tried to keep the most valuable mobile units in the second echelon, so that, if necessary, he would transfer him to a section that would collapse under the blows of the Soviet troops.

The command of Army Group South was not limited to the attack on Kursk with the forces of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel General Hermann Goth (52nd Army Corps, 48th Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps). In the north-east direction the Kempf task force was to advance under the command of Werner Kempf. The group stood front to east along the Seversky Donets River. Manstein believed that as soon as the battle began, the Soviet command would throw into the battle strong reserves located east and north-east of Kharkov. Therefore, the attack of the 4th Panzer Army on Kursk should have been secured from the east from suitable Soviet tank and mechanized formations. The Kempf Army Group was to have one 42nd Army Corps (39th, 161st and 282nd Infantry Divisions) of General Franz Mattenkloth to hold the line of defense on the Donets. Its 3rd Panzer Corps under the command of the General of the Panzer Troops Herman Bright (6th, 7th, 19th Panzer and 168th Infantry Divisions) and the 11th Army Corps of the Panzer General, Erhard Routh, he before the operation and until July 20 it was called - Reserve of the High Command of the Special Forces of Routh (106th, 198th and 320th Infantry Divisions), were to actively ensure the offensive of the 4th Panzer Army. The Kempf group was planned to subordinate another tank corps, which was in the reserve of the army group, after it captured a sufficient area and secured freedom of action in the north-east direction.

Erich von Manstein (1887 - 1973).

This innovation was not limited to the command of Army Group South. According to the recollections of the Chief of Staff of the 4th Tank Army, General Friedrich Fangor, at the meeting with Manstein on May 10–11, the offensive plan was adjusted at the suggestion of General Goth. According to intelligence, there was a change in the location of Soviet tank and mechanized troops. The Soviet tank reserve could quickly engage in battle, passing into the corridor between the Donets and Psel rivers in the Prokhorovka area. There was a danger of a strong blow to the right flank of the 4th Panzer Army. This situation could lead to disaster. Goth believed that it was necessary to enter into the oncoming battle with the Russian tank forces the most powerful formation that he had. Therefore, the 2nd Panzer Corps of the SS Paul Hausser as part of the 1st Panzer Grenadier Division of the SS Leibstantart Adolf Hitler, the 2nd Panzer Grenadier Division of the SS Reich and the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division of the SS Totenkopf (" Dead Head ”) was now not supposed to move directly north along the Psel River, he should have turned northeast to the Prokhorovka area to destroy Soviet tank reserves.

The experience of the war with the Red Army convinced the German command that strong counterattacks would certainly be. Therefore, the command of Army Group "South" tried to minimize their consequences. Both decisions — the Kempf group strike and the turn of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps to Prokhorovka — had a significant impact on the development of the Battle of Kursk and the actions of the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army. At the same time, the division of forces of Army Group South into a primary and auxiliary strike in the northeast direction deprived Manstein of serious reserves. Theoretically, Manstein had a reserve - the 24th tank corps of Walter Nering. But he was the reserve of the army group in case of the Soviet offensive in the Donbass and was located quite far from the place of the attack on the southern front of the Kursk ledge. As a result, it was used for the defense of Donbass. He had no serious reserves that Manstein could immediately enter into battle.

The best generals and the most combat-ready units of the Wehrmacht, a total of 50 divisions (including 16 tank and motorized) and a significant number of separate formations, were involved in the offensive operation. In particular, shortly before the operation, the 39th Tank Regiment (200 Panthers) and the 503rd Battalion of Heavy Tanks (45 Tigers) arrived in Army Group South. From the air, strike groups supported the 4th air fleet of Field Marshal Aviation Wolfram von Richthofen and the 6th air fleet under the command of Colonel-General Robert Ritter von Graeme. In total, over 900 thousand soldiers and officers, about 10 thousand guns and mortars, more than 2700 tanks and assault guns (including 148 new T-VI Tiger heavy tanks, 200 Panther T-V tanks participated in Operation Citadel) and 90 assault guns "Ferdinand"), about 2050 aircraft.

The German command placed great hopes on the use of new models of military equipment. The expectation of the arrival of new technology was one of the reasons why the advance was postponed to a later time. It was assumed that heavily armored tanks (the Soviet Panther researchers, which the Germans considered a medium tank, were considered heavy tanks) and self-propelled guns would become a battering ram for Soviet defense. The medium and heavy tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI, and the Ferdinand assault guns that entered the Wehrmacht's armament combined good armor protection and strong artillery weapons. Their 75-mm and 88-mm guns with a direct-shot range of 1.5-2.5 km were about 2.5 times greater than the range of the 76.2-mm gun of the main medium Soviet tank T-34. At the same time, due to the high initial velocity of the shells, German designers achieved high armor penetration. Armored self-propelled howitzers — 105 mm Vespe (German Wespe - “wasp”) and 150 mm Hummel (German “bumblebee”) —were used in the artillery regiments of tank divisions, were also used to combat Soviet tanks. German combat vehicles had excellent Zeiss optics. The German Air Force received new Fokke-Wulf-190 fighters, and Henkel-129 attack aircraft. They had to gain air supremacy and carry out assault support for the advancing troops.

Self-propelled howitzers "Wespe" ("Wespe") of the 2nd battalion of the artillery regiment "Great Germany" on the march.

Henschel Hs 129 attack aircraft.

The German command tried to keep the operation secret, to achieve a surprise strike. To this end, they tried to misinform the Soviet leadership. They carried out intensive preparations for Operation Panther in the band of Army Group South. They carried out demonstrative reconnaissance, transferred tanks, concentrated ferry facilities, conducted active radio communications, activated their agents, spread rumors, etc. In the offensive zone of the Army Group Center, on the contrary, they tried to camouflage all actions and hide them from the enemy. The events were carried out with German thoroughness and methodicity, but they did not give the desired results. The Soviet command was well informed about the upcoming enemy offensive.

German shielded tanks Pz.Kpfw. III in a Soviet village before the operation "Citadel".

In order to protect their rear areas from the blow of partisan formations, in May-June 1943 the German command organized and carried out several large punitive operations against Soviet partisans. In particular, 10 divisions were deployed against about 20 thousand Bryansk partisans, and 40 thousand were sent against partisans in the Zhytomyr region. grouping. However, the plan was not fully realized, the partisans retained the ability to deliver strong blows to the invaders.

To be continued…

The Battle of Kursk (Battle of the Kursk Bulge), which lasted from July 5 to August 23, 1943, is one of the key battles of World War II. In Soviet and Russian historiography, it is customary to divide the battle into three parts: the Kursk defensive operation (July 5-23); Oryol (July 12 - August 18) and Belgorod-Kharkov (August 3-23) offensive.

During the winter offensive of the Red Army and the subsequent Wehrmacht counterattack in Eastern Ukraine, a ledge of up to 150 and a width of 200 kilometers turned to the west (the so-called "Kursk Bulge") formed in the center of the Soviet-German front. The German command decided to conduct a strategic operation on the Kursk ledge. For this, a military operation codenamed Citadel was developed and approved in April 1943. Having information about the preparation of the Nazi forces for the offensive, the Supreme High Command decided to temporarily switch to defense on the Kursk Bulge and during the defensive battle to bleed the enemy’s strike groups and thereby create favorable conditions for the Soviet troops to launch a counterattack and then a general strategic offensive .

For the operation "Citadel", the German command concentrated 50 divisions on the site, including 18 tank and motorized divisions. The enemy grouping, according to Soviet sources, was about 900 thousand people, up to 10 thousand guns and mortars, about 2.7 thousand tanks and more than 2 thousand aircraft. Air support to the German troops was provided by the forces of the 4th and 6th air fleets.

At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Supreme High Command set up a group (the Central and Voronezh Fronts), which had more than 1.3 million people, up to 20 thousand guns and mortars, more than 3300 tanks and self-propelled guns, 2650 aircraft. The troops of the Central Front (commander - Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky) defended the northern face of the Kursk ledge, and the troops of the Voronezh Front (commander - Army General Nikolai Vatutin) - the southern front. The troops occupying the ledge relied on the Steppe Front as part of a rifle, 3 tank, 3 motorized and 3 cavalry corps (commander Colonel-General Ivan Konev). The coordination of the fronts was carried out by representatives of the General Headquarters Marshals of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov and Alexander Vasilevsky.

On July 5, 1943, German strike groups, according to the plan of Operation Citadel, launched an attack on Kursk from the areas of Orel and Belgorod. On the Orel side came a group under the command of Field Marshal Gunter Hans von Kluge (Army Group Center), on the side of Belgorod a group under the command of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Kempf Operation Group of the Army Group South).

The task of repelling the offensive from Orel was entrusted to the troops of the Central Front, and from Belgorod to the Voronezh Front.

On July 12, in the vicinity of the Prokhorovka railway station, 56 kilometers north of Belgorod, the largest tank battle of the Second World War took place - the battle between the advancing tank group of the enemy (Kempf operational group) and the Soviet forces that launched a counterattack. On both sides, up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled units took part in the battle. A fierce battle lasted all day, in the evening tank crews fought hand-to-hand with infantry. In one day the enemy lost about 10 thousand people and 400 tanks and was forced to go on the defensive.

On the same day, the troops of the Bryansk, Central and left wing of the Western Fronts launched Operation Kutuzov, which had the goal of defeating the Oryol group of the enemy. On July 13, troops of the Western and Bryansk fronts broke through the enemy defenses in the Bolkhov, Khotynets and Oryol directions and advanced to a depth of 8 to 25 km. On July 16, the troops of the Bryansk Front reached the border of the Oleshnya River, after which the German command began to withdraw its main forces to their original positions. By July 18, the troops of the right wing of the Central Front completely eliminated the enemy’s wedge in the Kursk direction. On the same day, troops of the Steppe Front were introduced into the battle, which began to pursue the retreating enemy.

Developing the offensive, the Soviet ground forces supported by air strikes by forces of the 2nd and 17th air armies, as well as long-range aviation, threw the enemy 140-150 km west by August 23, 1943, liberated Orel, Belgorod and Kharkov. According to Soviet sources, the Wehrmacht lost 30 selected divisions in the Battle of Kursk, including 7 tank divisions, more than 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1,5 thousand tanks, more than 3,7 thousand aircraft, 3 thousand guns. The losses of the Soviet troops surpassed the German; they amounted to 863 thousand people. Near Kursk, the Red Army lost about 6 thousand tanks.

The mastery of information and telecommunication technologies and the formation of general educational and general cultural skills for working with information is one of the goals of the modern educational process. The use of a computer in the lesson is justified primarily with a large individualization of students' work. Any form of work on a historical topic using a personal computer on the student’s desktop has advantages over traditional forms of lessons, because it has much greater possibilities of presenting visual, documentary and reference materials to students.

The lesson is designed for 1 hour of studying material in the 9th grade of a comprehensive school.

Lesson objectives

Educational:

Developing:

Educational:

Epigraph:

In the usual twilight harsh
   Midnight salvo of celebration,
   The applause for a new victory,
   Mother Moscow listened.

A. Twardowski

1. Introductory word. We continue to study one of the most difficult periods in the history of our country - the Great Patriotic War. In the last lesson, the Battle of Stalingrad was dismantled, which marked the beginning of a radical turning point in the course of the war. Today we will read another page in the history of the Great Patriotic War. The subject of today's conversation is the Battle of Kursk. The purpose of this lesson is to consider the completion of a radical change, get acquainted with the main events of the Battle of Kursk, and determine the significance. But first, I will allow myself to return a little back in 1942. (Slide1,2)

2. Checking homework.

Question: How was he significant?

Answer: The Battle of Stalingrad took place, ending with a brilliant victory for the Soviet Army. The myth of the invincibility of German weapons has faded.

Question: What is the date of the Second World War?

Question: What are the stages of the war.

Answer: June 22, 1941 - November 18, 1942 - the initial stage; November 19, 1942 - the end of 1943 - a period of radical change; 1944 - May 9, 1945 - the final stage.

Question: What are the main events of the initial stage.

Answer: The Germans had a strategic initiative, the retreat of the Soviet troops, the Germans occupied Belarus, the Baltic states, and Ukraine. Battle for Moscow. The beginning of the defense of Stalingrad.

Question: What is a radical turning point during the war?

Answer: The transition of strategic initiative from the German army to the Soviet one.

Question: What battles were the result of a radical change?

Answer: The Battle of Stalingrad and Kursk.

3. Learning new material

(The story is carried out using a map) Try to determine where the Germans could have begun the offensive, where the main offensive of 1943, on which so much is placed in the fate of the war, is more preferable.

(Students call the numbers that mark the entire length of the front line, and determine that the section of the Soviet Army near Kursk is very “seductive,” which goes far into the location of German troops).

Question: What did the Germans hope to get? What were you counting on?

Answer: - strengthen the spirit of the German people; add to the German soldier faith in victory; take revenge for a loss near Stalingrad.

The Germans called the operation “Citadel”, which means “fortress”. And this was invented, true: there are no walls, tower towers, ditches, but what was waiting for the Russians in this section really resembled a fortress. The importance of this operation for Hitler is also confirmed by the fact that by 1943 German industry had given the army new equipment: airplanes, tanks, guns. The enemy tried to keep his plans secret. But Soviet intelligence learned about the advance plans in advance - the information was complete. But what to do? Start an attack and disrupt a strike or wait for the enemy to gather strength? Marshal G.K.Zhukov proposed organizing a tough defense, concentrating anti-tank self-propelled artillery, aviation against fascist tank wedges, knocking them out, and then go on a decisive attack. (Slide 3) A defense in depth was created: minefields, trenches, trenches. In preparation for the upcoming battles, the front-line population also took part. . (The frames “The population is digging trenches” are being projected,slide 4 )

If I'm on the military field
   With a dying moan
   I'll fall in the sunset fire
   He was hit by an enemy bullet
   If a raven, as if in a song.
   A circle will close above me
   I want my peer
   He stepped forward through the corpse.
   Let him speed up the walk
   Among the scorched grass,
   Sweat cap
   Without removing from the head.
   And holding the rifle firmly
   He will avenge my death
   For the suffering of the people
   And for your homeland!

(K. Simonov)

This happened suddenly for the German command, so confusion reigned in their units, the inability to respond quickly. The German army immediately suffered heavy losses in artillery. After 2 hours, the Germans ordered the troops. At 5 hours 30 minutes German infantry and tanks moved to our positions.

Arc of fire! A battle unparalleled in history. The battle unfolding on a vast territory - Oryol, Kursk, Belgrade. Here we surpassed the enemy not only in heroism, but also in technology. Neither the "tigers" nor the "Ferdinand" nor the "Panther" helped the Nazis. Every Soviet soldier showed heroism. (Slide 5)

If I am on the battlefield, Having let out a dying moan, I will fall in the sunset fire An enemy bullet is slain, If a raven, as if in a song. A circle will close above me, - I want my peer through the corpse to step forward. Let him accelerate the gait Among the scorched grass, Sweaty cap without removing from his head. And holding the rifle firmly, He will avenge my death, For the sufferings of the people And for his Motherland!

Lieutenant I. Kozhedub - shot down 6 aircraft.

Senior Lieutenant A. Gorovets - in one battle he shot down 9 cadets, no one before him did not do it. Gorovets accomplished what was theoretically considered impossible and impossible in aviation.

Now let us turn our attention to the map of military operations. The German offensive on our positions from the north in the region of Ponyry wedged to a depth of 10-12 km, from the south - in the region of Prokhorovka from 30 to 35 km. Soviet troops were commanded by General Popov, Marshals Baghramyan, Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Malinovsky.

German troops were led by Mr. FM Kluge (German - “smart”), Lüdel, Manstein (German “man - stone”), Guderman - i.e. color of the German command.

In the village of Prokhorovka, 1200 tanks converged on both sides. (Slide 7)

“So, on the morning of July 12, two avalanches of tanks met and went in battle one-on-one as the teeth of two ridges passed in between. Comparison with the crests, however, does not give an idea of \u200b\u200bthe terrible energy that the opponents met. All around, for many kilometers - a whirlwind spun. Motors roared, caterpillars gnashed, guns hit, shells exploded and hearts hated with hatred. The collision of tanks was probably more correct to compare with the collision of two balls of buckshot, sent from huge cannons towards each other. Two balls merged into one, extremely large, and until nightfall this huge ball spun, burning the ground, burning itself. At first, artillery and aircraft helped tanks on both sides. But soon the guns and planes went out of business: with a shell, a bomb you could get into your tank, so Soviet and German cars mixed up. Artillery and aircraft now acted on the flanks of the battle, striking at reserves that were in a hurry for battle. The tanks then converged at close distances, then diverged, intending to get one alone on board. When the tank gun failed or the shells ran out, the tankers went to ram. Steel cars faced an incredible roar. Hundreds of tanks burned with gaping holes in the armor with torn tracks and towers. Pillars of thick smoke rose and gradually spread in the air. The ammunition that was inside the flames of tanks exploded, and huge flames, thousands of sparks flew in all directions. Towers thundered to the ground. Nobody thought about retreating, about leaving the battle: neither ours nor the Nazis. The enemy fought hard, skillfully, fiercely. ”

Battle on the rails.

A feature of the Battle of Kursk was the participation of partisans, although they were far away in the forests near Bryansk (formerly it was called Debryansk, i.e., wilds, wilderness). Partisans launched echelons with German technology downhill. Because of this, the Germans were forced to transfer their equipment and manpower only during the day, letting the trolley forward. “Rail war” - that’s what the partisans called at the headquarters.

(On the screen is the frame “The first salute in Moscow”,slides 9.10)

From the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (as read by announcer Yuri Levitan in the phonorecording):

Today, on August 5, the troops of the Bryansk Front, with the assistance from the flanks of the troops of the Western and Central Fronts, as a result of fierce fighting, captured the city of Oryol. The troops of the Steppe and Voronezh fronts broke the enemy’s resistance and captured the city of Belgorod. Thereby, the German legend that the Soviet troops were not able to conduct a successful offensive in the summer was exposed. Today, August 5, at 24 o’clock the capital of our Motherland, Moscow will salute our valiant troops, who liberated Oryol and Belgorod, with 12 artillery volleys of 120 guns ... Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the struggle for the freedom of our Motherland!

Death to the German occupiers! Supreme Commander-in-Chief Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Stalin. August 5, 1943.

Among the participants in the battles on the Kursk Bulge there was a native of the village of Beloe Ozero, a teacher of the veteran of the Beloozersky school - Vasily Kholodnov (memoirs of a veteran of the front-line soldier), (slide 8).

Born in 1918, member of the CPSU since 1951. He participated in the Great Patriotic War in 1942-1943, in battles on the Kursk Bulge. He worked as the director of the Beloozersky eight-year school in 1972-1979. He graduated in absentia from the Chuvash State Pedagogical Institute in 1952.

So the battle is won. What is the significance of this event? The significance of the Battle of Kursk.(Student responses ... The Soviet army was still in the middle of Russia, still separating it from Germany, but a radical coup had already taken place during World War II. Germany’s last attempt to attack ended in failure. The prestige of the USSR among allied countries grew. The victory at Kursk contributed to the liberation left bank of Ukraine in early November.) The British Prime Minister Churchill never tired of stressing that he was the first enemy of communism, but as a politician in those days he said: “Three great battles for Kursk, Oryol, Kharkov, all held for three months, marked the collapse of the German armies on the Eastern Front. ”

4. Material consolidation. What is a radical turning point in a war? Why is it believed that a radical turning point during the war finally occurred after the Battle of Kursk? What is the meaning and consequences of the Battle of Kursk for both sides? Test solution

1. The most important reason for the disruption of the plan of the German offensive in the Battle of Kursk is:

1) warning strike of Soviet artillery;
   2) the entry into battle of the reserve Siberian divisions;
   3) the environment of the bulk of the German troops;
   4) the blow of partisan formations to the rear of the Germans.

2. During what battle did the largest tank battle of the Great Patriotic War take place:

1) Battles for Moscow;
   2) the battle of Stalingrad;
   3) Battle of Kursk;
   4) The Battle of Berlin.

3. The Battle of Kursk completed a radical change during the Great Patriotic War, as:

1) the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Red Army;
2) the Nazis withdrew their troops from the Baltic states;
3) fascist Germany suffered the first major defeat;
4) in the spring of 1943 the Second Front was opened.

5. Homework: continue filling out the table “The main military operations of the Great Patriotic War”.

The Battle of Kursk is one of the largest and most important battles of the Great Patriotic War, which took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943.
The German command gave others the name for this battle - Operation Citadel, which, according to the plans of the Wehrmacht, was to counterattack the Soviet offensive.

The reasons for the Battle of Kursk

After the victory at Stalingrad, the German army first began to retreat during the Great Patriotic War, and the Soviet army launched a decisive offensive that could only be stopped on the Kursk Bulge and the German command understood this. The Germans organized a strong defense line, and in their opinion, it had to withstand any attack.

Forces of the parties

Germany
At the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht troops numbered more than 900 thousand people. In addition to a huge amount of human power, the Germans had a considerable number of tanks, among which were tanks of all the latest models: these were more than 300 Tiger and Panther tanks, as well as the very powerful PT-SAU (anti-tank gun) Ferdinand or Elephant "Among about 50 combat units.
It should be noted that among the tank army there were three elite tank divisions that had not previously suffered a single defeat - they included real tank asses.
And in support of the ground army, an air fleet was sent with a total number of more than 1,000 combat aircraft of the latest models.

USSR
To slow down and complicate the advance of the enemy, the Soviet Army installed about one and a half thousand mines per kilometer of the front. The number of foot soldiers in the Soviet Army reached more than 1 million soldiers. And the Soviet Army had 3-4 thousand tanks, which also exceeded the number of German tanks. However, a large number of Soviet tanks are outdated models and are not rivals to the Wehrmacht “Tigers”.
The Red Army had twice as many guns and mortars. If the Wehrmacht has 10 thousand, then the Soviet Army has more than twenty. There were also more planes, but historians cannot give exact numbers.

Battle progress

During Operation Citadel, the German command decided to launch a counterattack on the northern and southern wings of the Kursk Bulge in order to encircle and destroy the Red Army. But the German army failed to implement this. The Soviet command hit the Germans with a powerful artillery strike to weaken the initial attack of the enemy.
Before the start of the offensive operation, the Wehrmacht launched powerful artillery attacks on the positions of the Red Army. Then, on the North Face, the arcs launched an offensive by German tanks, but soon met very strong resistance. The Germans repeatedly changed the direction of the strike, but did not achieve significant results, by July 10, they managed to break through only 12 km, losing about 2 thousand tanks. As a result, they had to switch to defense.
On July 5, an attack began on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. First came a powerful artillery bombardment. Having failed, the German command decided to continue the offensive in the area of \u200b\u200bProkhorovka, where tank forces had already begun to accumulate.
The famous battle near Prokhorovka - the largest tank battle in history, began on July 11, but the height of the battle in the battle fell on July 12. On a small section of the front, 700 German and about 800 Soviet tanks and guns collided. The tanks of both sides mixed up and during the day many tank crews left the combat vehicles and fought in hand-to-hand combat. Towards the end of July 12, the tank battle began to decline. The Soviet army failed to defeat the enemy tank forces, but managed to stop their progress. Having broken a little deeper, the Germans were forced to retreat, and the Soviet Army launched an offensive.
The losses of the Germans in the battle of Prokhorovka were insignificant: 80 tanks, but the Soviet Army lost about 70% of all tanks in this direction.
In the next few days, they were almost completely bloodless and lost their attacking potential, while the Soviet reserves had not yet entered the battle and were ready to launch a decisive counterattack.
On July 15, the Germans went on the defensive. As a result, the German offensive did not bring any success, and both sides suffered serious losses. The number of those killed on the German side is estimated at 70 thousand soldiers, a large number of equipment and guns. According to various estimates, the Soviet army lost up to about 150 thousand soldiers, a large number of this figure are irretrievable losses.
The first offensive operations on the Soviet side began on July 5, their goal was to deprive the enemy of maneuvering their reserves and transferring forces from other fronts to this sector of the front.
On July 17, the Izyum-Barvenkov operation began on the part of the Soviet army. The Soviet command set out to surround the Donbass group of Germans. The Soviet army managed to force the North Donets, capture the bridgehead on the right bank and, most importantly, forge German reserves on this sector of the front.
During the Miuss offensive operation of the Red Army (July 17 - August 2), it was possible to stop the transfer of divisions from the Donbass to the Kursk Bulge, which significantly reduced the defensive potential of the bullet itself.
July 12 began an offensive in the Oryol direction. Within one day, the Soviet army managed to drive the Germans out of Orel, and they were forced to switch to another defense line. After Orel and Belgorod, the key cities and the Germans were driven back during the Oryol and Belgorod operations, were liberated, it was decided to arrange a fireworks display. So on August 5 in the capital, the first salute was organized for all the time of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War. In the operation, the Germans lost over 90 thousand soldiers and a large amount of equipment.
The offensive of the Soviet army began on August 3 on the southern phage and was called Operation Rumyantsev. As a result of this offensive operation, the Soviet army managed to liberate a number of important strategically important cities, including the city of Kharkov (August 23). The Germans made attempts to counterattack during this attack, but they did not bring any success to the Wehrmacht.
From August 7 to October 2, the Kutuzov offensive operation was carried out - the Smolensk offensive operation, during which the left wing of the German armies of the Center group was defeated and the city of Smolensk was liberated. And during the Donbass operation (August 13 - September 22), the Donetsk basin was liberated.
From August 26 to September 30, the Chernihiv-Poltava offensive operation took place. It ended in complete success for the Red Army, since almost the entire Left-Bank Ukraine was liberated from the Germans.

Aftermath of the battle

The Kursk operation was a turning point in World War II, after which the Soviet Army continued the offensive and liberated Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and other republics from the Germans.
Losses during the Battle of Kursk were simply colossal. Most historians agree that more than a million soldiers died on the Kursk Bulge. Soviet historians say that the losses of the German army amounted to more than 400 thousand soldiers, the Germans speak of a figure of less than 200 thousand. In addition, a huge amount of equipment, aircraft and guns was lost.
After the failure of the operation "Citadel", the German command lost the ability to conduct attacks and switched to a dead defense. In 1944 and 45, local offensives were launched, but did not bring success.
The German command has repeatedly said that the defeat on the Kursk Bulge is a defeat on the Eastern Front and it will be impossible to regain the advantage.