Stalin's reforms after the war. family archive

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, Joseph Stalin was not just the leader of the country, but the real savior of the fatherland. They practically did not call him otherwise than the leader, and the cult of personality in the post-war period reached its climax. It seemed that it was impossible to shake the authority of such a scale, but Stalin himself had a hand in this.

A series of inconsistent reforms and repressions gave rise to the term post-war Stalinism, which is also actively used by modern historians.

Brief analysis of Stalin's reforms

Reforms and state actions of Stalin	The essence of the reforms and their consequences
December 1947 - currency reform	The implementation of the monetary reform shocked the population of the country. After a fierce war, all funds were confiscated from ordinary people and exchanged at the rate of 10 old rubles for 1 new ruble. Such reforms helped to patch up gaps in the state budget, but for ordinary people they caused the loss of their last savings.
August 1945 - a special committee headed by Beria is created, which subsequently developed atomic weapons.	At a meeting with President Truman, Stalin learned that the Western countries were already well prepared in terms of atomic weapons. It was on August 20, 1945 that Stalin laid the foundation for the future arms race that nearly led to the Third World War in the middle of the 20th century.
1946-1948 - ideological campaigns led by Zhdanov to restore order in the field of art and journalism	As the cult of Stalin became more and more intrusive and visible, almost immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War, Stalin instructed Zhdanov to conduct an ideological struggle against those who spoke out against Soviet power. After a short break, new purges and repressions began in the country.
1947-1950 - agricultural reforms.	The war showed Stalin how important the agricultural sector was in the development. That is why, until his death, the Secretary General carried out numerous agricultural reforms. In particular, the country switched to a new irrigation system, and new hydroelectric power plants were built throughout the USSR.

Repressions of the post-war period and the tightening of the cult of Stalin

It has already been mentioned above that Stalinism in the post-war years only grew stronger, and among the people the General Secretary was considered the main hero of the Fatherland. The planting of such an image of Stalin was facilitated both by excellent ideological support and cultural innovations. All films being made and books being published glorified the current regime and praised Stalin. Gradually, the number of repressions and the volume of censorship increased, but no one seemed to notice this.

Stalinist repressions became a real problem for the country in the mid-30s, and after the end of the Great Patriotic War, they gained new strength. So, in 1948, the famous "Leningrad case" received publicity, during which many politicians holding key positions in the party were arrested and shot. So, for example, the chairman of the State Planning Commission Voznesensky was shot, as well as the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Kuznetsov. Stalin was losing confidence in his own close associates, and therefore those who yesterday were still considered the main friend and associate of the General Secretary were under attack.

Stalinism in the post-war years increasingly took the form of a dictatorship. Despite the fact that the people literally idolized Stalin, the monetary reform and the re-emergence of repression made people doubt the authority of the general secretary. The first to oppose the existing regime were representatives of the intelligentsia, and therefore, led by Zhdanov, purges among writers, artists and journalists began in 1946.

Stalin himself brought to the fore the development of the country's military power. The development of the plan for the first atomic bomb allowed the USSR to consolidate its status as a superpower. All over the world, the USSR was feared, believing that Stalin was capable of starting the Third World War. The Iron Curtain covered the Soviet Union more and more, and the people resignedly waited for changes.

Changes, albeit not the best, came suddenly when the leader and hero of the whole country died in 1953. Stalin's death marked the beginning of a completely new stage for the Soviet Union.

However, the Great Patriotic War gave rise to a number of negative phenomena that needed to be eliminated.

First, there was a discrepancy between the amount of money and the needs of trade. There was a surplus of money.

Secondly, several types of prices appeared - ration, commercial and market. This undermined the importance of money wages and cash incomes of collective farmers on workdays. Thirdly, large sums of money settled with speculators. Moreover, the difference in prices still gave them the opportunity to enrich themselves at the expense of the population. This undermined social justice in the country.

Immediately after the end of the war, the state carried out a number of measures aimed at strengthening the monetary system and increasing the welfare of the population. The purchasing demand of the population increased by increasing wage funds and reducing payments to the financial system. So, from August 1945, they began to abolish the military tax on workers and employees.

The tax was finally abolished in early 1946. No more money and clothing lotteries were held and the size of the subscription to the new state loan was reduced. In the spring of 1946, savings banks began to pay workers and employees compensation for unused holidays during the war. The post-war restructuring of industry began.

There was some growth in the commodity fund due to the restructuring of industry and by reducing the consumption of the armed forces and the sale of trophies. To withdraw money from circulation, they continued to develop commercial trade.

In 1946, commercial trade took on a fairly wide scope: a wide network of shops and restaurants was created, the range of goods was expanded and their price was reduced. The end of the war led to a drop in prices in the collective farm markets (by more than a third).

However, by the end of 1946, the negative phenomena were not completely eliminated. Therefore, the course for monetary reform was maintained. In addition, the issue of new money and the exchange of old money for new ones was necessary in order to eliminate the money that got abroad and improve the quality of banknotes.

According to the People's Commissar of Finance of the USSR Arseny Zverev (he managed the finances of the USSR since 1938), Stalin first asked about the possibility of monetary reform at the end of December 1942 and demanded that the first calculations be presented at the beginning of 1943.

At first, the monetary reform was planned to be carried out in 1946. However, due to famine, which was caused by drought and crop failure in a number of Soviet regions, the start of the reform had to be postponed.

Only on December 3, 1947, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to abolish the card system and start a monetary reform.

The terms of the monetary reform were defined in the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of December 14, 1947. The exchange of money was carried out throughout the territory of the Soviet Union from December 16 to 22, 1947, and ended on December 29 in remote areas.

When recalculating wages, money was exchanged in such a way that wages remained unchanged. The token coin was not subject to exchange and remained in circulation at face value. For cash deposits with Sberbank, amounts up to 3,000 rubles were also subject to a one-for-one exchange; on deposits from 3 to 10 thousand rubles, savings were reduced by one third of the amount; on deposits over 10,000 rubles, two-thirds of the amount was subject to withdrawal.

Those citizens who kept large sums of money at home could exchange at the rate of 1 new ruble to 10 old ones.

Relatively favorable conditions for the exchange of monetary savings were established for holders of state loan bonds: the loan bonds of 1947 were not subject to revaluation; mass loan bonds were exchanged for new loan bonds at a ratio of 3:1, bonds of a freely marketable loan of 1938 were exchanged at a ratio of 5:1. The funds that were on the settlement and current accounts of cooperative organizations and collective farms were revalued at the rate of 5 old rubles for 4 new ones.

At the same time, the government abolished the card system (before other victorious states), high prices in commercial trade and introduced uniform reduced state retail prices for food and manufactured goods. Thus, prices for bread and flour were reduced by an average of 12% against the current ration prices; for cereals and pasta - by 10%, etc.

Thus, in the USSR, the negative consequences of the war in the field of the monetary system were eliminated. This made it possible to switch to trading at uniform prices and reduce the money supply by more than three times (from 43.6 to 14 billion rubles). On the whole, the reform was successful.

In addition, the reform had a social aspect. Speculators were pressed. This restored the social justice that had been trampled during the war years. At first glance, it seemed that everyone suffered, because on December 15 everyone had some money on hand. But an ordinary worker and employee living on a salary, who by the middle of the month no longer had much money left, suffered only nominally. He was not even left without money, since already on December 16 they began to pay salaries in new money for the first half of the month, which was usually not done.

The salary was usually issued monthly after the end of the month. Thanks to this extradition, workers and employees were provided with new money at the beginning of the reform. The exchange of 3,000 rubles in a 1:1 deposit satisfied the vast majority of the population, since people did not have significant funds. Based on the entire adult population, the average contribution to the savings book could not be more than 200 rubles. It is clear that the “Stakhanovites”, inventors and other small groups of the population who had super profits lost part of their money with the speculators. But taking into account the general decline in prices, they, having not won, still did not suffer much.

True, those who kept large sums of money at home could be dissatisfied. This concerned speculative groups of the population and part of the population of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, who did not know the war and for this reason had the opportunity to trade.

It should be noted that the uniqueness of the Stalinist system, which was able to withdraw most of the money from circulation, while most ordinary people did not suffer. At the same time, the whole world was amazed that just two years after the end of the war and after a poor harvest in 1946, the main food prices were kept at the level of rations or even reduced. That is, almost all food in the USSR was available to everyone.

For the Western world, this was a surprise and an offensive surprise. The capitalist system was literally driven into the mud up to its ears. Thus, Great Britain, on whose territory there was no war for four years and which suffered in the war immeasurably less than the USSR, could not abolish the card system back in the early 1950s. At that time, in the former "workshop of the world", there were strikes of miners who demanded that they be provided with a standard of living like that of the miners of the USSR.

The Soviet ruble has been pegged to the US dollar since 1937. The ruble exchange rate was calculated against foreign currencies on the basis of the US dollar.

In February 1950, the Central Statistical Office of the USSR, on an urgent assignment from I. Stalin, recalculated the exchange rate of the new ruble.

Soviet experts, focusing on the purchasing power of the ruble and the dollar (compared the prices of goods) and deduced the figure of 14 rubles for 1 dollar. Previously (until 1947), the dollar was worth 53 rubles. However, according to the head of the Ministry of Finance Zverev and the head of the State Planning Commission Saburov, as well as Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Albanian leader Enver Hoxha, who were present at this event, Stalin crossed out this figure on February 27 and wrote: "At most - 4 rubles."

The Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 28, 1950 transferred the ruble to a permanent gold basis, the peg to the dollar was canceled. The gold content of the ruble was set at 0.222168 grams of pure gold. On March 1, 1950, the purchase price of the State Bank of the USSR for gold was set at 4 rubles. 45 kop. for 1 gram of pure gold.

As Stalin noted, the USSR was thus protected from the dollar. After the war, the United States had dollar surpluses that they wanted to dump on other countries, shifting their financial problems onto others. As an example of indefinite financial, and hence political dependence on the Western world, Joseph Stalin cited Yugoslavia, where Josip Broz Tito ruled. The Yugoslav currency was pegged to a "basket" of the US dollar and the British pound sterling. Stalin actually predicted the future of Yugoslavia: "... sooner or later the West will 'collapse' Yugoslavia economically and dismember it politically...". His prophetic words have come true since the 1990s.

For the first time, national money was freed from the American dollar. According to the UN Economic and Social Council, the UN European and Far Eastern Commissions (1952-1954), Stalin's decision almost doubled the efficiency of Soviet exports. Moreover, in that period - industrial and science-intensive. This happened due to the exemption from dollar prices of importing countries, which underestimated the prices of Soviet exports. In turn, this led to an increase in production in most Soviet industries. Also, the Soviet Union got the opportunity to get rid of the import of technology from the United States and other countries that focused on the dollar and accelerate their own technological renewal.

The transfer to the "Stalinist gold ruble" of most of the trade of the USSR with the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), established in 1949, as well as with China, Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam and a number of developing countries led to the formation of a financial and economic bloc. There was a common market that was free from the dollar and hence the political influence of the United States.

In the first half of April 1952, an international economic conference was held in Moscow. At it, the Soviet delegation, headed by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Shepilov, proposed the establishment of a common market for goods, services and investment. It was free of the US dollar and was created in opposition to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and US expansion. At this time, the Marshall Plan was already in full swing. The economies of most European countries turned out to be dependent on the United States.

Back in 1951, the CMEA members and China declared the inevitability of close cooperation of all countries that do not want to subordinate the US dollar and the dictates of Western financial and trade structures. The idea was supported by such countries as Afghanistan, Iran, India, Indonesia, Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Uruguay. These countries became co-organizers of the Moscow Forum. Interestingly, the proposal was also supported by some Western countries - Sweden, Finland, Ireland, Iceland and Austria. A total of 49 countries took part in the Moscow meeting.

During its work, more than 60 trade, investment, scientific and technical agreements were signed. Among the main principles of these agreements were: the exclusion of dollar settlements; the possibility of barter, including for repayment of debts; harmonization of policies in international economic organizations and in the world market; mutual maximum favored nation treatment in loans, investments, loans and scientific and technical cooperation; customs and price preferences for developing states (or their individual goods), etc.

The Soviet delegation proposed at the first stage to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on customs, price, credit and commodity issues. Then they planned to carry out a gradual unification of the principles of foreign economic policy and create a "bloc-wide" trade zone. At the final stage, it was planned to create an interstate settlement currency with a mandatory gold content (the ruble had already been prepared for this), which led to the completion of the creation of a common market.

It is clear that financial and economic integration led to political integration. Around the USSR, not only socialist, but also people's democratic and former colonies, that is, developing states, would unite.

Unfortunately, after the death of Stalin, the authorities of the USSR and most other CMEA countries departed from the proposals of the great leader, gradually falling under the rule of the dollar (and their elites under the rule of the "golden calf"). They tried to “forget” about the great Stalinist project. Moreover, in view of Khrushchev's socio-economic and political adventures, the "Stalinist gold ruble" had to be greatly devalued (by 10 times) and its gold content reduced.

In the late 1970s, the gold content of the Soviet ruble was de facto eliminated altogether. Since the time of Khrushchev, Soviet foreign trade with most countries began to be carried out in US dollars. In addition, the Soviet Union became a "donor" of developing countries and began to supply the Western world with cheap energy and industrial raw materials. And the gold reserve, which was created under Stalin, began to rapidly lose.

The idea of ​​"Soviet globalization" at the financial and economic level and freedom from the US dollar, dependence on the US Federal Reserve System, is now more relevant than ever. Actually, you don't need to invent anything. Everything has already been given to Russia by Joseph Stalin. It is only necessary to show political will and bring his plans to their logical conclusion. Then Russia will be completely independent on a financial and economic priority, undermine the power of the FRS, Western TNBs and TNCs, and receive a powerful tool for “Russian globalization”. Russia will receive a powerful tool for the development of the national economy and the development of the well-being of the people.

Brief history of the monetary system during the reign of Nicholas II.

The monetary system that existed in the Russian Empire before the First World War was formed thanks to the reform of 1897 (Witte's reform). The introduction of the golden ruble was in the interests of big capital, as well as foreign banks and monopolies that exported their capital to Russia. In general, Witte fulfilled the wishes of the so-called. "financial international", with which he was associated with a number of contacts. The reform was preceded by measures to strengthen the budget and the accumulation of gold reserves. The accumulation of gold proceeded by increasing its production and forcing export by reducing the domestic consumption of the population (“we are not enough to eat, but we will export it”).

As a result of the monetary reform in Russia, a classical form of the monetary system with a gold currency was established. However, despite the large gold reserves, the financial position of the Russian Empire was not stable. Russia had a large foreign debt.

Believing in the need for Western investment and the free circulation of the ruble, Nicholas II removed the protective barriers. Foreign capital indeed poured into Russia, but (as in the modern Russian Federation) it was of a speculative nature. Foreigners built enterprises in Russia for the extraction and processing of raw materials, and the manufacturing sector grew rapidly in the empire. But most of the profits were immediately exported abroad in the form of interest on loans and dividends from Western capital. For this, a freely convertible gold ruble was required. Gold flowed from the Russian Empire to Western banks. With the help of Witte, Western capital built such a system that most of the profits ended up in the hands of the "financial international", as well as Russian bankers and big industrialists. At the same time, the rich Russians preferred to burn their money abroad, buying Western luxury goods with them.

Having entered the First World War, Russia rather quickly exhausted its budgetary reserves. The government was forced to prohibit the exchange of credit notes for gold and began to resort to the issuance of large paper banknotes in order to cover military expenses. In 1914-1915. the money supply more than doubled. However, the financial situation remained quite stable. In some other warring powers, the situation was worse. Military orders and food purchases for the army even somewhat stimulated the national economy, and the Russian economy continued to grow. This delayed the fall in the value of the ruble. Confidence in the ruble has not yet been undermined. In 1916, the situation worsened somewhat, the depreciation of money began. The money supply continued to grow: from 2.4 billion rubles at the beginning of the war and 5.7 billion rubles at the beginning of 1916 to 10.8 billion rubles by March 1, 1917.

It should be noted that the depreciation of the ruble in 1914-1917. went no more because of the growth of consumer demand for a decreasing number of goods, but because of the speculative component. In fact, a significant part of the industrial and financial circles of Russia during the war years tried to cash in on wartime, the country's difficulties. The thieves component was increasingly included in the price of goods. There was a terrible war, hundreds of thousands of sons of the Fatherland died, were wounded, became crippled, froze and starved, fed lice, and at that time they stole everything that was possible in the rear.

So, at state-owned (state) factories, products cost 2-3 times less than at private ones. At a state-owned plant, 122-mm shrapnel cost 15 rubles, and at a private one - 35 rubles. When the head of the Main Artillery Directorate, General Aleksey Manikovsky, tried to clamp down on the thieves, they complained about him to the tsar. Nicholas II summoned the general to his office and said that he was hampering "the initiative of society in supplying the army." To this, Manikovsky replied that private traders already receive 300% of the profit, and in some cases up to 1000%. Nikolai said to this: “Well, let them make money, as long as they don’t steal.” Manikovsky noted that "this is worse than theft, this is open robbery." However, the emperor insisted on his own under the pretext that "there is no need to annoy the public."

This conversation is very indicative, it characterizes the degree of decomposition of the Russian Empire and the weakness of the imperial power. Nikolai, even during the war, does not want to tighten up the order and restore order in the rear, fearing "annoying the public." As is well known, the public during this period, like much of the press, was shaped by liberal, Masonic, and Zionist circles. The "Fifth Column", which eventually destroyed the autocracy and the Russian Empire, having arranged the February Revolution.

It should be noted that the activities of Manikovsky, who became the head of the GAU in a crisis situation - during the period of the so-called "shell hunger", ran into serious resistance. The general showed himself to be an energetic leader who was able to establish the production of ammunition and by 1917 fully satisfy the needs of the front. Under Manikovsky, already existing productions were expanded - weapons, artillery, shell, gunpowder, and new ones were created. Manikovsky was an excellent manager. He possessed colossal energy and exceptional abilities. His favorite saying was: "Procrastination is like death!" The general was not afraid to take responsibility for himself, he solved cases with lightning speed. He attracted people with his sincerity and directness. Manikovsky severely criticized private producers focused on super profits, they inflated prices and issued defective products. Private industrialists hated him and almost got Manikovsky resigned from the post of head of the GAU. In March 1916, the Minister of War agreed to transfer the general back to the post of commandant of the Kronstadt fortress. However, the possibility of a disruption in the supply of ammunition to the army in the event of the departure of Manikovsky forced the military leadership to leave a skilled manager in his post.

Manikovsky was able to put under his control private factories that produce military products. Manikovsky himself believed that in peacetime, state-owned enterprises should serve as a price regulator and the vanguard of technical progress, and in time of war they should have a dominant position. After the revolution, Manikovsky went to serve in the Red Army, headed the Artillery Directorate, the Supply Directorate of the Red Army. Thanks to Manikovsky, powerful artillery appeared in the Red Army and a system for supplying the army with ammunition was organized. Unfortunately, he died in 1920.

The situation in the Urals, which was one of the oldest industrial centers of the empire, clearly shows the picture of general theft in bourgeois circles. For comparison, during the Great Patriotic War, the Urals became the most powerful center of the USSR, which made a huge contribution to the common victory. So, if the output per worker in the Urals in the first (peaceful) half of 1941 is taken as 100%, then in the second half of 1941 the output increased to 217.3%, and in the first half of 1942 - up to 329%.

We see a completely different picture in the Urals during the First World War. Until the spring-summer of 1915, when the Great Retreat of the Russian army began and an acute shortage of weapons (especially shells, barbed wire) was discovered, they did not really think about the Urals and its industry. It was only in 1915 that the need to urgently transfer factories to the production of military products and increase steel production became acute. In the summer of 1915, a commission of General Mikhailovsky arrived in the Urals, which toured the factories and held meetings with breeders. Breeders stirred, began to actively express their "patriotism".

Entrepreneurs have developed active activities to modernize and expand production. Purchases of new machine tools began, and new factories were built. The number of workers has grown significantly. It would seem that the Urals had to survive the increase in production. However, the opposite happened. Ore mining, iron and steel smelting fell. At the same time, entrepreneurs felt great, riding like cheese in butter. The profits of joint-stock companies rose sharply. Thus, the Theological Society, which in 1913 had about 4 million gross profits, received in 1916 more than 10.5 million rubles; the profit of the Beloretsk Society increased from 860 thousand rubles to 2 million 170 thousand rubles, etc. In general, the profit of the Ural breeders tripled in two years.

Provisional government.

It is clear that under such a system, the government had no choice but to print more and more money. When the liberals seized power in February 1917, the collapse of the economy and the financial crisis intensified even more. From March to October 1917, the money supply doubled and reached 20.4 billion rubles by November 1, 1917. This, in connection with a sharp decrease in the volume of production, a reduction in marketable output and the throwing away of money and peasant egg-pods, led to a strong depreciation of the ruble. The depreciation of money overtook the emission. Russia has entered a period of severe financial crisis and the collapse of the monetary system. By the time of the October Revolution, the paper ruble had depreciated to 10 pre-revolutionary kopecks. The Bolsheviks inherited a completely disordered financial system.

period of war communism.

The Soviet government implemented a number of anti-crisis measures. Lenin put forward the idea of ​​refusing to issue money as one of the most important tasks of economic policy. The Council of People's Commissars (SNK) took measures to cut costs. Under the Council of People's Commissars, a "Special Committee for the Reduction of Public Expenditures" was established.

However, during the civil war and other difficulties of this period, it was not possible to eliminate the budget deficit. From November 1917 to April 1918, 18.7 billion rubles were put into circulation. In the spring of 1918, active work was carried out to prepare a monetary reform. Lenin paid great attention to this issue and emphasized that all other reforms are doomed to failure if there is no success in financial policy.

However, due to the intensification of the civil war and intervention, the financial reform, which involved a decrease in the money supply, could not be implemented. Expenditures for military needs increased sharply, while budget revenues could not be increased due to increased economic disruption and the inability to collect taxes. The budget deficit, despite the introduction of an emergency revolutionary tax, increased sharply and continued to grow. In 1920, the budget deficit amounted to more than one trillion rubles (87% of the budget expenditures). The only source of covering the budget deficit was the issue of money. The amount of money from the middle of 1918 to the beginning of 1921 grew almost 30 times - from 43.7 billion rubles on July 1, 1918 to 1.2 trillion rubles on January 1, 1921.

Money quickly depreciated. Thus, in January 1920, the money supply grew by 15.7%, and prices increased by 27%; in February, the money supply was increased by 12.6%, and prices - by 23%; in March, the money supply increased by 16.2%, and prices - by 25%. The rapid depreciation of money was associated not only with the emission, but also with a significant reduction in the volume of production and the mass of commodities. War, chaos and general devastation caused a reduction in production. The naturalization of the economy and exchange also had an effect (surplus appraisal, rations, the introduction of free services and goods, etc.), as well as the acceleration of the circulation of money. There was a "flight of money", characteristic of a period of strong inflation. Individual commodities have become means of exchange, crowding out money. In addition, the Soviet government did not even have a symbolic backing of money. The gold reserves of the Russian Empire were lost and taken abroad. The Soviet ruble did not inspire confidence due to the lack of gold reserves. Psychology is of great importance in financial policy. The financial experiments of the Bolsheviks also played their negative role. The Bolsheviks made attempts to completely abandon money and distribute goods for free.

NEP period.

Inflation during the civil war and intervention could not be stopped. It was necessary to support and feed the state apparatus, the army, to support cities and workers, and there was almost no tax revenue. But as soon as the war ended, the Soviet government was able to change the situation.

One of the most important measures to improve monetary circulation was the organization of the State Bank in October 1921. The State Bank became not only the main credit institution, but also the center for organizing money circulation and regulating money circulation. With the transition to the New Economic Policy, the importance of money has increased. Payment for goods and services was restored everywhere. Most of the state enterprises were transferred to self-financing, that is, they stopped the free supply of raw materials and materials and reduced budget support. The rationing system for distributing products among employees and workers was limited and then eliminated; cash wages gradually replaced wages in kind.

The XI Congress of the RCP(b) adopted a comprehensive program of financial policy. The transfer of most enterprises and organizations to self-financing contributed to the growth of production and trade, reduced government spending and expanded sources of income for the budget. In 1922-1923. local budgets were organized and administrative expenses were reduced. In 1922, the first short-term grain loan was issued. Loan bonds were sold for money, and they could be redeemed with money or bread. Bonds were also accepted in payment of tax in kind, which replaced the surplus appraisal. These and other measures somewhat stabilized the financial position of Soviet Russia.

For the reorganization of monetary circulation in 1921-1922. carried out two denominations of banknotes. During the first denomination, one ruble of new money (banknotes of the 1922 model) was equated to 10,000 rubles of banknotes of previous issues. According to the second denomination (banknotes of the sample of 1923) to 1 million rubles of banknotes of all issues until 1922 or 100 thousand rubles of the sample of 1922.

However, it was not possible to radically change the situation. The money supply continued to grow at a rapid pace. In the period from July 1, 1921 to January 1, 1923, it increased by 850 times. The crop failure and famine of 1921 also played a negative role. True, the growth of economic turnover contributed to the fact that the depreciation of money proceeded more slowly than the growth in emissions. To create a stable currency, a fundamental monetary reform and a serious expansion of production and trade were required.

Monetary reform in the USSR 1922-1924.

By the spring of 1922, the problem of stabilizing the ruble had become particularly acute, as the depreciation of the ruble hindered the recovery of the economy. It should be noted that the Soviet government knew why it needed a hard ruble. And this is different from modern economists who like to talk about the benefits for Russia of a “weak ruble”. In reality, the depreciation of the ruble is beneficial to the West, which, with its hard currency, is easier to buy Russian raw materials. The depreciation of the ruble is also beneficial for modern large Russian capital. All this reinforces the raw material nature of the Russian economy. A firm ruble is beneficial for the development of national production and domestic trade. The Bolsheviks understood this well.

Foreign currency and gold, which penetrated into the economic turnover of the USSR, reduced the sphere of circulation of the Soviet ruble. It was necessary to create a stable currency. The two denominations became the first stage of the reform. The denomination unified monetary circulation, but did not strengthen the Soviet sign. Since the summer of 1922, the State Bank has been preparing for the issuance of new banknotes. By decrees of the Council of People's Commissars of July 25 and October 11, 1922, the State Bank received the right to issue new banknotes - bank notes of large denominations. It was planned to put into circulation banknotes in denominations of 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 25 and 50 chervonets. Money got its name from "pure gold" (high-grade pure gold), which had a red, that is, red hue. In the future, banknotes in denominations of 2 and 50 chervonets, which were provided for by the decree, were never put into circulation. The Soviet chervonets was equated to a 10-ruble gold coin of the Russian Empire weighing 7.74 g. The chervonets was 25% backed by gold, other precious metals, as well as foreign currency; 75% of it was provided with short-term government obligations and goods.

The Soviet sign was not completely abolished, there was not enough security. The chervonets was a very large sum, and in fact it could only be used for large and bulk purchases. Small retailers needed small sums. Metal chervonets were mainly used by the Soviet government for foreign trade, domestic circulation was limited. As a result, a solid Soviet currency was created on a gold basis, but without the circulation of gold money. By the summer of 1923, the chervonets was firmly introduced into circulation as the main currency of Soviet Russia. The number of bank notes in circulation increased from 3.5 million rubles on January 1, 1923 to 237 million rubles on January 1, 1924. Their share in the entire mass of money, calculated in chervonets, increased from 3% to 75%.

Along with the release of the chervonets in October 1923, the so-called transport certificates with a bill of 5 rubles were put into circulation, they were accepted as payments by the railway along with the chervonets. In practice, transport certificates were accepted as payments not only by railways. Transport certificates entered the country's money circulation as a small denomination of chervonets.

The monetary reform stabilized the country's situation, but failed to eliminate a number of negative phenomena. The depreciation of Soviet signs continued at a rapid pace. The falling soviet sign for some time remained the leading currency in the countryside, as the chervonets had too large denominations. Chervonets, with low productivity (when the peasants produced a little more than they themselves consumed) and the low level of cash income of the peasants, was not available to the general population. In addition, there were no compensatory mechanisms in the village to protect cash income from the depreciation of the soviet signs that existed in the cities. Thus, the problems that the falling currency caused fell mainly on the Soviet peasantry. In fact, the burden of building the Soviet state was placed on the shoulders of the peasantry.

The persistence of the falling currency had a negative effect on the position of the workers. Salaries were still to a large extent issued not by chervonets, but by Soviet signs. The jumps in the rates of the Soviet sign and the gold coin and fluctuations in the rates of the same money in different markets created the ground for speculation. The stratum of "Nepmen" ("new Russians" of the 1920s) and kulaks benefited from the speculative rise in prices and the depreciation of their debts. The prosperous peasantry (kulaks) profited from usury and speculative transactions. This showed the need for a single currency.

Resistance was provided not only by representatives of the Nepman bourgeoisie and the kulaks, but also by Trotskyists. They prophesied the failure of the monetary reform and offered to cancel it or stop there. Economists at the Institute for Economic Research of Narkomfin also predicted the collapse of the monetary reform, speaking of the impossibility of quickly reducing budget spending and finding other sources to cover the budget deficit. Thus, certain sections of the population group in the Soviet Union wanted to preserve the weakness of the ruble and the dependence of the Soviet money circulation on the world money market and our economy and on foreign capital. Private traders and Nepmen wanted a free exchange of chervonets for gold in order to be able to withdraw gold abroad and escape there themselves.

At the beginning of 1924, the final stage of the reform was carried out. In the spring of 1924, treasury notes in denominations of 1, 3, and 5 rubles began to enter the currency. They stopped issuing Soviet signs and began withdrawing them from circulation by buying them back at a fixed rate. Soviet signs of the 1923 model were redeemed from the population at the rate of one gold ruble in treasury notes for 50 thousand old ones (50 billion rubles in old banknotes). At the same time, a high-grade silver coin in denominations of 1 ruble and 50 kopecks was put into circulation, as well as a changeable silver and copper coin.

The successful completion of the monetary reform in 1924 led to the creation of a single stable Soviet currency. Without outside help, they liquidated the disorder of the monetary system, which lasted 10 years, on their own. After the issuance of treasury bills and change coins, before the withdrawal of state marks, five types of banknotes were in circulation for some time: treasury notes, gold coins, change coins, state marks and transport certificates.

The monetary reform was of great importance for the economy of the USSR. The year 1924-1925 - the first economic year after the monetary reform - was the year of the maximum rise in industry over the entire recovery period. Industrial output grew by 57% compared with the 1923-1924 industrial year. A stable currency has created conditions for reducing costs, strengthening cost accounting, control and planning in industry. So, in the second half of 1924, the cost of production fell by almost 20%. Labor productivity in 1925 reached the pre-war level. Wages also reached pre-war levels. The reform was also of great importance for the development of agriculture. The losses of peasants from the depreciation of money have ceased, the conditions for the sale of agricultural products have improved; the difference in prices between industrial and agricultural goods has narrowed somewhat. This contributed to the rise of the peasant economy, expanded the raw materials and industrial base for industry. The sales market for industrial products was expanded.

Thus, for three years of serious work with the financial system, the Soviet government, without any external loans and credits, managed to strengthen the monetary system so much that a paper chervonets was worth more than a gold coin of the same denomination - more expensive than gold. The introduction of hard currency calmed the population. And with a sharp increase in production, there was an increase in the mass of money. The USSR was able, like the British with the pound sterling and the Americans with the dollar, to receive a net profit from the issue - from the operation of the printing press.

But in the end, everything still rested on the Soviet peasantry. In the USSR, "price scissors" continued to exist: prices for manufactured goods were high, and agricultural prices were low. The peasants were not given a fair price for their products, as funds were needed for the development of the Soviet Union. Actually, the Bolsheviks did not hide this. They honestly said that, in addition to the usual taxes, direct and indirect, they also had to receive an “excess tax” in the form of overpayments on manufactured goods and in the form of a shortfall in funds received by the peasants for agricultural goods. As Joseph Stalin noted at the April 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, this is "something like a tribute for our backwardness." The supertax was necessary for the development of industry and the elimination of the backwardness of the USSR from the advanced Western powers. It was believed that this tax was feasible for the peasants, since they had a private household, the income from which allowed them to pay an additional tax. This distinguished the peasants from the workers, who lived only on wages. As a result, at the expense of the Soviet peasantry, they exported agricultural products and received currency.

In the Russian Empire they did the same, but the difference was that in the USSR the funds received were used for development. In addition, the Soviet Union had an industrial development strategy and a planned economy. Machine tools were bought, heavy industry enterprises were built. Patience and "belt tightening" made it possible in the shortest possible time to eliminate the backlog of the USSR from the advanced countries of the West, create a powerful industry and not only survive in the bloody World War II, but also win, become a superpower.

Soviet chervonets 1923

pre-war period.

Before the start of the Great Patriotic War, the issuance of banknotes into circulation took place on the basis of credit operations of the State Bank. Money was issued into circulation in accordance with the needs of the national economy. During this period, the planned Soviet system of credit and money circulation was finally formed on the basis of the concentration of masses of commodities in the hands of the state, which were put into circulation at stable prices.

In 1929, the Soviet government temporarily introduced a card system. This was done to maintain real wages and provide workers with bread at low prices from government stocks. At the end of 1934, when large-scale mechanized production was finally established in agriculture and the collective farms and state farms occupied a dominant position in agriculture, it became possible to fully provide the population without cards. The card system was cancelled. At the same time, there were two price levels in the trade turnover - high in commercial and collective farm trade and low in a closed trade network.

The purchasing demand of the population during this period continued to grow. Thus, the number of workers and employees in the USSR from 1928 to 1934 doubled and exceeded 23 million people. The average annual salary in the same period increased from 703 rubles to 1,791 rubles, and the payroll increased from 8.2 billion rubles to 41.6 billion rubles. In 1937, the average annual salary rose to 3,047 rubles. The incomes of collective farmers also increased. At the same time, state spending on education, free medical care and other social and cultural activities has increased significantly. State budget expenditures for these needs in 1937 increased by 17 times compared to 1928.

We must remember how the Soviet leadership developed industry in the USSR. The goods require a buyer. If goods are bought up and more are needed, production will also develop. But the buyer needs money to buy goods. Stalin chose the so-called. the "American way" of industrial development ("the English way" involves the capture of colonies and the use of their markets), the way of developing one's own market. In the 1930s, hundreds of factories and enterprises were put into operation, but buyers were needed. Then the government began to deliberately carry out the emission, throwing money into the Soviet market. At the initial stage, the debts of state-owned enterprises were covered. Then they began to regularly increase the purchasing power of the population. In the post-war period, regular reductions in the prices of goods began.

The USSR formed the internal market. At the same time, the country had a positive balance in foreign trade; since 1933, the USSR has always sold a little more than it bought. The breakthrough of Russia-USSR was amazing. If we compare prices in 1928, then the level of industrial production in 1913 is 11 billion rubles. The Soviet Union reached this level in 1927. The following year, 1928, the country significantly surpassed the pre-revolutionary level - the level of industrial production reached 16.8 billion rubles. In 1938, industrial production in the USSR reached the level of 100.4 billion rubles. In terms of marketable output, the Union rose from fifth place in the world and fourth in Western Europe to second in the world and first in Europe. The Soviet Union produced 13.7% of world industrial output. The leaders were the Americans - the United States produced 41.9%. The leading European powers were inferior to the USSR: Germany produced 11.6% of world industrial output; Great Britain - 9.3; France - 5.7%.

Thus, the following prerequisites became the key to the success of the USSR: 1) mobilization of the people, "belt tightening" for the sake of a higher goal - the creation of a developed and powerful industry. This made it possible, by temporarily reducing the consumption of the population, to take an "excess tax" on the development of industry; 2) the issue of money in the initial period of industrialization, this allowed to expand the domestic market, making it "insatiable". The population trusted the Soviet ruble, so it did not depreciate; 3) monopoly of foreign trade. Stalin protected the domestic market and launched an attack on the world market.

10 chervonets 1937

War.

During 1940 and the pre-war months of 1941, the reserves of the state budget were constantly increasing. By the beginning of the war, they had reached 9.3 billion rubles. As a result, the Soviet government did not spend all the money that was going to the budget. The government was preparing for war and created a stockpile of goods. To prevent these goods from being sold, the amount of money was reduced. During this period, more than a quarter of the money supply was withdrawn from circulation.

In total, 582 billion rubles were spent on the war, and 1,117 billion rubles were received by the budget during the war. The war and military restructuring of the economy significantly changed the state of money circulation in the Soviet Union. The material and financial resources of the Soviet state were switched to meet the needs that the war with Germany caused. Huge military spending, a sharp decrease in the production of items of national production (enterprises began to produce military products), and, consequently, a significant decrease in the volume of retail trade and state budget revenues - all this caused an overstrain of the financial resources of the USSR. Military spending continuously increased from 1940 (57 billion rubles) until 1944 (152.6 billion rubles) and began to decrease from 1945 (144.5 billion rubles). The share of military spending in the total budget spending peaked in 1942-1943. Expenditure on financing the national economy fell from 58.3 billion rubles in 1940 to 31.6 billion rubles in 1942. Then they began to grow rapidly, and in 1945 they reached 74.4 billion rubles. It should be noted that most of the appropriations for the national economy were directed to capital construction related to the war and to the restoration of what had been destroyed.

Due to the occupation of a significant part of the territory, in connection with the transfer of industry to the production of military products, the output of consumer goods, the production of food products, has sharply decreased. Thus, the production of bread fell from 24 million tons in 1940 to 11 million tons in 1945; cereals from 1.7 million tons to 1.1 million tons; meat from 1417 thousand tons to 624 thousand tons; fish catch from 14 million centners to 11.3; sugar from 2151 thousand tons to 465; cotton fabric from 3952 million meters to 1615; leather shoes from 211 million pairs to 63.1, etc. Moreover, the largest decline in production was recorded in 1942-1943.

At the same time, there was an increase in non-market consumption of most of the goods produced by the light and food industries. This further reduced market funds and government retail turnover. Retail trade turnover in 1940 prices decreased in 1942 to 34% of the pre-war level. Even in the victorious year of 1945, it accounted for 47% of the trade turnover of 1940.

While the commodity funds for the population were seriously reduced, money incomes decreased only in the first years of the war, in 1944-1945. they began to rise again and exceeded the pre-war level. Expenses for the monetary allowance of military personnel, pensions and benefits for military personnel and their families were significantly increased.

The war upset the balance between the money income of the population and trade. This created a threat to monetary circulation. Therefore, the government took a number of serious measures to eliminate the sharp discrepancy between the income and expenditures of the population. On the one hand, they began to increase payments, contributions from the population, on the other hand, they began to increase prices for certain goods - vodka, tobacco, perfumery, etc. buy goods at high prices.

So, with the outbreak of war, a military surcharge was introduced to the income tax on workers and employees, and to the agricultural tax on collective farmers and individual farmers. In 1942, a military tax was introduced. At a higher level than before the war, among the people they subscribed to state loans (76 billion rubles were collected during the war years). Large amounts were received from the placement among the population of tickets for cash and clothing lotteries. Established a tax collection on bachelors and small families. Unmarried people over 18 and childless married couples paid 2% of their income. In connection with the cancellation of vacations, compensation for non-use was not handed out, but transferred to nominal deposits in savings banks. A significant source of income was the collection of funds for the Defense and Red Army funds, the attraction of monetary contributions from military personnel to the field cash desks of the State Bank. During the war years, more than 200 billion rubles were attracted from the population through these activities.

Rising prices for vodka, tobacco, perfumes and some other goods, as well as proceeds from organized commercial trade, provided an additional 172 billion rubles. At the same time, they were able to maintain pre-war prices for basic goods. And in the face of a shortage of food products and a number of manufactured goods, a rationing system for the distribution of products was introduced to ensure a living wage. This made it possible to maintain a minimum level of consumption for all.

All these measures provided about 90% of the financial resources needed by the country. The budget deficit in the first years of the war and the backlog of finance receipts to the budget from expenditures necessitated the issue. In total, during the war years, 54.4 billion rubles were put into circulation. As a result, the money supply at the beginning of 1946 reached 73.9 billion rubles and exceeded the pre-war money supply by 3.8 times. Especially a lot of rubles had to be printed in the second half of 1941, when huge expenses were required to transfer the country to a “war footing” (15.3 billion rubles were printed).

Emission, the reduction of the state supply of goods to the population, the reduction of food surpluses among the rural population led to a large increase in market prices. For agricultural products, the growth was 1020% in 1943 from the level of 100% in 1940. Then prices began to fall. It must be said that the huge gap between the prices of state trade and market trade, as well as the difference in price levels in different cities and regions, led to widespread speculation during the war years. Unfortunately, even in the most difficult years of the Great Patriotic War, when the vast majority of the people gave literally everything to the front (from their lives to their last money), there were subhuman selfish people who grew rich on someone else's grief.

On the whole, the monetary system of the USSR withstood the test of the war. Despite the severe wounds that the war inflicted on the country's economy, the emission was relatively small. For comparison, during the three years of the First World War, Russia increased the money supply by 9.5 times, and during the four years of the Great Patriotic War - by 3.8 times. Already during the war, it was possible to stop the deterioration of the situation and begin to strengthen the monetary system. The advantage of the socialist economy was proved by the most brutal war in the history of mankind.

Industrialization and collectivization: the great reforms of I.V. Stalin

INTRODUCTION.

It is impossible to say unequivocally what figure Stalin was in the political arena of our country. People representing different political parties interpret his actions in different ways: on the one hand, during his reign, a lot of improvements were made, industrialization was carried out, which raised industry to unprecedented heights, agriculture was reformed, the crime rate was low, under his leadership there was the Great Patriotic War was won; on the other hand, millions of ordinary people were called “enemies of the people”, sent to camps, hundreds of thousands were physically destroyed, torture flourished ... I am not going to start a debate here on political issues related to the period when the country was ruled by I.V. Stalin. My task today is to consider two, in my opinion, the most important reforms carried out in the USSR in the 1930s - industrialization and collectivization.

In general, this period of our country is a huge field for study. It is not for nothing that hundreds of Soviet and foreign historians to this day publish books describing that time and bring their own opinions to them. Of course, these opinions are radically opposite. If we take only the final results, then by 1953, the year of Stalin's death, there was an undoubted increase in industrial output, more grain was collected than in the 20s. In terms of economic indicators, the country has made a dizzying leap forward. At first glance, everything looks like an “economic miracle”, like the Japanese one in the 60s. But if we turn to how this colossal breakthrough was made, then we can undoubtedly conclude that the methods used here have no analogues in world history. Few rulers treated their people with the same cruelty. And even the end result of these transformations cannot justify these actions.

In my report, out of the many reforms carried out under the leadership of Stalin, I would like to single out the two most global: industrialization and collectivization, and here's why: if we talk about industry, then in the mid-20s, after “war communism”, it was in ruins, and the rise that she made in 10-15 years is amazing. This rise is unparalleled in history and is certainly an interesting field to explore. However, without collectivization, which was carried out simultaneously with industrialization, such a rapid rise in industry would not have been possible, because. It was agriculture that provided the main import funds for the purchase of machine tools and equipment. These reforms are closely related and it is impossible to consider one independently of the other.

And one more question that I would like to find an answer to in the process of writing an abstract: are the methods used in the 30s applicable at the moment, because It is not news that both in industry and agriculture our country is going through a difficult period, similar to the situation in the 1920s.

INDUSTRIALIZATION.

PREREQUISITES FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION.

One of the reference points from which to begin consideration of this issue is the XV Congress of the CPSU (b).

The XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place in December 1927 and passed in a tense atmosphere caused by internal difficulties and an alarming international situation. Absorbed by the factional struggle, the congress nonetheless pointed out certain principal directions in the development of the economy. They were formed in such a way that, it soon became clear, they could be interpreted in exactly the opposite way. Therefore, it was later suggested that it was a compromise between various currents that had already appeared in the majority itself after it had expelled the oppositionists from the party.

In the leading circles of the party, by this time, not only the idea of ​​​​industrialization was established, but also the idea of ​​​​the need for a high pace of its implementation, one that would allow the USSR to “catch up and overtake” the most developed capitalist countries. This was facilitated by the old Bolshevik understanding of the backwardness of Russia, the successes in the restoration of the economy in previous years, and finally, criticism and reminders of the opposition. The construction of a hydroelectric power station on the Volkhov River, provided for by the GOERLO plan, was completed, and two construction projects were started that were destined to remain in the annals of Soviet economic development: one - Dneprostroy: the construction of a dam and the largest European hydroelectric power station at that time on the Dnieper, near Zaporozhye, the other - Turksib: a new railway directly linking the Trans-Siberian Railway (at the latitude of Novosibirsk) with Central Asia. A tractor plant is being built in Stalingrad. Large industrial facilities are also being designed. They argued about territorial distribution: different republics argued in favor of building them within their borders. The 15th Congress also formulated directives for drawing up a five-year development plan, but no one then imagined that this could lead to a sudden break in all the existing relationships between various sectors of the national economy.

The crisis of grain procurements in 1927 led to the fact that Stalin more and more insistently and categorically emphasized the new idea he expressed at the 15th Congress: the way out of the crisis is in the transition from small, private farming to large-scale collective farming. The theme of accelerating the creation of collective farms and state farms became the leitmotif of his speeches. There is no reason to assert that even then Stalin had a clear idea of ​​​​how collectivization would be carried out. At the same time, it is clear that, having become a zealous champion of high rates of industrialization, he already staked everything on this card and was not considered such obstacles as the slow evolution of a backward village. It is alleged that during these months he abruptly changed course and adopted the theses of the newly defeated Trotskyites. In part, this statement is undoubtedly true: in the debate provoked by his new proposal, he, justifying the fight against the kulak, defends the acceleration of industrialization and justifies the need to impose "tribute" on the peasantry, using arguments that he completely borrowed from those who a few months ago was his opponent.

Opponents of such a forced industrialization appeared at the top of the party. Already at the end of January, the head of the powerful Moscow party organization, Uglanov, spoke out against exceptionally large investments in heavy industry and excessive hopes for collective farms, which, in his opinion, were suitable as a solution for a more distant future. In turn, in March, Rykov comes into conflict with the majority of the Politburo: he proposed to reduce investment in metallurgy and engineering. At the Plenum of the Central Committee in April, for the first time, the opposition of directions was openly revealed. Uglanov and Rykov were joined by Bukharin and Tomsky, the head of the trade unions. They expressed alarm at the deteriorating political situation in the countryside, where discontent, they said, was growing and was directed against Soviet power as a whole. The final resolution condemning the excesses attributed to peripheral organizations sounded like a compromise.

However, when the application of emergency measures resumed, the contradictions in the Politburo escalated. This time, the critics were led by the "party favorite" Bukharin. In notes to like-minded people, he wrote: “If all salvation is in the collective farms, then where can we get money for mechanization? ... no collectivization is possible without certain accumulations in agriculture, because machines cannot be obtained for nothing ...”.

The pace of industrialization should be high, Bukharin argued, but to accelerate it even more is tantamount to a transition to the positions of Trotskyism. The country's efforts should not be focused solely on the construction of new large factories, which will begin to produce products only in a few years, while already now they will absorb all available funds. It is necessary to develop agriculture: this can be done at the present time only with the help of small, individual agricultural producers. With these statements, he contradicted the main theses of Stalin ...

The difficult international situation (in particular, the attempt by the Chinese authorities to seize the railway in Manchuria, which remained under mixed Chinese-Soviet control) also required rapid industrialization. Stalin, perhaps only more categorically than others, expressed it. In the directives approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the preparation of a five-year plan, containing requirements to pay “maximum attention” to ensuring the “rapid development” of those branches of heavy industry on which the country's defense capability depended. This imperious demand has not lost relevance throughout the entire period of the plan. It acted, therefore, as one of the factors characteristic of industrialization.

The consequences of the economic crisis for the USSR were ambiguous. Isolation from the world economy and protection of the domestic market by the state monopoly on foreign trade served as a cover against the general storm, so industrialization efforts were largely removed from the negative impact of the consequences of the crisis on the other side of the border. Economic development programs, therefore, were not frozen. With their help, the USSR acquired great weight in the international arena. Even before the crisis began, when the struggle for the sale of surplus products between capitalist firms became very acute, the USSR acted as a huge, difficult, but promising market. He showed demand primarily for machinery and equipment for his new enterprises. After the onset of the crisis, Soviet production plans increased. In 1931 and 1932, the USSR accounted for 30% and 50% of world imports of machinery and equipment, respectively. During the most dramatic period of the crisis, entire industries of some of the most economically developed countries escaped disaster by selling their products to the USSR: this was the case, for example, with American machine tool companies, which in 1931 were able to place 65% of their exports in the USSR.

Although the United States still did not recognize the USSR, many large American firms sold their products to it and provided technical assistance in the creation of new Soviet enterprises. The beginning was laid by Hugh Cooper, who participated in the construction of the Dneproges. He was followed by many other businessmen and companies: from Ford, a company involved in the construction of an automobile plant in Nizhny Novgorod, to General Electric, which contributed to the development of numerous enterprises for the production of electrical products. Attracted by high wages, many foreign engineers, especially Americans, found in those years at the construction sites of the first Soviet five-year plan vast fields for applying their creative abilities ...

INDUSTRIALIZATION DURING THE FIRST FIVE YEARS.

In 1928, the first five-year plan was born. Beginning in 1926, various draft plans were prepared one after the other in two institutions, the State Planning Commission and the Supreme Economic Council. Their development was accompanied by continuous discussions. As one scheme replaced another, the prevailing trend was to set maximum goals for the industrial development of the country. Bukharin and his group tried to resist this. Overly ambitious goals without the necessary economic justification, they argued, would shock the economy, give rise to the danger of inter-industry contradictions, and therefore doom the very idea of ​​​​industrialization to failure. “From the bricks of the future it is impossible to build today's factories,” with this famous phrase Bukharin wanted to say that it is pointless to force the growth of some industries if the industries that complement them continue to lag behind. But the Bukharin wing was defeated precisely in this field. His condemnation and presentation of the first five-year plan coincided with the 16th Party Conference (April 1929).

The State Planning Committee prepared 2 versions of the plan for the conference: one was the minimum, "starting", the other was the maximum, "optimal", its indicators were 20% higher than the first one. But the Central Committee had already decided that only the second option was taken into account. On the eve of Rykov tried to make some amendments to it. He proposes the adoption of a special two-year plan designed to create "particularly favorable conditions" for agriculture and thereby eliminate its backlog, or, as Rykov said, to "straighten the agricultural front." His proposal was rejected by Stalin. Thus, the most ambitious version of the plan became its official version, and in this form was approved in May 1929. In time, it covered the period from October 1928 to September 1933, that is, at the time the plan was approved, its implementation should have been considered already begun. Economic reforms reforms. From 1921 to 1925 ... and above all - on Stalin. In this responsibility, one can ... state policy, which required huge economic And political efforts. In Khrushchev's decade...

economic development of the USSR (1945-1991) and post-Soviet Russia

Abstract >> Economics

Chosen after death Stalin economic course. A special... a dramatic change political situation was accompanied by an avalanche-like increase economic problems. ... carrying out radical economic reforms and the formation of a new Russian ...

Secret chronology and psychophysics of the Russian people Sidorov Georgy Alekseevich

Chapter 44

If you look into the medieval Byzantine and Arab chronicles, then a strange fact catches your eye: both the Byzantines, and the Arabs, and later the Turks, describing the Slavs, speaking of their physical perfection and diligence, at the same time considered this people unsuitable for slavery. In the eastern markets of living goods, Slavic slaves and slaves, despite their stature, beauty and strength, were cheaper than the "Franks" and Iberians. The same chronicles explain why this happened. It turns out that the Slavs lived very little in slavery. And who wanted to buy a slave who could live a year, maybe two?

That is why, following the advice of the Byzantines, who believed that a Slav was not capable of being a slave, but could be a good warrior and friend, the Egyptian sultans began to form the famous Mamelukes from them. The situation was worse with Slavic women who fell into slavery. Other Slavs were not suitable either as slaves or concubines: both there and in another capacity, they very soon withered and passed away. From the Slavs only wives were obtained, again not harem, but free and loving. Therefore, if it was not possible to “tame” a Slavic woman, then she was either killed or released to her homeland; the second was less frequent. This begs the question: what's the matter, what is in the Slavic souls that made them so unstable in captivity? To some extent, the medieval Byzantines answered this question as well. According to the Byzantine chroniclers, the Antes Slavs, or Russ, while at least some spark of hope was alive in their souls, showed such fortitude that no other nation is capable of. And at the same time, if this spark went out, the Slavs, knowing that human life is by and large eternal, included in themselves the mental mechanism of self-destruction. When they passed away, they thereby left the hopeless situation in which they found themselves.

This feature of the psyche of the Slavs was preserved with the adoption of Christianity. Only here the Slav, dying, did not think about a new birth, about his revenge on the rapists; he, being a Christian, by means of death escaped from the shame of being and did not consider that his death was too great a price for freedom. In fact, in the depths of his soul, he remained and still continues to be an Aryan revering Rod.

This property of the Slavic, in particular, the Russian soul is used by modern Satanists-Democrats. From the beginning of perestroika, they set themselves the goal of mixing with dirt everything that was positive in that Soviet socialism, which the country inherited from I.V. Stalin. For 10 years, the Masonic media of disinformation have brainwashed the Russian people about the ideas of socialism and communism so that they stopped believing in the positive and advanced that the Soviet people managed to do for the working people, despite the Jewish dictates. In words, everything turned out to be bad: Soviet science, economics, free secondary and higher education, and free healthcare. Friends of the Soviet people in the West, seeing such a mockery of the socialist gains of the democratized media, were horrified. They, living in a pseudo-democratic society, where money is the main value, understood very well that our people have succeeded in a lot, and the defamation of socialism by pseudo-democrats was started on purpose. But their voices were not heard by our people, both in the West and in the East they believed that in Russia the perestroikas started the transition from failed socialism to a more progressive society. True, this transition went with a clear inflection. But after all, that's what it is and the revolution, to pour lies on everything that hinders it; and very few people understood the true meaning of the destruction of the idea of ​​socialism and communism. Those who understood what was happening in Russia, who knew the nature of the Russian soul, but their efforts to stop the discrediting of the idea that the Russian people had once accepted and followed for many years, were not crowned with success.

As a result, what the pseudo-democrats were counting on happened.

The Russian people, being a cementing nation in Russian society, having lost faith and disappointed in the idea of ​​​​socialism and not seeing a new high just idea in front of them (it must be said that the democratic idea, where there is no democracy, and the dollar rules the ball, the smart Russian people for the most part do not accepted), began to sink, therefore, to lose the binder that he possessed among the peoples inhabiting Russia. Not only that, not seeing the future and having lost hope for the return of a lofty and bright idea, he automatically began to lose the meaning of life.

According to the genetics of the hereditary Orian-Hyperborea, the values ​​that the Western Jewish pseudo-democracy offered him are a shame. What does it mean, democratically, to live for oneself? Russian still, having existed in the Judeo-Christian information field for a thousand years, does not know what it is - in Rus', no one has ever lived only for himself. Every Russian for many thousands of years felt himself a part of a living organism, the body of which was his native people. He well knew that his personal well-being depended entirely on the health of this organism. And, of course, he understood that the integrity of the strength of the people, in turn, depends on each of its members. To live for the benefit of his people for the Russian person meant to live for himself.

The Russian people also considered shameful the electoral institution that the pseudo-democrats offered them. A Russian person will never understand that false election, where the winner is not the candidate who is more spiritual, more talented, and has knowledge, but the one who has more money for the election campaign. In a word, the new masters of Russia took away from the Russian people not only the socialist idea close to their Hyperborean spirit, but, most importantly, their hope.

And when the disinformation media begins to claim that Russians are dying out due to economic hardship, the heart clenched with resentment. How much can you lie about the Russian people? After all, all educated people of the Earth are well aware that the Russians are able to endure (and have proven it more than once) such economic upheavals and catastrophes that could easily bring any other people to the grave. After all, the matter is quite different: the economic problem in Russia was only the background of the psychological one. The latter is the main killer of the Russian people.

Of course, this disaster on Russian soil would never have happened if the West had not drawn Rus' into the Judeo-Christian information field at one time. As you know, one of the duties of Christian missionaries was to uproot the memories of the Golden Age from the memory of the Aryan peoples. I must say that the Christians did an excellent job with this task. Therefore, no one in Europe or Russia could object to Marx in his lies about primitive communism. The only people who, after reading his works, understood what awaited Europe and the world as a whole, were Russian sorcerers-guardians. But what could they do at that time? Almost nothing. Moreover, the society of Russia until the arrival of the Bolsheviks was class, and in the villages, despite the reforms of Stolypin, the neighboring community continued to live.

I must say that the desire of Russian peasants and Cossacks to live according to the laws of the community was so great that Stolypin's reforms, aimed at destroying it, only strengthened the community. The great reformer believed that only poverty and landlessness kept the Russian peasants in the community, and he made the main bet on the forest-steppe regions of Siberia, free from landowners, where the peasant could take as much arable land as he was able to cultivate. Peasant settlers did just that, as a result of which powerful peasant farms arose in the east of the country. But instead of farm competition, which the reformer dreamed of, Russia received rich rural communities, the heads of which, as in the good old days, supported each other in whatever way they could, fought together against natural disasters, traded, set prices for their goods and etc. Modern bourgeois historians are struggling to explain the unprecedented rise of agriculture in pre-revolutionary Russia by the fact that Stolypin managed to destroy the rural community and create thousands of independent competing farms on the territory of the country. This is another lie - the laws of the rural community have remained unshakable. It's just that new Siberian peasant communities took shape in a place where there were no landowners' estates, and where the peasants could take as much land as they wanted. In addition, in the initial period, which is very important, the state helped the settlers well with equipment, livestock and seeds. So the ideas of communism in Russia landed on fertile ground; and it is not necessary to say that socialism in Russia was an accidental phenomenon introduced from outside. The division of Russian society into estates and the preservation of the rural community - all this was an atavism of the Golden Age - that ancient Aryan past, when man, nature and society were a single whole, when a person did not oppose himself to another person, but lived one life with him, delving into his problems, as in his own, not envying him and sharing his grief and joy.

The genetic folk memory of the Golden Age, estates, catholicity and communality played a cruel joke on the Russian people at the beginning of the 20th century. The people could not help but believe the propagandists of Bolshevism, all the more so in their slogans they said exactly what they dreamed of, being under the yoke of their national elite and the Christian church greedy for material wealth for many centuries. Then the Russian people did not understand that the communist slogans: "Down with the war!" "Power to the people!" "Land to the peasants!" etc. - only bait, cheap bait - no more. He realized that he had fallen into a trap when the inexplicable Red Terror began, when not only land and property earned by honest labor were taken away from him, but also the very right to life.

And yet, Bronstein-Trotsky and his team failed to turn Russia, as they dreamed, into a "country of white blacks." The main brake on their bloody idea was not so much I.V. Stalin, who declared war on Zionist-Trotskyism, how many ordinary Russian communists, who finally realized what a Masonic trap Russia had fallen into.

Their efforts from below, together with the action of I.V. Stalin, who took a firm course on the de-Sionization of the Soviet Union by 1940, the peoples of Russia were freed from the Masonic-Jewish, and hence the Zionist dictates.

But the Judeo-Zionist circles in the West, of course, could not come to terms with what happened in Russia. In particular, with the fact that this huge power has ceased to be a raw material appendage of their vaunted bourgeois Judeo-Zionist democracy.

It is clear that Zionism at any cost had to stop the construction of popular socialism in the USSR and put this country again into extreme dependence on the West. To do this, Jewish-controlled American and European banks began to subsidize the German fascist war machine. Why doesn't the layman think: why did the Jewish bankers and industrialists need to invest in the military industry of Hitler's Germany? At first glance, it would seem that we are faced with a paradox: the Jews provide money to those who hate them fiercely, but there is no paradox here. The fact is that both Hitler and his entourage were not only informationally controlled by the Zionists, but also directly dependent on them financially, so they did not pose a great danger to the Jewish pyramid. On the contrary, thanks to emigrants from Germany and other European countries and the energetic mediation of the Masonic government of England, the first Jewish settlements began to appear in Palestine in the late 40s, which eventually turned into modern Israel. Hitler for the Jews became a European scarecrow, thanks to which the age-old dream of the Zionists about their own national state came true. So do not make him a great fighter against Zionism and world Jewry. Of course, Hitler served Zionism to the extent of his misunderstanding, and this is natural. At present, not realizing the depths of those dark forces that deliberately distort the truth, thousands of politicians confident in their decency serve Zionism, and Hitler was no exception. In his soul, of course, he considered himself an ardent anti-Semite, and if you believe his will, written by him a few hours before abdicating power, then Hitler managed to realize that he had been a pawn in someone else's game for a long time, but change the course events were no longer possible. In his miraculously surviving address to the peoples of the continent, he wrote that “I realized too late that the world war was provoked by the Jewish banking circles of the West, and that let the people of Germany, the war-affected peoples of Western Europe and the heroic Aryan people of Russia, forgive him if they can.” ". It turns out that Hitler, starting the war with the USSR, did not know that the Russians were the same full-fledged descendants of the ancient Aryans as the Germans.

The fate of Hitler and his Reich can serve as a classic example of the power of information suffocation, which, through hundreds of Masonic lodges, is perfectly controlled by world Zion and its masters.

Regarding fascist Germany, there is another subtlety that the West does not like to mention. The fact is that Germany in the period of preparation for the war and during its course was actually a socialist power. The question is why? How could Western Judeo-Zionist democracies allow the building of socialism in Nazi Germany? Not only that, they helped German socialism financially and get back on its feet? And the answer is simple. The Germans, like other Aryan peoples, are genetically much closer to communal relations in a society where “one for all and all for one” than individual relations, when every man is for himself, which Jewish morality diligently imposed on them. It is clear that the consciousness of unity raises the spirit of society, makes it several times stronger and more energetic, and this is exactly what the West needed from Germany. According to his plan, fascist Germany was to turn into a European superpower as soon as possible, which could militarily oppose Stalin's eastern socialist empire on an equal footing.

As you can see, all the talk of the democrats that only the capitalist system can be the most economically efficient system is another lie. When it is necessary to revive a nation economically very soon, the example of Germany itself shows that Western financial tycoons resort not to their vaunted capitalism, but to socialism.

But the peoples of the world are still being told that socialist relations in society are leading to economic collapse. A weak socialist society can lead to an economic crisis from an internal illness that the West is able to organize with the help of Masonic lodges and heavily funded intelligence services, but not the objective reasons that bourgeois economists point to. Socialism is far from being communism, it is quite flexible and has a high potential for self-development. You just need to be able to use this potential; most importantly, it is necessary to rid socialism of the influence of Marxism. It must be remembered that the main task of Marx was to discredit the society of the Golden Age, and he coped with his task.

But let's get back to the Soviet Union. Socialist construction for the benefit of the working people, which was started by the people's government, was interrupted by a bloody, cruel and protracted war after the country was cleared of Trotskyists, Bukharians and Masons. This war claimed more than 25 million human lives in the USSR, destroyed more than a thousand cities and towns, many villages and hamlets. The Ziono-Democrats in the West rejoiced: it seemed to them that the peoples of Russia, in particular, the Russian people, would never be able to restore the economy destroyed by the war without their help, that economically Russia was now on its knees, and it would need loans, technologies, and much more. And for all this, she will fall into such financial bondage that will allow the West to dictate any conditions to her. But it was not there! Our people and especially the pro-national government headed by I.V. Stalin, understanding what forces fostered Hitlerism, and what they want from the Soviet Union after the war, without taking a single loan from the West, managed to restore all the destroyed cities and villages in a short time. In addition, instead of the factories evacuated to the east, hundreds of new enterprises were built in the restored and rebuilt cities. Western democrats, even taking into account the high spiritual uplift of the Russian masses, still refuse to believe in this Russian economic miracle. Their historians write that German and Japanese prisoners of war were engaged in the restoration of the economy destroyed by the war in the USSR. It is clear that this is another lie. Captured Germans and Japanese were taken out of Russia in the very first years after the signing of peace with these countries. The Russian peoples were engaged in the restoration of cities and villages burned to the ground for 5-7 years. But still: what is seven years for such a gigantic and large-scale undertaking? Bourgeois economists of that time admitted that not a single Western democratic power, if it had been in the place of the USSR, would ever have been able to master what the Soviet people managed to do then. There was no economic miracle.

It’s just that the USSR, after the war, ruled, as you know, not the Jewish and Masonic government, but the Russian one, and the people understood this well.

He knew that the Kremlin was thinking not about how much and where to steal, but about what to do for him. This unity of government and people raised the country to an unprecedented economic and spiritual level. In addition, at that time the so-called "Iron Curtain" was in full swing.

In other words, the people's government stopped exporting to the West the raw materials needed by the Soviet people, as a result of which the price of energy resources dropped sharply on the territory of the USSR.

This was not long in affecting the rate of development of the productive forces and the prices of foodstuffs and basic consumer goods. The Western powers considered the security of the Soviet ruble in gold to be the most terrible and alarming. The ruble began to crowd out the dollar in the world financial market, and the financiers of the West understood that the days of their financial domination were numbered. It was only a matter of time.

But the most important thing is that in the USSR after the war, it was not pseudo-socialism proposed by Bronstein-Trotsky that gained strength, but true socialism, intuitively and through bitter experience, suffered, aimed at the benefit of all working people. From 1945 to 1953 in the USSR there were three major markdowns of all consumer goods without exception. Less significant markdowns took place every year, and no one was surprised by this. The people rightly considered the fall in prices for food and goods to be the result of their labor. Simultaneously with the markdowns, the wages of workers increased significantly.. As you know, Western monopolists are trying in every possible way to raise the prices of their goods. The endless rise in prices is the law of the market. They call socialism state capitalism, therefore, the prices of consumer goods and foodstuffs should also rise under it. Then how to explain Stalin's markdowns? Very simple.

Under Stalin, the USSR lived under socialism, and not under state capitalism, as under Khrushchev and up to Gorbachev. Socialism And state capitalism- two different socio-economic formations, and they should not be confused.

Monopoly capitalism and state capitalism are two sides of the same coin. Both of them are interested, first of all, in the profitable sale of their goods. Socialism, on the other hand, is interested not in the prices of its goods, but in their quality for the benefit of man and in the fact that man does not become part of a market economy, but lives and develops his creative potential to the maximum. Money for a person in a socialist society has always been a means, not an end. The goal, according to the plan of the national Soviet government of that time, should be the desire to obtain comprehensive knowledge and honest service to one's country and native people.

Modern democrats stubbornly drive into the consciousness of the peoples of the Earth that Stalin was the worst of the despots of all times and peoples. But in order to understand the despotism of I.V. Stalin, we must first figure out who the democrats are. And the democrats are those who were brought to power over the Christian nations by the Masons of the Scottish wing - the direct descendants of the Templars and Rosicrucians. Scottish Freemasons are considered to be the administrative-democratic group of Freemasonry, while Egyptian Freemasons are considered revolutionary. So, the revolutionary freemasons of the Egyptian persuasion, having carried out a socialist coup in Russia and won the civil war, hoped to export the revolution to the whole of Europe. They pushed back the so-called Mensheviks, administrative Masons, to secondary clans, and also completely controlled the situation and seriously believed in their victory. They were headed by L.D. Bronstein-Trotsky. But the Egyptian revolutionary Freemasons became a victim of their own enthusiasm, they overlooked I.V. Stalin, who was not going to be engaged in the export of Jewish pseudo-socialist revolutions and to achieve this goal, send millions of Russians to the bloody slaughter. He dreamed of building true socialism in his native country, and in this he saw his destiny. This man sought to deprive Trotsky and his people of supreme power also because he realized the true meaning of the Masonic revolution in Russia. I.V. Stalin, seeing the terror unleashed by the Trotskyists against the Russian people, realized that led by L.D. Trotsky, the group is not at all communist, but Zionist, and it needs communist slogans in order to camouflage the destruction of the color of the nation in Russia.

At the beginning of his struggle with the Trotskyists, I.V. Stalin had very few forces. His main support in this confrontation was his personal friend and sincere patriot S.M. Kirov, but the Trotskyists did not doze off either. After the assassination attempt on Kirov in 1934, I.V. Stalin also lost this reliable, and most importantly, intelligent and far-sighted ally. He had no choice but to turn to the masses for support. By this time, the Russian people already knew from their own bitter experience who the Trotskyists were and what they were doing in Soviet Russia. So not only ordinary communists, but also ordinary workers I.V. Stalin was both understood and supported. But we must also pay tribute to the Judeo-Zionists: in order to fight against Stalin, both - the revolutionary and the administrative - groupings united. Towards the end, they killed many thousands of innocent workers, especially peasants, whom the Trotskyists and Bukharinites who had seized power in the localities declared “kulaks” and mercilessly exiled to certain death.

At present, the pseudo-democrats of Russia are accused of dispossession and decossackization of I.V. Stalin and keep quiet that the destruction of the Cossacks was the work of Trotsky, who personally hated the Cossacks. And they also keep quiet about the fact that the very project of forced collectivization was not only developed by him, but was also carried out by his people. To make sure that I.V. Stalin was against the Trotskyist collectivization plan, it is enough to read his articles on this issue, where Iosif Vissarionovich directly says that any violence against the peasantry will discredit socialism and undermine the faith of the masses in it. To stop judging I.V. Stalin, it is necessary to acquaint the peoples of Russia with his works; but try to find the work of Stalin in our democratic society! Books by I.V. Stalin was removed from public libraries and sent to the fire by the Khrushchev administration. This was done in order to slander this outstanding person and destroy what he was trying to give to the Soviet people.

Indeed, I.V. Stalin and his entourage dealt ruthlessly with both the Trotskyists and the Bukharinites. Both anti-people Zionomasonic groups in the Soviet Union perished. The Zionists-Trotskyists and Bukharinites were judged publicly, openly, and there is no need to imagine that they, who did not admit their guilt, were treacherously shot by the Stalinists. Masons were shot for their cause: for the fact that millions of innocent people were killed by their hands; for the fact that, on the orders of their Western masters, the Zionists, under the guise of communists, massacred the Russian intelligentsia, destroyed the educated part of the working class and lowered the best representatives of the Russian peasantry into the graves. Modern democrats blame everything that was done by their predecessors, the Trotskyists, in relation to the Soviet people, on I.V. Stalin. Satan is known to be a great confusion; and the Trotskyist Red Terrors and repressions against the Russian peoples, the democrats deliberately confuse with the cleansing blows that were inflicted on the Zionists by I.V. Stalin and his government. The main goal of this lie is to discredit the high socialist idea, which can again take over the minds of spiritually disadvantaged peoples, which, in turn, will surely lead to the destruction of the Jewish pyramid of controlling the world through the power of money, which has been built by the Freemasons for so long.

To understand the repressions against the Russian people that Stalin allegedly carried out since 1936, it is enough to compare the number of prisoners in “his” camps with the number of prisoners who were put behind bars by our vaunted democrats. So, according to Bakatin, in 1993, about 1 million people were imprisoned in the free Russian Federation. In 1936: 839,406 people; in 1933 - 820,881; in 1938 - 996,357; 1939 dismissed 12461 servicemen, including 8122 arrested. In particular, Trotskyists, Zionists, drunkards, plunderers, as well as Poles, Germans, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, etc. were fired. I must say that if Stalin had not taken before the war with Germany from the Zionist-Trotskyist army, then the Soviet Union could hardly withstand the blow of the Nazis and its allies, the Western democrats.

By the way, the democrats really don’t like to remember that they helped Hitler in the war with the USSR not only financially or with raw materials, but also with their personal participation: after all, the troops of Austria, Italy, Spain, Finland, Romania, Hungary, Croatia fought against the USSR, in addition to Germany, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland. At the head of this entire bloc was albeit Nazi, but still socialist Germany. So, it was not about socialism, but about something else. The fact that the people's government of the Soviet Union, headed by I.V. Stalin destroyed the “fifth column” in the country along with Trotsky, thereby wresting 1/6 of the land from the tenacious clutches of world Judeo-Zionism, calling into question its very existence.

Western democracy saw the speed with which the growth of productive forces and science was going on in the post-war Soviet Union. In all cities of the country, not only industrial enterprises began to be built, but also many new schools and hospitals.

During the period from 1945 to 1953, dozens of new magnificent universities and research institutes were built in Russia. In those years, the housing problem was also successfully solved in the country.

Until now, spacious, high-ceilinged so-called "Stalinist apartments" are pleasing to the eye in many Russian cities. The socialist state of that time spared no expense to decorate buildings. The buildings of those years were built mainly of brick, well plastered and decorated with plaster or cement molding, which later N.S. Khrushchev (N.S. Perlmutter) will call it an excess.

The economic upsurge in the country could not but be accompanied by an upsurge in agriculture. Collective farms, which were created in Russia according to the Bronstein-Trotsky plan, had disappeared by that time. They were replaced by collective farms of a different type, now they relied on the equipment of numerous MTS and had the right to sell the surplus products of their labor independently, without the mediation of the state, to the working people of the cities. As a result of this, a mass of millionaire collective farms appeared in the country, thanks to which the USSR began to fully provide itself with food. The older generation remembers well the time when any products lay freely in stores, from crabs and sturgeon, to various varieties of sausages, smoked hams, etc. But the most important thing was not this, but that all this could buy a lot. Bread in those days cost a penny, often the townspeople fed their cattle with bread and did not consider it an expensive pleasure. The Soviet people's government of that period of time rightly believed that for a Soviet person, given the expanses of the USSR, personal transport cannot be a luxury, so the prices for cars were so low that, for example, a miner, metallurgist, bricklayer or oilman could buy a car after each paychecks. It is noteworthy that the people of Stalin's time did not really want to burden themselves with personal transport, and cars in the country were not in short supply. The villages traditionally kept good horses, the breeding of which was supervised by the state. In those years, dozens of stud farms worked in the USSR, where horses of various breeds were bred, including heavy trucks that were very necessary in collective farms and private households.

The people's government paid special attention to the education of the population. I must say that even before the war, immediately after the defeat of the Trotskyist-Bukharin Masonic group, a compulsory seven-year education was introduced in the USSR. This decision of the Soviet government infuriated Western democrats, because in their countries at that time there were more illiterates than literate ones. But immediately after the restoration of the national economy destroyed by the war, the government of the Soviet Union headed for universal compulsory secondary education. In parallel with this, the government began to seriously consider the issue of the future introduction of universal higher education in the country. In this regard, I.V. Stalin, at one of his last speeches in March 1952, put forward a project in which he substantiated that in the near future the working day of Soviet people should be no more than 5 hours, so that they have enough time for self-education. After all, the transition to universal secondary education, and then to higher education, was planned by the people's government of the country through evening and distance learning. Here is an excerpt on this issue from Stalin's article "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR": “This is necessary to ensure that members of the society have enough free time to receive a comprehensive education. To do this, it is necessary to further introduce universally compulsory political education, which is necessary for the members of society to have the right to freely choose a profession and not be chained for life to any profession. To do this, it is necessary to further radically improve living conditions and raise the real wages of workers and employees at least twice, if not more, both through a direct increase in money wages, and especially through a further systematic reduction in prices for consumer goods.. As they say, comments are superfluous.

The anti-Masonic government of the Soviet Union of those times was well aware that Lenin's slogan that "the country can be ruled by a cook" is a real lie. Only well-educated people can rule the country, and their education must be comprehensive and necessarily with a humanitarian bias. Also I.V. Stalin was well aware that Lenin's "right of nations to self-determination" was nothing more than a time bomb that almost blew up the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, the Stalinist government of the Soviet Union developed a plan for the abolition of national entities in the USSR and their division into vast economic zones. Such a decision of the socialist leadership, if implemented, would forever eliminate the threat of disintegration in the USSR, at the same time, of course, giving the nations inhabiting the country the opportunity to develop their culture. This means that there was no question of any discrimination against national minorities in the USSR.

Everything that happened in the post-war USSR, world Freemasonry and its masters, of course, could not endure. After all, the growth of the national income in the USSR, despite the fact that it had to restore the national economy destroyed by the war, exceeded the growth of the national income of Europe and America by more than three times. In addition, the USSR, as we noted earlier, has ceased to be a gratuitous raw material appendage of the West. Plus, the Stalinist ruble, backed by gold, put on both shoulder blades the god of the Western world - the American dollar, and the dollar had only to get out of the world financial arena in disgrace. All this began to really threaten the death of the Western Judeo-democratic civilization, which lives mainly due to the robbery of underdeveloped peoples, deceit and brazen unscrupulous interference in the internal affairs of third world countries.

The West had to urgently do something. The Jewish banking circles and those who manage them understood well that while I.V. Stalin, there will be no place for Masonic lodges - their main striking force for the destruction of statehood - on the territory of Soviet Russia. Therefore, it was necessary to remove I.V. at any cost. Stalin. Which was done in 1953 by the Trotskyist and Jew Nikita Solomonovich Perlmutter (N.S. Khrushchev).

With the death of I.V. Stalin died and socialist relations in the Soviet Union. The reign of proteges of Western Judeo-democracy in the USSR, starting with N.S. Perlmutter (Khrushchev) and ending with M.S. Gorbachev - a descendant of Moses himself - is nothing more than the gradual destruction of what was built by the peoples of the USSR under I.V. Stalin.

And now let's remember the so-called "Khrushchev thaw". What was this thaw? Just a transition from socialism to state capitalism. N.S. Khrushchev, with his enlargement, corn and state farms, destroyed agriculture, put the livestock of stud farms under the knife, deliberately slaughtered herds of cattle and invested gigantic public funds in a completely unnecessary undertaking with raising virgin lands. You can’t call this otherwise than targeted sabotage. In addition, when planning the collapse of the USSR (the plan for the collapse of a single country was developed by the Freemasons even under him), this puppet of the West gave Crimea to Ukraine, Southern Siberia and the Urals to Kazakhstan, Cossack lands to Chechnya. But his anti-people reforms had not yet broken the country - the Stalinist spirit was too strong among the people, and the military generation was still in force. Khrushchev was soon figured out by the people, as indicated by numerous anecdotes about him. The Western Judeo-Zionist masters had to change him for a more leisurely and calm "reformer" - the well-known L.I. Brezhnev. The “fifth column” that had infiltrated the Kremlin was already breaking the country. Gorbachev - a Jew by religion, a Freemason by conviction, in his words, a descendant of Moses, therefore, an Illuminati by origin - in the act of destroying the Soviet Union is a more sinister figure than the half-Chuvash half-Jewish B.I. Yeltsin.

The latter acted as an executor of what was designed by Gorbachev. In addition, Yeltsin turned out to be an easily manageable figure, and therefore very valuable for the West. About the fact that B.I. Yeltsin was ruled, many facts say, for example, the signing of the well-known treaty in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. What is this if not a Jewish ritual?! Yeltsin himself would never have thought of it; it is the Russian people who have a short memory, but not the Jews. Khazar Jews remember well how in the 10th century the army of Svetoslav stormed the sacred capital of Khazaria, once captured by the Khazars and their allies, the ancient Russian city of the northerners Belaya Vezha, renamed by the conquerors into Sarkel. Here is the occult-ritual meaning of the Belovezhskaya agreement. It turns out that the battle for Belaya Vezha was not over, it continued for a thousand years; as a result, the Russian people lost it and lost 25 million prisoners. Only at the end of the 20th century did the war with Khazaria end. True, the descendants of the Khazars think so, but the Russian people think differently. For us, the decisive battle is still ahead, and we will definitely win. We are not given anything else.

Why did the Soviet Union collapse - that state that the Stalinist government so carefully cobbled together around Russia? For the same reason as many other gentile empires, for example, the Roman, Byzantine, Frankish empires. The fact is that the Jews in the information war, in the ability to shamelessly lie and hide knowledge from the masses, are completely superior to the descendants of the Aryans. Low distortion and concealment of the truth for their psyche deprived of the third signal system is quite normal. And until the Aryan peoples learn to expose the deliberate lies of God's chosen ones in the field of information, it will always be so. Not truth, but lies will rule the world. People with a non-predatory, truly human psyche will only have to die. Great efforts are spent by the God-chosen people in order to conceal from the descendants of the Aryans the knowledge of the Golden Age. Even at the dawn of Judaism, they invented a legend about the historical past, in which the Semites flourished, for example, the same tribes of the Bedouin Arabs. So, the Golden Age, with their stubbornly paranoid insistence, took on the status of a legend, became only a dream of people about a just society, nothing more. This legend of "fairy land" was repeated by Christians, with whose hands the descendants of the Egyptian priests of Seth destroyed thousands of books about Orian-Hyperborea, Antides, or Atlantis, about Lemuria and the distant fabulous Pacifida. All of these civilizations flourished in one way or another during the Golden Age.

In order to hide from the peoples of the planet this high and the only correct socio-economic formation, which in Rus' was called the Rule, the Jews and their power Masonic structures tried to take away from the peoples of the Earth the very memory of past and bygone civilizations. In addition, the personnel specially prepared by them, which we have already mentioned more than once, for example, the same E. Blavatsky and others like her, spun so much about the same Lemuria or Atlantis that they finally turned this closed topic into a fairy tale. For some reason, people who read the works of E. Blavatsky will not ask themselves why this "initiate" wrote about Lemuria, Atlantis, and her doctrine of races? But the answer is very close, on the surface, and we have already talked about this: according to Blavatsky, a half-Jew, just like in the opinion of other Jewish theosophists (O. Besant, N.K. Roerich, etc.), the fifth the brown race, to which all the Aryan peoples belong, descended from the fifth sub-race of the Atlanteans - the primary Semites. It turns out that, according to their theory, the ancestors of all the European peoples of Europe and Asia without exception were the Atlantic Semites. In order to impose this on the population of the Earth, Blavatsky nevertheless remembered two ancient civilizations - Lemuria and Atlantis. She "forgot" about Oriana-Hyperborea. Probably, before writing the “secret doctrine”, she did not re-read the myths of the ancient Greeks once again, or maybe she did not read them at all? Of course, she read, Blavatsky knew about the content of the Vedas and Avesta. She also had an idea about the society of the people of the Golden Age, but her main task was to distort the truth and direct the consciousness of people in a different direction, which is why she did not mention Hyperborea-Arktida in her works.

The society of the Golden Age was completely discredited by the Jewish philosopher, a descendant of rabbis, Solomon (Moses, Moses) Mordechai Levi, or Karl Heinrich Marx. He called the ancient perfect human society primitive communism. And he made it clear to mankind that this communism is possible only with primitive relations, while in a civilized society it must be built, first of all, economically.

Further, the truly socialist idea was discredited by the well-known Trotskyists, who, hiding behind the construction of a just socialist society in Russia, sent millions of innocent citizens to the next world. Behind them, this was successfully done by Khrushchev and Gorbachev. Organized by the Khrushchev entourage in the Soviet Union, state capitalism is still shamelessly presented by the democrats as genuine socialism, at the same time, the real socialist relations that began to take shape in the country under I.V. Stalin.

Democrats call Stalinist socialism camp and barracks socialism. Allegedly, it was built at the expense of the gratuitous labor of prisoners - this is again an unscrupulous lie. Firstly, the figures for the number of prisoners during Stalin's time are well known. There were fewer arrestees under Joseph Vissarionovich than they are now sitting in the camps of the Russian Federation. And, secondly, the 12-million crowd of prisoners, on which the democrats insist, had to be fed with something, because prisoners were not allowed into the agricultural area. Consequently, this cheap army of builders of socialism would certainly have led the country to cards, but cards were abolished in the USSR back in 1948, and since that time, an intensive increase in wages and a steady decline in prices, primarily for food, began. All this speaks for itself. It is time for our people, finally, to understand that both monopoly capitalism and Khrushchev-Brezhnev-Gorbachev state capitalism are, above all, profit.

Under true socialism, however, profit plays only an auxiliary role, nothing more. As I.V. Stalin: "The goal of socialist production is not profit, but a person with his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural needs." Figuratively, a state capitalist society is socialism turned upside down. It is clear that such a society could not stand on its head for a long time. We had to go to some end.

Do not think that we are trying to idealize I.V. Stalin and the society that he led and built. Undoubtedly, Stalin was a very gifted person by nature, and this helped him a lot. Still, he went to popular socialism largely empirically and blindly. Despite the fact that Iosif Vissarionovich studied all his life, he constantly lacked knowledge, hence some of his misconceptions and even mistakes. For example, Stalin, realizing that the Trotskyists, together with Lenin, destroyed the Christian Russian Orthodox Church so that in the future, after all the purges and the Red Terrors, introducing Judaism in the country, thereby reviving the new Khazaria, prevented this and returned Christianity to the USSR. Yes, he filled an empty spiritual niche with the same Abrahamic faith, but not in order to destroy the spirit of the Russian people, Stalin simply did not have much time with religion.

I.V. Stalin throughout his reign mercilessly fought against embezzlers, bribe takers, extortionists, people who used their power for personal interests, sexual perverts and seasoned criminals - sadists and Zionists. On an intuitive level, he felt that this whole company had something in common, but he did not know and could not know that they were all representatives of the predatory human species, people deprived of a third signal system, or reason. Therefore, he believed some of the predators, personally put them in high positions and, in the end, was killed by them.

For a very long time I.V. Stalin could not free himself from Marxism. In order to understand that Marxism is a utopia, it took him more than a dozen years. True, we must pay tribute to Joseph Vissarionovich, when he realized this, he did not lose heart, but relying on his knowledge, he nevertheless led Russian society to socialist relations. This was done by him already contrary to Marxism and mainly on the knowledge received from the Russian people about the Golden Age.

But the biggest misfortune of Joseph Vissarionovich was that he entered the Vedic layers of Russian society too late and figured out the golden ratio in the economy. If the struggle against the Trotskyists, as well as the war, had not interfered, and Stalin and the people's government would have been able to build a socialist society on the territory of the USSR, economically close to the cosmic proportion of the "golden section" (we will describe this cosmic law of proportionality in detail below), then no Khrushchev and no Brezhnev would ever have succeeded in reshaping the raw Stalinist socialist relations into state capitalism and thereby killing the idea of ​​both socialism and a just human society.

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CHAPTER 9 Stalin: Last Years in Power Stalin's Proposal to Raise Collective Farm Tax Stalin's Discontent with Postyshev "Disorganization" of Politburo Work Did Stalin suspect that Voroshilov was an "English spy"? "Unbridled arbitrariness" in relation to Andreev

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1. Introduction

2. Monetary reform

3. Industrialization

3.1 Prerequisites for industrialization

3.2 Industrialization during the years of the first five-year plans

3.3 Results of industrialization

4. Collectivization

5. Cultural Revolution

6. Stalin's military reforms

7. "10 blows of Stalin"

8. Stalin's post-war reforms

9. Fatal reform

1. INTRODUCTION

It is impossible to say unequivocally what figure Stalin was in the political arena of our country. People representing different political parties interpret his actions in different ways: on the one hand, during his reign, a lot of improvements were made, industrialization was carried out, which raised industry to unprecedented heights, agriculture was reformed, the crime rate was low, under his leadership there was the Great Patriotic War was won; on the other hand, millions of ordinary people were called "enemies of the people", sent to camps, hundreds of thousands were physically destroyed, torture flourished. I am not going to start here a debate on political issues related to the period when the country was ruled by JV Stalin. My task today is to consider two, in my opinion, the most important reforms carried out in the USSR in the 1930s - industrialization and collectivization.

In general, this period of our country is a huge field for study. It is not for nothing that hundreds of Soviet and foreign historians to this day publish books describing that time and bring their own opinions to them. Of course, these opinions are radically opposite. If we take only the final results, then by 1953, the year of Stalin's death, there was an undoubted increase in industrial output, more grain was collected than in the 20s. In terms of economic indicators, the country has made a dizzying leap forward. At first glance, everything looks like an “economic miracle”, like the Japanese one in the 60s. But if we turn to how this colossal breakthrough was made, then we can undoubtedly conclude that the methods used here have no analogues in world history. Few rulers treated their people with the same cruelty. And even the end result of these transformations cannot justify these actions.

In my report, out of the many reforms carried out under the leadership of Stalin, I would like to single out the two most global: industrialization and collectivization, and here's why: if we talk about industry, then in the mid-20s, after “war communism”, it was in ruins, and the rise that she made in 10-15 years is amazing. This rise is unparalleled in history and is certainly an interesting field to explore. However, without collectivization, which was carried out simultaneously with industrialization, such a rapid rise in industry would not have been possible, because. It was agriculture that provided the main import funds for the purchase of machine tools and equipment. These reforms are closely related and it is impossible to consider one independently of the other.

reform industrialization revolution collectivization

2. Densouthern reform

By the 20s of the 20th century, Russia was experiencing great difficulties caused by heavy losses after the First World War, civil strife, the total damage from which was estimated at 50 billion gold rubles. There was a noticeable decline in production, cargo turnover, the economy, and large human losses. Years of devastation led to total unemployment, because all the previous places of work were simply destroyed. People had no choice but to move to the villages and work in the fields. Between 1917 and 1920, about 5 million people left for the countryside.

Therefore, it is not surprising that many people expressed their dissatisfaction with the policy of "war communism" of the Bolsheviks. Anti-government uprisings began to flare up all over the country, which could at any moment turn into a real war. However, this was avoided by suppressing the uprising by military forces. However, this uprising gave rise to another wave of workers' discontent. It rolled like a snowball turning into an economic crisis. The government understood that it was necessary to change something, it was impossible to remain inactive. And in 1921, a course was set for the New Economic Policy (NEP). It was the NEP that necessitated the monetary reform of 1922-1924.

For the normal functioning of a well-functioning national economy, a reliable and stable monetary currency was vital. At the origins was the People's Commissar of Finance Grigory Sokolnikov, a talented Soviet figure who, back in 1918, objected to the issue of money, which almost led to the complete annulment of money. Under his leadership, new financial bodies began to be created, and more qualified employees began to be selected. The main thought and idea of ​​​​Sokolnikov was that the state and industrial enterprises, merchants, etc. should not just give something to each other. Everything should be based on financial considerations.

Already in the autumn of 1921, the State Bank was established and this was the first and important step. The main task of the bank was the strengthening of monetary circulation and the development of commodity-money relations in the country. The bank issued the necessary loans to restore production after the war. A year later, this policy began to bear fruit - the volume of industrial production increased by 30.7%, which made it possible to accumulate certain financial reserves. Part of this money was transferred to the state for self-supporting enterprises. Of great importance was the fact that the state credit began to bear interest. Thus began the first stage of monetary reform.

Further, state banknotes of the RSFSR of the 1922 model were issued. One new ruble was equal to 10 thousand old ones. A year later, in 1923, the ruble was issued, which was equal to 1 million of the former and 100 rubles of the 1922 model. What did this mean for the country? This meant that the rate of new money fell. Simultaneously with the issue of banknotes in 1922, the State Bank issued chervonets, which were intended to ensure normal economic turnover. Thus, a new monetary system was created. But ... Joseph Stalin appeared in the firmament of power.

He sharply crushed the views of the opposition and interceded for the resumption of the policy of "war communism". And as one would expect from a man of principle, Stalin began to act without ceremony. The confiscation of grain surpluses began, searches of barns, posts that prevented the import of grain to the markets. He did everything necessary for what he considered truly right, and he considered the right to reject the NEP. Stalin often spoke publicly calling for tough measures to be taken against the kulaks. He believed that the new policy and monetary reform allowed the so-called "kulaks" to appear, and Joseph, as we all know, was supporters of the "golden mean" stratum of society. So, Stalin returned everyone to politics to socialist ideals.

As a result, the NEP was completely overthrown. Stalin, as always, achieved what he wanted. And this meant the curtailment of the new policy, in which the monetary reform fit perfectly. Why did Stalin need this? Well, he had his own interests, which were at odds with the interests of the peasants and workers

3. Industrialization

3 .1 PREREQUISITES FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION

One of the reference points from which to begin consideration of this issue is the XV Congress of the CPSU (b). The XV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks took place in December 1927 and passed in a tense atmosphere caused by internal difficulties and an alarming international situation. Absorbed by the factional struggle, the congress nonetheless pointed out certain principal directions in the development of the economy. They were formed in such a way that, it soon became clear, they could be interpreted in exactly the opposite way. Therefore, it was later suggested that it was a compromise between various currents that had already appeared in the majority itself after it had expelled the oppositionists from the party.

In the leading circles of the party, by this time, not only the idea of ​​​​industrialization was established, but also the idea of ​​​​the need for a high pace of its implementation, one that would allow the USSR to “catch up and overtake” the most developed capitalist countries. This was facilitated by the old Bolshevik understanding of the backwardness of Russia, the successes in the restoration of the economy in previous years, and finally, criticism and reminders of the opposition. The construction of a hydroelectric power station on the Volkhov River, provided for by the GOERLO plan, was completed, and two construction projects were started that were destined to remain in the annals of Soviet economic development: one - Dneprostroy: the construction of a dam and the largest European hydroelectric power station at that time on the Dnieper, near Zaporozhye, the other - Turksib: a new railway directly linking the Trans-Siberian Railway (at the latitude of Novosibirsk) with Central Asia. A tractor plant is being built in Stalingrad. Large industrial facilities are also being designed. They argued about territorial distribution: different republics argued in favor of building them within their borders. The 15th Congress also formulated directives for drawing up a five-year development plan, but no one then imagined that this could lead to a sudden break in all the existing relationships between various sectors of the national economy.

The crisis of grain procurements in 1927 led to the fact that Stalin more and more insistently and categorically emphasized the new idea he expressed at the 15th Congress: the way out of the crisis is in the transition from small, private farming to large-scale collective farming. The theme of accelerating the creation of collective farms and state farms became the leitmotif of his speeches. There is no reason to assert that even then Stalin had a clear idea of ​​​​how collectivization would be carried out. At the same time, it is clear that, having become a zealous champion of high rates of industrialization, he already staked everything on this card and was not considered such obstacles as the slow evolution of a backward village. It is alleged that during these months he abruptly changed course and adopted the theses of the newly defeated Trotskyites. In part, this statement is undoubtedly true: in the debate provoked by his new proposal, he, justifying the fight against the kulak, defends the acceleration of industrialization and justifies the need to impose "tribute" on the peasantry, using arguments that he completely borrowed from those who a few months ago was his opponent.

Opponents of such a forced industrialization appeared at the top of the party. Already at the end of January, the head of the powerful Moscow party organization, Uglanov, spoke out against exceptionally large investments in heavy industry and excessive hopes for collective farms, which, in his opinion, were suitable as a solution for a more distant future. In turn, in March, Rykov comes into conflict with the majority of the Politburo: he proposed to reduce investment in metallurgy and engineering. At the Plenum of the Central Committee in April, for the first time, the opposition of directions was openly revealed. Uglanov and Rykov were joined by Bukharin and Tomsky, the head of the trade unions. They expressed alarm at the deteriorating political situation in the countryside, where discontent, they said, was growing and was directed against Soviet power as a whole. The final resolution condemning the excesses attributed to peripheral organizations sounded like a compromise.

However, when the application of emergency measures resumed, the contradictions in the Politburo escalated. This time, the critics were led by the "party favorite" Bukharin. In notes to like-minded people, he wrote: “If all salvation is in the collective farms, then where can we get money for mechanization? No collectivization is possible without certain accumulations in agriculture, because machines cannot be obtained for free.”

The pace of industrialization should be high, Bukharin argued, but to accelerate it even more is tantamount to a transition to the positions of Trotskyism. The country's efforts should not be focused solely on the construction of new large factories, which will begin to produce products only in a few years, while already now they will absorb all available funds. It is necessary to develop agriculture: this can be done at the present time only with the help of small, individual agricultural producers. With these statements, he contradicted Stalin's main theses.

The difficult international situation (in particular, the attempt by the Chinese authorities to seize the railway in Manchuria, which remained under mixed Chinese-Soviet control) also required rapid industrialization. Stalin, perhaps only more categorically than others, expressed it. In the directives approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the preparation of a five-year plan, containing requirements to pay “maximum attention” to ensuring the “rapid development” of those branches of heavy industry on which the country's defense capability depended. This imperious demand has not lost relevance throughout the entire period of the plan. It acted, therefore, as one of the factors characteristic of industrialization.

The consequences of the economic crisis for the USSR were ambiguous. Isolation from the world economy and protection of the domestic market by the state monopoly on foreign trade served as a cover against the general storm, so industrialization efforts were largely removed from the negative impact of the consequences of the crisis on the other side of the border. Economic development programs, therefore, were not frozen. With their help, the USSR acquired great weight in the international arena. Even before the crisis began, when the struggle for the sale of surplus products between capitalist firms became very acute, the USSR acted as a huge, difficult, but promising market. He showed demand primarily for machinery and equipment for his new enterprises. After the onset of the crisis, Soviet production plans increased. In 1931 and 1932, the USSR accounted for 30% and 50% of world imports of machinery and equipment, respectively. During the most dramatic period of the crisis, entire industries of some of the most economically developed countries escaped disaster by selling their products to the USSR: this was the case, for example, with American machine tool companies, which in 1931 were able to place 65% of their exports in the USSR.

Although the United States still did not recognize the USSR, many large American firms sold their products to it and provided technical assistance in the creation of new Soviet enterprises. The beginning was laid by Hugh Cooper, who participated in the construction of the Dneproges. He was followed by many other businessmen and companies: from Ford, a company involved in the construction of an automobile plant in Nizhny Novgorod, to General Electric, which contributed to the development of numerous enterprises for the production of electrical products. Attracted by high wages, many foreign engineers, especially Americans, found in those years at the construction sites of the first Soviet five-year plan vast fields for the application of their creative abilities.

3.2 INDUSTRYLIZATION DURING THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLANS

In 1928, the first five-year plan was born. Beginning in 1926, various draft plans were prepared one after the other in two institutions, the State Planning Commission and the Supreme Economic Council. Their development was accompanied by continuous discussions. As one scheme replaced another, the prevailing trend was to set maximum goals for the industrial development of the country. Bukharin and his group tried to resist this. Overly ambitious goals without the necessary economic justification, they argued, would shock the economy, give rise to the danger of inter-industry contradictions, and therefore doom the very idea of ​​​​industrialization to failure. “From the bricks of the future it is impossible to build today's factories,” with this famous phrase Bukharin wanted to say that it is pointless to force the growth of some industries if the industries that complement them continue to lag behind. But the Bukharin wing was defeated precisely in this field. His condemnation and presentation of the first five-year plan coincided with the 16th Party Conference (April 1929).

The State Planning Committee prepared 2 versions of the plan for the conference: one was the minimum, "starting", the other was the maximum, "optimal", its indicators were 20% higher than the first one. But the Central Committee had already decided that only the second option was taken into account. On the eve of Rykov tried to make some amendments to it. He proposes the adoption of a special two-year plan designed to create "particularly favorable conditions" for agriculture and thereby eliminate its backlog, or, as Rykov said, to "straighten the agricultural front." His proposal was rejected by Stalin. Thus, the most ambitious version of the plan became its official version, and in this form was approved in May 1929. In terms of time, it covered the period from October 1928 to September 1933, that is, at the time the plan was approved, its implementation should have been considered already begun.

The plan provided that over the five-year period industrial output would increase by 180%, means of production by 230%, agricultural production by 55%, and national income by 103%. It was about stunningly rapid progress, without precedent in world history. Some absolute indicators were set: 10 million tons of pig iron, 75 million tons of coal, 8 million tons of chemical fertilizers.

The approval of the five-year plan was often regarded as a dramatic choice for the entire future of the country, that is, as a conscious decision to sacrifice everything for the sake of accumulating national wealth and strengthening the basic industries that ensure industrialization. However, this impression is inaccurate. It is true that at the 16th Party Conference it was recognized that the implementation of the plan would be accompanied by "the overcoming of enormous internal and external difficulties" arising primarily from the "intensity of the plan itself." But the conference did not say at all that some industry or consumers should be sacrificed for the development of another. In April 1929, it was assumed that agricultural production would increase, if not on a par with industry, then at least on a sufficiently large scale. The same applied to the production of consumer goods. Real wages, in turn, were to grow by 71%, peasant incomes by 67%, and industrial labor productivity by 110%. In short, a harmonious process was envisaged.

Some, such as some economists, have drawn attention to the internal incompatibility of some of the objectives of the plan. These people were told that they were skeptical, decadent, that they did not believe, or that they were infected with longing for the bourgeois past, and ordered to be silent. One might wonder, however, whether there was not a deeper understanding among the highest leaders of the Stalinist wing that the decision to head for industrialization at an accelerated pace was implied by the necessity of a gradual abandonment of many of the goals of the plan. It is possible that such an understanding did exist, but it cannot be stated quite definitely, because it has not received an open expression.

A whole constellation of construction sites has sprung up, both in old industrial areas and in promising new regions where there was little or no industry before. There was a reconstruction of old factories in Moscow, Leningrad, Nizhny Novgorod, in the Donbass: they were expanded and equipped with new imported equipment. Modern new enterprises were being built, they were conceived on a large scale and based on the most modern technology; construction was often carried out according to projects purchased abroad: in America, Germany. The plan gave priority to branches of heavy industry: fuel, metallurgical, chemical, electric power, as well as engineering in general, i.e. to the sector that will be called upon to make the USSR technically independent, in other words, capable of producing its own machines. For these industries, giant construction sites were created, erecting enterprises with which the memory of the first five-year plan will forever be associated, which the whole country will talk about: Stalingrad and Chelyabinsk, and then Kharkov tractor plants, huge heavy engineering plants in Sverdlovsk and Kramatorsk, automobile plants in Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow, the first ball-bearing plant, chemical plants in Bobriky and Bereznyaki.

The most significant among the new buildings were two metallurgical plants: Magnitogorsk - in the Urals, and Kuznetsk - in Western Siberia. The decision to build them was made after long and bitter disputes between the Ukrainian and Siberian-Ural leaders, which began in 1926 and dragged on until the end of 1929. The former emphasized that expanding the existing metallurgical enterprises in the south of the country would require less costs, the latter - the prospects for industrial transformation Soviet East. Finally, military considerations tipped the scales in favor of the latter. In 1930, the decision took on a large-scale development - to create in the USSR along with the southern “second industrial base”, “a second coal-metallurgical center”. Kuzbass coal was supposed to serve as fuel, and ore was to be delivered from the Urals, from the bowels of Mount Magnitnaya. The distance between these two points was 2 thousand km. The issue of transportation costs was not taken into account, since it was a question of creating a new powerful industrial region, remote from the border, and, therefore, protected from the threat of attack from outside.

Many enterprises were built in the bare steppe, or, in any case, in places where there was no infrastructure. The apathetic mines in Hizhinka, designed to provide raw materials for the production of superphosphate, were generally located in the tundra, on the Kola Peninsula, beyond the Arctic Circle.

Of course, all this was accompanied by constant difficulties, and many outside observers called these construction projects "grand chaos." There were not enough elementary things: there were no measuring instruments, shovels. People lived in wooden barracks for 80 people, work was carried out even at a temperature of -40 C, and so on.

In the spring of 1929, a stunningly accelerated implementation of the plan was planned. It all started with the nomination by Stalin of the slogan “Five-Year Plan in Four Years” (the congress coincided in time with the beginning of open criticism of Bukharin). According to the five-year plan, iron smelting was to be increased to 10 million tons (from 3 to 5 million tons). It was a lot, even too much, according to experts. But in January 1930, Kuibyshev announced a decision to increase it to 17 million tons (10 - in Ukraine, 7 - in the Ural-Siberian complex) for the same period of time. Potential capacities planned for Kuzbass and Magnitogorsk were increased by 4 times. During the first year of the five-year plan, industrial production increased by 20%, that is, slightly less than planned (21.4%), but still in a significant way. Then it was decided that its growth during the second year should be 32%, that is, it would be more than half the planned level.

On the eve of the 16th Party Congress (June-July 1930), Stalin and Molotov appeared at the Council of People's Commissars and demanded that all the figures of the plan as a whole be doubled. Be that as it may, in his report to the congress, Stalin demanded a gigantic increase in the five-year plan assignments, arguing that "for a number of branches of industry" the plan could be fulfilled "in 3 and even 2.5 years." Thus, it was required to produce 170 thousand tractors, instead of the previously planned 55 thousand, twice as many non-ferrous metals, cars, agricultural machines, etc. Stalin put forward these tasks as difficult, but necessary solutions. He assured that at the same time there would be an increase in the output of consumer goods, because "we now have the opportunity to develop at an accelerated pace both heavy and light industry." One got the impression that each new or unpredictable problem was solved simply by increasing the corresponding figures of the plan, without any adjustment of its other indicators, which made these latter less and less achievable. The country was seized with industrial fever, a kind of insanity, the paroxysms of which were noticed until 1932.

In 1930, the volume of production did not increase by 32%, as required, but - according to conflicting public official sources - by only 22%, and even then in industry, that is, in the area where all efforts and funds were concentrated. Nevertheless, Stalin declared that next year industrial output could and should be increased by 45%. This statement is contained in his famous short speech delivered in February 1931 at the first All-Russian Conference of Socialist Industry Workers. This speech became famous thanks to Stalin's, almost prophetic, statement: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We have to overcome this backlog of 10 years. Either we do it or we will be crushed.” To those who asked whether it was possible to slow down the pace of industrialization, Stalin answered categorically: "No, it is impossible." He said: “This is the law of the exploiters - to beat the backward and weak. Wolf law of capitalism. You are behind, you are weak - that means you are wrong, therefore, you can be beaten and enslaved. You are powerful - it means you are right, therefore, you must beware.

The climax of this reckless ballooning of commitments was marked by the 17th Conference in January-February 1932, when the first directives were drawn up for the second five-year plan, which was to be completed in 1937. The reports of Molotov and Kuibyshev, as well as the resolutions on the five-year plan, stated, that by this time the production of electricity should be brought up to 100 billion kWh, and coal - up to 250 million tons, pig iron - up to 22 million tons, oil - up to 80-90 million tons, grain - up to 130 million tons. In a word, the Soviet economy had to jump to the American level. In order to be able to estimate these figures, we will only say that the planned indicators were realized in the USSR only in the 1950s.

It is necessary to dwell briefly on the figures - the results of the first five-year plan. So, all efforts gradually focused on industry, moreover, on heavy industry. However, the planned level was not reached in this industry either. True, industrial output in 1932 doubled compared to 1928, while, according to the optimal variant, it should have increased by 180%, and according to the minimum - by 135%. But as regards the “Group A” industries that produce means of production, their level of production increased by only 170%, instead of the planned 230%. This is not surprising, because since the second half of 1930 the growth rate here has been lower than planned. While talking about percentages. If we turn to the main branches of industry, where achievements were measured in absolute figures, then we can see that their growth not only did not approach the astronomical targets set over and over again by Stalin and Kuibyshev, but did not even reach those, however, very high indicators. that were included in the original plan. Not 17 million tons of pig iron were smelted, and not even 10 million tons, but about 6 million tons. Electricity generation amounted to 13.5 billion kilowatts. instead of 22 billion kW. according to plan. The planned targets were met, on the contrary, for oil production and, almost, for coal production (65 million tons against 75 million tons). The chemical industry remained very far from its intended goals. This was especially true for fertilizers: instead of the planned 8 million tons, less than 1 million tons were produced.

But if the results show how wasteful the fever of hyperbolic figures and fantastic projects that seized the Stalinist leadership turned out to be, it would be at the same time a gross mistake to regard the five-year plan as a failure. In monstrous tension and chaotic movement, the foundations of the industrialization of the country were laid for the first time. One and a half thousand large enterprises were built, or reconstructed so much that they practically became new. Many others remained in an unfinished form: they will be completed in subsequent years, and then their beneficial contribution to the development of the economy will be felt. Despite inhuman difficulties, Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk became a reality. The power plant on the Dnieper was completed. Mechanical engineering has made tremendous strides; Entire industries appeared that did not exist before in Russia: aircraft construction, tractor and automobile plants, and machine-tool enterprises. From a country that imported equipment, the USSR turned into a country that produces equipment. The machine park in the industry has been updated by more than half. It was then that the foundation of Soviet power was laid. This applies in particular to the production of modern types of weapons.

We now turn to the description of the second five-year plan. The second five-year plan was finally approved at the 17th Party Congress.

The general mood of the congress sounded notes of realism, unthinkable two or three years ago. So, for example, Ordzhonikidze took the floor in order to demand, albeit modest, but a reduction in the planned target for industry, especially metallurgical. It is better to set more reasonable goals, but achieve them, than to draw too high figures on paper. As tasks for steel smelting, he indicated the same 17 million tons, which, of course, the delegates remembered, were planned as an achievable level for the first five-year period.

It should be noted that even while maintaining an extremely high level of capital investment and the accelerated development of the production of means of production, the emphasis was decisively shifted to light industry and the production of consumer goods. These industries were to grow faster in the second five-year plan than heavy industry; moreover, so quickly that, in the long run, they could once again take a leading place in the overall balance of the Soviet economy. Many speakers have argued that the moment has come when the development of "Group A" (the production of means of production) has reached such a level that it can and must equip not only its own enterprises, but also all other branches of the national economy with modern equipment.

3.3 RESULTS OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

The middle of the 1930s was marked by a great result in the USSR: industrialization was becoming a real fact. In terms of gross industrial output, the USSR became the second power in the world in 1937: it was still far behind the United States, but ahead of any single European country. Soviet large-scale industry was born, and, more importantly, operated. The second five-year plan, more soberly calculated, not as desperately dramatic as the first, was just as important for industrialization. The great exertion of forces that lay ahead of the population of the country looked more balanced. There were no attempts to shorten the time frame for the plan. Capital investments were higher than in the first five-year plan, but during the first two years they were directed for the most part to complete the construction projects that had already begun, only later new industrial construction was resumed on a large scale. 4,500 large enterprises have entered into operation, including such famous ones as Uralmash, or a similar giant in Kramatorsk, powerful factories of factories, enterprises producing equipment for metallurgy and other branches of heavy industry. According to Soviet statistics, at the end of the five-year plan, in 1937, industrial production exceeded the level of 1932 by 120%, i.e. increased more than 4 times compared with 1928. In 1937, the USSR produced 17.7 million tons of steel, mined 128 million tons of coal, 28.5 million tons of oil, and produced 36 billion kilowatts. h., produced 48.5 thousand metal-cutting machines. This does not mean that the plan was carried out as originally intended. From among the given data, for example, the result in the field of metallurgy and mechanical engineering corresponded to, or even exceeded, the planned indicators, while the extraction of fuel was below the planned level. Nevertheless, on the whole, the second five-year plan was much more successful than the first: at least in the field of heavy industry, the results corresponded to the goals set. The most serious rearrangement that the plan underwent in the course of its implementation concerned those sectors which, according to the draft adopted by the 17th Party Congress, were to be placed in a privileged position. The indicators for these sectors were far from the planned ones. One of the reasons for this is the difficult process of restoring agriculture, which has not yet been able to supply enterprises with raw materials in sufficient quantities. The lag was also explained by reasons of a more general nature. The growth of heavy industry was largely due to the entry into operation of enterprises, the construction of which began in the first five-year plan, while light industry was still just waiting for new factories.

Much attention was paid to the mining industry. Geological surveys were developed on a large scale: until 1940 they provided the necessary resources for the development of the country in all areas and revealed the extraordinary richness of the USSR's natural reserves. Having received a realistic plan, the chemical industry fulfilled it, increasing output by about 3 times. In addition to ferrous metallurgy, the production of non-ferrous metals was increased: gold, copper, aluminum; for the first time in the USSR, the production of antimony was established. All of these areas have lagged behind. In order to overcome this lag, which was necessary for the successful operation of heavy industry, the production of consumer goods was again sacrificed.

Thanks to its success in industrial development, the USSR achieved a significant degree of self-sufficiency. The country has gone from being an importer to a manufacturer of cars. The purchases of metals were also reduced, since now the country could produce an increasing amount of metal, and moreover, just those special plans, without which modern engineering and the military industry could not develop. The scale of foreign technical consultations has become much more modest.

The country has moved forward. In addition, it has advanced along a completely new path, without the help of foreign capital, without the spring in the form of private profit, but in the name of collective interests, albeit formulated and expressed by the will of the supreme power. The rapidly growing economy was entirely in the hands of the state. By the end of the second five-year plan, almost all industry, both large and medium and small, was state-owned; trade was also state-owned: wholesale, foreign and domestic. The progress that the country has made looked even more prominent against the backdrop of the crisis in the rest of the world. Of course, even at the starting point, Russia could not be considered an underdeveloped country; this could be said at most only about some of its, though very extensive, parts. Now these territories were covered by the process of general transformations. A new chapter was written in the history of the development of mankind, and this added another motive to those that attract so many sympathies and attentive eyes to the USSR.

4. Collectivization

Joseph Stalin always believed that collectivization was simply necessary for the normal functioning of the country. She solved three main tasks that haunted Stalin. First, collectivization was to create a powerful system of agriculture based on mechanization. The second - the results of collectivization - food - were to provide the workers of numerous construction projects of the national economy. And thirdly, the mechanization of the labor process was supposed to free up the share of working peasants and thereby increase the urban population.

For the first time, the word collectivization was uttered at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b), which was held in December 1927. However, this word was not entirely new. The concept invested in it was contained in the party program adopted in 1919. What was new was the categorical formulation of the question given in the document by Stalin. Noting a clear trend towards a slower pace of development in agriculture compared to industry, he declared that there was no other solution to the problem than "the transition of small and dispersed peasant farms to large and united farms on the basis of social cultivation of the land." Molotov then developed this idea in a special report on work in the countryside. However, both of them made many reservations to their proposals about the need for a careful and gradual process, about the variety of its forms, about patient work to convince the peasant on the basis of his own interests. The final resolution spoke of "a decisive offensive against the kulak," but Stalin himself warned that repressive measures in this case would be a mistake.

Meanwhile, a new crisis was brewing. The grain harvest, if not decreased compared to last year, then, in any case, did not increase. Consumption also increased, especially with the onset of industrialization. State grain procurements were carried out with difficulty: having begun more or less normally in the summer, they were sharply reduced in the summer. By the end of the year, the state was short of 128 million poods. Since supplies were minimal, this meant that both the city, with its increased population, and the army were in danger of being left without bread, especially towards spring, when mudslides would interrupt normal communication for several weeks. All economic plans could fail.

The crisis was due to many reasons: a serious mistake in price policy, which stimulated the development of industrial crops and animal husbandry at the expense of grain crops; fear of war prompted the peasant to keep grain as much as possible; involved in the bakery business.

A solution was feverishly sought in early 1928. For the first time, Stalin took over the operational leadership. In the first days of January, an instruction was received: to get grain "by all means", and the party leadership at various levels was personally responsible for this. Top leaders were sent to the main grain-producing regions to personally lead the work on the "procurement front." 30,000 communists from among the workers of the apparatus were mobilized for harvesting in the countryside. The main cause of the crisis was called the fist and his grain speculation in order to increase prices. An article of the Criminal Code was applied to the fist, which provided for bringing to court with a complete confiscation of property (a quarter of the confiscated was given to the poor). But most of the grain, as Stalin himself admitted a few months later, was, however, not in the hands of the kulaks, but in the mass of the middle peasants, hardly distinguishable from them. Ways were devised to seize grain from the middle peasants, such as forced delivery of grain on account of a state loan, self-taxation of villages, early collection of taxes, and so on. Whatever their specific forms, they invariably came down to hard pressure on the peasant who had the grain. To stimulate his personal interest, a large flow of industrial goods taken from the city was sent to the village, but they were still not enough.

Today, even Soviet historians admit that the methods used were borrowed from the experience of 1918, kombeds and grain requisitions. Such methods were then condemned by Moscow as a deplorable and unacceptable distortion of this instruction by local authorities. By this time, the worst seemed to be over: with the help of Stalin's harsh measures, called "exceptional", enough grain was collected to cover the shortfall compared to the previous year. But it only seemed. The death of winter crops in the vast areas of the grain south (Ukraine and the North Caucasus) led to the fact that the party had to resort again to emergency measures. Stalin himself admitted that now it was a question of snatching "insurance reserves" from the peasants. Because of this, the resistance of the peasantry became more stubborn. The so-called “acts of terrorism”, that is, attacks on party activists and their killings, have become more frequent. In some areas entire villages rioted.

As mentioned above, Stalin categorically demanded the speedy organization of collective farms and state farms. Some members of the Politburo did not agree with him. Thus, for example, at the end of June Bukharin presented his theses to the Politburo: the individual peasantry would remain the decisive force in the countryside for a long time to come; it is necessary to save the alliance with him, which is under serious threat. Bukharin devoted one of his public speeches to Lenin's last articles, which he described as a "political testament." It was then that he was the first to talk about them as a global "great plan" of activity for the party. This program, he stressed, remains true. According to Bukharin, no "third revolution" was required - all problems: bread, commodity hunger, defense were reduced, in his opinion, to the "fundamental problem" of the relationship between workers and peasantry.

Meanwhile, new motifs were woven into the debates at the top. The next harvest could not be called encouraging, like a year ago. There was not enough bread. Things were moving towards the widespread introduction of the rationing system in the cities, which was done in the first months of 2929, a few months before the adoption of the first five-year plan.

First five years. After the revolution, the country did not know such a terribly turbulent internal process. The path to raising the low level of agricultural productivity lay through large farms, the pooling of efforts and material resources, the widespread introduction of mechanization - someone who, and the Bolsheviks always proceeded from this conviction. The idea was reasonable. However, even vegetating in far from brilliant conditions, the peasant - and especially the notorious middle peasant - remained distrustful of such projects. In addition to the attachment to the newly acquired land allotment, a deep-seated hostility to large-scale farming was also embedded in his psychology. Due to the centuries-old experience of oppression, the peasant associated it with the inability to work for himself, with the obligation to work for another, almost with the return of serfdom.

At the 16th Party Conference in April 1929, it was announced that during the years of the five-year plan, 5-6 million households of peasant families (20% of the total) should be united into social enterprises. They were conceived as large farms with vast lands. As for the grain problem, the main role in solving it was assigned to state farms: it was assumed that these state farms would be able to master vast expanses of fallow lands with the help of technology.

The first acceleration of collectivization took place in the summer of 1929. By June 1, the collective farms had about 1 million households (3.9%). By the first days of November, the percentage rose to 7.6%. It was a lot. More and more talk began about villages, districts and even areas of "solid" collectivization. But the majority of those who joined continued to be poor, that is, those who took less risks. The middle peasants still remained in the clear minority on the collective farms. Be that as it may, the progress was: difficult, but real. In the same summer, however, the first alarms were received. There was a new, third in a row, grain procurement campaign. Until June, the collective-farm driving force was modest, but effective. Then the forcing began, and with it big serious conflicts. In a word, even the first attempts show that there, striving to achieve complete collectivization, the entry of peasants into the collective farm cannot be voluntary. Tension acquired, therefore, a formidable shade, the alignment of forces became unclear.

From above there were no instructions to act with great discretion. Quite the opposite. Stalin began with the article "The Year of the Great Turn", written on the anniversary of the revolution. The article asserted that "the middle peasants had gone into collectivization", while the "radical change" in the attitude of the peasantry towards the collectivization of agriculture was portrayed as something already achieved. A few days later (November 10-17) the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission met. It discussed three reports on agriculture. In the opinion of Molotov, who was one of the speakers, complete collectivization of the main agricultural regions or even of entire republics was needed, and not within five years, as he himself had said a few months earlier, at the 16th Party Conference, but in the next year. Stalin declared: "Now even the blind see that the collective farms and state farms are growing at an accelerated pace." Judging by known facts, the collectivization fever was inherent in most of the speakers. The impression was that the leaders were seized with the hope of solving the accursed problem of the countryside in one fell swoop by a feverish attack on the old peasant world, which had to be dealt with by the most decisive methods.

In the person of Stalin, the striving for "gigantic acceleration" acquired its most authoritative supporter. In December, arguing with Engels' theses, he stated that the attachment of the peasant to his piece of land in the USSR is not so strong, because the land has already been nationalized. Stalin therefore spoke of the "comparatively easy and rapid development" of the collective-farm movement, but as a "rotten theory" he rejected the idea of ​​the possibility of developing this process "by gravity": the collective farms had to be planted from outside. In the same speech, Stalin put forward a new slogan: "eliminate the kulaks as a class." So in November-December 1929 there was a real “turning point” in the agrarian policy of the Soviet Communists. A commission was set up to express directives on collectivization. Divided into 8 subcommittees, it sought solutions to the main problems: the timing of the operation, the type of collective farms, the distribution of personnel and technical resources, and the attitude towards the kulaks. In general, the commission emphasized the maximum acceleration of progress. Be that as it may, the right to make the final decision did not belong to the commission, but to the Politburo. Thus, the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 5, 1930 was born. He established that by the end of the first five-year plan, not 20%, but the "vast majority" of cultivated land should be collectivized. The main grain regions (the lower and middle Volga regions, the North Caucasus) were to complete the process by the autumn of 1930, or, at the latest, by the spring of 1931, the other grain regions by the autumn of 1931, or, at the very least, by the spring of 1932. Under no circumstances were kulaks admitted to the collective farms.

When the decree was published for at least 2 months, a fierce struggle was going on in the country - there was almost not a single village where the "collective farm" would not become the cause of the conflict. The collective farm was supported mainly by the poorest peasants and farm laborers. They were assisted by the working class. The party demanded that the working class give the countryside at least 25,000 organizers of collective farms. In fact, 35,000 workers went to the countryside. The kulak families opposed the collective farm, and according to the most conservative estimates, there were about 1 million families of kulak families. All churches, from Christian to Muslim, also opposed. There remained a huge mass of middle peasants: their transition to one side or another could decide the outcome of the struggle. But due to the circumstances under which the offensive began, it was precisely for the conviction of the middle peasants that the main, decisive argument was not found. Soviet agitation intended to focus on the collective farm use of tractors and combines, but due to the underdevelopment of industry, there was little equipment, and the middle peasants who joined the collective farm had to be taken away from their horses for “public use”. It was hopeless to persuade the middle peasants to join the collective farm under such conditions. Here the liquidation of the kulaks helped. This meant the expropriation of his land and property, which became the property of the collective farm, and his personal deportation.

Among the regions, a competition has unfolded - who will “collectivize” more. The North Caucasus was the first to announce its intention to complete complete collectivization in a matter of months before the spring of 1930. The North Caucasus was followed by the Lower Volga, the Moscow Regional Organization, the Central Black Earth Region, the Buryat and Kalmyk Autonomous Okrugs, and, finally, all the rest. Belarus declared itself a republic of complete collectivization, although with its scattered small farms it was very little prepared for such an event, and could hardly have carried it out even in much less unfavorable conditions.

Since the base of collective farms in the countryside was weak, their organization was entrusted, for the most part, to activists or outside cadres sent from regional centers or more remote cities. Their task was to agitate the poor and middle peasants. But the peasants continued to treat them with distrust. Then any concern for the observance of the law was pushed aside. Threats and violence were used: those who did not join the collective farm were told that they would be treated like kulaks, that is, they would expropriate their property and send them away (in some areas, the percentage of dispossessed kulaks was 20-25%). Opposition, in turn, took the form of desperate resistance. Among the peasants they began to say: "To the collective farm, but with empty hands." Secret slaughter began in the summer of 1929. In the following months, it took on unimaginable proportions. Despite the decree providing for the deportation and confiscation of property for the predatory slaughter of livestock, it continued throughout the entire collectivization, and was one of its most difficult consequences. The “red rooster” again roamed the villages - arson, the weapon of all peasant riots in Russia. In 1929, on the territory of the RSFSR alone, about 30 thousand arsons were registered, that is, almost a hundred a day.

The first collective-farm offensive was in danger of ending in disaster. By the end of February, the peasant uprisings threatened to turn into a general anti-Soviet uprising. 15 million head of cattle, a third of the pig population and over a quarter of the sheep population were slaughtered. The hope that forced collectivization would help "save the means of production in agriculture" was now turning into its opposite.

On February 2, Pravda published Stalin's article "Dizziness from Success." It sounded like a bombshell. The author admitted that serious mistakes had been made in the countryside. In a number of regions, two conditions equally necessary for the success of the collective-farm movement were not met: the “voluntary” nature of joining the collective farm, and taking into account the various situations in different parts of the USSR. Never before has Stalin spoken of dangers of this kind. However, there was no self-criticism in the article. Stalin laid all the blame on the peripheral organizations. This article created even more confusion than the one that already reigned on the ground. The peasants interpreted the new guidelines in the sense that they could leave the collective farm. Where official permission was not given, they themselves took away their inventory and land. The percentage of collectivized territories fell rapidly. But the spring sowing was saved. A series of recent measures guaranteed collective farms and collective farmers a certain number of financial and tax benefits. The year 1930 was very favorable for agriculture, when a record harvest was collected. It was a major success of collectivization.

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