Pakistan in the Afghan war 1979 1989. Afghan war - briefly

Afghan war 1979-1989: the entire chronicle of events from beginning to end

For more than 30 years after World War II, the Soviet Union was at peace without taking part in any major military conflicts. Thus, Soviet military advisers and soldiers participated in wars and conflicts, but they did not take place on the territory of the USSR and in terms of the scope of participation of Soviet citizens in them they were essentially insignificant. Thus, the Afghan War became the largest armed conflict since 1945 in which Soviet soldiers and officers took part.

Historical background

Since the 19th century, there has been a peaceful struggle between the Russian and British empires, aimed at expanding the sphere of influence in the Central Asian region. At the same time, Russia's efforts were aimed at annexing the lands lying along its southern outskirts (Turkestan, Khiva, Bukhara), and Great Britain - at the colonization of India. It was here that already in 1885 the interests of both powers collided for the first time. However, things did not come to war, and the parties continued to colonize the lands that were in their spheres of influence. Afghanistan was at the same time a cornerstone in relations between Russia and Britain, a very advantageous position that would allow decisive control over the region. At the same time, the country remained neutral, extracting its own benefits from this situation.

The first attempt by the British crown to subjugate Afghanistan was made back in 1838-1842. Then the British expeditionary force encountered stubborn resistance from the troops of the Afghan emirate, as well as guerrilla warfare. The result was the victory of Afghanistan, the preservation of its independence and the withdrawal of British troops from the country. However, Britain's presence in the Central Asian region has increased.

The next attempt by the British to take control of Afghanistan was a war that lasted from 1878 to 1880. During this war, British troops again suffered a series of defeats from the Afghan army, but the Afghan army, in turn, was defeated. As a result, Afghanistan became a British protectorate, and the southern part of the country was annexed to British India.

However, this state of affairs was temporary. The freedom-loving Afghans did not want to remain under the control of the British, and discontent quickly and massively matured in the country. However, Afghanistan had a real chance to free itself from British protectorate only after the First World War. In February 1919, Amanullah Khan ascended the throne in Afghanistan. He was supported by representatives of the “Young Afghans” and the army, who finally wanted to get rid of the oppression of the British. Already upon his accession to the throne, Amanullah Khan declared the country's independence from Britain, which caused the invasion of British troops. The 50,000-strong Afghan army was quickly defeated, but a powerful national movement practically nullified the military victories of the British. Already in August 1919, a peace treaty was concluded between Afghanistan and Great Britain, according to which Afghanistan became a completely independent state, and its border ran along the Durand Line (the modern Afghan-Pakistani border).

In foreign policy, the orientation towards the young Soviet state became most obvious. So, Soviet military instructors arrived here, who made it possible to create a fairly combat-ready air force, and also participated in combat operations against Afghan rebels.

However, the north of Afghanistan became a refuge for mass migration of residents of Soviet Central Asia who did not want to accept the new government. Basmachi detachments were also formed here, which then carried out partisan attacks on the territory of the USSR. At the same time, the financing of armed groups was carried out by Great Britain. In this regard, the Soviet government sent a note of protest to Amanullah Khan, after which the channels of English assistance to the Basmachis were significantly suppressed.

However, things were far from calm in Afghanistan itself. Already in the fall of 1928, an uprising of a new contender for the throne, Habibullah, who also received support from Great Britain, broke out in the east of the country. As a result, Amanullah Khan was forced to flee to Kandahar, and Habibullah seized power. The result of this was the complete immersion of Afghanistan into the abyss of anarchy, when absolutely everything was subjected to pogroms: schools, hospitals, villages.

Thus, by April 1929, a difficult situation had developed: the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, was in Kandahar, forming an army of people loyal to him. Habibullah was in Kabul, continuing to enforce the cruel laws of Islamic fundamentalism. In this situation, the Soviet leadership decided to help the legitimate leader of Afghanistan regain power in the country. On April 15, Soviet troops under the command of the Soviet military attache V. Primakov crossed the border of Afghanistan and began active military operations against Habibullah’s supporters. From the very first days, events developed clearly in favor of the Red Army, and the number of losses was approximately 1:200 in its favor. However, the successes of the operation, achieved in a month and a half, were negated by the flight of Amanullah Khan to India and the end of his struggle for power. After this, the Soviet contingent was withdrawn from the country.

In 1930, the Red Army again launched a campaign into Afghanistan with the goal of defeating the Basmachi gangs based there and destroying their economic and supply bases. However, the Basmachi did not accept the battle and retreated to the central regions of the country, which is why the further presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan became not only impractical, but also diplomatically dangerous. In this regard, the Red Army left the country.

In Afghanistan itself, the civil war subsided only at the end of 1929, when Habibullah was overthrown by Nadir Shah (the latter became the king of Afghanistan). After this, the country continued to develop, albeit extremely slowly. Relations with the Soviet Union were quite close, thanks to which the country had many benefits, mainly of an economic nature.

At the turn of the 1950s-1960s, people's democratic movements, including Marxist ones, began to emerge in Afghanistan. Thus, the ideological inspirer and leader of the Marxist movement was Nur Mohammed Taraki, a journal poet. It was he who, on January 1, 1965, announced the creation of the PDPA - the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. However, the composition of the party was heterogeneous - it included people from the lower strata of society, as well as from the middle and even the upper. This inevitably led to a conflict within the party and caused its split already in 1967, when two branches were formed at once: “Khalq” (“People”, the most radical faction) and “Parcham” (“Banner”, a moderate faction, represented mainly representatives of the intelligentsia).

Afghanistan remained a monarchy until 1973, when the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud led an anti-monarchy coup and ultimately came to power as prime minister. The change in the form of government had virtually no effect on Soviet-Afghan relations, since Muhammad Daoud continued to maintain close relations with the USSR. The name of the country changed to the Republic of Afghanistan.

Over the next five years, Mohammed Daoud took steps to modernize Afghan industry and the state as a whole, but his steps actually did not have any results. By 1978, the situation in the country was such that almost all sections of the population were opposed to the vain prime minister. The severity of the political situation can be indicated by the fact that already in 1976, both factions of the PDPA - Khalq and Parcham - agreed to cooperate against the dictatorship of Daoud.

The revolution and the assassination of Muhammad Daoud, which occurred on April 28, 1978 under the leadership of the PDPA and the army, became a milestone in the history of the country. Now a regime has been established in Afghanistan, very similar and akin to the Soviet one, which could not but cause further rapprochement between the two countries. As in the USSR, the head of state was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Nur Muhammad Taraki, who was the leader of the Khalq faction. The name of the state changed to "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan".

Beginning of the Civil War

However, things were still not calm in Afghanistan. First of all, after the April (or Saur) revolution, the struggle between the PDPA factions intensified. Since it was the Khalq wing that received a dominant position in the government, the gradual removal of the Parchamists from the levers of power began. Another process was the departure from Islamic traditions in the country, the opening of schools, hospitals and factories. Also an important decree was the provision of land to peasants free of charge.

However, all these measures, which were intended to improve life and thus gain the support of the people, led mainly to diametrically opposed results. The formation of armed opposition groups began, consisting mainly of peasants, which, in principle, is not surprising. People who had lived Islamic traditions for hundreds of years and suddenly lost them, simply could not accept it. Also dissatisfied were the actions of the Afghan government army, which often, in the fight against the rebels, struck peaceful villages whose residents were not associated with the opposition.

In 1978, the civil war began, which essentially continues in Afghanistan to this day. In its early stages, this war was fought between the Afghan government and armed rebels - the so-called "dushmans". However, in 1978, the rebels’ actions were still not sufficiently coordinated and consisted mainly of attacks on Afghan military units and shelling of convoys. Blows were also struck against party functionaries, but this mainly concerned lower-level party representatives.

However, the main signal that the armed opposition had matured and was ready for decisive measures was the uprising in the large city of Herat, which broke out in March 1979. At the same time, there was a real danger of the city being captured, since the Afghan government army was very reluctant to fight against its compatriots, and there were frequent cases of government soldiers going over to the side of the rebels.

It was in this regard that real panic began among the Afghan leadership. It became clear that with the loss of such a large administrative center as Herat, the government’s position would be seriously shaken. A long series of negotiations began between the Afghan and Soviet leadership. In these negotiations, the Afghan government asked to send Soviet troops to help suppress the rebellion. However, the Soviet leadership clearly understood that the intervention of the Soviet Armed Forces in the conflict would only lead to a worsening of the situation, including the international one.

Ultimately, the Afghan government army was able to cope with the Herat rebellion, but the situation in the country continued to deteriorate. It became clear that a civil war was already in full swing in the country. Thus, the Afghan government army was drawn into battles with rebel gangs that controlled mainly rural and mountainous areas. The “people's” Afghan government managed to control only a number of large cities (and not always completely).

In the same regard, the popularity of Noor Mohammad Taraki in Afghanistan began to decline, while his prime minister, Hafizullah Amin, was rapidly gaining political weight. Amin was a rather tough politician who believed that order could be restored in the country only through military means.

Undercover intrigues in the Afghan government led to the fact that in mid-September 1979, Nur Mohammad Taraki was removed from all his posts and expelled from the PDPA. The reason for this was the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Prime Minister Amin when he arrived at Taraki’s residence for negotiations. This assassination attempt (or provocation, since there is still no sufficient evidence that Mohammad Taraki himself was involved in the assassination attempt) made him an obvious enemy of Amin, which resulted in the former receiving a death sentence. Taraki was killed in October 1979, and his family and friends were taken to Puli-Charkhi prison.

Having become the ruler of Afghanistan, Hafizullah Amin set about purging both the ranks of the clergy and the rival faction, Parcham.

At the same time, Amin realized that he could no longer cope with the rebels on his own. Increasingly, there were cases of soldiers and officers transferring from the government Afghan army to the ranks of the Mujahideen. The only restraining factor in the Afghan units were Soviet military advisers, who sometimes suppressed such incidents by the force of their authority and character. During numerous negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan leadership, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, after weighing all the pros and cons, at its meeting on December 12, 1979, decided to send a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan.

Soviet troops had been in Afghanistan since July 1979, when a battalion of the 111th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 105th Airborne Division was transferred to Bagram (a city about 60 km from Kabul, also a large air base in the country). The battalion’s responsibilities included monitoring and guarding the Bagram airfield, where Soviet planes with supplies for the Afghan leadership landed and took off from. On December 14, 1979, a battalion from the 345th separate parachute regiment arrived here as reinforcements. Also on December 20, the Soviet “Muslim Battalion” was transferred to Kabul, which received this name because it was staffed exclusively by Soviet military personnel from the Central Asian republics. This battalion was included in the Amin palace security brigade, supposedly to strengthen the security of the Afghan leader. But few people knew that the Soviet party leadership decided to “remove” the too impulsive and obstinate leader of Afghanistan.

There are many versions of why it was decided to remove Hafizula Amin and put Babrak Karmal in his place, but there is no consensus on this matter. It is likely that after establishing order in Afghanistan with the help of Soviet troops, Amin would become too independent, which, given his close contacts with the United States, jeopardized the Soviet presence in the country. If the United States of America had received an ally in Amin, the threat to the southern borders of the USSR would have become obvious. Also, we should not forget that Amin, with his widespread repressions and the murder of Nur Mohammad Taraki, managed in a very short period of time to turn against himself not only the lower strata of Afghan society (who, however, were already in the majority in opposition to the regime), but also and the Afghan elite. Having concentrated great power in his hands, he had no intention of sharing it with anyone. It would be, to put it mildly, unreasonable for the Soviet leadership to rely on such a leader.

By December 25, 1979, two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, two motorized rifle regiments, 2 fighter-bomber aviation regiments, 2 helicopter regiments, one airborne fighter regiment, and airborne troops were prepared for entry into Afghanistan from the Central Asian, Turkestan and Belarusian military districts. -assault brigade and logistics support units. Additionally, three more divisions were formed and staffed according to wartime standards as a reserve. All these troops were part of the 40th Combined Arms Army, which was destined to enter Afghanistan.

The troops were staffed mainly by reservists - residents of the Central Asian republics called up for military training. For example, in the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, whose task was to march and take positions in the area of ​​the city of Kunduz, about half of the personnel were reservists. All this, of course, had a negative impact on the combat training of the units, but given that the participation of Soviet troops in hostilities was not planned, then such a “show of force” had its meaning.

Already on December 25, the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan began. The first to enter Afghanistan were units of the 108th Motorized Rifle Division, as well as units of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, which were landed in Kabul. Also on this day, the 4th Airborne Assault Battalion of the 56th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade entered the country, whose task was to secure the strategically important tunnel on the Salang Pass.

In the period from December 25 to December 31, 1979, almost all units of the 40th Army that were intended for this entered the territory of Afghanistan.

As of March 1980, the deployment of units of the 40th Army was as follows:

• Kabul - 103rd Guards Airborne Division and 108th Motorized Rifle Division.
• Bagram - 345th separate parachute regiment.
• Herat - 101st motorized rifle regiment of the 5th motorized rifle division.
• Shindand - 5th motorized rifle division.
• Kunduz - 201st motorized rifle division and 56th separate air assault brigade.
• Kandahar - 70th separate motorized rifle brigade.
• Jalalabad - 66th separate motorized rifle brigade.
• Ghazni - 191st separate motorized rifle regiment.
• Puli-Khumri - 395th motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
• Khanabad - 122nd motorized rifle regiment of the 201st motorized rifle division.
• Fayzabad - 860th separate motorized rifle regiment.
• Jabal Ussaraj - 177th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division.
• Aviation units were based at the airfields: Bagram, Kunduz, Shindand, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Faizabad, Ghazni and Gardez.

On December 27, 1979, the Alpha group carried out an operation at Amin’s residence to eliminate the obstinate leader. As a result, Hafizula Amin was eliminated, and on the night of December 28, the new ruler of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, arrived in Kabul. On the same night (from December 27 to 28), Soviet troops, mainly from the 103rd Airborne Division, occupied a number of important buildings in the Afghan capital and established complete control over them.

Beginning of the war (1979-1982)

OKSV began suffering its first losses in Afghanistan back in December 1979. So, on December 25, while landing at Kabul airfield, an Il-76 carrying paratroopers of the 103rd Airborne Division crashed into a mountain. As a result, dozens of soldiers and officers died.

From the very first days of the presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, our units began to be drawn into hostilities, which at first were of an exclusively episodic nature. So, on January 11, 1980, units of the 186th motorized rifle regiment of the 108th motorized rifle division stormed the village of Nahrin not far from Baghlan, suppressing the rebellion of the Afghan artillery regiment. At the same time, losses during the operation were extremely low (two wounded and two killed, with about 100 Afghans killed).

It is noteworthy that the nature of the first military operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan was more likely to suppress uprisings of Afghan units than to fight with dushmans, whose units were essentially still being created and formed. Also, the tasks of the Soviet units at this time included maintaining control over a number of large settlements in the country, disarming deserters and improving everyday life.

The first clash between Soviet troops and dushmans was the Kunar operation, which took place from late February to mid-March 1980. During this operation, three Soviet battalions carried out a raid against gangs in the province of the same name. As a result, having inflicted significant losses on the enemy, our troops lost 52 people killed.

Since the beginning of the spring of 1980, the war in Afghanistan has unfolded in full. To ensure control over a number of areas, as well as to reduce the effectiveness of the rebels’ actions, Soviet military units began to be regularly involved in combat operations, often in cooperation with the Afghan army (“greens”) or Afghan units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“tsaranda”). The combat effectiveness of the Afghan government army (unlike the Mujahideen) was at a very low level, which was explained by the reluctance of ordinary Afghans to fight for something that they themselves did not really know.

Although the effectiveness of OKSVA’s actions was quite high, losses increased sharply with the increase in the intensity of hostilities. Naturally, this was kept silent in the official Soviet press, which stated that “Soviet troops are in Afghanistan for maneuvers, as well as to provide international assistance to the fraternal people, consisting in the construction of hospitals, houses and schools.”

By mid-1980, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee decided to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan a number of tank and anti-aircraft units, which were not needed in the conditions of the guerrilla war. However, at the same time, the question of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was postponed. It became clear that the Soviet Army was “bogged down” in Afghanistan, and this fact simply could not go unnoticed by the CIA. It was 1980 that was characterized by the beginning of cooperation between American intelligence services and the Afghan Mujahideen.

The year 1981 for OKSVA is characterized by a further intensification of hostilities. During the first half of the year, Soviet troops fought with rebels mainly in the northern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, but already in May the situation in the central region of the country, near Kabul, worsened. Here, actions on the part of the group of Ahmad Shah Masud, whose patrimony was the Panjshir Gorge, intensified, thanks to which he received the title “Lion of Panjshir”. The purpose of his group’s actions was to expand the area of ​​control, as well as to pin down Soviet troops in order to prevent their penetration into Panjshir.

However, by August 1981, Soviet troops had already carried out four combined arms operations in the Panjshir Gorge. However, as in previous times, Soviet troops occupied the territory of the gorge, destroyed part of the enemy’s manpower and their ammunition depots, but could not stay here for long - the difficulties in supplying them far from the places of permanent deployment of units affected them, as well as the fact that the dushmans in such a “dead” area they acted exceptionally boldly. The effectiveness of the Panjshir operations was seriously reduced by the fact that the rebels left the gorge ahead of time, leaving only barriers from small detachments and mining the paths.

By the end of 1981, it became clear that the dushmans, having an inexhaustible flow of volunteers and supplies from Pakistan, could fight for as long as they wanted. It was for this purpose, to block mountain paths in the southeast, that the 56th separate air assault brigade was transferred from Kunduz to the city of Gardez, the capital of Paktia province. Additionally, the actions of other Soviet units near the southern border of Afghanistan intensified. Indeed, already in the first months of 1982, it was possible to significantly reduce the flow of reinforcements and supplies for the Mujahideen from Pakistan. However, in the following months, due to the intensification of the actions of the dushman in other parts of the country, the situation practically returned to its initial state. The most striking episode, testifying to the increased combat capabilities of the rebels, was their encirclement of an entire battalion (4th Airborne Assault) of the 56th Airborne Assault Brigade in the Alikhail area. Only thanks to the energetic actions of the brigade leadership, as well as the competent interaction of the military branches (aviation, landing and artillery), the battalion was released with relatively small losses.

The war continues (1982-1987)

The year 1982 was also marked by a major tragedy at the tunnel through the Salang Pass, which was strategically important for the whole of Afghanistan. In November, a sabotage act by dushmans was committed there, which consisted in the fact that the exit from one side of the tunnel was blocked by their cars.

As a result of this action, 64 Soviet soldiers died, as well as more than 100 Afghans, including civilians. The rebels, in pursuit of immediate success, did not even stop at killing their compatriots, Afghan women and children.

At the end of the same 1982, a meeting was held in Moscow between Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq and the head of the USSR Yuri Andropov. During the meeting, the conditions for ending Pakistan's assistance to the Afghan rebels, as well as the conditions for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country, were discussed.

During 1983, Soviet troops in Afghanistan continued to carry out operations against armed opposition groups. However, this period is characterized by an increased intensity of hostilities in the area of ​​the Soviet-Afghan border (Marmol operation), as well as the end of the fighting in the Panjshir Gorge by signing a truce with the armed forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud. The 177th special forces detachment located in the gorge was eventually withdrawn from it after 8 months of intense combat operations.

In April, in the province of Nimroz, a large fortified area of ​​​​Rabati-Jali militants was defeated. This fortified area also had the functions of a transshipment base for transporting drugs. After its destruction, the economic base of the rebels was significantly damaged, not to mention the fact that they lost a powerful base capable of admitting a large number of militants from Iran and Pakistan.

Another “hot” spot in a far from calm Afghanistan in the summer of 1983 was the city of Khost, located in the southeast of the country, almost close to the border of Pakistan. It was on him that the dushmans began their attack in July. Their plan was simple: to capture the city and make it the capital of the “rebellious” areas. Taking the Host would allow them to gain recognition in the world.

However, the stubborn defense of Khost made adjustments to the plans of the leadership of the Afghan opposition. Having failed to take the city right away, it was decided to take it into the blockade ring. But this plan also failed. Soviet troops, with massive air and artillery support, managed to thwart the attempted blockade of the city.

The winter of 1983-1984 in the Afghan War is notable for the fact that for the first time during it, armed opposition groups did not leave the territory of Afghanistan, as was the case previously. This caused an aggravated situation in the area of ​​Kabul and Jalalabad, where the Mujahideen began setting up bases and fortified areas for a long-term guerrilla war.

It was in this regard that, already at the beginning of 1984, the decision was made to carry out Operation Veil by Soviet troops. Its essence was to create a barrier line along the Afghan-Pakistani and partially Afghan-Iranian borders with the aim of stopping the supply of Mujahideen detachments and intercepting caravans going to the territory of Afghanistan. For these purposes, quite large forces with a total number of 6 to 10 thousand people and a large number of aviation and artillery were allocated.

But the operation ultimately did not achieve its goal, since it was almost impossible to completely close the border with Pakistan, especially with such limited, albeit mobile, forces. Only 15-20% of the total number of caravans coming from Pakistan were intercepted.

1984 was characterized mainly by military operations against the newly created transit points and fortified areas of the dushmans with the aim of depriving them of long-term bases and ultimately reducing the intensity of their operations. At the same time, the Mujahideen not only carried out military operations, but also carried out a number of terrorist attacks in the cities of the country, such as the explosion of a bus with passengers in Kabul in June of the same year.

In the second half of 1984, the rebels became more active in the area of ​​​​the city of Khost, and therefore, in November-December, a large army operation was carried out here to accompany the columns and break through the orders of dushmans who were trying to take the city. As a result, the Mujahideen suffered heavy losses. It is worth noting, however, that the losses of Soviet troops were very noticeable. Constant mine explosions, of which by 1984 there were almost 10 times more on Afghan roads compared to the initial period of the war, unexpected shelling of convoys and Soviet units, already exceeded the level of casualties from ordinary fire contacts with dushmans.

However, the situation in January 1985 remained stable. The Afghan government, with strong support from the Soviet Army, held Kabul and a number of provincial centers. The Mujahideen were in full control of the rural and mountainous areas, having serious support among dehkans - Afghan peasants and receiving supplies from Pakistan.

It was with the aim of increasing the number of intercepted caravans coming from Pakistan and Iran that in the spring of 1985, the 15th and 22nd separate GRU special forces brigades were introduced into Afghanistan. Being divided into several detachments, they were dispersed throughout the country, from Kandahar to Jalalabad. Thanks to their mobility and exceptional combat effectiveness, the special forces of the GRU General Staff were able to significantly reduce the number of caravans carried out from Pakistan, and, as a result, seriously hit the supply of dushmans in a number of areas.

However, 1985 was marked primarily by large and bloody operations in the Panjshir Gorge, as well as in the Khost region and in the so-called “green zone” of a number of provinces. These operations ensured the defeat of a number of gangs, as well as the seizure of large quantities of weapons and ammunition. For example, in the province of Baghlan, serious losses were inflicted on the troops of the field commander Said Mansur (he himself remained alive).

The year 1985 is also notable for the fact that the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took a course towards a political solution to the Afghan problem. The new trends caused by the young General Secretary M. Gorbachev came in handy on the Afghan issue, and already in February of the following year, 1986, the development of a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began.

In 1986, there was an increased effectiveness of the actions of Soviet troops against the bases and fortified areas of the Mujahideen, as a result of which the following points were defeated: “Karera” (March, Kunar province), “Jawara” (April, Khost province), “Kokari-Sharshari” ( August, Herat province). At the same time, a number of large operations were carried out (for example, in the north of the country, in the provinces of Kunduz and Balkh).

On May 4, 1986, at the XVIII plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, the former head of the Afghan Security Service (KHAD), M. Najibullah, was elected to the post of Secretary General instead of Babrak Karmal. The new head of state announced a new – exclusively political – course for solving intra-Afghan problems.

At the same time, M. Gorbachev announced the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan of a number of military units numbering up to 7 thousand people. However, the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan took place only 4 months later, in October. This move was rather psychological, aimed at showing the Western powers the readiness of the Soviet Union to resolve the Afghan issue peacefully. The fact that a number of withdrawn units practically did not participate in hostilities, and the personnel of a number of newly formed regiments consisted exclusively of soldiers who had served 2 years and were being demobilized, did not bother anyone. That is why this step by the Soviet leadership was a very serious victory with minimal sacrifices.

Another important event that opened the page for the new, final period of the USSR war in Afghanistan was the proclamation by the Afghan government of a course towards national reconciliation. This course provided for a unilateral ceasefire starting January 15, 1987. However, the plans of the new Afghan leadership remained plans. The Afghan armed opposition viewed this policy as a cause of weakness and intensified efforts to fight government forces throughout the country.

The final stage of the war (1987-1989)

The year 1987 is characterized by the complete failure of the policy of national reconciliation put forward by M. Najibullah. The rebels were not going to follow the example of the government troops, and the fighting continued throughout the country. However, it was since 1987 that Soviet troops operated mainly through large army operations, which achieved success thanks to the competent interaction of all branches of the military. The largest operations during this period were: “Strike” (Kunduz province), “Thunderstorm” (Ghazni province), “Circle” (Logar and Kabul provinces), “South-87” (Kandahar province).

Separately, it is also worth mentioning Operation Magistral to unblock the city of Khost. It was this city that was stubbornly defended by both Afghan and Soviet forces for more than 5 years and, as a result, was surrounded. However, supplies to the Khost garrison were carried out by air. The result of Operation Magistral was the complete unblocking of the Gardez-Khost highway in January 1988 and the defeat of a number of rebel gangs.

On April 14, 1988 in Geneva, the ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed agreements on a political settlement of the Afghan conflict. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of these agreements. In addition, the USSR pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan within 9 months. The United States and Pakistan pledged to stop supporting the Mujahideen.

The first period of the OKSV withdrawal from Afghanistan began on May 15, 1988. During it, Soviet units were withdrawn from the Panjshir Gorge, Kunduz, Kandahar, Gardez and other points of the country. As a result, a kind of “vacuum” was initially formed, which was very quickly filled by rebels. Already in August-October, the dushmans occupied a number of large settlements in Afghanistan, including Kunduz and Khanabad. The number of limited Soviet troops was approximately half of what it was as of January 1, 1988 - 50 thousand people.

By November, the Afghan government army, with the support of Soviet troops, controlled only approximately 30% of the country's territory, while after the departure of Soviet units, entire provinces came under the control of the rebels.

On November 15, the second and final stage of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country began. This period is characterized by a significantly reduced intensity of hostilities. The last operation for the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was Operation Typhoon in the provinces of Baghlan, Parwan and Kapisa. It was carried out at the request of the General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee M. Najibullah, who thus wanted to seriously weaken the forces of the rebels at last before facing them one on one. However, although the dushman’s losses were quite large, they were not critical, but the withdrawal of the last Soviet units from Afghanistan made this operation somewhat more complicated.

Tactics of the parties

During the Afghan War, both sides widely used tactics that originated during World War II in Yugoslavia, and were also developed in the wars for freedom of Algeria and Vietnam. At the same time, the USSR, which previously supported the rebels who fought against the armies of capitalist countries, was now itself faced with a serious partisan struggle.

At the beginning of the war, the Soviet army had virtually no experience in fighting modern partisan movements, which caused a number of command errors and serious losses in the first operations. However, the Soviet troops had good combat training and were seriously superior to the Afghan rebels technically, materially and morally.

A striking example of the initial period of hostilities of the Soviet army in Afghanistan was the capture of the bridge over the Kokcha River. This bridge was captured at the end of 1979 - beginning of 1980 and was held by large forces of dushmans (up to 1,500 people). Soviet forces numbered up to 70 people (1st parachute company of the 1st infantry battalion of the 56th air assault brigade, reinforced by AGS-17 crews).

As a result of the battle, Soviet troops drove the rebels out of their positions and occupied the bridge, suffering losses of 7 dead and 10 wounded. The dushman's losses turned out to be much greater. This operation was considered successful, and the company commander, Senior Lieutenant S.P. Kozlov, was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Subsequently, Soviet tactics were significantly developed and became more flexible. To destroy the Mujahideen bases, Soviet units (usually at first no more than a battalion, divided into combat groups for ease of control) went on foot through the mountains or were delivered by helicopter. The firepower of combat groups almost always made it possible to suppress the firing points of the dushmans, as well as destroy their ambushes. In addition to small arms, combat groups were often reinforced by mortar crews and AGS crews. In rare cases, combat groups were even assigned crews of SPTG (mounted anti-tank grenade launchers), which usually did not usually participate in combat operations.
In cases where the enemy was hiding in villages or green zones, the Soviet units themselves or interacting with the “greens” (Afghan government army) carried out a “combing” (search for dushmans in the territory) of a given area.

GRU special forces units, used to intercept caravans, interacted more closely with aviation. Helicopters delivered them to ambush sites, from where they already operated, intercepting, inspecting caravans, or eliminating them if necessary.

The supply of Soviet troops was carried out through columns traveling along Afghan roads with everything they needed. These columns were mandatorily equipped, in addition to trucks, with military equipment (armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, tanks and self-propelled guns). However, despite all the precautions, attacks by dushmans on columns were a very frequent occurrence, and the number of broken and burned equipment became more and more numerous. The road in the area of ​​the village of Mukhamed-Aga in Logar province (the so-called “Mukhamedka”) was notorious throughout Afghanistan - almost every column here was fired upon. It is noteworthy that the drivers of the vehicles in the convoys had instructions - during shelling, increase their speed and try to get out of the fire as quickly as possible.

The Soviet army also made massive use of aviation and artillery. If Vietnam became the “finest” hour for American helicopters, then for Soviet army aviation it was the Afghan War that became such a time. The Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters were not only mobile and reliable means of delivering personnel to the required areas, but also excellent means of supporting ground troops, as well as suppressing enemy firing points. In total, during the years of the Afghan war, the USSR lost 333 helicopters.

The dushman's tactics consisted mainly of inflicting as much damage as possible on Soviet troops and acting on their communications, as well as (for example, near Khost in 1983-1988 or in general at the final stage of the war) in capturing populated areas. Ambushes, attacks on convoys, mining of mountain paths and even terrorist attacks in Kabul and other large cities - these measures had their results, although sometimes very dubious. There were also frequent cases of mujahideen extermination of families, and even entire villages, that in any way collaborated with the “infidels.”

If the dushman group was in danger, it easily disappeared into the mountains that were native to the Afghans. However, the dushmans’ retreat was not always successful, and in such cases the group died or was captured.

At the beginning of the war (1979-1983), the Mujahideen, as a rule, went to spend the winter in Pakistan, where they had equipped field camps and bases. However, starting from 1983, they began to establish similar bases on the territory of Afghanistan, and often these bases were discovered and destroyed by Soviet troops. Reinforcement into the ranks of the Mujahideen came mainly from destroyed villages or from deserted soldiers of the Afghan government army.

Results of the Afghan War and its significance

The result of the Afghan War was that the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, with the support of Soviet troops, was able to hold out much longer than it would have lasted without it (the regime finally fell in 1992). However, at the same time, the trust of the Afghan people in the PDPA was completely undermined, and therefore no political solution to intra-Afghan problems could be found.

The USSR, which was created at the southern border, somewhat fettered the Soviet forces, preventing them from effectively solving other foreign policy problems in the 80s, such as, for example, the crisis in Poland. Ultimately, this circumstance seriously influenced the balance of power in Eastern Europe and, as a consequence, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact Organization.

The American leadership, having barely recovered from the Vietnam War, was interested in bogging down the USSR in Afghanistan, and therefore provided serious support to the Afghan rebels. However, in reality, the Afghan insurgent movement was poorly controlled, as a result of which already in the mid-90s it was completely discredited in the eyes of almost the entire world.

In military terms, the Soviet Army gained very extensive experience in fighting partisans in mountainous areas, which, however, was little taken into account 6 years later - during the war in Chechnya. Nevertheless, OKSVA honorably fulfilled all the military tasks set for itself, in the words of General B. Gromov, “returned to their homeland in an organized manner.”

The losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted, according to various sources, from 13,835 to 14,427 people. The KGB losses amounted to 576 people, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people. 53,750 people were wounded and shell-shocked, 415,930 fell ill (mainly with diseases such as malaria, typhus and hepatitis). 417 military personnel were captured, of which 130 were released.

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The Afghan War is a military conflict on the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). A limited contingent of Soviet troops took part in this conflict. The conflict took place between the Afghan government forces and the armed forces of the Afghan Mujahideen, which were supported by NATO, and primarily the United States, which actively armed the enemies of the Afghan regime.

Background to the Afghan War

The war itself, which lasted from 1979 to 1989, is defined in historiography by the presence of a limited contingent of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of Afghanistan. But the beginning of the entire conflict must be considered 1973, when King Zahir Shah was overthrown in Afghanistan. Power passed to the regime of Muhammad Daoud, and in 1978 the Saur (April) Revolution took place, and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, became the new government. Afghanistan began to build socialism, but all construction took place in an extremely unstable internal situation.

The leader of the PDPA was Nur Mohammad Taraki. His reforms were extremely unpopular in a country where traditionally the majority were rural residents. Any dissent was brutally suppressed. During his reign, he arrested thousands of people, some of whom were executed.

The main opponents of the socialist government were radical Islamists, who declared a holy war (jihad) against it. Mujahideen detachments were organized, which later became the main opposing force - the Soviet army fought against it.

The majority of Afghanistan's population was illiterate, and it was easy for Islamist agitators to turn the population against the new government.

Beginning of the war

Immediately after coming to power, the government was faced with the outbreak of armed uprisings organized by Islamists. The Afghan leadership was unable to cope with the situation and turned to Moscow for help.

The issue of assistance to Afghanistan was considered in the Kremlin on March 19, 1979. Leonid Brezhnev and other members of the Politburo opposed armed intervention. But over time, the situation at the borders of the USSR worsened, and opinion changed radically.

On December 12, 1979, a resolution was adopted by the CPSU Central Committee on the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Formally, the reason was repeated requests from the Afghan leadership, but in fact these actions were supposed to prevent threats of foreign military intervention.

It must be remembered that, in addition to tense relations with the Mujahideen, there was no unity in the government itself. The internal party struggle, which reached its climax in September 1979, became particularly irreconcilable. It was then that the leader of the PDPA, Nur Mohammad Taraki, was arrested and killed by Hafizullah Amin. Amin took Taraki's place and, while continuing to fight against the Islamists, intensified repression within the ruling party.

According to Soviet intelligence, Amin tried to come to an agreement with Pakistan and China, which our experts considered unacceptable. On December 27, 1979, a detachment of Soviet special forces captured the presidential palace, Amin and his sons were killed. Babrak Karmal became the new leader of the country.

Progress of the war

As a result, our soldiers found themselves drawn into the outbreak of a civil war and became its active participants.

The entire war can be divided into several stages:

1st stage: December 1979 - February 1980. Introduction of the 40th Soviet Army of General Boris Gromov into Afghanistan, placement in garrisons, organization of security of strategic objects and locations.

2nd stage: March 1980 - April 1985. Conducting active large-scale combat operations. Reorganization and strengthening of the armed forces of the DRA.

3rd stage: May 1985 - December 1986. Reduction of active hostilities and transition to supporting the actions of Afghan government troops. Assistance was provided by aviation and sapper units. Organization of counteraction to the delivery of weapons and ammunition from abroad. Six regiments were withdrawn to their homeland.

4th stage: January 1987 - February 1989. Assisting the Afghan leadership in pursuing a policy of national reconciliation. Continued support for military operations carried out by government forces. Preparations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

In April 1988, an agreement was signed in Switzerland between Afghanistan and Pakistan to resolve the situation around the DRA. The Soviet Union pledged to withdraw its troops within nine months, and the United States and Pakistan were to stop supporting the mujahideen. In April 1988, in accordance with the agreement, Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan.

Losses in the Afghan War

At the moment, it is known that the losses of the Soviet army amounted to 14 thousand 427 people, the KGB - 576 people, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - 28 people (dead and missing). There were 53 thousand people wounded and shell-shocked during the fighting.

The exact data on Afghans killed in the war is unknown. According to various sources, these losses could range from 1 to 2 million people. From 850 thousand to one and a half million people became refugees and settled mainly in Pakistan and Iran.

After the end of the war

The Mujahideen did not take part in the Geneva negotiations and did not support these decisions. As a result, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, hostilities did not stop, but even intensified.

The new leader of Afghanistan, Najibullah, could barely hold back the onslaught of the Mujahideen without Soviet help. There was a split in his government, many of his associates joined the ranks of the opposition. In March 1992, General Dostum and his Uzbek militia abandoned Najibullah. In April, the Mujahideen captured Kabul. Najibullah hid for a long time in the UN mission building, but was captured by the Taliban and hanged.

The United States of America provided great assistance in supporting the counter-revolution in Afghanistan. They were the initiators and organizers of many international protests against the Soviet Union.

Back in 1980, an Islamic conference was organized, at which 34 foreign ministers demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. At the instigation of the United States, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution protesting against Soviet intervention. American President D. Carter advocated a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

The United States and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf organized unprecedented assistance to Afghan militants. With their money, Mujahideen were trained in Pakistan and China. Actively participated in operations against Soviet CIA forces.

Throughout the entire period of hostilities, the United States supplied the Mujahideen with a variety of modern weapons (recoilless rifles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and others).

When Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 1979 to support the friendly communist regime, no one could have imagined that the war would stretch out for ten long years and ultimately “drive” the last nail “in the coffin” of the USSR. Today, some are trying to present this war as the villainy of the “Kremlin elders” or the result of a worldwide conspiracy. However, we will try to rely only on the facts.

According to modern data, the losses of the Soviet Army in the Afghan war amounted to 14,427 people killed and missing. In addition, 180 advisers and 584 specialists from other departments were killed. More than 53 thousand people were shell-shocked, wounded or injured.

Cargo "200"

The exact number of Afghans killed in the war is unknown. The most common figure is 1 million dead; Available estimates range from 670 thousand civilians to 2 million in total. According to Harvard professor M. Kramer, an American researcher of the Afghan war: “During the nine years of war, more than 2.7 million Afghans (mostly civilians) were killed or maimed, and several million more became refugees, many of whom fled the country.” . There appears to be no clear division of victims into government soldiers, mujahideen and civilians.

The terrible consequences of war

For the courage and heroism shown during the war in Afghanistan, more than 200 thousand military personnel were awarded orders and medals (11 thousand were awarded posthumously), 86 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (28 posthumously). Among the awarded – 110 thousand soldiers and sergeants, about 20 thousand warrant officers, more than 65 thousand officers and generals, more than 2.5 thousand SA employees, including – 1350 women.

A group of Soviet military personnel awarded government awards

During the entire period of hostilities, 417 military personnel were in Afghan captivity, 130 of whom were released during the war and were able to return to their homeland. As of January 1, 1999, 287 people remained among those who had not returned from captivity and had not been found.

Captured Soviet soldier

During nine years of war P The losses of equipment and weapons amounted to: airplaneecomrade - 118 (in the Air Force– 107); helicopters - 333 (in the Air Force – 324); tanks - 147; BMP, armored personnel carrier, BMD, BRDM – 1314; guns and mortars - 433; radio stations and KShM – 1138; engineering vehicles – 510; flatbed vehicles and tank trucks – 11,369.

Burnt Soviet tank

The government in Kabul was dependent throughout the war on the USSR, which provided it with about $40 billion in military aid between 1978 and the early 1990s. Meanwhile, the rebels established contacts with Pakistan and the United States, and also received widespread support from from Saudi Arabia, China and a number of other states, which together provided the Mujahideen with weapons and other military equipment worth about $10 billion.

Afghan Mujahideen

On January 7, 1988, in Afghanistan, at an altitude of 3234 m above the road to the city of Khost in the Afghan-Pakistan border zone, a fierce battle took place. This was one of the most famous military clashes between units of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the armed formations of the Afghan Mujahideen. Based on these events, the film “The Ninth Company” was shot in the Russian Federation in 2005. The height of 3234 m was defended by the 9th parachute company of the 345th Guards separate parachute regiment with a total number of 39 people, supported by regimental artillery. Soviet fighters were attacked by units of Mujahideen numbering from 200 to 400 people who were trained in Pakistan. The battle lasted 12 hours. The Mujahideen never managed to capture the heights. After suffering heavy losses, they retreated. In the ninth company, six paratroopers were killed, 28 were injured, nine of them – heavy. All paratroopers for this battle were awarded the Order of the Red Banner and the Red Star. Junior Sergeant V.A. Aleksandrov and Private A.A. Melnikov were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Still from the film “9th Company”

The most famous battle of Soviet border guards during the war in Afghanistan took place on November 22, 1985 near the village of Afrij in the Zardevsky gorge of the Darai-Kalat mountain range in northeastern Afghanistan. A combat group of border guards from the Panfilov outpost of a motorized maneuver group (21 people) was ambushed as a result of an incorrect crossing of the river. During the battle, 19 border guards were killed. These were the most numerous losses of border guards in the Afghan war. According to some reports, the number of Mujahideen participating in the ambush was 150 people.

Border guards after the battle

There is a well-established opinion in the post-Soviet period that the USSR was defeated and expelled from Afghanistan. It is not true. When Soviet troops left Afghanistan in 1989, they did so as a result of a well-planned operation. Moreover, the operation was carried out in several directions at once: diplomatic, economic and military. This made it possible not only to save the lives of Soviet soldiers, but also to preserve the Afghan government. Communist Afghanistan held out even after the fall of the USSR in 1991 and only then, with the loss of support from the USSR and increasing attempts from the Mujahideen and Pakistan, did the DRA begin to slide towards defeat in 1992.

Withdrawal of Soviet troops, February 1989

In November 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR declared an amnesty for all crimes committed by Soviet military personnel in Afghanistan. According to the military prosecutor's office, from December 1979 to February 1989, 4,307 people were brought to criminal responsibility as part of the 40th Army in the DRA; at the time the decision of the USSR Armed Forces on amnesty came into force, more than 420 former soldiers were in prison - internationalists.

We have returned…

The military conflict in Afghanistan, which began more than thirty years ago, remains the cornerstone of world security today. The hegemonic powers, in pursuit of their ambitions, not only destroyed a previously stable state, but also crippled thousands of destinies.

Afghanistan before the war

Many observers, describing the war in Afghanistan, say that before the conflict it was an extremely backward state, but some facts are kept silent. Before the confrontation, Afghanistan remained a feudal country in most of its territory, but in large cities such as Kabul, Herat, Kandahar and many others, there was a fairly developed infrastructure; these were full-fledged cultural and socio-economic centers.

The state developed and progressed. There was free medicine and education. The country produced good knitwear. Radio and television broadcast foreign programs. People met in cinemas and libraries. A woman could find herself in public life or manage a business.

Fashion boutiques, supermarkets, shops, restaurants, and a host of cultural entertainment existed in the cities. The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, the date of which is interpreted differently in sources, marked the end of prosperity and stability. The country instantly turned into a center of chaos and destruction. Today, power in the country has been seized by radical Islamist groups who benefit from maintaining unrest throughout the territory.

Reasons for the start of the war in Afghanistan

To understand the true reasons for the Afghan crisis, it is worth remembering history. In July 1973, the monarchy was overthrown. The coup was carried out by the king's cousin Mohammed Daoud. The general announced the overthrow of the monarchy and appointed himself president of the Republic of Afghanistan. The revolution took place with the assistance of the People's Democratic Party. A course of reforms in the economic and social sphere was announced.

In reality, President Daoud did not carry out reforms, but only destroyed his enemies, including the leaders of the PDPA. Naturally, discontent in the circles of the communists and the PDPA grew, they were constantly subjected to repression and physical violence.

Social, economic, and political instability in the country began, and external intervention by the USSR and the USA served as an impetus for even more massive bloodshed.

Saur revolution

The situation was constantly heating up, and already on April 27, 1987, the April (Saur) Revolution took place, organized by the country’s military units, the PDPA and the communists. New leaders came to power - N. M. Taraki, H. Amin, B. Karmal. They immediately announced anti-feudal and democratic reforms. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan began to exist. Immediately after the first jubilations and victories of the united coalition, it became clear that there was discord between the leaders. Amin did not get along with Karmal, and Taraki turned a blind eye to this.

For the USSR, the victory of the democratic revolution came as a real surprise. The Kremlin was waiting to see what would happen next, but many prudent Soviet military leaders and apparatchiks understood that the start of the war in Afghanistan was just around the corner.

Participants in the military conflict

Just a month after the bloody overthrow of the Daoud government, new political forces were mired in conflicts. The Khalq and Parcham groups, as well as their ideologists, did not find common ground with each other. In August 1978, Parcham was completely removed from power. Karmal, together with his like-minded people, travels abroad.

Another setback befell the new government—the implementation of reforms was hampered by the opposition. Islamist forces are uniting into parties and movements. In June, armed uprisings against the revolutionary government began in the provinces of Badakhshan, Bamiyan, Kunar, Paktia and Nangarhar. Despite the fact that historians call 1979 the official date of the armed conflict, hostilities began much earlier. The year the war in Afghanistan began was 1978. The civil war was the catalyst that pushed foreign countries to intervene. Each of the megapowers pursued its own geopolitical interests.

Islamists and their goals

Back in the early 70s, the organization “Muslim Youth” was formed in Afghanistan. Members of this community were close to the Islamic fundamentalist ideas of the Arab “Muslim Brotherhood”, their methods of struggle for power, including political terror. The primacy of Islamic traditions, jihad and suppression all kinds of reforms that contradict the Koran - these are the main provisions of such organizations.

In 1975, Muslim Youth ceased to exist. It was absorbed by other fundamentalists - the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA) and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (IAS). These cells were led by G. Hekmatyar and B. Rabbani. Members of the organization were trained to conduct military operations in neighboring Pakistan and were sponsored by the authorities of foreign countries. After the April Revolution, opposition societies united. The coup in the country became a kind of signal for military action.

Foreign support for radicals

We must not lose sight of the fact that the start of the war in Afghanistan, the date of which in modern sources is 1979-1989, was planned as much as possible by foreign powers participating in the NATO bloc and some If earlier the American political elite denied involvement in the formation and financing of extremists, then The new century has brought some very interesting facts to this story. Former CIA employees left a lot of memoirs in which they exposed the policies of their own government.

Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the CIA financed the mujahideen, set up training bases for them in neighboring Pakistan and supplied the Islamists with weapons. In 1985, President Reagan personally received a mujahideen delegation at the White House. The most important US contribution to the Afghan conflict was the recruitment of men throughout the Arab world.

Today there is information that the war in Afghanistan was planned by the CIA as a trap for the USSR. Having fallen into it, the Union had to see the inconsistency of its policies, deplete its resources and “fall apart.” As we see, this is what happened. In 1979, the start of the war in Afghanistan, or rather, the introduction of a limited contingent became inevitable.

USSR and support for the PDPA

There are opinions that the USSR prepared the April Revolution for several years. Andropov personally supervised this operation. Taraki was a Kremlin agent. Immediately after the coup, friendly assistance from the Soviets to brotherly Afghanistan began. Other sources claim that the Saur Revolution was a complete surprise for the Soviets, albeit a pleasant one.

After the successful revolution in Afghanistan, the USSR government began to monitor events in the country more closely. The new leadership, represented by Taraki, showed loyalty to friends from the USSR. KGB intelligence constantly informed the “leader” about instability in the neighboring region, but the decision was made to wait. The USSR took the beginning of the war in Afghanistan calmly, the Kremlin was aware that the opposition was sponsored by the States, it did not want to give up the territory, but the Kremlin did not need another Soviet-American crisis. Nevertheless, I did not intend to stand aside; after all, Afghanistan is a neighboring country.

In September 1979, Amin killed Taraki and proclaimed himself president. Some sources indicate that the final discord in relation to former comrades occurred due to President Taraki’s intention to ask the USSR to send in a military contingent. Amin and his associates were against it.

Soviet sources claim that the Afghan government sent them about 20 requests to send troops. The facts state the opposite - President Amin was opposed to the introduction of the Russian contingent. A resident in Kabul sent information about the US attempts to drag the USSR into the USSR. Even then, the leadership of the USSR knew that Taraki and the PDPA were residents of the States. Amin was the only nationalist in this company, and yet they did not share with Taraki the $40 million paid by the CIA for the April coup, this was the main reason for his death.

Andropov and Gromyko didn’t want to listen to anything. In early December, KGB General Paputin flew to Kabul with the task of persuading Amin to call on USSR troops. The new president was relentless. Then on December 22 an incident occurred in Kabul. Armed “nationalists” burst into a house where Soviet citizens lived and cut off the heads of several dozen people. Having impaled them on spears, the armed “Islamists” carried them through the central streets of Kabul. The police who arrived at the scene opened fire, but the criminals fled. On December 23, the government of the USSR sent a message to the government of Afghanistan, informing the president that Soviet troops would soon be in Afghanistan in order to protect the citizens of their country. While Amin was thinking about how to dissuade the troops of his “friends” from invading, they had already landed at one of the country’s airfields on December 24. The start date of the war in Afghanistan is 1979-1989. - will open one of the most tragic pages in the history of the USSR.

Operation Storm

Units of the 105th Airborne Guards Division landed 50 km from Kabul, and the KGB special forces unit “Delta” surrounded the presidential palace on December 27. As a result of the capture, Amin and his bodyguards were killed. The world community gasped, and all the puppeteers of this idea rubbed their hands. The USSR was hooked. Soviet paratroopers captured all major infrastructure facilities located in major cities. Over 10 years, more than 600 thousand Soviet soldiers fought in Afghanistan. The year the war in Afghanistan began was the beginning of the collapse of the USSR.

On the night of December 27, B. Karmal arrived from Moscow and announced the second stage of the revolution on the radio. Thus, the beginning of the war in Afghanistan is 1979.

Events of 1979-1985

After the successful Operation Storm, Soviet troops captured all major industrial centers. The Kremlin's goal was to strengthen the communist regime in neighboring Afghanistan and push back the dushmans who controlled the countryside.

Constant clashes between Islamists and SA troops led to numerous civilian casualties, but the mountainous terrain completely disoriented the fighters. In April 1980, the first large-scale operation took place in Panjshir. In June of the same year, the Kremlin ordered the withdrawal of some tank and missile units from Afghanistan. In August of the same year, a battle took place in the Mashhad Gorge. SA troops were ambushed, 48 soldiers were killed and 49 were wounded. In 1982, on the fifth attempt, Soviet troops managed to occupy Panjshir.

During the first five years of the war, the situation developed in waves. The SA occupied the heights, then fell into ambushes. The Islamists did not carry out full-scale operations; they attacked food convoys and individual units of troops. The SA tried to push them away from large cities.

During this period, Andropov had several meetings with the President of Pakistan and members of the UN. The representative of the USSR stated that the Kremlin was ready for a political settlement of the conflict in exchange for guarantees from the United States and Pakistan to stop funding the opposition.

1985-1989

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the first secretary of the USSR. He was constructive, wanted to reform the system, and outlined a course for “perestroika.” The protracted conflict in Afghanistan slowed down the process of resolving relations with the United States and European countries. There were no active military operations, but still Soviet soldiers died on Afghan territory with enviable regularity. In 1986, Gorbachev announced a course for a phased withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In the same year, B. Karmal was replaced by M. Najibullah. In 1986, the leadership of the SA came to the conclusion that the battle for the Afghan people was lost, since the SA could not take control of the entire territory of Afghanistan. January 23-26 A limited contingent of Soviet troops conducted their last Operation Typhoon in Afghanistan in the Kunduz province. On February 15, 1989, all troops of the Soviet army were withdrawn.

Reaction of world powers

After the media announcement of the seizure of the presidential palace in Afghanistan and the murder of Amin, everyone was in a state of shock. The USSR immediately began to be viewed as a total evil and an aggressor country. The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) for European powers signaled the beginning of the Kremlin’s isolation. The President of France and the Chancellor of Germany personally met with Brezhnev and tried to persuade him to withdraw his troops, Leonid Ilyich was adamant.

In April 1980, the US government authorized $15 million in aid to Afghan opposition forces.

The United States and European countries called on the world community to ignore the 1980 Olympics taking place in Moscow, but due to the presence of Asian and African countries, this sporting event still took place.

The Carter Doctrine was drawn up during this period of strained relations. Third world countries overwhelmingly condemned the actions of the USSR. On February 15, 1989, the Soviet state, in accordance with agreements with UN countries, withdrew its troops from Afghanistan.

Outcome of the conflict

The beginning and end of the war in Afghanistan are conditional, because Afghanistan is an eternal hive, as its last king said about his country. In 1989, a limited contingent of Soviet troops “organized” crossed the border of Afghanistan - this was reported to the top leadership. In fact, thousands of prisoners of war of the SA soldiers, forgotten companies and border detachments that covered the retreat of that same 40th Army remained in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, after a ten-year war, was plunged into absolute chaos. Thousands of refugees fled their country to escape the war.

Even today the exact number of Afghan deaths remains unknown. Researchers voice a figure of 2.5 million dead and wounded, mostly civilians.

During the ten years of war, the SA lost about 26 thousand soldiers. The USSR lost the war in Afghanistan, although some historians claim the opposite.

The economic costs of the USSR in connection with the Afghan war were catastrophic. $800 million was allocated annually to support the Kabul government, and $3 billion to arm the army.

The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan marked the end of the USSR, one of the world's largest powers.

After World War II, Afghanistan, which had the status of a neutral state, was actually in the sphere of Soviet influence. Cooperation with the USSR was very close. A large number of Soviet specialists were constantly in the country, and many Afghans studied at Soviet universities.

In 1973, the monarchy was overthrown in Afghanistan. As a result of the coup, the brother of the last king, Zakir Shah, Muhammad Daoud, came to power and established a presidential dictatorship. The regime change had no effect on relations with the USSR.

But the overthrow and murder of Daoud during the coup on April 27-28, 1978 by military units loyal to the pro-communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the prologue to many years of bloody war that continues in Afghanistan to this day. The Soviet side was not directly involved in the coup, but military advisers in the country knew about its preparations, but did not receive orders to warn Daoud. On the contrary, KGB representatives made it clear to the leaders of the coup that if successful, recognition and assistance were guaranteed.

The PDPA was a small party of the intelligentsia. In addition, it split into two warring factions: “Khalk” (“People”) and “Parcham” (“Banner”). The leader of the Khalq, the poet Hyp Muhammad Taraki, who became president, began intensive transformations in the country. Islam ceased to be the state religion, women were allowed to remove their veils and were allowed to participate in education. A campaign to eliminate illiteracy, agrarian reform, and the beginning of collectivization were proclaimed.

All this caused discontent among the Muslim clergy and nobility. Afghan society, with the exception of a thin layer of city dwellers, remained essentially feudal and was not ready for radical transformations. Among the main population, the Pashtuns, a clan-tribal structure was still preserved, and tribal leaders were especially influential. Islam was declared a religion reflecting only the interests of the “exploiting classes,” and terror was launched against the clergy. The Pashtun tribes fared no better, they tried to disarm them (traditionally all Pashtuns carried weapons), and deprive the tribal elite of power and even destroy it. The peasants refused the land plots provided because they did not have the means to cultivate them, and the state was not able to provide these funds.

Already in the summer of 1978, supporters of Islamic fundamentalism, who had fought against Daoud, began to put up armed resistance to the new government. They were joined by Pashtun tribal militias. By that time, Taraki's relations with the Parchamists had worsened, many of whom were executed.

On December 5, 1978, a Soviet-Afghan treaty on friendship, good neighborliness and cooperation was concluded, providing for mutual assistance of the parties in repelling an external threat. Gradually, the Taraki administration, despite the terror, increasingly lost control over the country. There are about 2 million Afghan refugees in neighboring Pakistan. Due to the failures, the president's relations with the second person in the Khalq faction, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin, who enjoyed influence in the army, sharply worsened. Amin was a more decisive leader and tried to strengthen the weakening power by seeking allies among various social and ethnic groups (both Amin and Taraki were Pashtuns). But Moscow decided to bet on Taraki and advised him to eliminate his opponent.

The Kremlin hoped to find a springboard in Afghanistan for a push to the Indian Ocean. In neighboring Pakistan, tribes of Pashtuns and Baluchis, related to the Afghans, lived, and the leaders of the PDPA made territorial claims to their neighbor, hoping to occupy most of Pakistani territory with the support of the USSR.

General D.A. Volkogonov recalled that on September 8, 1978, in the presidential palace, Taraki’s guards tried to kill Amin, but only his bodyguard died. Amin survived, raised the loyal units of the Kabul garrison and displaced Taraki. Soon the hapless president was strangled. Amin intensified the terror, but did not achieve his goal. They decided to remove him.

Both Taraki and Amin repeatedly appealed to the USSR with a request to send troops to Afghanistan. We were talking about small units designed, in particular, to provide protection for Afghan leaders and help conduct operations against Mujahideen rebels.

The Kremlin decided differently. On December 12, 1979, the Politburo approved the removal of Amin and the subsequent entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan. KGB agents slipped poison into Amin’s food. An unsuspecting Soviet doctor literally pulled the dictator out of the other world. Then the special KGB group "Alpha" went into action. Its fighters, together with special forces from the Main Intelligence Directorate, freely arrived in the Afghan capital, ostensibly to guard Amin, and on the night of December 27, 1979, stormed the presidential palace on the outskirts of Kabul, destroying Amin along with his family, associates and several dozen security soldiers. TASS later announced that the dictator was killed by “the healthy forces of the Afghan revolution.”

The next morning, Soviet troops began to arrive in Kabul. Their arrival was justified by external aggression against Afghanistan, expressed in the support of Afghan rebels by Pakistan, Iran, China and the United States, and by urgent requests from the “legitimate Afghan authorities.” There is a problem with the legality. After all, before the Soviet invasion, the “legitimate authority” was Amin, who was posthumously declared a CIA agent. It turned out that he himself invited his death, and besides, he was “not entirely legal”, since he had to be eliminated and urgently replaced by the leader of the Parcham faction, Babrak Karmal, who had returned to the convoy of Soviet troops.

Soviet propaganda was never able to clearly explain to the world community who exactly invited our “limited contingent,” whose number at times reached 120 thousand people. But in the USSR, rumors were spread that Soviet soldiers were only a few hours ahead of the American landing force, which was supposed to land in Kabul (although there were no US troops or bases within a thousand miles of Afghanistan) In connection with the entry of Soviet Army units into Afghanistan in Moscow a joke was born. “What should we now call the Tatar-Mongol yoke? - The introduction of a limited contingent of Tatar-Mongol troops into Rus' to protect against the Lithuanian threat.”

The limited contingent was unable to change the situation in the country, although by the beginning of 1980 there were 50 thousand Soviet soldiers and officers in the country, and in the second half of the year the contingent reached its maximum number. The majority of the population perceived Karmal as a puppet sitting on Soviet bayonets. The Afghan government army, melting from desertion, held only the capital and provincial centers with Soviet support. The rebels controlled the countryside, which was mountainous and difficult to access. The Mujahideen received help from the Pashtun tribes of Pakistan, and it was almost impossible to close the Afghan-Pakistani border, which was a conventional line on rough terrain with many mountain paths. Fleeing from the war, over 4 million refugees fled to Pakistan and Iran. Raids of Soviet troops against partisans, as As a rule, the Mujahideen did not achieve success and disappeared into the mountains. The Soviet 40th Army suffered losses. The rebels fired at Soviet transports and attacked small detachments and garrisons. Some groups, in particular the army of the Tajik field commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, concentrated in the Panjshir Valley, fought successful battles with entire Soviet divisions, which repeatedly tried to destroy the “lion of Panjshir.”

By the mid-80s, the futility of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan became obvious. In 1985, after the rise of Gorbachev, Karmal was replaced by the former head of the security service, Dr. Najibullah, who had a reputation as a cruel but cunning man, representing the larger Khalq faction. He tried to find support for the regime both among part of the Pashtun tribes and among the peoples of the north. Here, however, he was able to rely only on the Uzbek division of General Rashid Dostum

The Kabul government was completely dependent on Soviet military and food aid. The United States stepped up assistance to the rebels by starting to supply them with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Several planes and helicopters were shot down and absolute Soviet air supremacy was called into question. It became clear that we had to leave Afghanistan

On April 14, 1988, an agreement was concluded in Geneva between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the USSR and the USA on a political settlement. It was announced that Soviet troops would leave the country. On February 15, 1989, the commander of the limited contingent, General Boris Gromov, was the last to cross the border river Pyanj. According to official data, the losses of Soviet troops in Afghanistan amounted to 14,433 military personnel and 20 civilians killed, 298 missing, 54 thousand wounded and 416 thousand sick. There are also higher estimates of Soviet losses at 35, 50, 70 and 140 thousand dead. Afghan casualties, mainly among civilians, were significantly higher. Many villages were leveled by aircraft, and residents were shot as hostages for the actions of the partisans. Sometimes they talk about a million dead Afghans, but no one has accurately counted Afghan losses

After the withdrawal of troops, the Soviet side continued to provide Najibullah with massive military assistance. Gorbachev said: “It is important that this regime and all its cadres are not swept away... We cannot appear before the world in just panties or even without them...” After the August war the end of the coup and the collapse of the USSR

In March 1992, Dostum rebelled against Najibullah, who had lost Soviet support, and occupied Kabul. The former dictator took refuge in a UN mission. In Afghanistan, a war began between various ethnic and political groups, previously united in the fight against the pro-Soviet regime. It continues to this day. In 1996, the Taliban, led by madrassa students and relying on the Pashtun population, occupied Kabul. Najibullah was captured at the mission premises and hanged.

At the beginning of 2000, the Taliban controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan, with the exception of the Panjshir Valley and some adjacent areas with a predominantly Tajik population. During the offensive launched in the fall of 2000, the Taliban movement established control over almost the entire territory of the country, with the exception of a few internal enclaves and a narrow border strip in some northern regions.