The father of the Soviet atomic bomb. The atomic bomb in the ussr: creation

The creation of the Soviet atomic bomb (military part of the atomic project of the USSR) - basic research, development of technologies and their practical implementation in the USSR, aimed at creating weapons of mass destruction using nuclear energy. The events were largely stimulated by activities in this direction of scientific institutions and the military industry of other countries, primarily Nazi Germany and the United States [ ]. In 1945, on August 9, American planes dropped two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Almost half of the civilians died immediately during the bombings, others were seriously ill and continue to die until now.

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In 1930-1941, work was actively carried out in the nuclear field.
In this decade, fundamental radiochemical studies were carried out, without which a complete understanding of these problems, their development, and even more so implementation, is inconceivable.

Work in 1941-1943

Foreign Intelligence Information

Already in September 1941, intelligence began to arrive in the USSR about conducting secret intensive research work in the UK and the USA aimed at developing methods for using atomic energy for military purposes and creating atomic bombs of enormous destructive force. One of the most important documents received back in 1941 by Soviet intelligence is the report of the British MAUD Committee. From the materials of this report, obtained through foreign intelligence channels of the NKVD of the USSR from Donald Macklin, it followed that the creation of the atomic bomb is real, that it can probably be created before the end of the war and, therefore, can affect its course.
Reconnaissance information on work on the problem of atomic energy abroad, available in the USSR at the time of the decision to resume work on uranium, was obtained both through the NKVD intelligence channels and through the channels of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU) of the Red Army.
In May 1942, the GRU leadership informed the Academy of Sciences of the USSR that there were reports of work abroad on the problem of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and requested information on whether this problem currently had a real practical basis. The answer to this request in June 1942 was given by V. G. Khlopin, who noted that over the past year, the scientific literature has almost never published any works related to solving the problem of using atomic energy.
An official letter from the head of the NKVD L.P. Beria to I.V. Stalin with information on works on the use of atomic energy for military purposes abroad, proposals for organizing these works in the USSR and secret acquaintance with materials of the NKVD of prominent Soviet specialists, the options for which were prepared by the NKVD officers in late 1941 - early 1942, was sent to JV Stalin only in October 1942, after the adoption of the order of the GKO on the resumption of uranium work in the USSR.
Soviet intelligence had detailed information about the creation of the atomic bomb in the United States, coming from experts who understood the danger of a nuclear monopoly or sympathized with the USSR, in particular, Klaus Fuchs, Theodore Hall, Georges Koval and David Greenglas. However, a decisive value, as some believe, was addressed to Stalin in early 1943 by a letter from the Soviet physicist G. Flerov, who managed to explain the essence of the problem popularly. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the work of G. N. Flerov on the letter to Stalin was not completed and it was not sent.
The hunt for America’s uranium project data began on the initiative of the head of the NKVD scientific and technical intelligence department, Leonid Kvasnikov, back in 1942, but was fully deployed only after the arrival of the famous couple of Soviet intelligence officers: Vasily Zarubin and his wife Elizabeth. It was with them that the resident of the NKVD in San Francisco, Grigory Heifits, interacted, reporting that the most prominent American physicist Robert Oppenheimer and many of his colleagues left California for an unknown place where they would be engaged in the creation of some kind of superweapon.
Rechecking the data of Charon (such was the code name Heifits) was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Semyon Semenov (the pseudonym "Twain"), who had been working in the USA since 1938 and had gathered a large and active agent group there. It was Twain who confirmed the reality of the atomic bomb, named the code for the Manhattan project and the location of its main research center, the former Los Alamos juvenile delinquency colony in New Mexico. Semenov also told the names of some scientists who worked there, who had been invited to the USSR to participate in large Stalinist construction projects and who, having returned to the United States, had not lost ties with extreme left organizations.

Thus, Soviet agents were introduced into the scientific and design centers of America, where nuclear weapons were created. However, in the midst of the establishment of undercover operations, Lisa and Vasily Zarubin were urgently recalled to Moscow. They were at a loss, because not a single failure had occurred. It turned out that the Center received a denunciation of a resident employee Mironov, who accused the Zarubins of treason. And almost half a year the Moscow counterintelligence checked these charges. They were not confirmed, however, the Zarubins were no longer allowed to go abroad.
In the meantime, the work of the introduced agents has already brought the first results - reports began to arrive, and they had to be sent immediately to Moscow. This work was assigned to a group of special couriers. The most efficient and fearless were the spouses Cohen, Maurice and Lona. After Maurice was drafted into the American army, Lona began to independently deliver information materials from the state of New Mexico to New York. To do this, she went to the small town of Albuquerque, where, for the sake of visibility, she visited a tuberculosis dispensary. There she met with agents named Mlad and Ernst.
However, the NKVD still managed to extract several tons of low enriched uranium.

The primary tasks were the organization of industrial production of plutonium-239 and uranium-235. To solve the first problem, it was necessary to create an experimental and then industrial nuclear reactors, and to build a radiochemical and special metallurgical workshops. To solve the second problem, the construction of a plant for the separation of uranium isotopes by the diffusion method was launched.
The solution to these problems was possible as a result of the creation of industrial technologies, the organization of production and production of the necessary large quantities of pure metallic uranium, uranium oxide, uranium hexafluoride, other compounds of uranium, high-purity graphite and a number of other special materials, the creation of a complex of new industrial units and devices. The insufficient volume of uranium ore mining and production of uranium concentrates in the USSR (the first plant for the production of uranium concentrate - “Combine No. 6 of the USSR NKVD” in Tajikistan was founded in 1945) during this period was offset by trophy raw materials and products of uranium enterprises in Eastern Europe, with which the USSR concluded relevant agreements.
In 1945, the Government of the USSR adopted the following major decisions:
- on the creation on the basis of the Kirov Plant (Leningrad) two special experimental design bureaus designed to develop equipment that produces 235 uranium enriched by the gas diffusion method;
- about the start of construction in the Middle Urals (near the village of Verkh-Neyvinsky) of a diffusion plant for the production of enriched uranium-235;
- the organization of a laboratory for the creation of heavy water reactors on natural uranium;
- on choosing a site and starting construction in the South Urals of the country's first plutonium-239 production enterprise.
The structure of the enterprise in the South Urals should include:
- uranium-graphite reactor on natural (natural) uranium (plant "A");
- radiochemical production for the separation of plutonium-239 from natural (natural) uranium irradiated in the reactor (plant “B”);
- chemical and metallurgical production for the production of highly pure metallic plutonium (plant "B").
The participation of German experts in the nuclear project

In 1945, hundreds of German scientists related to the nuclear issue were brought from Germany to the USSR. Most of them (about 300 people) were brought to Sukhumi and secretly placed in the former estates of the Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich and the millionaire Smetsky (sanatoriums "Sinop" and "Agudzery"). In the USSR, equipment was exported from the German Institute of Chemistry and Metallurgy, the Kaiser Wilhelm Physical Institute, the Siemens Electrotechnical Laboratories, and the Physical Institute of the German Ministry of Posts. Three of the four German cyclotrons, powerful magnets, electron microscopes, oscilloscopes, high voltage transformers, and high-precision instruments were brought to the USSR. In November 1945, the Office of Special Institutions (9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR) was created as part of the NKVD of the USSR to supervise the work on the use of German specialists.
The Sinop Sanatorium was named Object A, which was led by Baron Manfred von Ardenne. The “Agudzers” became the “Object G” ”- it was headed by Gustav Hertz. At facilities “A” and “G” outstanding scientists worked - Nikolaus Riel, Max Volmer, who built the first heavy water production plant in the USSR, Peter Thyssen, designer of nickel filters for gas diffusion separation of uranium isotopes, Max Steenbeck and Gernot Zippe, who worked on centrifugal separation method and subsequently granted patents for gas centrifuges in the west. On the basis of objects "A" and "G" was later created (SIPT).
Some leading German experts for this work were awarded government awards of the USSR, including the Stalin Prize.
In the period 1954-1959, German specialists at different times moved to the GDR (Gernot Zippe to Austria).

Construction of a gas diffusion plant in Novouralsk

In 1946, the construction of a gas diffusion plant, known as Combine No. 813 (Plant D-1)) and intended for the production of highly enriched uranium, began at the production base of Plant No. 261 of the People’s Commissariat of the Aviation Industry in Novouralsk. The plant produced its first products in 1949.

Construction of a uranium hexafluoride production in Kirovo-Chepetsk

At the site of the chosen construction site, over time a whole complex of industrial enterprises, buildings and structures were erected, interconnected by a network of roads and railways, a heat and power supply system, industrial water supply and sewage. At different times, the secret city was called differently, but the most famous name is Chelyabinsk-40 or “Sorokovka”. Currently, the industrial complex, which was originally called Combine No. 817, is called the Mayak Production Association, and the city on the shore of Lake Irtyash, in which Mayak workers and their families live, is called Ozersk.
In November 1945, geological surveys began at the selected site, and the first builders began to arrive in early December.
The first construction manager (1946-1947) was J. D. Rappoport, and was subsequently replaced by Major General M. M. Tsarevsky. The chief engineer of construction was V. A. Saprykin, the first director of the future enterprise - P. T. Bystrov (from April 17, 1946), who was replaced by E. P. Slavsky (from July 10, 1947), and then B. G. Muzrukov (from December 1, 1947). I.V. Kurchatov was appointed the supervisor of the plant.

Construction of Arzamas-16

Products

Development of the design of atomic bombs

Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers No. 1286-525ss “On the plan for the deployment of KB-11 at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences” defined the first tasks of KB-11: the creation under the scientific supervision of Laboratory No. 2 (academician I.V. Kurchatov) of atomic bombs, conditionally named in the resolution of "jet engines C", in two versions: RDS-1 - an implosive type with plutonium and an atomic bomb RDS-2 cannon type with uranium-235.
Tactical and technical tasks for the design of the RDS-1 and RDS-2 should have been developed by July 1, 1946, and the design of their main components - by July 1, 1947. A fully manufactured bomb of the RDS-1 should have been submitted to state tests for an explosion when installed on the ground on January 1, 1948, in an aircraft version - on March 1, 1948, and the RDS-2 bomb - respectively on June 1, 1948 and by January 1, 1949. Work on the creation of structures was carried out in parallel with the organization of special laboratories in KB-11 and the deployment of the work of these laboratories . Such short deadlines and the organization of parallel operations became possible also due to the receipt in the USSR of some intelligence data on American atomic bombs.
Research laboratories and design departments of KB-11 began to expand their activities directly in

Why did the USSR postpone its project and create an analogue of US nuclear weapons

In the early 90s, all perestroika publications voted at once: they say, the Soviet atomic bomb project was stolen from the United States. Say, the “scoop” itself was weak-witted, could only steal and copy. And without America I would not have made a bomb or rockets. This thesis was indirectly confirmed by scout memoirists, while the still-secret Soviet atomic scientists simply could not refute. In light of the recent American test of the B61-12 atomic bomb, it is worth considering the sinister events of August 1945 and 1949.
70 years ago, a few days before the atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima, the newly made American president Truman decided to kill Stalin. And to make it more accommodating at the Potsdam Conference, where the heads of the three victorious powers from July 17 to August 2, 1945 had to coordinate the borders of Europe.
Potsdam's explosive atmosphere

The fight was serious. The United States and Great Britain have already developed a plan to divide Germany into several states, mainly agricultural. But unexpectedly, the Soviet leader on Victory Day declared that the USSR "was not going to either dismember or destroy Germany." And in Potsdam he broke all the arguments of the British Prime Minister Churchill, made territorial claims of Turkey, which infuriated the Western allies. But, most importantly, the United States and Great Britain needed to prevent the USSR from entering the war with Japan until August 9.

Let me remind you that the leaders of the "Big Three" agreed in Yalta in winter that the redistribution of borders would be considered valid only if Stalin met this deadline. The winner of the war with the Japanese received the laurels of the winner throughout the Second World War, since at the time of Hitler's defeat, about 60 countries had already declared war on Japan. But the samurai continued to live in vain in China, to attack the Asian possessions of the British, French, Dutch, Americans and were not going to capitulate.
Truman dreamed of becoming famous as the founder of the era of US dominance on the planet and was sure that he had control for everyone. On July 16, the day before the Potsdam Conference, the world's first atomic bomb, the Trinity, was tested in the desert region of New Mexico. On July 24, the President of the United States, as it were, incidentally, informed Stalin that the United States "created a new weapon of extraordinary destructive power." But Stalin did not blink an eye. Truman and Churchill decided that the Soviet leader did not even understand what it was about. However, in the evening, according to Marshal ZhukovaStalin laughed and told the Foreign Minister Molotov: “It will be necessary today to speak with Kurchatov about accelerating our work. ”
   But Truman ordered to drop a bomb over Japan as soon as possible, but only after he left Potsdam.

Monument to Igor KURCHATOV

For your information
   Igor Kurchatov was the coordinator of all work on the nuclear topic and an intermediary between scientists and the country's leadership. He was the only one who had access to intelligence materials. The creation of the atomic bomb was led by Julius Hariton. In 1992, in an interview, he uttered the phrase "... our first atomic bomb is a copy of the American." Taken out of context, it became the only argument in the hysteria of the press test, as if "the Russians stole the secret of the atomic bomb from the Americans." And the academician’s words that “the calculations of our scientists on one of the designs yielded results similar to the American ones” have sunk into oblivion.

Burning August in the East

* On August 6, 1945, in the USA, Enolu Gay, the Boeing B-29 strategic bomber with the Kid atomic bomb, was escorted to the combat mission with a prayer service. Pressing the button - and tens of thousands of Japanese instantly turned into ashes, soaring with the cloud over Hiroshima. Tens of thousands more died from the shock wave. Hundreds of thousands of wounded, burned, affected by radiation.

* On August 9, the Yankees incinerated Nagasaki. As a result of the bombing of two cities, nearly half a million people died. And from remorse, only one American went crazy - the commander of a weather reconnaissance aircraft Claude Ezerlywho visited Hiroshima after the bombing.
   * Recently, new evidence has been found of Japan’s attempt to create its own atomic bomb: 1944 archival documents describe uranium enrichment equipment. In parallel, the Japanese were developing two nuclear projects.
* The bloodless USSR declared war on Japan on time. Having managed to build roads, ferries and transfer more than 400 thousand people and a huge amount of equipment to the Far East. On the night of August 8–9, 1945, the troops, together with the Pacific Fleet, began military operations against Japanese troops on a front with a length of over 5,000 km. The Japan Surrender Act was signed on September 2, 1945 aboard the battleship Missouri. The Second World War ended with the victory of the Soviet Union and the Allies.

“Two bombs fell - and the war is over.”
Vannivar BUSH, US Atomic Program Member

Do you remember how it all started?

On August 29, 1939, Einstein, in his famous letter to Roosevelt, said that Nazi Germany had been conducting active research on the fission of uranium for a year, which could result in an atomic bomb. In November, Roosevelt thanked Einstein for the information and announced the start of the American project, called the “Manhattan Project” on September 17, 1943.

This snapshot revealed many espionage secrets. Robert OPPENHEIMER, wife of physicist Elsa and Albert EINSTEIN, Margarita KONENKOVA, adopted daughter of EINSTEIN Margot

In the USSR, work in the field of nuclear energy started in 1932. In declassified six years ago, documents dated March 5, 1938, scientists asked Molotov to provide the Leningrad Institute of Physics and Technology with two grams of radium and “to propose to the USSR People’s Commissar, which we are now in charge of, to create all the conditions for the completion of the cyclotron construction at LFTI by January 1, 1939.” And the request was granted. Only talented scientists not involved in the Soviet atomic project in the 1940s sounded the alarm that the West was closely engaged in atomic research, and we supposedly did nothing. But in connection with the Second World War, which was going near our borders, only peaceful atomic research was suspended. Only Stalin and only Stalin possessed complete information about secret projects labeled "32cc", the lion's share of which was not declassified. Beria.

He came

The pacifist Einstein became nervous, realizing what universal horror he provoked. If the United States creates an infernal bomb, then they will certainly use it. A 29-year-old professor also understood this. Klaus Fuchswho emigrated from Nazi Germany and at the end of 1940 began working in England on the project of the British atomic bomb Tube Elloys (Pipe Alloy). The communist guy was worried that the United States and England, united against Hitler, jointly developed such a formidable weapon, but kept it secret from the Soviet Union. The only, as he believed, the guarantor that the atom should serve a peaceful life on the planet.
When the Nazis approached Moscow, Fuchs himself came to our embassy in the UK and said that a plant was being built in Wales to test the theoretical methods for the separation of uranium isotopes, and he was ready to transfer information free of charge. But how?
Scout feat

A 27-year-old machine tool engineer came to a meeting with Fuchs in a bar Vladimir Barkovskyrecently graduated from the SHON - Special Purpose School was preparing communications for foreign intelligence officers. Things went swimmingly. Barkovsky held a glass of beer and a magazine with photos of famous athletes.
   - Joe Louis is the best boxer in the world! - as if in ecstasy he cried out and began to show everyone his photo.
   “No, Jackie Brown is the best of all time,” said Klaus. Arguing loudly, the young people went outside. Barkovsky’s operational nickname Dan was the first meeting with an agent in his life. We agreed to call the atomic bomb "little thing." Fuchs avalanche gave out information, until he realized that the contactee does not understand anything from his scientific speech.
   - What are you going to transmit ?! Fuchs asked. - I will only work with an equal. And you read at least the American textbook on atomic physics.

The scout slept for two or three hours a day for two months, mastered the topic, studied the latest publications, but could not freely use the terms in the conversation - there were no transcriptions in the textbooks. And Klaus sent him again. And Moscow was in a hurry. Dan compiled a “conversational” profile encyclopedia and, during a week of training with a translator, spoke 16 hours a day. It became a small matter - to convince Fuchs once again to meet with him. Both were mortally risked. Beria suspected that they were driving disa from London to the USSR through Dan, so that during the “war of engines” we already lacked, to distract the country into creating a counterbalance to new weapons, but if it exists, you can’t hesitate. And Fuchs passed a tough test in the Manhattan Project Robert Oppenheimer. And in 1943, he suddenly disappeared for a long time.

CIA vs USSR

* By the summer of 1948, the Chariotir plan appeared in the United States. For 30 days, the Yankees wanted to drop 133 atomic bombs in 70 Soviet cities. Of these, eight - to Moscow and seven to Leningrad. And then in two years another 200 atomic and 250 thousand conventional bombs.
   * On December 19, 1949, the committee of chiefs of staff approved the Dropshot plan and then the Trojan plan for a preventive war against the USSR and our allies. As of January 1, 1950, the United States had 840 strategic bombers in service and 1350 in reserve, over 320 atomic bombs. Of these, 300 were planned to be dropped on 100 Soviet cities. Estimated: 6-7 million Soviet citizens will be killed in 6 thousand sorties.

Why they didn’t bomb us

* On August 29, 1949, the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1 was tested at the Semipalatinsk test site.
   * September 25, 1949 TASS reported: “The Soviet Union took possession of the secret of atomic weapons back in 1947. ... The Soviet government, despite having atomic weapons, stands and intends to stand in the future in its old position of the unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons. " For the United States, it was like a bolt from the blue. Their intelligence blinked.
   The Committee of Chiefs of Staff finished off the power. A check in the headquarters game gave an unexpected result: taking into account the defense capabilities of the USSR, the maximum probability of achieving goals was only 70 percent, and the smallest losses of bombers were 53 percent. The group that bombed Nuremberg in March 1944 rebelled, losing only 11.82 percent of the aircraft. She was supported by all the flight personnel at the bases of England. And what will happen if more than half of the pilots die?

Keep in mind
   Recently it became known that Fuchs “added” to the American project through her lover Einstein the elegant and incredibly attractive scout Margarita Konenkova, the wife of a Soviet sculptor, who became the last love of a brilliant physicist.
   Klaus and Vladimir met in March 1944 already overseas. This time, Dan passed the Fuchs exam, set out and handed over to the Center almost 10 thousand pages of their conversations and personally made the scientist duplicate keys for opening the safes, since Moscow requested copies of a number of genuine documents.

Whose RDS-1 is she?

Only 12 people knew about the secret decree “On the organization of work on uranium” in September 1942. It ordered the study of various options for creating an atomic bomb. Scientists argued whether plutonium is a fissile element. The information received from Fuchs helped to sift deadlocks and concentrate on original projects.

The uranium plant in the mountains of Tajikistan was already operating in 1945. In August 1946, in the Ural Kyshtym, they began to dig a pit under a nuclear reactor. And on June 8, 1948, a nuclear reactor was first launched to produce weapons-grade plutonium - the "stuffing" for the bomb. He produced 100 g per day. And then the country's leadership decided to create a charge according to the American scheme. They say that there is no time at the risk of testing a completely new design; the security of the country is at stake.
   - We can’t say that our first atomic charge was a copy of the American one. And in general, what does it mean to “steal a bomb”? - says the famous designer of nuclear weapons Arkady Brish. - Thanks to intelligence, we only knew its scheme, and not the design drawings and calculations. The monument at the test site in Alamogordo - this is the very scheme. So what? Non-nuclear states seized roulettes, measured the sculpture and rushed to make bombs? The technologies for creating a charge under this scheme are completely domestic. They dictated a number of design differences. The Americans shot a charge in the barrel, and due to its compression, a chain reaction began. Our scientists used the compression of the ball instead of the barrel. This is a more complex design, but it gave better efficiency.

Monument to the first American bomb in Alamogordo erected in full size according to a scheme already known to our intelligence

And already in the second test in 1951 of the “homegrown” RDS-2 bomb, Soviet scientists proved that they had wiped their nose off the Americans. The charge was twice as powerful and at the same time twice as light as created by the American scheme.
Count it up!
   In 1945, the book "Nuclear Energy for Military Purposes" was published in the United States. The Americans were sure that it would not be able to help us create an atomic bomb even in 15 years, since the entire cycle of its creation - from theory to industrial introduction - is too complicated.

The creation of the Soviet nuclear bomb in terms of the complexity of scientific, technical and engineering problems is a significant, truly unique event, which had an impact on the balance of political forces in the world after the Second World War. The solution to this problem in our country, which has not yet recovered from the terrible destruction and turmoil of the four war years, became possible as a result of the heroic efforts of scientists, organizers of production, engineers, workers and the whole people. The implementation of the Soviet atomic project required a real scientific, technological and industrial revolution, which led to the emergence of the domestic nuclear industry. This labor feat has paid off. Having mastered the secrets of nuclear weapons production, our Homeland for many years ensured the military-defense parity of the two leading states of the world - the USSR and the USA. The nuclear shield, the first link of which was the legendary RDS-1 product, still protects Russia.
I. Kurchatov was appointed Head of the Atomic Project. Since the end of 1942, he began to gather the scientists and specialists necessary to solve the problem. Initially, the general management of the atomic problem was carried out by V. Molotov. But on August 20, 1945 (a few days after the atomic bombing of Japanese cities), the State Defense Committee decided to create a Special Committee, headed by L. Beria. It was he who began to lead the Soviet atomic project.
The first domestic atomic bomb was officially designated RDS-1. It is deciphered in different ways: “Russia does it herself,” “Motherland gives to Stalin,” etc. But in the official decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of June 21, 1946, the RDS received the wording “Jet Engine C”.
The tactical and technical task (TTZ) indicated that the atomic bomb is developed in two versions: using “heavy fuel” (plutonium) and using “light fuel” (uranium-235). The writing of TK at RDS-1 and the subsequent development of the first Soviet atomic bomb, RDS-1, was carried out taking into account the available materials according to the plutonium bomb scheme of the United States, tested in 1945. These materials were provided by Soviet foreign intelligence. An important source of information was K. Fuchs - a German physicist, a participant in work on nuclear programs in the United States and England.
Reconnaissance materials on the US plutonium bomb made it possible to avoid a number of mistakes in the creation of RDS-1, significantly reduce its development time, and reduce costs. Moreover, from the very beginning it was clear that many technical solutions of the American prototype are not the best. Even at the initial stages, Soviet specialists could offer the best solutions to both the charge as a whole and its individual units. But the unconditional demand of the country's leadership was to guarantee, with the least risk, an active bomb by its first test.
The nuclear bomb was to be made in the form of an aviation bomb weighing no more than 5 tons, with a diameter of not more than 1.5 meters and a length of not more than 5 meters. These restrictions were due to the fact that the bomb was developed in relation to the TU-4 aircraft, the bomb bay of which allowed the placement of the “product” with a diameter of not more than 1.5 meters.
As the work progressed, the need for a special research organization for the design and development of the “product” itself became apparent. A number of studies carried out by Laboratory N2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences demanded that they be deployed in a "remote and isolated location." This meant: it was necessary to create a special research and production center for the development of the atomic bomb.

The creation of KB-11

Since the end of 1945, there has been a search for a place to place a top-secret facility. Various options were considered. At the end of April 1946, Y. Khariton and P. Zernov examined Sarov, where the monastery used to be, and now the plant N 550 of the People’s Commissariat of Ammunition was located. As a result, the choice stopped at this place, which was remote from large cities and at the same time had an initial production infrastructure.
The scientific and production activities of KB-11 were subject to strict secrecy. Her character and purpose were a state secret of paramount importance. From the first days, security issues were in the spotlight.
April 9, 1946 a closed resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the creation of the Design Bureau (KB-11) at Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences. P. Zernov was appointed the head of KB-11, and Yu. Khariton was the chief designer.

The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946 determined the tight deadlines for the creation of the facility: the first phase was to go into operation on October 1, 1946, the second on May 1, 1947. The construction of KB-11 (the “facility”) was assigned to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. "Object" was to occupy up to 100 square meters. kilometers of forests in the zone of the Mordovian reserve and up to 10 square meters. kilometers in the Gorky region.
Construction was carried out without projects and preliminary estimates, the cost of work was taken at actual costs. A team of builders was formed with the involvement of a "special contingent" - that is how prisoners were designated in official documents. The government created special conditions for ensuring construction. Nevertheless, construction was difficult, the first production buildings were ready only at the beginning of 1947. Some of the laboratories are located in the monastery buildings.

The volume of construction work was great. The reconstruction of plant N 550 was planned for the construction of a pilot plant on the existing areas. The power station needed updating. It was necessary to build a foundry and press workshop for working with explosives, as well as a number of buildings for experimental laboratories, test towers, casemates, warehouses. For blasting, it was necessary to clear and equip large areas in the forest.
At the initial stage, there were no special rooms for research laboratories - scientists had to occupy twenty rooms in the main design building. Designers, as well as administrative services of KB-11, had to stay in the reconstructed premises of the former monastery. The need to create conditions for arriving specialists and workers forced us to pay more and more attention to the residential village, which gradually acquired the features of a small city. Along with the construction of housing, a medical town was erected, a library, a cinema club, a stadium, a park and a theater were built.

On February 17, 1947, by a resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR signed by Stalin, KB-11 was classified as a special regime enterprise with the transformation of its territory into a closed regime zone. Sarov was removed from the administrative subordination of the Mordovian ASSR and excluded from all accounting materials. In the summer of 1947, the perimeter of the zone was taken under military guard.

Works in KB-11

The mobilization of specialists in the nuclear center was carried out regardless of their departmental affiliation. The leaders of KB-11 searched for young and promising scientists, engineers, and workers in literally all the institutions and organizations of the country. All candidates for work in KB-11 underwent a special audit in the state security services.
The creation of atomic weapons was the result of the work of a large team. But it did not consist of faceless “staff units”, but of bright personalities, many of whom left a noticeable mark in the history of Russian and world science. Significant potential was concentrated here, both scientific, design, and performing, working.

In 1947, 36 researchers arrived at KB-11. They were seconded from various institutes, mainly from the USSR Academy of Sciences: Institute of Chemical Physics, Laboratory N2, NII-6, and the Institute of Mechanical Engineering. In 1947, 86 engineers and technicians worked in KB-11.
Taking into account the problems that were to be solved in KB-11, the formation of its main structural divisions was planned. The first research laboratories began to work in the spring of 1947 in the following areas:
laboratory N1 (supervisor - M. Ya. Vasiliev) - development of charge structural elements from explosives providing a spherically converging detonation wave;
laboratory N2 (A.F. Belyaev) - explosive detonation studies;
laboratory N3 (V. A. Zuckerman) - X-ray studies of explosive processes;
laboratory N4 (L.V. Altshuler) - determination of equations of state;
laboratory N5 (K. I. Shchelkin) - full-scale tests;
laboratory N6 (E.K. Zavoisky) - measurements of compression of the central part;
laboratory N7 (A. Ya. Apin) - development of a neutron fuse;
laboratory N8 (N.V. Ageev) - study of the properties and characteristics of plutonium and uranium for use in bomb construction.
The beginning of the full-scale work of the first domestic atomic charge can be attributed to July 1946. During this period, in accordance with the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 21, 1946, Yu. B. Khariton prepared the Tactical and Technical Assignment for the Atomic Bomb.

The TTZ indicated that the atomic bomb is being developed in two versions. In the first of them plutonium (RDS-1) should be the working substance, in the second - uranium-235 (RDS-2). In a plutonium bomb, a transition through a critical state should be achieved by symmetric compression of plutonium, which has the shape of a ball, with an ordinary explosive (implosive version). In the second embodiment, the transition through the critical state is provided by combining the masses of uranium-235 with the help of an explosive substance (the “gun variant”).
At the beginning of 1947, the formation of design divisions began. Initially, all design work was concentrated in a single research and development sector (NKS) KB-11, which was headed by V. A. Turbiner.
The intensity of work in KB-11 from the very beginning was very high and constantly increasing, since the initial plans, from the very beginning very extensive, increased every day in terms of volume and depth of study.
Explosive experiments with large explosive charges were launched in the spring of 1947 at KB-11 pilot sites that were still under construction. The largest amount of research was to be performed in the gas-dynamic sector. In connection with this, a large number of specialists were sent there in 1947: K. I. Schelkin, L. V. Altshuler, V. K. Bobolev, S. N. Matveev, V. M. Nekrutkin, P. I. Roy, N. D. Kazachenko, V. I. Zhuchikhin, A. T. Zavgorodniy, K. K. Krupnikov, B. N. Ledenev, V. M. Malygin, V. M. Bezotosny, D. M. Tarasov, K. I. Panevkin, B.A. Terletskaya and others.
Experimental studies of charge gas dynamics were carried out under the direction of K. I. Shchelkin, and theoretical questions were developed by a group in Moscow led by Ya. B. Zeldovich. The work was carried out in close collaboration with designers and technologists.

The development of "NZ" (neutron fuse) engaged A.Ya. Apin, V.A. Alexandrovich and constructor A.I. Abramov. To achieve the desired result, it was necessary to master a new technology for the use of polonium, which has a sufficiently high radioactivity. In this case, it was necessary to develop a complex system for protecting materials in contact with polonium from its alpha radiation.
In KB-11, research and design work on the most precise charge-capsule-detonator element was carried out for a long time. This important direction was led by A.Ya. Apin, I.P. Sukhov, M.I. Puzyrev, I.P. Kolesov and others. The development of research required the territorial approximation of theoretical physicists to the KB-11 research, development and production base. Since March 1948, a theoretical department began to form in KB-11 under the leadership of Ya.B. Zeldovich.
In view of the great urgency and high complexity of the work, new laboratories and production sites began to be created in KB-11, and the best specialists of the Soviet Union seconded to them mastered new high standards and harsh production conditions.

The plans, laid out in 1946, could not take into account the many difficulties that were open to the participants of the nuclear project as they moved forward. Decree SM N 234-98 ss / op of 02/08/1948. The RDS-1 charge production time was set to a later date - by the time the charge details were ready from plutonium at Combine N 817.
With respect to the RDS-2 option, it became clear by this time that it was not practical to bring it to the test stage because of the relatively low efficiency of this option compared to the cost of nuclear materials. Work on RDS-2 was discontinued in mid-1948.

By the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of June 10, 1948, the following were appointed: the first deputy chief designer of the "facility" - Schelkin Kirill Ivanovich; deputy chief designer of the facility - Alferov Vladimir Ivanovich, Dukhov Nikolai Leonidovich.
In February 1948, 11 scientific laboratories worked intensively in KB-11, including theorists led by Ya.B. Zeldovich, who moved to the facility from Moscow. His group included D. D. Frank-Kamenetsky, N. D. Dmitriev, V. Yu. Gavrilov. The experimenters did not lag behind theorists. The most important work was carried out in the departments of KB-11, which were responsible for undermining the nuclear charge. Its design was clear, the mechanism of detonation - too. In theory. In practice, it was required to carry out checks again and again, to carry out complex experiments.
The production workers were also very active - those who were to translate the ideas of scientists and designers into reality. In July 1947, A. K Bessarabenko was appointed the head of the plant, N. A. Petrov became the chief engineer, P. D. Panasyuk, V. D. Shcheglov, A. I. Novitsky, G. A. Savosin, A.Ya. Ignatiev, V.S. Lyubertsev.

In 1947, a second pilot plant appeared in the structure of KB-11 - for the production of parts from explosives, the assembly of experimental units of the product, and the solution of many other important tasks. The results of calculations and design studies quickly embodied in specific details, nodes, blocks. By the highest standards, responsible work was performed by two plants at KB-11. Plant N 1 manufactured many parts and components of RDS-1 and then assembled them. Plant No. 2 (A. Ya. Malsky became its director) was engaged in the practical solution of various problems associated with the receipt and processing of parts from explosives. The charge assembly from the explosives was carried out in a workshop led by M. A. Kvasov.

Each stage passed posed new challenges for researchers, designers, engineers, and workers. People worked 14-16 hours a day, completely surrendering to the cause. On August 5, 1949, a plutonium charge manufactured at Combine No. 817 was received by a commission led by Khariton and then sent by letter train to KB-11. Here, on the night of August 10 to August 11, a control assembly of the nuclear charge was carried out. She showed: RDS-1 meets the technical requirements, the product is suitable for testing at the test site.

The question of the creators of the first Soviet nuclear bomb is quite controversial and requires a more detailed study, and who actually father of the Soviet atomic bomb, There are several deep-rooted opinions. Most physicists and historians believe that Igor Kurchatov made the main contribution to the creation of Soviet nuclear weapons. However, some are of the opinion that without Julius Borisovich Khariton, the founder of Arzamas-16 and the creator of the industrial basis for obtaining enriched fissile isotopes, the first test of this type of weapon in the Soviet Union would drag on for several more years.
Consider the historical sequence of research and development to create a practical model of the atomic bomb, leaving aside theoretical studies of fissile materials and the conditions for the emergence of a chain reaction, without which a nuclear explosion is impossible.
For the first time, a series of applications for copyright certificates for the invention (patents) of the atomic bomb was filed in 1940 by F. Lange, V. Spinel and V. Maslov, employees of the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology. The authors considered issues and proposed solutions for the enrichment of uranium and its use as an explosive. The proposed bomb had a classic scheme of detonation (cannon type), which later, with some modifications, was used to initialize a nuclear explosion in American nuclear bombs based on uranium.
The outbreak of World War II slowed down theoretical and experimental research in the field of nuclear physics, and the largest centers (Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology and the Radium Institute - Leningrad) ceased their activities and were partially evacuated.
Beginning in September 1941, the intelligence agencies of the NKVD and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army began to receive an increasing amount of information about the special interest shown in the military circles of Great Britain to the creation of explosives based on fissile isotopes. In May 1942, the Main Intelligence Agency, summarizing the materials received, reported to the State Defense Committee (GKO) on the military designation of the ongoing nuclear research.
Around the same time, lieutenant technician Georgy Nikolayevich Flerov, who in 1940 was one of the discoverers of the spontaneous fission of uranium nuclei, wrote a letter to I.V. To Stalin. In his message, the future academician, one of the creators of Soviet nuclear weapons, draws attention to the fact that publications on the work related to the fission of the atomic nucleus have disappeared from the scientific press of Germany, Great Britain and the United States. According to the scientist, this may indicate a reorientation of "pure" science in the practical military field.
In October - November 1942, the foreign intelligence of the NKVD was reported by L.P. Beria, all available information on work in the field of nuclear research, obtained by illegal intelligence agents in England and the United States, on the basis of which the People's Commissar writes a memorandum to the head of state.
At the end of September 1942 I.V. Stalin signed the decree of the State Defense Committee on the resumption and intensification of "uranium work," and in February 1943, after studying the materials submitted by L.P. Beria, a decision is made to transfer all research on the creation of nuclear weapons (atomic bombs) into a "practical channel." The general management and coordination of all types of work was entrusted to the Deputy Chairman of GKO V.M. Molotov, the scientific management of the project was entrusted to I.V. Kurchatov. The management of work on the search for deposits and mining of uranium ore was entrusted to A.P. Zavenyagin, MG was responsible for the creation of enterprises for the enrichment of uranium and the production of heavy water Pervukhin, and to the People’s Commissar of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy P.F. Lomako "trusted" by 1944 to accumulate 0.5 tons of metallic (enriched to the necessary standards) uranium.
At this point, the first stage (the deadlines for which were disrupted), which envisaged the creation of an atomic bomb in the USSR, was completed.
After the United States dropped atomic bombs on Japanese cities, the Soviet leadership personally saw the backlog of scientific research and practical work on creating nuclear weapons from its competitors. To intensify and create an atomic bomb on August 20, 1945, a special decree of the State Defense Committee on the creation of Special Committee No. 1 was issued, whose functions included the organization and coordination of all types of work to create a nuclear bomb. L.P. is appointed the head of this extraordinary body with unlimited powers. Beria, the scientific leadership is entrusted to I.V. Kurchatov. Directly managing all research, design and manufacturing enterprises was to be carried out by the People's Commissar of Arms B.L. Vannikov.
Due to the fact that scientific, theoretical and experimental studies were completed, intelligence data on the organization of industrial production of uranium and plutonium were obtained, intelligence agents obtained schemes of American atomic bombs, the most difficult was the transfer of all types of work to an industrial basis. To create enterprises for the production of plutonium, the city of Chelyabinsk - 40 was built from scratch (supervisor IV Kurchatov). In the village of Sarov (future Arzamas - 16), a plant was built for the assembly and production on an industrial scale of the atomic bombs themselves (supervisor - chief designer Yu.B. Khariton).
Thanks to the optimization of all types of work and tight control over them by L.P. Beria, which, however, did not impede the creative development of the ideas laid down in the projects, in July 1946 technical specifications were developed for the creation of the first two Soviet atomic bombs:
- "RDS - 1" - a bomb with a plutonium charge, the detonation of which was carried out on an implosive type;
- "RDS - 2" - a bomb with a cannon undermining a uranium charge.
I.V. was appointed as the supervisor of the work on the creation of both types of nuclear weapons. Kurchatov.
Paternity rights
The tests of the first RDS-1 atomic bomb created in the USSR (the abbreviation in various sources stands for “jet engine C” or “Russia does it yourself”) took place in late August 1949 in Semipalatinsk under the direct supervision of Yu.B. Hariton. The nuclear charge power was 22 kilotons. However, attributing paternity to this product to any of the Russian (Soviet) citizens, from the point of view of modern copyright, is impossible. Earlier, when developing the first practical model suitable for military use, the Government of the USSR and the leadership of Special Project No. 1 decided to copy as much as possible the domestic implosive bomb with plutonium charge from the American prototype Fat Man dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki. Thus, the “paternity” of the first nuclear bomb of the USSR most likely belongs to General Leslie Groves, the military leader of the Manhattan project and Robert Oppenheimer, known throughout the world as the “father of the atomic bomb” and who carried out the scientific management of the project Manhattan The main difference between the Soviet model and the American one is the use of domestic electronics in the system of detonation and changing the aerodynamic shape of the bomb body.
The first "purely" Soviet atomic bomb can be considered the product "RDS - 2". Despite the fact that the original plan was to copy the American uranium prototype “Kid”, the Soviet uranium atomic bomb “RDS-2” was created in an implosive version, which had no analogues at that time. L.P. participated in its creation. Beria - general project management, I.V. Kurchatov - supervisor of all types of work and Yu.B. Khariton is a scientific supervisor and chief designer responsible for the manufacture of a practical sample of the bomb and its testing.
Speaking about who is the father of the first Soviet atomic bomb, one should not lose sight of the fact that both RDS-1 and RDS-2 were blown up at the firing range. The first atomic bomb dropped from the Tu-4 bomber was the RDS-3 product. Its design was similar to the RDS - 2 implosive bomb, but had a combined uranium-plutonium charge, due to which it was possible to increase its power, with the same dimensions, up to 40 kilotons. Therefore, in many publications, Academician Igor Kurchatov is considered the “scientific” father of the first atomic bomb actually dropped from an airplane, since his colleague in the science department, Julius Khariton, was categorically against any changes. The fact that in the entire history of the USSR L.P. Beria and I.V. Kurchatov were the only ones who in 1949 were awarded the title of Honorary Citizen of the USSR - "... for the implementation of the Soviet atomic project, the creation of the atomic bomb."

Under what conditions and by what efforts did the country that survived the worst war of the twentieth century create its atomic shield
Almost seven decades ago, on October 29, 1949, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued four top-secret decrees on awarding 845 people with the titles of Heroes of Socialist Labor, the Orders of Lenin, the Red Banner of Labor and the Badge of Honor. None of them said in relation to any of the recipients what it was noted for: the standard wording “for exceptional services to the state in performing a special task” appeared everywhere. Even for the Soviet Union, accustomed to secrecy, this was a rare occurrence. Meanwhile, the awarded themselves knew perfectly well, of course, which particular “exceptional merits” were meant. All 845 people were more or less directly connected with the creation of the first nuclear bomb of the USSR.
It was not strange for the awarded that both the project itself and its success were wrapped in a dense curtain of secrecy. After all, they all knew well that, to a large extent, they owed their success to the courage and professionalism of the Soviet intelligence officers, who for eight years supplied scientists and engineers with top-secret information from abroad. And the appreciation that the creators of the Soviet atomic bomb deserved was not exaggerated. As one of the creators of the bomb, Academician Yuli Khariton recalled, at the ceremony, Stalin suddenly said: “If we were one or one and a half years late, we probably would have tried this charge on ourselves.” And this is not an exaggeration ...

Atomic bomb sample ... 1940
The idea of \u200b\u200bcreating a bomb that uses the energy of a nuclear chain reaction in the Soviet Union came almost simultaneously with Germany and the United States. The first officially considered project of this type of weapon was presented in 1940 by a group of scientists from the Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology under the leadership of Friedrich Lange. It was in this project that, for the first time in the USSR, a scheme was proposed that later became a classic for all nuclear munitions to detonate conventional explosives, due to which the supercritical was almost instantly composed of two subcritical uranium masses.
The project received negative reviews and was not considered further. But the work underlying it continued, and not only in Kharkov. At least four major institutes in the pre-war USSR were engaged in atomic issues - in Leningrad, Kharkov and Moscow, and Vyacheslav Molotov, chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, oversaw the work. Shortly after the presentation of the Lange project, in January 1941, the Soviet government made the logical decision to classify Russian nuclear research. It was clear that they really could lead to the creation of a new type of powerful one, and such information should not be scattered, all the more so since it was at that time that the first intelligence information on the American nuclear project was received - and in Moscow they did not want to risk it.
The natural course of events interrupted the start of World War II. But, despite the fact that all Soviet industry and science were quickly transferred to the military track and began to provide the army with the most pressing developments and inventions, forces and means were also found to continue the atomic project. Although not immediately. The resumption of research should be counted from the decree of the State Defense Committee of February 11, 1943, which stipulated the beginning of practical work on the creation of the atomic bomb.

Project "Enormoz"
By this time, Soviet foreign intelligence was already working hard to get information on the Enormoz project - as the American nuclear project was called in operational documents. The first substantial data indicating that the West is seriously engaged in the creation of uranium weapons came from the London residency in September 1941. And at the end of the same year, from the same source, a message comes that America and Great Britain have agreed to coordinate the efforts of their scientists in the field of atomic energy research. In a war, this could only be interpreted in one way: the Allies are working on the creation of atomic weapons. And in February 1942, intelligence received documentary evidence that Germany was actively doing the same.
As the efforts of Soviet scientists, working on their own plans, progressed, so did intelligence work to obtain information about American and English nuclear projects. In December 1942, it became completely clear that the United States was clearly ahead of Britain in this area, and the main efforts were focused on data mining from across the ocean. In fact, every step of the participants in the Manhattan Project, as the work on creating the atomic bomb in the USA was called, was tightly controlled by Soviet intelligence. It is enough to say that the most detailed information about the construction of the first real atomic bomb in Moscow was received less than two weeks after it was collected in America.
That is why the boastful message of the new US President Harry Truman, who decided to dazzle Stalin at the Potsdam Conference with a statement that America has new weapons of unprecedented destructive power, did not cause the reaction that the American was counting on. The Soviet leader calmly listened to him, nodded - and did not answer. The foreigners were sure that Stalin simply did not understand anything. In reality, the leader of the USSR sensibly appreciated Truman's words and on the same day in the evening demanded that Soviet specialists speed up the work on creating their own atomic bomb. But it was already impossible to overtake America. In less than a month, the first atomic mushroom grew over Hiroshima, three days later - over Nagasaki. And the shadow of a new atomic war hung over the Soviet Union, not with anyone, but with the former allies.

Time forward!
Now, seventy years later, it no longer surprises anyone that the Soviet Union received the much-needed time reserve for creating its own super-bomb, despite sharply worsened relations with ex-partners in the anti-Hitler coalition. Indeed, already on March 5, 1946, six months after the first atomic bombings, the famous Fulton speech of Winston Churchill was delivered, which marked the beginning of the Cold War. But in the hot, as conceived by Washington and its allies, it was supposed to develop later - at the end of 1949. After all, as was calculated overseas, the USSR was not supposed to get its own atomic weapons before the mid-1950s, which means there was nowhere to hurry.
Tests of the atomic bomb. Photo: U.S. Air Force / AR

From the height of today, it seems surprising that the date of the start of a new world war — or rather, one of the dates of one of the main plans, Fleetwood — and the date of the test of the first Soviet nuclear bomb: 1949, are surprising. But in reality, everything is natural. The foreign policy situation was heating up quickly, the former allies spoke sharper and sharper with each other. And in 1948, it became quite clear that Moscow and Washington, apparently, would not be able to agree among themselves. Hence, we need to count the time before the start of a new war: a year is the deadline for which countries that have recently emerged from a colossal war can fully prepare for a new one, moreover, with a state that has borne the brunt of Victory on its shoulders. Even the atomic monopoly did not allow the United States to shorten the time for preparing for war.

Foreign “accents” of the Soviet atomic bomb
All of this was well understood by us. Since 1945, all work related to the atomic project has sharply intensified. During the first two post-war years of the USSR, tormented by the war, having lost a considerable part of its industrial potential, it was possible to create a colossal nuclear industry from scratch. Future nuclear centers have emerged, such as Chelyabinsk-40, Arzamas-16, Obninsk, and large scientific institutes and production facilities have developed.
Not so long ago, a common point of view on the Soviet atomic project was this: they say, if not for intelligence, the scientists of the USSR could not have created any atomic bomb. In reality, however, everything was far from as clear as the revisionists of Russian history tried to show. In fact, the data obtained by the Soviet intelligence on the American nuclear project allowed our scientists to avoid many mistakes that their American colleagues who had advanced ahead inevitably had to make (recall, the war did not seriously interfere: the enemy did not invade US territory, and the country did not lose during several months half the industry). In addition, intelligence data undoubtedly helped Soviet specialists evaluate the most advantageous designs and technical solutions that made it possible to assemble their own, more advanced atomic bomb.
And if we talk about the degree of foreign influence on the Soviet atomic project, then, rather, we need to recall the hundreds of German nuclear specialists who worked at two secret facilities near Sukhumi - in the prototype of the future Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology. So they really helped a lot to advance the work on the “product” - the first atomic bomb of the USSR, so much so that many of them were awarded Soviet orders with the same secret decrees of October 29, 1949. Five years later, most of these specialists left for Germany, having settled for the most part in the GDR (although there were some who went to the West).
Objectively speaking, the first Soviet atomic bomb had, so to speak, more than one “emphasis”. After all, she was born as a result of colossal cooperation of the efforts of many people - both those who carried out the project of their own free will, and those who were involved in the work as prisoners of war or interned specialists. But the country, which by all means needed to get a weapon as fast as possible, equalizing its chances with ex-allies, who rapidly turned into mortal enemies, was not up to sentiment.

Russia does it herself!
In the documents concerning the creation of the first nuclear bomb of the USSR, the term “product”, which later became popular, was not yet met. More often, it was officially called the “special jet engine,” or RDS for short. Although, of course, there was nothing reactive in the work on this design: the whole thing was only in the strictest requirements of secrecy.
With the light hand of Academician Yuli Khariton, the unofficial transcript “Russia makes itself” was quickly assigned to the acronym RDS. There was a considerable amount of irony in this, since everyone knew how much the intelligence obtained by the intelligence had given our nuclear scientists, but also a large share of the truth. After all, if the design of the first Soviet nuclear bomb was very similar to the American one (simply because the most optimal one was chosen, and the laws of physics and mathematics do not have national characteristics), then, say, the ballistic housing and electronic filling of the first bomb were purely domestic development.
When work on the Soviet atomic project advanced far enough, the Soviet leadership formulated tactical and technical requirements for the first atomic bombs. It was decided to simultaneously refine two types: an implosive-type plutonium bomb and a cannon-like uranium bomb similar to that used by the Americans. The first received the RDS-1 index, the second, respectively, RDS-2.
According to the plan, RDS-1 was to be submitted for state tests by an explosion in January 1948. But these terms could not be sustained: there were problems with the manufacture and processing of the required amount of weapons-grade plutonium for its equipment. It was received only a year and a half later, in August 1949, and immediately went to Arzamas-16, where the almost ready first Soviet atomic bomb was waiting. Within a few days, the specialists of the future VNIIEF completed the assembly of the “product”, and it went to the Semipalatinsk test site.

The first rivet of Russia's nuclear shield
The first nuclear bomb of the USSR was detonated at seven in the morning on August 29, 1949. Almost a month passed before the overseas shrank from the shock caused by intelligence about the successful testing of our own "big club" in our country. Only on September 23, Harry Truman, not so long ago boastfully reporting to Stalin about America’s success in creating atomic weapons, made a statement that the USSR also now has the same type of weapons.

Presentation of a multimedia installation in honor of the 65th anniversary of the creation of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Photo: Artyom Geodakyan / TASS

Oddly enough, Moscow was in no hurry to confirm the statements of the Americans. On the contrary, TASS actually refuted the American statement, arguing that the whole thing was in the colossal scope of construction in the USSR, which also used blasting using the latest technology. True, at the end of the Tassov statement contained more than a transparent allusion to the possession of their own nuclear weapons. The agency reminded everyone who was interested that on November 6, 1947, USSR Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov announced that no secret of the atomic bomb had existed for a long time.
And that was twice true. By 1947, no information about atomic weapons was a secret for the USSR, and by the end of the summer of 1949 it was no secret to anyone that the Soviet Union had restored strategic parity with its main rival, the United States. Parity, which has been maintained for six decades. Parity, which is supported by the nuclear shield of Russia and which began on the eve of World War II.

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