Kursk arc battle map. Battle of Kursk - Ural State Military History Museum
Battle of Kursk became one of the most important stages on the road to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany. In terms of scope, tension and results, it is among the largest battles of the Second World War. The battle lasted less than two months. During this time, in a relatively small area, a fierce clash of enormous masses of troops took place involving the most modern military equipment at that time. More than 4 million people, over 69 thousand guns and mortars, more than 13 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, and up to 12 thousand combat aircraft were involved in battles on both sides. From the Wehrmacht, more than 100 divisions participated in it, which accounted for over 43 percent of the divisions that were on the Soviet-German front. The victorious tank battles for the Soviet Army were the greatest in World War II. " If the battle of Stalingrad foreshadowed the decline of the Nazi army, the battle of Kursk put her in disaster».
The hopes of the military-political leadership did not come true " third Reich"For success operation Citadel . During this battle, Soviet troops defeated 30 divisions, the Wehrmacht lost about 500 thousand soldiers and officers, 1,5 thousand tanks, 3 thousand guns and more than 3,7 thousand aircraft.
The construction of defensive lines. Kursk Bulge, 1943
Especially severe defeats were inflicted on tank units of the Nazis. Of the 20 tank and motorized divisions that took part in the battle of Kursk, 7 were defeated, while the rest suffered significant losses. Fascist Germany could no longer fully compensate this damage. Inspector General of German Armored Forces colonel General Guderian had to admit:
« As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were incapacitated for a long time due to large losses in people and equipment. Their timely restoration for conducting defensive operations on the eastern front, as well as for organizing defense in the West, in case of the landing, which the Allies threatened to land next spring, was called into question ... and there were no more calm days on the eastern front. The initiative completely passed to the enemy ...».
Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943 g
Before Operation Citadel. From right to left: G. Kluge, V. Model, E. Manstein. 1943 g
Soviet troops are ready to meet the enemy. Kursk Bulge, 1943 ( see comments on the article)
The failure of the offensive strategy in the East forced the Wehrmacht command to find new methods of warfare in order to try to save fascism from the impending defeat. It hoped to translate the war into positional forms, gain time, hoping to split the anti-Hitler coalition. West German historian V. Hubach writes: " On the eastern front, the Germans made their last attempt to seize the initiative, but to no avail. The failed operation Citadel was the beginning of the end of the German army. Since then, the German front in the East has not stabilized anymore.».
The crushing defeat of the Nazi armies on the Kursk testified to the increased economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union. The victory at Kursk was the result of the great feat of the Soviet Armed Forces and the dedicated work of the Soviet people. This was a new triumph of the wise policies of the Communist Party and the Soviet government.
Near Kursk. At the observation post of the commander of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps. From left to right: N. S. Khrushchev, commander of the 6th Guards Army, Lieutenant General I. M. Chistyakov, corps commander, Major General N. B. Ibyanskiy (July 1943)
Planning Operation Citadel , the Nazis had high hopes for new equipment - tanks " tiger"And" panther", Assault guns" ferdinand", Aircraft" Focke-Wulf-190A". They believed that the new weapons received in the Wehrmacht would surpass Soviet military equipment and ensure victory. However, this did not happen. Soviet designers created new models of tanks, self-propelled artillery, aircraft, anti-tank artillery, which in their tactical and technical data were not inferior, but often surpassed similar enemy systems.
Fighting on the Kursk Soviet soldiers constantly felt the support of the working class, the collective farm peasantry, and the intelligentsia, arming the army with excellent military equipment, providing it with everything necessary for victory. Figuratively speaking, in this grandiose battle shoulder to shoulder with an infantryman, a tankman, an artilleryman, a pilot, a sapper, the metalworker, constructor, engineer, and grain grower fought. The military feat of the soldiers merged with the selfless work of the rear workers. The unity of the rear and the front, forged by the Communist Party, created an unshakable foundation for the military successes of the Soviet Armed Forces. Great merit in the defeat of the Nazi troops near Kursk belonged to the Soviet partisans, who launched active operations behind enemy lines.
Battle of Kursk It was of great importance for the course and outcome of events on the Soviet-German front in 1943. It created favorable conditions for the general offensive of the Soviet Army.
had the greatest international significance. She had a great influence on the further course of World War II. As a result of the defeat of the considerable forces of the Wehrmacht, favorable conditions were created for the landing of the Anglo-American troops in Italy in early July 1943. The defeat of the Wehrmacht near Kursk directly affected the plans of the German fascist command related to the occupation of Sweden. The previously developed plan for the invasion of Nazi troops in this country was canceled due to the fact that the Soviet-German front absorbed all the enemy’s reserves. As early as June 14, 1943, the Swedish envoy in Moscow declared: “ Sweden is well aware that if it still remains outside the war, it is only thanks to the military successes of the USSR. Sweden is grateful to the Soviet Union for this and speaks directly about it».
The increased losses on the fronts, especially in the East, the dire consequences of total mobilization and the growing liberation movement in European countries affected the internal situation in Germany, the moral condition of German soldiers and the entire population. Distrust of the government intensified in the country, criticisms of the fascist party and the state leadership became more frequent, and doubts about achieving victory grew. Hitler went on to further intensify repression to strengthen the "internal front." But neither the bloody Gestapo terror, nor the colossal efforts of Goebbels’s propaganda machine could neutralize the influence that the defeat at Kursk had on the morale of the population and soldiers of the Wehrmacht.
Near Kursk. Direct fire on the advancing enemy
Huge losses of military equipment and weapons presented new requirements for the German military industry and further complicated the situation with human resources. The attraction in industry, agriculture and transport of foreign workers, who Hitler new order"Was deeply hostile, undermining the rear of the fascist state.
After defeat in Battle of Kursk Germany’s influence on the fascist bloc’s states was further weakened, the political situation of the satellite countries worsened, and the foreign policy isolation of the Reich intensified. Catastrophic for the fascist elite, the outcome of the Battle of Kursk predetermined a further cooling of relations between Germany and neutral countries. These countries have reduced the supply of raw materials and materials " third Reich».
The victory of the Soviet Army in the battle of Kursk raised the authority of the Soviet Union even higher as a decisive force opposing fascism. The whole world looked with hope at the socialist power and its army, which was delivering to mankind a deliverance from the Nazi plague.
Victorious end of the battle of Kursk intensified the struggle of the peoples of enslaved Europe for freedom and independence, intensified the activity of numerous groups of the resistance movement, including in Germany itself. Under the influence of victories on the Kursk Bulge, the peoples of the countries of the anti-fascist coalition began even more resolutely to demand the quickest opening of a second front in Europe.
The successes of the Soviet Army reflected in the position of the ruling circles of the United States and England. In the midst of the Battle of Kursk president Roosevelt in a special message to the head of the Soviet government he wrote: “ During the month of gigantic battles, your armed forces, with their skill, their courage, their dedication and their perseverance, not only stopped the long-planned German offensive, but also launched a successful counterattack, with far-reaching consequences ... "
The Soviet Union can rightly be proud of its heroic victories. In the battle of Kursk the superiority of the Soviet military leadership and military art was manifested with renewed vigor. She showed that the Soviet Armed Forces are a well-coordinated organism in which all types and types of troops are harmoniously combined.
The defense of Soviet troops near Kursk withstood severe tests and achieved her goals. The Soviet Army was enriched by the experience of organizing a defense in depth, stable in anti-tank and anti-air terms, as well as the experience of decisive maneuver by forces and means. Pre-created strategic reserves were widely used, most of which were included in the specially created Stepnoy okrug (front). His troops increased the depth of defense on a strategic scale and took an active part in the defensive battle and in the counterattack. For the first time in World War II, the total depth of the operational construction of fronts in defense reached 50–70 km. The massing of forces and assets in the areas of expected enemy attacks, as well as the general operational density of troops in defense, increased. Significantly increased the resistance of the defense due to the saturation of troops with military equipment and weapons.
Anti-tank defense reached a depth of up to 35 km, the density of artillery anti-tank fire increased, barriers, mining, anti-tank reserves and mobile fencing units found wider application.
German prisoners after the collapse of the operation "Citadel". 1943
German prisoners after the collapse of the operation "Citadel". 1943
The maneuver by the second echelons and reserves, which was carried out from the depths and along the front, played a large role in increasing the stability of the defense. For example, during a defensive operation on the Voronezh Front, regrouping covered about 35 percent of all rifle divisions, over 40 percent of parts of fighter-anti-tank artillery, and almost all individual tank and mechanized brigades.
In the battle of Kursk For the third time during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces successfully carried out a strategic counter-offensive. If the preparation of the counterattack near Moscow and Stalingrad proceeded in an environment of heavy defensive battles with superior enemy forces, then different conditions developed near Kursk. Thanks to the successes of the Soviet military economy and purposeful organizational measures to prepare reserves, the balance of forces by the beginning of the defensive battle had developed in favor of the Soviet Army.
During the counterattack, Soviet troops showed high skill in organizing and conducting offensive operations in the summer. The right choice of the moment of transition from defense to counterattack, close operational and strategic interaction of the five fronts, the successful breakthrough of the enemy’s prepared defense in advance, the skillful conduct of a simultaneous offensive on a wide front with attacks in several directions, the massive use of armored forces, aviation and artillery - all of this had tremendous importance for the defeat of the strategic groupings of the Wehrmacht.
In the counterattack for the first time during the war, the second echelons of fronts began to be created as part of one or two combined arms armies (Voronezh Front) and powerful groups of mobile troops. This allowed the front commanders to build up attacks of the first echelon and develop success in depth or in the direction of the flanks, break through intermediate defensive lines, and also repel strong counterattacks of the Nazi troops.
The battle of Kursk enriched military art all types of armed forces and combat arms. In defense, the artillery was more decisively massed in the direction of the main enemy attacks, which ensured the creation of higher operational densities in comparison with previous defensive operations. The role of artillery in the counterattack increased. The density of guns and mortars in the direction of the main attack of the advancing troops reached 150 - 230 barrels, and the maximum up to 250 barrels per kilometer of the front.
In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet tank troops successfully solved the most complex and varied tasks both in defense and in offensive. If until the summer of 1943, tank corps and armies were used in defensive operations mainly for delivering counterattacks, then in the battle of Kursk they were also used to hold defensive lines. This achieved a greater depth of operational defense and increased its stability.
During the counterattack, armored and mechanized troops were used on a massive scale, being the main means of commanding the fronts and armies in completing the breakthrough of enemy defenses and developing tactical success in the operational one. At the same time, the experience of military operations in the Oryol operation showed the inappropriateness of using tank corps and armies to break through the positional defense, since in carrying out these tasks they suffered heavy losses. In the Belgorod-Kharkov direction, the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone was carried out by advanced tank brigades, and the main forces of the tank armies and corps were used for operations in the operational depths.
Soviet military art in the use of aviation rose to a new level. IN battle of Kursk more decisively massaging front-line and long-range aviation forces in the main directions, their interaction with the ground forces improved.
In full, a new form of using aviation in a counterattack was used - an air offensive in which attack and bomber aircraft continuously attacked enemy groups and objects, supporting ground forces. In the Battle of Kursk, Soviet aviation finally gained strategic supremacy in the air and thereby contributed to the creation of favorable conditions for subsequent offensive operations.
In the battle of Kursk successfully passed the test organizational forms of arms and special forces. The tank armies of the new organization, as well as artillery corps and other formations played an important role in winning the victory.
In the battle of Kursk, the Soviet command demonstrated a creative, innovative approach to solving the most important tasks of the strategy , operational art and tactics, its superiority over the military school of the Nazis.
The bodies of the strategic, front-line, army, and rear services have gained extensive experience in providing troops comprehensively. A characteristic feature of the organization of the rear was the approach of the rear units and institutions to the front line. This ensured the uninterrupted supply of material resources to the troops and the timely evacuation of the wounded and sick.
The enormous scope and intensity of the military operations required a large amount of material means, primarily ammunition and fuel. During the Battle of Kursk, troops of the Central, Voronezh, Stepnoy, Bryansk, Southwestern and left wings of the Western Fronts delivered 141,354 wagons with ammunition, fuel, food and other materiel from central bases and warehouses. 1828 tons of various supplies were delivered by air to the troops of the Central Front alone.
The medical service of the fronts, armies and formations was enriched with experience in conducting preventive and sanitary-hygienic measures, skillful maneuver by forces and means of medical institutions, and the widespread use of specialized medical care. Despite the significant losses suffered by the troops, many wounded already during the Battle of Kursk thanks to the efforts of military doctors returned to duty.
Hitler’s strategists for planning, organizing and maintaining operation Citadel they used old, stereotyped methods and methods that did not correspond to the new situation and were well known to the Soviet command. This is recognized by a number of bourgeois historians. So, an English historian A. Clark in work Barbarossa notes that the Nazi command again relied on a lightning strike with the widespread use of new military equipment: Junkers, short intensive artillery preparation, close interaction between the mass of tanks and infantry ... without due regard for the changed conditions, except for a simple arithmetic increase in the corresponding components. " West German historian W. Gorlitz writes that the attack on Kursk was basically carried out "in in accordance with the scheme of previous battles - tank wedges operated with the aim of coverage from two directions».
The reactionary bourgeois researchers of the Second World War made a lot of efforts to pervert events near Kursk . They are trying to rehabilitate the command of the Wehrmacht, to obscure its mistakes and all the blame for the failure of the operation "Citadel" entrust Hitler and his closest associates. This position was put forward immediately after the end of the war and has been persistently upheld to date. So, the former chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Halder, back in 1949, was working "Hitler as a commander", deliberately distorting the facts, argued that in the spring of 1943, when developing a war plan on the Soviet-German front, " the commanders of army and army groups and Hitler’s military advisers from the main command of the ground forces tried unsuccessfully to overcome the great operational threat posed in the East, to direct him on the only path that promised success — the path of flexible operational leadership, which, like the art of fencing, consists in the rapid alternation of cover and strike and compensates for the lack of forces with skillful operational leadership and high combat qualities of the troops ...».
Documents indicate that miscalculations in the planning of armed struggle on the Soviet-German front were made by both the political and military leaders of Germany. The Wehrmacht intelligence service did not cope with its tasks. Allegations of the non-involvement of the German generals in the development of the most important political and military decisions contradict the facts.
The thesis that the Nazi offensive near Kursk had limited goals and that the failure of the operation "Citadel" cannot be considered as a phenomenon of strategic importance.
In recent years, works have appeared in which a fairly close to objective assessment of a number of events of the Battle of Kursk is given. American historian M. Caydin in the book Tigers burn "characterizes the Battle of Kursk as" the greatest land battle that has ever taken place in history", And does not agree with the opinion of many researchers in the West that it pursued limited, supportive" goals. " History is deeply in doubt- the author writes, - in German claims that they did not believe in the future. Everything was decided near Kursk. What happened there determined the future course of events.". The same idea is reflected in the annotation to the book, where it is noted that the battle of Kursk " broke the backbone of the German army in 1943 and changed the whole course of World War II ... Few outside of Russia understand the enormity of this stunning clash. In fact, even today, the Soviets are bitter, as they see Western historians belittle the significance of the Russian triumph near Kursk».
Why, then, was the last attempt by the fascist German command to carry out a large victorious offensive in the East and regain the lost strategic initiative failed? The main reasons for the failure operation Citadel the ever-growing economic, political and military power of the Soviet Union, the superiority of Soviet military art, the limitless heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers appeared. In 1943, the Soviet military economy gave military equipment and weapons more than the industry of Nazi Germany, which used the resources of the enslaved countries of Europe.
But the growth of military power of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces was ignored by Nazi political and military leaders. The underestimation of the capabilities of the Soviet Union and the reassessment of their own forces were an expression of the adventurism of the fascist strategy.
From a purely military point of view, complete the failure of the operation "Citadel" To a certain extent, it was due to the fact that the Wehrmacht did not succeed in achieving a surprise strike. Thanks to the clear work of all types of reconnaissance, including air reconnaissance, the Soviet command was aware of the impending offensive and took the necessary measures. The military leadership of the Wehrmacht believed that no defense was capable of resisting powerful tank rams, supported by massive air operations. But these forecasts turned out to be unfounded, the tanks at the cost of huge losses only slightly wedged into the Soviet defense to the north and south of Kursk and got stuck in the defense.
Important reason the collapse of Operation Citadel there was a secrecy in the preparation of Soviet troops for both a defensive battle and a counteroffensive. The fascist leadership did not have a complete picture of the plans of the Soviet command. In the prepared July 3, that is, on the eve german offensive near Kursk, department of the study of the armies of the East during the operation "Citadel" there is not even a mention of the possibility of a Soviet counter-offensive against the Wehrmacht strike groups.
The major miscalculations of Nazi intelligence in assessing the forces of the Soviet Army concentrated in the Kursk ledge region are convincingly evidenced by the report card of the operational department of the general headquarters of the ground forces of the German army, prepared on July 4, 1943. It even contains information about the Soviet troops deployed in the first operational echelon reflected inaccurately. German intelligence had completely fragmentary data on reserves located in the Kursk direction.
In early July, the situation on the Soviet-German front and the possible decisions of the Soviet command were evaluated by the political and military leaders of Germany, essentially, from the previous positions. They firmly believed in the possibility of a major victory.
In the battles of Kursk, Soviet soldiers showed courage, stamina and mass heroism. The Communist Party and the Soviet government praised the greatness of their feat. Combat orders flashed on the banners of many formations and units, 132 formations and units received the guard rank, 26 formations and units were awarded the honorary names of the Oryol, Belgorod, Kharkov and Karachevsky. More than 100 thousand soldiers, sergeants, officers and generals were awarded orders and medals, over 180 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, including Private V. Ye. Breusov, Division Commander Major General L.N. Gurtiev, platoon commander, Lieutenant V.V. Zhenchenko, battalion commissar, lieutenant N.M. Zverintsev, battery commander captain G.I. Igishev, Private A.M. Lomakin, commander of the platoon senior sergeant Mukhamadiev, unit commander sergeant V.P. Petrishchev, gun commander junior sergeant A.I. Petrov, senior sergeant G.P. Pelikanov, sergeant V.F. Chernenko and others.
The victory of Soviet troops on the Kursk testified to the increased role of party political work. Commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol organizations helped the personnel understand the significance of the upcoming battles, their role in the victory over the enemy. By a personal example, the Communists carried along fighters. Political organs took measures to maintain and replenish party organizations in units. This ensured continuous party influence on the entire personnel.
An important means of mobilizing warriors for combat exploits was the promotion of best practices, the popularization of units and subunits that distinguished themselves in battles. The orders of the Supreme Commander-in-chief with the announcement of gratitude to the personnel of the distinguished troops possessed great inspiring force - they were widely propagated in units and formations, read at meetings, distributed with the help of leaflets. Extracts from orders were handed to each soldier.
Improving the morale of Soviet soldiers, confidence in victory was facilitated by timely information of personnel about events in the world and in the country, about the successes of the Soviet troops and the defeats of the enemy. Political bodies, party organizations, carrying out active work to educate personnel, played an important role in achieving victories in defensive and offensive battles. Together with the commanders, they held the banner of the party high, were the bearers of its spirit, discipline, stamina and courage. They mobilized and inspired the soldiers to defeat the enemy.
« The giant battle on the Oryol-Kursk in the summer of 1943, - noted L. I. Brezhnev , – broke the ridge of Nazi Germany and incinerated its shock armored troops. The superiority of our army in combat skill, armament, and strategic leadership has become clear to the whole world.».
The victory of the Soviet Army in the battle of Kursk opened up new opportunities for the struggle against German fascism and the liberation of Soviet lands temporarily captured by the enemy. Firmly holding strategic initiative. The Soviet Armed Forces more and more deployed a general offensive.
Battle of Kursk - the fighting during the Great Patriotic War in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kursk ledge in the summer of 1943. It was a key element of the 1943 summer campaign of the Red Army, during which a radical turning point in the Great Patriotic War ended, which began with the victory at Stalingrad.
Chronological framework
In domestic historiography, the point of view was established that the Battle of Kursk took place from July 5 to August 23, 1943. Two periods are distinguished in it: the defensive stage and the counterattack of the Red Army.
At the first stage, the Kursk strategic defensive operation was carried out by forces of two fronts of the Central (July 5-12, 1943) and Voronezh (July 5-23, 1943) with the involvement of the strategic reserves of the Supreme Command Headquarters (Steppe Front), whose purpose was to disrupt the plan ".
Background and plans of the parties
After the defeat at Stalingrad, the German leadership faced two key problems: how to hold the eastern front under the increasing blows of the Red Army, which was gaining power, and how to keep allies in their orbits who had already begun to look for ways out of the war. Hitler believed that an offensive without such a deep breakthrough, as it was in 1942, was to help not only solve these problems, but also raise the morale of the troops.
In April, the operation plan “Citadel” was developed, according to which two groups strike in convergent directions and surround the Central and Voronezh Fronts in the Kursk ledge. According to the calculations of Berlin, their defeat made it possible to inflict enormous losses on the Soviet side, and to reduce the front line to 245 km, and to form reserves from the released forces. Two armies and one army group stood out for the operation. South of Orel, Army Group (GA) “Center” deployed the 9th Army (A), Colonel General V. Model. After several modifications to the plan, she got the task: breaking through the defenses of the Central Front and, having traveled about 75 km, to connect in the Kursk region with the troops of the GA "Yu" - 4th Tank Army (TA), Colonel General G. Goth. The latter was concentrated north of Belgorod and was considered the main force of the offensive. After breaking through the line of the Voronezh Front, she had to go to the meeting place for more than 140 km. The external front of the encirclement was to be created by 23 ak 9A and the Kempf Army Group (AG) from GA South. Active combat operations were planned to be deployed on a plot of about 150 km.
For the Citadel, Center Center assigned V. Model, whom Berlin had been appointed responsible for the operation, 3 tank (41.46 and 47) and one army (23) corps, a total of 14 divisions, of which 6 were tank, and GA was “South” - 4 TA and AG “Kempf” 5 corps - three tank (3, 48 and 2 mk SS) and two army (52 ak and ak “Raus”), consisting of 17 divisions, including 9 tank and motorized.
The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command (VGK) received the first data on Berlin's planning of a major offensive operation near Kursk in mid-March 1943. On April 12, 1943, at a meeting with I.V. Stalin, a preliminary decision was already made on the transition to strategic defense. Central Front of Army General K.K. Rokossovsky received the task of defending the northern part of the Kursk Bulge, repel a possible strike, and then, together with the Western and Bryansk Fronts, went on the counterattack and defeated the German group in the Orel region.
The Voronezh Front of Army General N.F. Vatutin was supposed to defend the southern part of the Kursk ledge, to bleed the enemy in the upcoming defensive battles, after which he would transfer to a counterattack and, in cooperation with the South-Western Front and the Steppe Fronts, complete its rout in the Bel -city and Kharkov.
The Kursk defensive operation was considered as the most important element of the entire summer campaign of 1943. It was planned that after the expected enemy offensive in the Central and Voronezh fronts was stopped, conditions would arise for the completion of its rout and the transition to a general offensive from Smolensk to Taganrog. The Bryansk and Western fronts will immediately begin the Oryol offensive operation, which will help the Central Front completely disrupt the enemy’s plans. In parallel with it, the Steppe Front should approach the south of the Kursk ledge, and after its concentration it was planned to begin the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation, which was to be carried out in parallel with the Donbass offensive operation of the Southern Fronts and the South-Western Front.
As of July 1, 1943, the Central Front had 711575 people, including 467179 combat personnel, 10725 guns and mortars, 1607 tanks and self-propelled guns, and Voronezh - 625590 military personnel, 417 451 of them, 8583 guns and mortars, 1700 units armored vehicles.
Kursk defensive operation. The fighting in the north of the Kursk Bulge July 5-12, 1943
During April - June, the beginning of the Citadel was postponed several times. The last date was the dawn of July 5, 1943. On the Central Front, fierce battles unfolded on a 40 km stretch. 9 A with a small interval attacked in three directions. The main blow was struck at 13A by lieutenant general N.P. Pukhov with 47 mk forces - to Olkhovatka, the second, auxiliary, 41 mk and 23 ak - at Malo-Arkhangelsk, 13 A on the right wing and lieutenant general P. L. 48A on the left .Romanenko and the third - 46 mk - on Gnilets along the right flank 70A of Lieutenant General I.V. Galanin. Heavy and bloody battles ensued.
In the olkhovatsk-ponyrovsky direction, the Model threw more than 500 armored units at once into the attack, and groups of bombers were moving in the air, but a powerful defense system did not allow the enemy to immediately break the boundaries of Soviet troops.
In the second half of July 5, N.P. Pukhov advanced some of the mobile reserves to the main lane, and K.K.Rokossovsky sent howitzer and mortar brigades to the Olkhovatka area. The counterattacks of tanks and infantry with the support of artillery, the advance of the enemy was suspended. By the end of the day, a minor dent had formed in center 13A, but the defense was not broken anywhere. Troops 48A and the left flank 13A fully retained their positions. At the cost of heavy losses of 47 and 46 tk, they managed to advance 6–8 km along the Olkhov direction, while 70A troops retreated only 5 km.
To restore the lost position at the junction 13 and 70A, in the second half of July 5, K.K. Rokossovsky decided to hold a counter-attack of 2 TA by Lieutenant General A.G. Rodin and 19 mk in cooperation with the second echelon 13 A - 17 Guards . Rifle Corps (SK). He could not completely solve the tasks. After two days of fruitless attempts to implement the Citadel plan, 9A was bogged down in the defense of the Central Front. From July 7 to 11, the epicenter of the battles in band 13 and 70A was the Ponyri station and the area of \u200b\u200bthe villages of Olkhovatka - Samodurovka - Gnilets, where two powerful resistance nodes were created that blocked the path to Kursk. By the end of July 9, the offensive by the main forces of 9A was stopped, and on July 11 she made the last unsuccessful attempt to break through the defenses of the Central Front.
On July 12, 1943, a turning point occurred in hostilities in the area. The Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive in the Oryol direction. V.Model, who was appointed responsible for the defense of the entire Oryol arc, began hastily transferring troops aimed at Kursk under Orel. And on July 13, Hitler officially stopped the Citadel. The depth of advancement 9A was 12-15 km at the front to 40 km. No operational, and especially strategic, results were not achieved. Moreover, she did not hold back the already occupied positions. On July 15, the Central Front launched a counterattack and after two days basically regained its position until July 5, 1943.
At dawn on July 5, 1943, the troops of GA South went on the offensive. The main blow was inflicted in the band of 6 Guards. And Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakova in the direction of Oboyan by 4TA. Here, the German side involved more than 1,168 armored units. In the auxiliary, Korochansky direction (east and northeast of Belgorod), positions 7 guards. And Lieutenant General M.S. Shumilov was attacked by 3 shopping malls and the Raus AG Kempf, which had 419 tanks and assault guns. However, thanks to the resilience of the soldiers and commanders of 6 Guards. And, already in the first two days, the South GA’s offensive schedule was disrupted, and its divisions suffered heavy damage. And most importantly, the shock group GA "South" was split. 4TA and Kempf AG failed to create a continuous breakthrough front because AG Kempf was unable to cover the right wing of the 4TA and their troops began to move in diverging directions. Therefore, 4TA was forced to weaken the strike wedge and direct large forces to strengthen the right wing. However, a wider front of the offensive (up to 130 km) than in the north of the Kursk Bulge and more significant forces allowed the enemy to break through the line of the Voronezh Front in the band up to 100 km by the end of the fifth day and enter the defenses in the main direction up to 28 km, in its hulls, 66% of armored vehicles failed.
On July 10, the second stage of the Kursk defensive operation of the Voronezh Front began, the epicenter of the fighting shifted to the station Prokhorovka. The battle for this knot of resistance lasted from July 10 to July 16, 1943. On July 12, a frontal counterattack was carried out. For 10-12 hours in the station area on a 40 km section, about 1100 armored units of the warring parties acted at different times. However, he did not bring the expected result. Although the troops of GA "South" managed to keep in the system of army defense, but all formations of 4 TA and AG "Kempf" retain combat effectiveness. Over the next four days, the most intense battles went south of the station between the Seversky and Linden Donets interfluves, which was convenient for striking both the deep right flank of 4TA and the left wing of Kempf AG. However, it was not possible to defend this area. On the night of July 15, 1943, 2 mt SS and 3 mk surrounded four divisions 69A south of the station, but they managed to break out of the “ring”, albeit with heavy losses
On the night of July 16-17, the GA South troops began to withdraw towards Belgorod, and by the end of July 23, 1943, the Voronezh Front pushed the South GA about to the position from which it launched the offensive. The goal set for the Soviet troops during the Kursk defensive operation was fully achieved.
Oryol offensive operation
After two weeks of bloody battles, the Wehrmacht’s last strategic offensive was stopped, but this was only part of the Soviet command’s plan for the 1943 summer campaign. Now, it was important to finally take the initiative and turn the tide of the war.
The plan for the destruction of German troops in the Orel region, code-named Operation Kutuzov, was developed before the Battle of Kursk. The troops of the Western, Bryansk, and Central fronts bordering the Oryol arc were to strike in the general direction at Oryol, cut 2 TA and 9A GA Center into three separate groups, encircle them in the areas of Bolkhov, Mtsensk, Orel and destroy.
Part of the Western forces (commander Colonel-General V.D. Sokolovsky), all of Bryansk (Colonel-General M.M. Popov) and the Central Front were involved in the operation. The breakthrough of the enemy’s defense was provided for in five areas. The western front was to deliver the main blow by the left wing troops - 11th Guards A. Lieutenant General I.Kh. Bagramyan - on Khotynets and the auxiliary - on Zhizdra, and the Bryansk Front - on Oryol (main strike) and Bolkhov (auxiliary). After the central front completely stopped offensive 9A, it was necessary to concentrate the main efforts of 70,13, 48A and 2 SLTs on the Kromsky direction. The beginning of the offensive was tightly tied to the moment when it became clear that the strike force 9A was worn out and connected by fighting on the borders of the Central Front. According to Stavka, such a moment came on July 12, 1943.
The day before the onset, Lieutenant General I.Kh. Baghramyan conducted reconnaissance in battle on the left flank of 2 TA. As a result, not only the outline of the enemy’s front edge and its fire system was specified, but in some areas the German infantry was knocked out of the first trench. THEM. Baghramyan ordered the immediate start of a general offensive. Introduced July 13, 1 TC completed the breakthrough and the second band. Then 5 mk began to develop an offensive bypassing Bolkhov, and 1 mk - on Khotynets.
The first day of the advance of the Bryansk Front did not bring tangible results. Acting in the main, Oryol direction, 3A Lieutenant General A.V. Gorbatov and 63A Lieutenant General V.Ya. Kolpakchi by the end of July 13 broke through 14 km, and 61A Lieutenant General P.A. Belova in the Bolkhov direction wedged into the enemy’s defenses for only 7 km. The offensive of the Central Front that began on July 15 did not change the situation. His troops by the end of July 17 threw 9A only to the positions that she occupied at the beginning of the Battle of Kursk.
Nevertheless, already on July 19, a threat to the environment loomed over the Bolkhov group, as 11 Guards A in the south broke through 70 km, stubbornly moving towards Bolkhov and 61A. This city was the "key" to Orel, so the warring parties began to build up their strength here. In the direction of the main strike of the Bryansk Front, on July 19, 3 Guards of the Lieutenant General P.S. Rybalko advanced. Reflecting the enemy’s counterattack, by the end of the day she broke through the second defense line on the Oleshnya River. The grouping of the Western Front was also hastily strengthened. A significant preponderance of forces, although not quickly, was bearing fruit. On August 5, 1943, the city of Oryol was liberated by the troops of the Bryansk Front, one of the largest regional centers of the European part of the USSR.
After the destruction of the group in the area of \u200b\u200bBolkhov and Orel, the most intense fighting took place on the Khotynets-Kroma front, and at the final stage of the Kutuzov operation, the most difficult battles broke out for the city of Karachev, which covered the approaches to Bryansk, which was released on August 15, 1943.
On August 18, 1943, Soviet troops reached the German Hagen defensive line, east of Bryansk. On this operation "Kutuzov" ended. For 37 days, the Red Army advanced 150 km, the fortified bridgehead and a large enemy group were liquidated, in a strategically important direction, favorable conditions were created for an attack on Bryansk and further to Belarus.
Belgorod - Kharkov offensive operation
It received the code name “Commander Rumyantsev”, was held from August 3 to 23, 1943 by the Voronezh (Army General N.F. Vatutin) and Stepny (Colonel General I.S. Konev) fronts and was the final stage of the Battle of Kursk. The operation was supposed to be carried out in two stages: at the first, defeat the troops of the left wing of the GA South in the vicinity of Belgorod and Tomarovka, and then liberate Kharkov. The steppe front was supposed to liberate Belgorod and Kharkov, and Voronezh - to get around them from the north-west, to develop success in Poltava. It was planned to deliver the main blow by the armies of the adjacent flanks of the Voronezh and Steppe fronts from the area northwest of Belgorod in the direction of Bogodukhov and Valki, at the junction of 4 TA and AG Kempf, to crush them and cut off their path for departure to the west and south-west. A secondary strike is delivered to Akhtyrka, using forces 27 and 40A, to block the pulling up of reserves to Kharkov. At the same time, the city was to bypass from the south 57A of the South-Western Front. The operation was planned at a front of 200 km and a depth of 120 km.
On August 3, 1943, after a powerful artillery preparation, the first echelon of the Voronezh Front - 6th Guards A, Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and 5th Guards A Lieutenant General A.S. Zhadov was forced to cross the Vorskla River and struck a 5 km gap at the front between Belgorod and Tomarovka, through which the main forces entered - 1TA Lieutenant General M.E. Katukova and 5th Guards. T. Lieutenant General P.A. Rotmistrova. Having passed the “corridor” of the breakthrough and turned into battle formation, their troops dealt a strong blow to Zolochev. By the end of the day, the 5th Guards TA, having delved into the enemy’s defenses for 26 km, cut off the Belgorod group from Tomarov’s, and reached the border with. Good Will, and the next morning broke through to Bessonovka and Orlovka. And on 6 August, in the evening of August 3 they broke through to Tomarovka. 4TA rendered stubborn resistance. From August 4, 5th Guards. TA for two days was shackled by enemy counterattacks, although according to the calculations of the Soviet side, on August 5, its brigades were supposed to go west of Kharkov and take control of Lyubotin. This delay changed the plan for the entire operation to quickly split the enemy group.
After two days of heavy fighting on the outskirts of Belgorod, on August 5, 1943, the 69th and 7th Guards of the Steppe Front drove the Kempf AG troops to the outskirts and began its assault, which in the evening ended with clearing the main part of it from the invaders. On the evening of August 5, 1943, in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod, salute was given for the first time during the war years in Moscow.
On that day, a turning point also occurred in the strip of the Voronezh Front, on the auxiliary direction, Lieutenant General K.S. Moskalenko, in the direction of Boroml and 27A, Lieutenant General S.G. Trofimenko, who by the end of August 7 freed Grayvoron and was advancing to Akhtyrka.
After the liberation of Belgorod, the onslaught and the Steppe Front intensified. On August 8, 57A was given to him by Lieutenant General N.A. Hagen. Trying to prevent the encirclement of his troops, E.Fon Manstein launched counterattacks on 1TA and 6th guards on August 11, and to the south of Bogodukhov using forces of the Kempf Group of Companies, which slowed down the pace of attack not only of the Voronezh, but also of the Steppe Front. Despite the stubborn resistance of the Kempf AG, Konev’s troops continued to push aggressively towards Kharkov. On August 17, they started fighting on its outskirts.
On August 18, GA South made a second attempt to stop the advance of two fronts with a counterattack, now along the stretched right flank 27A. To reflect it, N.F. Vatutin brought into battle 4 Guards A. Lieutenant General G.I. Kulik. But they failed to quickly turn the tide. The destruction of the Akhtyr group dragged on until August 25th.
On August 18, offensive 57A resumed, which, bypassing Kharkov from the southeast, moved to Merefa. In this situation, the capture on August 20 by units of Lieutenant General I.M. Managarov of the resistance node in the forest of northeast Kharkov was of great importance. Using this success, 69 A Lieutenant General VD Kryuchenko began to bypass the city from the north-west and west. During August 21, in the 53A strip, the 5th TA corps concentrated, which significantly strengthened the right wing of the Steppe Front. A day later, the Kharkov-Zolochev, Kharkov-Lyubotin-Poltava railroads and the Kharkiv-Lyubotin highway were cut, and on August 22, 57A left south of Kharkov in the area of \u200b\u200bBezlyudovka and Konstantinovka villages. Thus, most of the paths for the enemy’s retreat were cut off, so the German command was forced to begin a hasty withdrawal of all troops from the city.
August 23, 1943, Moscow saluted the liberators of Kharkov. This event marked the victorious completion of the Battle of Kursk by the Red Army.
Summary, Value
In the battle of Kursk, which lasted 49 days, about 4,000,000 people, over 69,000 guns and mortars, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled (assault) guns, and up to 12,000 aircraft took part on both sides. It became one of the most large-scale events of the Great Patriotic War; its significance goes far beyond the borders of the Soviet-German front. “A major defeat on the Kursk Bulge was the beginning of a deadly crisis for the German army,” wrote the outstanding commander Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky. - Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historical milestones on the road to victory over Nazi Germany. The initiative on the Soviet-German front - the main and decisive front of the entire Second World War - was firmly entrenched in the hands of the Red Army. ”
Dates of the Battle of Kursk 07/05/1943 - 08/23/1943. The Great Patriotic War has 3 significant events:
- The liberation of Stalingrad;
- Battle of Kursk;
- The capture of Berlin.
Here we will talk about the greatest tank battle in modern history.
Battle of Kursk. Situation before the battle
Before the Battle of Kursk, little success was celebrated by Germany, who was able to once again seize the cities of Belgorod and Kharkov. Hitler, seeing short-term success, decided to develop it. The offensive was planned on the Kursk. The ledge, cut into the depths of German territory, could be surrounded and captured. The operation, approved May 10-11, was called the Citadel.
Forces of the parties
The advantage was on the side of the Red Army. The number of Soviet troops was 1. 200,000 people (against 900 thousand from the enemy), the number of tanks - 3,500 (2,700 from the Germans) units, guns - 20,000 (10,000), aircraft 2,800 (2,500).
The German army was replenished with heavy (medium) Tiger tanks (Panther), self-propelled guns (self-propelled guns) Ferdinand, and Foke-Wulf 190 aircraft. An innovation from the Soviet side was the St. John's Wort cannon (57 mm), which was capable of penetrating the Tiger’s armor, and anti-tank mines that caused them significant damage.
Plans of the parties
The Germans decided to deliver a lightning strike, quickly capture the Kursk ledge, and then continue the large-scale offensive. The Soviet side decided at first to defend itself, delivering counterattacks, and when the enemy is exhausted and exhausted, go on the offensive.
Defense
I managed to find out that Battle of Kursk begins on 05/06/1943. Therefore, at 2:30 and 4:30 the Central Front carried out two half-hour artillery counterattacks. At 5:00, the enemy’s guns answered, and then the enemy went on the offensive, exerting strong pressure (2.5 hours) on the right flank towards the village of Olkhovatka.
When the attack was repelled, the Germans increased the onslaught on the left flank. They even managed to partially surround two (15, 81) Soviet divisions, but failed to break through the front (advance of 6-8 km). Then the Germans made an attempt to capture the Ponyri station in order to control the railway Orel - Kursk.
170 tanks and self-propelled guns Ferdinand broke through the first line of defense on July 6, but the second survived. On July 7, the enemy came close to the station. The 200 mm frontal armor became impenetrable for Soviet guns. Ponyri station was kept at the expense of anti-tank mines and powerful raids of Soviet aviation.
The tank battle near the village of Prokhorovka (Voronezh Front) lasted 6 days (10-16). Almost 800 Soviet tanks opposed 450 tanks and self-propelled guns of the enemy. The total victory was for the Red Army, but more than 300 tanks were lost against 80 from the opponent. Medium tanks The T-34s hardly stood up to the heavy Tigers, and the light T-70 was generally unsuitable in the open. Here comes such losses.
Offensive
While the troops of the Voronezh and Central fronts repulsed the enemy’s attacks, parts of the Western and Bryansk fronts (July 12) went on the attack. For three days (12-14), waging heavy fighting, the Soviet army was able to advance up to 25 kilometers.
The Battle of Kursk is a turning point throughout the Second World War, when the Soviet troops inflicted such damage on Germany and its satellites that they could no longer recover and lost the strategic initiative before the end of the war. Although before the defeat of the enemy there were many sleepless nights and thousands of kilometers of battles, after this battle in the hearts of every Soviet citizen, private and general, confidence appeared in victory over the enemy. In addition, the battle on the Oryol-Kursk ledge was an example of the courage of ordinary soldiers and the brilliant genius of Russian commanders.
A radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War began with the victory of the Soviet troops at Stalingrad, when a large enemy group was liquidated during the Uranus operation. The battle on the Kursk ledge was the final stage of a radical change. After the defeat at Kursk and Orel, the strategic initiative finally passed into the hands of the Soviet command. After the failure, German troops until the end of the war were mainly defending, and ours predominantly conducted offensive operations, freeing Europe from the Nazis.
On June 5, 1943, German troops launched an offensive in two directions: on the northern and southern faces of the Kursk ledge. Thus began the operation "Citadel" and the Battle of Kursk itself. After the offensive onslaught of the Germans subsided, and his divisions were significantly bloodless, the command of the USSR launched a counterattack against the troops of the Army Groups Center and South. Kharkov was liberated on August 23, 1943, which marked the end of one of the largest battles of World War II.
The background of the battle
After the victory at Stalingrad during the successful operation “Uranus”, Soviet troops managed to conduct a good offensive on the entire front and drive the enemy back many miles to the West. But after the German counterattack in the Kursk and Orel region, a ledge arose that was directed towards the West with a width of up to 200 and a depth of 150 kilometers, formed by the Soviet group.
From April to June, relative calm reigned over the fronts. It became clear that after the defeat at Stalingrad, Germany would try to take revenge. It was precisely the Kursk ledge that was considered the most suitable place, by striking at it in the direction of Oryol and Kursk from the North and the South, respectively, it was possible to create a boiler, on a scale larger than near Kiev and Kharkov at the beginning of the war.
On April 8, 1943, Marshal Zhukov G.K. He sent his report on the spring-summer military company, where he expressed his thoughts on the actions of Germany on the Eastern Front, where it was assumed that the Kursk Bulge would become the site of the enemy’s main strike. At the same time, Zhukov expressed his plan of countermeasures, which included exhausting the enemy in defensive battles, and then applying a counterattack and its complete destruction. On April 12, Stalin listened to General Antonov A.I., Marshal Zhukov G.K. and Marshal Vasilevsky A.M. on this occasion.
Representatives of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander unanimously spoke out for the impossibility and futility of delivering a preemptive strike in spring and summer. Indeed, based on the experience of past years, an attack against large enemy groups preparing to strike does not bring significant results, but only contributes to losses in the ranks of its troops. Also, the formation of forces for delivering a main strike was supposed to weaken the grouping of Soviet troops in the directions of the main strike of the Germans, which would also inevitably lead to defeat. Therefore, it was decided to conduct a defensive operation in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kursk ledge, where the main strike of the Wehrmacht forces was expected. Thus, the Headquarters expected to exhaust the enemy in defensive battles, knock out his tanks and deliver a decisive blow to the enemy. This was facilitated by the creation of a powerful defensive system in this area, unlike the first two years of the war.
In the spring of 1943, the word "Citadel" appeared more and more often in intercepted radio data. On April 12, intelligence laid a plan for Stalin on the table, code-named "Citadel", which was developed by the General Staff of the Wehrmacht, but was not signed by Hitler yet. This plan confirmed that Germany was preparing a major strike, where it was awaited by the Soviet command. Three days later, Hitler signed a plan for the operation.
In order to destroy the plans of the Wehrmacht, it was decided to create a defense in depth in the direction of the predicted strike and to create a powerful group capable of withstanding the pressure of the German units and carrying out counter-attacks at the time of the culmination of the battle.
The composition of the armies, commanders
It was planned to attract forces to attack the Soviet troops in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kursk-Oryol ledge Army Group Centercommanded by field Marshal Kluge and army Group "South"commanded by field Marshal Manstein.
The German forces included 50 divisions, including 16 motorized and tank divisions, 8 assault gun divisions, 2 tank brigades, and 3 separate tank battalions. In addition, the SS Das Reich, Dead Head, and Adolf Hitler, considered elite tank divisions, were pulled up to strike in the direction of Kursk.
Thus, the group amounted to 900 thousand personnel, 10 thousand guns, 2700 tanks and assault guns, and more than 2 thousand aircraft, which were part of two Luftwaffe air fleets.
One of the key trump cards in Germany’s hands was to use the heavy Tiger and Panther tanks and the Ferdinand assault guns. Due to the fact that the new tanks did not have time to get to the front, were in the process of being finalized, the start of the operation was constantly delayed. Also in service with the Wehrmacht were obsolete Pz.Kpfw tanks. I, Pz.Kpfw. I I, Pz.Kpfw. I I I, passed some modification.
The main blows were to be delivered by the 2nd and 9th armies, the 9th tank army of the Army Group Center under the command of Field Marshal Model, as well as the Kempf Task Force, tank 4th Army and the 24th Corps of the group Army "South", which was entrusted to command General Gotha.
In the defensive battles of the USSR, three fronts of Voronezh, Stepnoy, and Central were involved.
The Central Front was commanded by Army General K. Rokossovsky. The front's task was to defend the northern face of the ledge. The Voronezh Front, whose command was entrusted to Army General NF Vatutin, was to defend the southern front. Colonel General Konev I.S. He was appointed commander of the Steppe Front, the reserve of the USSR during the battle. In total, about 1.3 million people, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns, almost 20,000 guns and 2100 aircraft were involved in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Kursk ledge. Data may vary with some sources.
Armament (tanks)
The German command during the preparation of the plan "Citadel" did not begin to look for new ways to achieve success. The main offensive power of the Wehrmacht troops during the operation on the Kursk Bulge was to carry out tanks: light, heavy and medium. To strengthen the shock groups before the start of the operation, several hundred of the latest Panther and Tiger tanks were delivered to the front.
Medium Tank Panther was developed by MAN for Germany in 1941-1942. According to German classification it was considered heavy. First participated in battles on the Kursk. After the fighting in the summer of 1943 on the Eastern Front, the Wehrmacht began to be actively used in other areas. It is considered the best tank in Germany in World War II, even despite a number of shortcomings.
"Tiger I" - heavy tanks of the German armed forces during the Second World War. Over long distances, the battle was a little vulnerable with the fire weapons of Soviet tanks. It is considered the most expensive tank of its time, because the German treasury spent 1 million Reichsmarks on the creation of one combat unit.
Panzerkampfwagen III until 1943 was the main medium tank of the Wehrmacht. The captured combat units were used by Soviet troops, self-propelled guns were created on their basis.
Panzerkampfwagen II produced from 1934 to 1943 Since 1938, it was used in armed conflicts, but it was weaker than similar models of equipment in the enemy, not only in armor, but even in weapons. In 1942, he was completely withdrawn from the tank divisions of the Wehrmacht, however, remained in service and was used by assault groups.
Light tank Panzerkampfwagen I - the brainchild of Krupp and Daimler Benz, discontinued in 1937, was released in the amount of 1574 units.
In the Soviet army, the bulk of the Second World War was supposed to withstand the bulk of the German armored armada. Medium Tank T-34had many modifications, one of which the T-34-85 is in service with some countries to this day.
Battle progress
There was a lull on the fronts. Stalin had doubts about the accuracy of the calculations of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Also, the idea of \u200b\u200bcompetent misinformation did not leave him until the last moment. Nevertheless, at 23.20 on July 4 and 02.20 on July 5, artillery of two Soviet fronts dealt a massive blow to the alleged positions of the enemy. In addition, the bombers and attack aircraft of the two air armies made an air raid on the enemy’s position in the area of \u200b\u200bKharkov and Belgorod. However, this did not bring much result. According to German reports, only communications were damaged. Losses in manpower and equipment were not serious.
Exactly at 06.00 on July 5, after a powerful artillery preparation, significant forces of the Wehrmacht launched an offensive. However, unexpectedly they received a powerful rebuff. This was facilitated by the presence of numerous tank barriers, minefields with a high frequency of mining. Due to significant damage to the connected communications, the Germans failed to achieve a clear interaction between the units, which led to disagreements in the actions: the infantry was often left without the support of tanks. On the northern front, the blow was aimed at Olkhovatka. After little success and serious losses, the Germans sent a strike at Ponyri. But even there, they failed to break into the Soviet defense. Thus, on July 10, less than a third of all German tanks remained in service.
* After the Germans went on the attack, Rokossovsky called Stalin and happily announced in his voice that the offensive had begun. Perplexed, Stalin asked Rokossovsky about the reason for his joy. The general replied that now the victory in the Battle of Kursk will not go anywhere.
To defeat the Russians in the South was assigned the task of the 4th Panzer Corps, the 2nd Panzer Corps of the SS and the Kempf Army Group, which were part of the 4th Army. Here events unfolded more successfully than in the North, although the planned result was not achieved. The 48th Panzer Corps suffered heavy losses in the attack on Cherkasskoye, not moving significantly forward.
The defense of Cherkassky is one of the brightest pages of the Battle of Kursk, which for some reason is practically not remembered. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps was more successful. He was tasked to go to the Prokhorovka area, where in a favorable tactical battle area to give battle to the Soviet reserve. Thanks to the presence of companies consisting of heavy Tigers, the Leibstandart and Das Reich divisions managed to quickly breach the defenses of the Voronezh Front. The command of the Voronezh Front decided to strengthen the defensive lines and sent the 5th Stalingrad Panzer Corps to carry out this task. In fact, Soviet tankers received an order to seize the line that had already been captured by the Germans, but threats by the tribunal and execution forced them to go on the offensive. Having hit the Das Reich in the forehead, the 5th Stk failed and was thrown back. The Das Reich tanks launched an attack, trying to encircle the forces of the corps. In part, they succeeded, but thanks to unit commanders who were outside the ring, communications were not cut. However, during these battles, Soviet troops lost 119 tanks, which is undeniably the largest loss of Soviet troops in one day. Thus, on July 6, the Germans reached the third line of defense of the Voronezh Front, which made the situation difficult.
On July 12, in the Prokhorovka area, after mutual artillery preparation and massive airstrikes, 850 tanks of the 5th Guards Army under the command of General Rotmistrov and 700 tanks from side 2 of the SS Panzer Corps collided in a head-on battle. The fight lasted all day. The initiative passed from hand to hand. Opponents suffered tremendous losses. A thick smoke of fires covered the battlefield. However, the victory remained with us, the enemy was forced to retreat.
On this day, on the North Face, the Western and Bryansk fronts went on the offensive. The very next day, the German defense was broken through, and by August 5, Soviet troops managed to free the Eagle. The Oryol operation, during which the Germans lost 90 thousand soldiers killed, was called “Kutuzov” in the plans of the General Staff.
Operation Rumyantsev was to defeat the German forces in the Kharkov and Belgorod region. On August 3, an offensive was launched by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Front. By August 5, Belgorod was liberated. On August 23, Kharkov, on the third attempt, was liberated by the Soviet troops, which marked the end of Operation Rumyantsev and, together with it, the Battle of Kursk.
* On August 5, the first salute in the entire War was given in Moscow in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod from the Nazi invaders.
Loss of parties
Until now, the losses of Germany and the USSR during the Battle of Kursk are not exactly known. Today, the data diverge dramatically. In 1943, the Germans in the battle on the Kursk ledge lost more than 500 thousand people killed and wounded. 1000-1500 enemy tanks were destroyed by Soviet soldiers. And Soviet asses and air defense forces destroyed 1696 aircraft.
As for the USSR, irretrievable losses amounted to more than a quarter of a million people. 6024 tanks and self-propelled guns were burned, out of order for technical reasons. 1626 aircraft were shot down in the sky over Kursk and Orel.
Summary, Value
Guderian and Manstein in their memoirs say that the Battle of Kursk was a turning point in the war on the Eastern Front. Soviet troops inflicted heavy damage on the Germans, who forever missed a strategic advantage. In addition, the armored power of the Nazis could no longer be restored to its previous levels. The days of Hitler Germany were numbered. The victory on the Kursk Bulge became an excellent tool for raising the morale of fighters on all fronts, the population in the rear of the country and in the occupied territories.
Day of Military Glory of Russia
The day of the defeat by the Soviet troops of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Kursk in accordance with the Federal Law of March 13, 1995 is celebrated annually. This is a memorial day for all those who, in July-August 1943 during the defensive operation of the Soviet troops, as well as the offensive operations "Kutuzov" and "Rumyantsev" on the Kursk ledge, managed to break the ridge of a powerful enemy, predetermining the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. In 2013, large-scale celebrations are expected to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory on the Arc of Fire. 
Video about the Kursk Bulge, the key moments of the battle, be sure to recommend viewing:
In the early spring of 1943, after the end of the winter-spring battles, a huge ledge was formed on the line of the Soviet-German front between the cities of Oryol and Belgorod, directed to the west. This bend was unofficially called the Kursk Bulge. On the bend of the arc were the troops of the Soviet Central and Voronezh Fronts and the German Army Groups Center and South.
Some representatives of the highest command circles of Germany suggested the Wehrmacht to go on defensive actions, exhausting the Soviet troops, restoring their own forces and strengthening the occupied territories. However, Hitler was categorically against: he believed that the German army was still strong enough to inflict a major defeat on the Soviet Union and again seize the elusive strategic initiative. An objective analysis of the situation showed that the German army was no longer capable of attacking immediately on all fronts. Therefore, it was decided to limit the offensive action to only one segment of the front. Logically, the German command chose the Kursk Bulge to strike. According to the plan, German troops were supposed to strike in convergent directions from Orel and Belgorod in the direction of Kursk. With a successful outcome, this ensured the encirclement and defeat of the troops of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of the Red Army. The final plans for the operation, codenamed Citadel, were approved on May 10–11, 1943.
To solve the plans of the German command regarding exactly where the Wehrmacht would advance in the summer of 1943 was not a big deal. The Kursk ledge, extending many kilometers deep into the territory controlled by the Nazis, was a tempting and obvious target. Already on April 12, 1943, at a meeting at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR, a decision was made to move to deliberate, planned and powerful defense in the Kursk region. The troops of the Red Army were to restrain the onslaught of the Nazi forces, exhaust the enemy, and then go on a counterattack and defeat the enemy. After that, it was supposed to launch a general offensive in the western and south-western directions.
In case the Germans decided not to advance in the Kursk region, an offensive plan was also created by forces concentrated on this sector of the front. However, the defensive plan remained a priority, and it was to its implementation that the Red Army began in April 1943.
The defense on the Kursk Bulge was built thoroughly. In total, 8 defensive lines with a total depth of about 300 kilometers were created. Great attention was paid to the mining of approaches to the defense line: according to various sources, the density of minefields amounted to 1500-1700 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines per kilometer of the front. Anti-tank artillery was not evenly distributed along the front, but assembled in the so-called "anti-tank areas" - localized clusters of anti-tank guns that covered several directions at once and partially overlapped the shelling sectors. Thus, the maximum concentration of fire was achieved and the shelling of one advancing enemy unit from several sides at once.
Before the start of the operation, the troops of the Central and Voronezh fronts totaled about 1.2 million people, about 3.5 thousand tanks, 20 000 guns and mortars, as well as 2800 aircraft. The Steppe Front, numbering about 580,000 people, 1,500 tanks, 7,400 guns and mortars, and about 700 aircraft, acted as a reserve.
From the German side, 50 German divisions took part in the battle, numbering, according to various sources, from 780 to 900 thousand people, about 2700 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 10 000 guns and about 2.5 thousand aircraft.
Thus, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the Red Army had a numerical advantage. However, we should not forget that these troops were located on the defensive, and therefore, the German command was able to effectively concentrate forces and achieve the necessary concentration of troops in the breakthrough areas. In addition, in 1943, the German army received in large numbers new heavy Tiger tanks and medium Panthers, as well as Ferdinand heavy self-propelled guns, which were only 89 in the troops (out of 90 built) and which, however , by themselves, represented a considerable threat, provided that they were correctly used in the right place.
At the time, the German Air Force received new combat aircraft: the Fokke-Wulf-190A fighters and the Henschel-129 attack aircraft. During the battles on the Kursk Bulge, the first mass use by the Soviet Air Force of the La-5, Yak-7 and Yak-9 fighters took place.
On May 6–8, Soviet aviation using six air armies struck at a 1,200-kilometer front from Smolensk to the coast of the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov. The goal for this strike was the airfields of the German Air Force. On the one hand, this really made it possible to inflict certain damage on both cars and airfields, however, on the other hand, Soviet aircraft suffered losses, and these actions did not significantly affect the situation in the upcoming Kursk battle.
In general, the same can be said about the actions of the Luftwaffe. German planes bombed railways, bridges, places of concentration of Soviet forces. It is worth noting that German aviation often acted more successfully. Claims in this regard were made to parts of the Soviet air defense. One way or another, the German troops could not achieve serious damage and disruption to the communications of the Red Army.
Both commands — the Voronezh and Central Fronts — predicted the date of the German troops on the offensive quite accurately: according to them, the attack should have been expected from July 3 to 6. The day before the battle, Soviet intelligence managed to capture the "language", which announced that the Germans would begin the assault on July 5.
The northern face of the Kursk Bulge was held by the Central Front of Army General K. Rokossovsky. Knowing the time of the beginning of the German offensive, at 2:30 a.m. the front commander gave the order to conduct a half-hour artillery counter-training. Then, at 4:30, the artillery strike was repeated. The effectiveness of this event was quite controversial. According to reports of Soviet artillery, German troops suffered substantial damage. However, apparently, it was still not possible to inflict big damage. It is precisely known about small losses in manpower and equipment, as well as about the violation of the enemy’s wired lines. In addition, now the Germans knew for sure that a sudden attack would not work - the Red Army was ready for defense.
Aviation was supposed to support Soviet troops in the process of counteracting artillery raids, but due to the dark time of the day, all sorties were canceled. At 2:30 on July 5, a readiness directive was received by the aviation units from the commander of the 16th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rudenko. In accordance with it, the fighter units should have been ready to repel possible Luftwaffe raids already at dawn, and attack aircraft and bombers were ordered to be ready by 6:00 in the morning.
In the early morning, Soviet fighters began a battle with German bombers and attack aircraft. In the area of \u200b\u200bMaloarkhangelsk, German Ju-88s, operating under the guise of Fokke-Wulf fighters, bombed the location of Soviet units. The pilots of the 157th fighter regiment shot down three Ju-88s and two FW-190s. The Germans shot down five Soviet fighters. In this battle, the Luftwaffe lost the commander of the unit, German Michael, whose plane, according to German data, exploded in the air.
Until half-past seven in the morning on the first day of the battle on the Central Front section, Soviet pilots managed to quite successfully repel the Luftwaffe attacks. However, then the Germans began to act much more actively. The number of enemy aircraft in the air also increased. Soviet aircraft continued to fly out in groups of 6-8 fighters: the organizational mistake made by the air command affected. This led to serious difficulties for fighters of the Red Army Air Force. In general, on the first day of the battle, the 16th Air Army suffered quite serious losses in both destroyed and damaged aircraft. In addition to the errors mentioned above, the small experience of many Soviet pilots also affected.
On July 6, the 16th Air Army accompanied the counterattack of the 17th Guards Corps at Maloarkhangelsk. Aircraft of the 221st Bomber Division took off until the second half of the day, attacking German troops in Senkovo, Yasnaya Polyana, Podolyany and other settlements. At the same time, German planes continuously bombed the positions of Soviet troops. According to Soviet data, Soviet tanks did not suffer heavy losses from bombs - most of the vehicles destroyed and damaged by that time were hit by land means.
Until July 9, the 16th Air Army continued not only to conduct active battles, but also simultaneously try to change the tactics of using aviation. Before the bombers, they tried to send large groups of fighters to "clear" the airspace. Air divisions and regiment commanders began to receive more initiative in planning operations. But when conducting operations, the pilots had to act in accordance with the set goals, without being distracted from the plan.
In general, during the battles of the first stage of the Battle of Kursk, units of the 16th Air Army completed about 7.5 thousand sorties. The army suffered heavy losses, but did everything possible to provide proper support to its ground forces. Starting from the third day of fighting, the command of the army changed the tactics of the aircraft, resorting to massive attacks on the accumulations of enemy equipment and manpower. These attacks had a positive impact on the development of events on July 9-10 in the battle zone of the Central Front.
In the area of \u200b\u200boperations of the Voronezh Front (commander - Army General Vatutin), hostilities began as early as July 4 with attacks by German units on positions of military front guard and lasted until late at night.
On July 5, the main phase of the battle began. The fighting on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was significantly more intense and was accompanied by more serious losses of the Soviet troops than on the northern. The reason for this was the area more suitable for the use of tanks, and a number of organizational miscalculations at the level of the Soviet front command.
The main blow of the German troops was delivered along the Belgorod-Oboyan highway. This section of the front was held by the 6th Guards Army. The first attack took place at 6 am on July 5 in the direction of the village of Cherkasskoye. Two attacks followed with the support of tanks and aircraft. Both were repelled, after which the Germans moved the direction of the attack towards the settlement of Butovo. In the battles of Cherkassky, the enemy practically managed to make a breakthrough, but at the cost of heavy losses the Soviet troops prevented it, often losing up to 50-70% of the personnel of the units.
Air support of the Red Army units on the southern front of the Kursk Bulge was carried out by the 2nd and 17th Air Armies. In the early morning of July 5, German aviation began bombing the battle formations of the first and second lines of Soviet defense. Departures by fighter squadrons managed to inflict quite substantial damage to the enemy, but the losses of the Soviet troops were also high.
On July 6, German tanks launched an assault on the second line of defense of the Soviet troops. On this day, among the other Soviet units, it should be noted the 291st assault and the 2nd guards assault air divisions of the 16th Air Army, for the first time using cumulative bombs PTAB 2.5-1.5 in battle. The effect of these bombs on enemy vehicles was described as "excellent."
The problems and shortcomings that were noted in the actions of Soviet aviation of the 2nd and 17th air armies are very similar to similar problems in the 16th army. However, even here the command tried to correct the tactics of using airplanes, to solve organizational problems as quickly as possible and by all means strive to increase the effectiveness of the air forces. Apparently, these measures have reached their goal. Increasingly, in the reports of the commanders of ground units, words began to appear that the Soviet attack aircraft significantly facilitate the repulsion of German tank and infantry attacks. Fighters also inflicted significant damage to the enemy. So, it was noted that only the 5th fighter air corps in the first three days reached the mark of 238 enemy aircraft shot down.
On July 10, bad weather set in the Kursk. This sharply reduced the number of sorties from both the Soviet and German sides. Among the undoubtedly successful battles of this day, one can note the actions of 10 La-5 from the 193 fighter regiment, who were able to “disperse” a group of 35 Ju-87 dive bombers with a cover of six Bf.109. Enemy aircraft randomly dropped bombs and began to leave on their territory. Two Junkers were shot down. The heroic feat in this battle was made by junior lieutenant M.V. Kubyshkin, who, saving his commander, went to the oncoming ram of the Messerschmitt and died.
On July 12, at the height of the Prokhorov battle, aviation on both sides could provide only very limited support to ground units: weather conditions continued to be bad. The Air Force of the Red Army made only 759 sorties on this day, and the Luftwaffe - 654. At the same time, there are no references to the destroyed Soviet tanks in the reports of German pilots. Subsequently, the advantage in the air on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge gradually passed to Soviet aviation. By July 17, the activity of the 8th German air corps fell to almost zero.
